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ABSTRACT 
The thesis covers issues of constitutional design, legislative procedures and agenda 
control in presidential systems, with specific empirical application to four Central 
American cases in a comparative perspective. The results relate to the critical view that 
presidential systems are inherently prone to institutional deadlock, deriving from their 
rigid constitutional design. My findings suggest that constitutional rules only determine 
broad parameters of variation, and that greater attention should be paid to the 
endogenous procedural design of the legislative process of policy approval in the 
explanation of institutional performance and inter-branch dynamics.  
The work is comparative and bridges quantitative and qualitative analysis. The data 
employed are original and allow for an innovative connection between theory-driven 
hypotheses on the incentives for majority political actors to circumvent ordinary 
procedures and play strategically employing procedural choices and political outcomes, 
by assessing the patterns of legislative production. The hypotheses are generated with 
attention to the degree of aggregation of interests in the decision-making process, as a 
measure of the representativeness of the decision-making process and hence as a general 
characteristic of the everyday democratic process. In fact, while democracy is 
understood as a process and not as a formal procedure, it is important to observe 
procedures as subtle devices where majority actors may find embedded comparative 
advantages to impose their political agenda unilaterally.  
The analysis further represents a thorough effort of theory testing whereby a 
competitive assessment of informational theories of legislative politics, exogenous 
factors such as electoral pressures or endogenous contextual characteristics such as the 
degree of fragmentation and polarization on the floor,   is unpacked and delivers 
important analytical refinements to these theories.  
Finally, the normative agenda for analysis includes a view on constitutional choice and 
on methodological biases in the literature of Comparative Politics which have a large 
impact on the research output. The theoretical, substantive and methodological 
implications of the findings are thus reinserted into a normative view on procedural 
justice and the quality of democracy.  
 
Key words: institutional design, procedural choice, inter-branch dynamics, presidential 
systems, agenda control, Central America, qualities of democracy.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
LEGISLATIVE STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE:  
THE FOCUS ON THE PATTERNS OF LEGISLATIVE PRODUCTION  
IN PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “For nearly 300 years, constitution 
writers and institutional designers have 
been cognizant that their choice of 
institutional structure affects political 
behavior. They have recognized that there 
is no single ideal form of democratic 
government, and that each choice involves 
tradeoffs.”1 
                                                
1 Haggard and McCubbins, 2001: 2. 
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1) INTRODUCTION 
This first chapter describes the research puzzle of this thesis and locates it in 
relation to the field of analysis focusing on legislative politics, inter-branch dynamics and 
institutional performance in presidential systems. In order to achieve this, I first explain the 
controversial view that has guided the approach to the institutional workings of presidential 
regimes in Section 2. To that purpose, I describe the arguments and counterarguments of 
the debate, which will allow me to elaborate my specific theoretical claims. These are 
developed in the third section, where I explain the contribution of the focus on the 
patterns of legislative production to the analysis of policy outcomes in presidential systems.  
In the fourth Section, I carry out a synthetic literature review, developed along two 
axes: first, the central issues for analysis in the broad literature on legislative politics and 
inter-branch dynamics in presidential systems. Second, the various methodological 
approaches in the field, which have greatly affected the lines of research and the stable 
findings in the field, also occupy their own space in the literature review. This literature 
review will be useful throughout the thesis as a reference section for the positioning of my 
analytical proposal within the broader field of research on legislative studies.  
In the fifth Section, I spell out my research design, specifying the dependent and 
independent variables, the general hypotheses and the assumptions employed. Finally, I 
explain the criteria for case selection, the time frame this thesis covers and briefly describe 
the data available to carry out the research I propose.  
2) CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN PRESIDENTIAL REGIMES 
“There is a renewed focus on the importance of 
political institutions in accounting for the success or failure of 
democracy. Recent advances of democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europe and other parts of the globe have given 
impetus to the study of designing constitutions and the 
consequences of institutional choice”2 
The idea that the form of government influences the survival of democracies was a 
major point of contention among students of Comparative Politics in the late 1980s and 
1990s (Cheibub and Limongi, 2002: 151). Linz, in his influential article of 1989, 
subsequently published in a collective volume in 1994 (Linz and Valenzuela, eds.), 
emphasized that presidential regimes are more rigid in managing political conflict, with 
direct consequences at the regime level on the quality and stability of presidential 
                                                
2 Shugart and Carey (1992: 1).  
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democracies. This was seen to be a direct consequence of three main components of the 
constitutional design typical to presidential regimes, namely: (1) the Executive is directly 
elected; (2) the terms of office are fixed both for the Executive and Legislative branches 
(i.e. terms of office do not depend on mutual confidence); (3) the elected Executive names 
the cabinet independently3. His argument was, essentially, that these three elements 
together produce an unstable and unfriendly arena for the resolution of political conflict. 
Instead, it was claimed, these characteristics, typical of presidential systems, dramatically 
increase the likelihood of divided government. The tensions created when divided 
governments appear is likely to be more dramatic in presidential systems than in 
parliamentary ones, Linz argued, due to the very independence of the branches from the 
election devices legitimating each in office. This direct legitimacy and fixed office terms, 
with no means to impose vote of confidence or dependence on mutual support, was seen 
to easily lead to political conflict, institutional blockage and, overall, a great threat to the 
stability and survivability of democracy.  
A second possible resulting scenario, which Linz et alia (in the volume of 1994) 
considered very likely under the constitutional design of presidential systems, was an overly 
powerful Executive, with an exceptional degree of authority to overcome institutional 
conflicts with the legislature. Decree authority 4 and veto power5 have traditionally been 
studied under this critical light, and these studies produced newly coined terms such as 
hyper-presidentialism - when Executives overuse these decisional tools. In this state of affairs, 
the role of Assemblies6 in presidential systems was assumed to be weak, marginal and 
powerless, in the face of such strongly empowered Executives, and they were characterized 
rather figuratively as “rubber-stamp legislatures”, particularly in Latin America.  
Whereas the main conceptual approximation Linz offered on presidential systems 
was based on the idea of “rigidity”, as opposed to the “more flexible” nature of the 
                                                
3 See Lijphart, 1992, Shugart and Carey, 1992 and Sartori, 1994, for discussions on which components of the 
constitutional design define presidential systems. However, these three elements gather the academic consensus on the 
key defining components of presidential systems.   
4 Decree authority is the ability of the Executive to emit a law which is immediately effective, i.e. which avoids the 
oversight of the legislative body. This authoritative device is not exclusive to presidential systems, and within presidential 
systems it is usually constrained to specific policy areas and to a specific range of temporal validity. Despite these facts, 
decree authority in presidential systems has been seen to be overused, particularly in some specific governments (such as 
under Cardoso in Brazil in the first government), which was seen henceforth as a typical characteristic of several 
presidential systems (i.e. there was an ecological inference).   
5 The typical decisional structure of a presidential system is to give the President the “last word” on the approval of 
legislation, by providing this actor with veto power (see Cameron, 1999; Tsebelis, 2002). As we will see, however, the 
legislative body has the possibility to override the veto with a more or less severe majority of votes.  
6 Throughout the thesis, I employ indistinctively the terms Assemblies, legislatures, the House, Congress or Parliament. 
Although some authors would argue that Assemblies is the most general term, while the others are designed for specific 
systems (such as House, usually employed for the U.S. Congress, or Parliament, mostly employed for European 
parliamentary systems), I believe there are nonetheless sufficient commonalities between these terms to allow them to be 
understood as designating the same institution, the Legislative branch, central to any democratic political system.  
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institutional design typical of parliamentary systems, several branches of the field of 
legislative studies have reacted by highlighting the exceptional nature of his characterization 
of presidential systems. The central idea was to suggest that the political system Linz 
described as the typical presidential system, even if illustrated with some specific examples, 
needs not be the archetypical or inherently ill-advised one.   
Generally, not all presidential systems suffer from institutional blockage, political 
conflict and deadlock, nor do all parliamentary systems enjoy consensus, cooperation and 
the peaceful resolution of political conflict. It has become clear that Linz’s analysis of 
presidential systems has proved useful to trigger both theoretical and empirical debates, but 
also that a renovated research agenda is now needed in order to proceed with a more 
detailed analysis of political outcomes under presidentialism, parliamentarism or other 
mixed forms of government (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Cheibub et alia, 2004).  
In fact, despite the convincing character of Linz’s arguments, they lacked consistent 
and comparative empirical support. Besides, while the debate (so-called ‘presidentialism versus 
parliamentarism’) had a considerable academic impact during the 1990s, the current academic 
consensus places a greater demand on more empirical and comparative analysis. In the 
words of Haggard and McCubbins: “for too long, the debate has focused on the question 
of whether institutions matter. In order to progress beyond this question, it is necessary to 
shift our focus from sweeping, general questions about institutions (such as presidentialism 
versus parliamentarism), and to develop more fine-grained comparisons” (2001: 17). In  
addition, there is also a renewed perspective more straightforwardly engaged with the 
normative implications of Linz’s original view on presidential systems, recognizing that 
“while there is no single model or easy solution for democratic political development, (…) 
presidential institutions can provide a complex system of representation when bargaining, 
negotiation and compromise are essential” (Von Mettenheim, 1997: 245). In this line, 
current works on the issue claim that the analysis requires greater institutional detail in 
order to confirm or reject Linz’s arguments: we simply do not yet know which part of the 
explanatory equation was wrongly specified, but we are now certain that it suffered from 
serious ecological biases and generalizations (Cheibub et alia, 2004).  
One convergent perspective is that the political outcomes of presidential regimes 
do not only depend on macro institutional design, but rather on the presence of other 
factors, as I will develop further on in this Chapter. Three branches of research in 
particular have contributed to elaborating these other sets of relevant factors determining 
the institutional performance of presidential systems.  
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A first fertile branch of the literature claims the importance of the degree of 
polarization and fragmentation within the party system (Mainwaring, 1990; Mainwaring and 
Scully, 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997) to explain the stability or instability of 
presidential systems. Since within these systems the two branches of government are 
separated by the very nature of their electoral devices of origin, a large ideological 
polarization is particularly expected to work against the principle of cooperation and 
consensus Linz so enthusiastically attributed to parliamentary systems. The argument is 
again related to the institutional conditionings that lead to divided government and the 
refined prediction of this field is that when polarization and fragmentation appear together 
the possibility to form a unified government is very low. Hence, either a divided 
government is formed or coalition-building becomes the central device for policy making. 
Under these circumstances, confrontation and blockage is more likely than cooperation and 
consensus, unless other devices bring political compromise. Therefore, this line of thinking 
only partially refutes LInz’s original hypothesis, by adding the refinement to the hypothesis 
that it is not presidentialism alone but the combination of presidentialism and 
multipartism which produces ‘the difficult equation’ (as is known in the debate by the original 
words of Mainwaring in his 1990 article.  
The second branch of the literature in fact focuses on the conditions under which 
the institutional structure can foster compromise and bargaining instead of confrontation 
and conflict. In this way the perils of presidentialism, which were seen as a structural 
characteristic of this type of political system by Linz, are thus seen as a more or less likely 
outcome rather independently of the type of political system. It is dependent, instead, 
on the structure of the decision-making process (Shepsle, 1979; Krehbiel, 1991; Haggard 
and McCubbins, 2001). This field of analysis understands political outcomes in relation to 
the institutional structure, but instead of looking at the macro, constitutional design level, it 
focuses on the more intermediate level of political behavior that is determined by the 
structure of the decision-making process. A seminal work in this field of research is the 
theoretical work by Shepsle (1979), which provided the basis for the structure-induced 
equilibrium school (SIE) and which has inspired a large number of specific analyses in the 
neo-institutional tradition. These specific contributions are reviewed in greater detail in the 
literature review. Suffice to highlight here that, generally, their shared characteristic is the 
generation of hypotheses that include greater institutional detail combined with the explicit 
objective of generating empirical analyses with comparative applicability.  
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Finally, a third though less developed branch of research points to the need of 
unpacking variation within the pure typology of parliamentary and presidential systems. 
The point of departure here is that given the great variation within presidential systems7, 
any objective to lay out general predictions about the political outcomes of these systems 
constitutes a bias in nature. Consequentially, this branch of research highlights that the 
original hypotheses were rather a set of spurious and general assertions which imposed a 
common model of understanding of presidential democracies that does not hold 
empirically, because variation is larger. An important argument that derives from this field 
of analysis is that neither presidential nor parliamentary systems lack the potential for 
political conflict and institutional blockage, so that institutional design alone cannot 
account for all the possible manifestations of these political outcomes. In fact, typologies 
that account for variation within political systems (be they parliamentary or presidential) are 
relatively scarce for being such a central object of study in the discipline. Within the 
existing ones, some propose a range of four-fold categories (such as in Shugart and Carey, 
1992 and Sartori, 1994)8 while others analyze country-specific patterns (see Lanzaro, 2001, 
for the exploration of regime variation in Latin American cases, and Lijphart and Waisman, 
1996, for an equivalent effort with respect to the mixed forms of government in some 
Eastern and Central European new democracies).   
Summing up these arguments and counterarguments, one clear point is that the 
renewed research agenda has gone beyond the origins of the debate on ‘presidentialism versus 
parliamentarism’’. A more developed effort to bring to the forefront in the discipline a 
greater institutional detail, plus more comparative and empirically oriented research, has 
arisen. Some important convergences among the newly generated lines of research are 
gathered here in order to engage these arguments more clearly with my own in the next 
Section.  
First, the hypothesis that there is a greater likelihood of political conflict in 
presidential systems is unsustainable in the light of empirical analysis (see Shugart and 
Carey, 1992: 41; Power and Gasiorowski, 1997; Cheibub and Limongi, 2002; Cheibub et al, 
2004). Neither divided government, nor institutional blockage or tyranny of the majority is 
                                                
7 The effort to create typologies accounting for variation within presidential systems, including semi-presidential systems, 
pure presidential systems, premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentary mixed systems, was initiated by the volume 
on Constitutional design and electoral dynamics by Shugart and Carey in the early 1990’s (1992). Since then, Lijphart 
(1992) and Sartori (1994), have undertaken severe efforts to describe the core characteristics of pure presidential, pure 
parliamentary, as well as define some mixed systems. These works represent a great advance for the state of knowledge on 
variations among political systems. A more recent empirical work can be found in Lanzaro (2001), which however only 
refers to the variation in Latin American cases. These works are developed further in the literature review in this Chapter.  
8 These four categories are: pure presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, premier-presidentialism and pure parliamentary 
systems, with the defining characteristics of each being essentially based on distinctions on how is the cabinet elected and 
named and which devices are available for impeachment, mutual control and confidence.  
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necessarily absent from parliamentary or other types of political systems. Hence, the 
elaboration of hypotheses should not only take into consideration the characteristics of the 
constitutional design but also attend to other contextual or political factors, as these may be 
the main causes for spurious conclusions.  
Furthermore, the potential for political conflict has been systematically assessed 
through the stability of democracy, measured by the longevity of the regime (issues such as 
‘what makes democracy endure?’, Przeworski et alia, 1996). Indeed, the Theory of 
Democracy has spent a long time and devoted great effort to explain which conditions 
precede a transition to democracy or which conditions announce a democratic breakdown. 
My argument is that while the assessment of stability and longevity is an important general 
measure of a regime’s performance, and particularly relevant to students of democratic 
consolidation, this measure is however unable to reveal the ability of institutions to solve 
day-to-day conflict over policy. Longevity tells us very little about which particular practices 
are becoming institutionalized, in the sense of routinized (Power and Gasiorowski, 1997: 
131) and very little about the capacity of democratic regimes to deliver representative 
policy. In fact, longevity only tells us about one possible extreme situation, in which 
political conflict has become so exacerbated that a breakdown occurs.  
My research proposal departs from the belief that a focus on which practices are 
becoming institutionalized by the very nature of institutions may contribute to the renewed 
research agenda briefly described above. The study of the patterns of legislative production, 
as a political output that reflects the way political behavior – specifically inter-branch 
dynamics – occurs in everyday interaction. Focusing on this object of research thus allows 
me to effectively connect the analysis of constitutional rules determining resources of 
power and authority and the actual outcomes. The next Section describes more thoroughly 
how this research contributes to the general lines of debate and analysis presented above, 
focusing specifically on the side of the debate grounded in the assessment of the 
institutional performance of presidential systems.  
3) THE FOCUS ON THE PATTERNS OF LEGISLATIVE PRODUCTION 
Patterns of legislative production can contribute to explaining whether the perils of 
divided government and arduous political conflict resolution are effectively a consequence 
of the institutional design of presidential regimes or, alternatively, a byproduct of other 
factors.  
Legislative production is the amount of legislation produced in a certain legislative 
period. The patterns of legislative production concern the characteristics of the process of 
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legislative approval, including the behavior of political actors and the procedures employed 
to get legislation passed. The process of legislative approval is hence the realm where 
interaction between rules (and the different levels where these operate, from the 
constitutional rules to the procedural ones) and actors’ behavior takes place. This analysis is 
therefore chosen because it allows for a clear assessment of the connections between the de 
jure and de facto practices in decision-making9.  
This connection, between de jure design and de facto practices is necessary in order to 
establish whether the patterns we observe are in effect a pure outcome of constitutional 
design or whether de facto practices are informative of further dynamics explaining policy 
outcomes. In this way, this research can help to shed light on whether the workings of 
presidential systems follow a pattern characterized by the Assemblies acting as rubber stamps 
or marginal political actors and by an Executive which substantively and systematically 
monopolizes the political agenda, or whether the variation is larger and there are further 
political dynamics embedded in the shape of the political outcomes (as reflected in the 
patterns of legislative production).  
Thus, this research contributes to the renewed research agenda described in the 
first Section of this chapter by proposing, first, an empirically oriented model of analysis, 
by focusing on the way legislation is produced; and second, a comparative analysis which 
may identify sources of variation as well as common and stable outcomes which can be 
related to the characteristics of the political system, such as the party system format or the 
character of historical interaction between political actors. As I point out in the Section 
devoted to the case selection criteria, I follow two main concerns in this respect: the first is 
narrowly related to the worry for the party system format (bipartisan, moderate multiparty, 
extreme multiparty, etc). The second is related to the theoretical aim of this thesis to speak 
to the Theory of Democracy with new findings relative to which practices are becoming 
institutionalized by the nature of institutions, via the selection of countries in a relevant 
stage of the democratization process (see Section 6).  
In the third place, this research proposal constitutes an original and unexplored 
strategy to assess the effect of institutional design on political outcomes. This type of 
                                                
9 As may have become clear from the previous Section, a partial conclusion of the new lines of research is that only 
accounting for the constitutional design of presidential systems, as the original view (Linz, 1989), does not suffice to 
capture the diverging institutional performance of parliamentary and presidential systems when compared. Yet neither 
does it suffice for examining presidential systems on their own. This nuance is labeled in this thesis as the de jure and de 
facto, the first term designating the focus on the constitutional design (as de jure literally refers to the legal grounds of a 
certain system) and the second designing the focus on the practices of political actors in their participation in the 
decision-making process (legislative production). The levels of analysis and the claim in favor of including this analytical 
connection (between the de jure and the de facto) in the debate of institutional performance of presidential systems will 
become clearer in this Chapter and is practically carried out in Chapters 2 and 3.  
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research is data intensive, which partially explains the lack of empirical and comparative 
research in this particular field of research (with the exception of the U.S. Congress and 
Senate). Nonetheless, there are available studies, although they lack a unitary approach and 
contribution to the field, explaining the relationship between legislatures and development 
(Smith and Musolf, 1979; Mezey, 1985) and between legislatures and democracy more 
generally (Manin, 1997; Close, 1995; Von Mettenheim, 1997; Reynolds, 2002). In the 
empirical realm we also find recent works which reflect the increasing attention being paid 
to this issue (Morgenstern and Nacif, 2002; Lanzaro, 2001; Limongi and Figueiredo, 1999, 
2001, 2002).   
The analysis of the patterns of legislative production is also complex, given the 
large number of variables affecting legislative performance: the procedural design, the 
contextual characteristics of the legislative scenario, and the incentives of the specific 
political actors who play the game. This range of factors constitutes a complex 
constellation of variables, where independent and interactive effects are endogenous10 and 
difficult to separate. My focus in the assessment of political outcomes as an indicator of 
institutional performance is the degree of aggregation of interests in the decision-making 
process, which defines an array of decisional styles. This is a key aspect to enhancing our 
understanding of the dynamic interaction between rules and political actors’ incentives and 
the results of these interactions for democratic rule. The aggregation of interests in the 
decision-making process must normatively be a core function of legislatures in modern 
democracies, from their straight relationship to representation and hence a key basis of 
democracy as a political regime. Whether the decision-making process engages all political 
actors on equal participatory grounds affects the prospects for the possibilities of the 
political system to deliver representative outputs.  
Moreover, the role of legislatures in presidential systems is relevant on these 
grounds because there is the possibility that a unilateral actor, such as the Executive, may 
restrict the process of deliberation via the employment of exclusive and exceptional power 
tools, as was originally remarked by Linz et alia with an emphasis on decree and veto 
power. If unilateral action constitutes a systematic characteristic of policy-making, the 
capacity of the political system to translate social demands into public policy – the 
representative function – will suffer a corresponding decrease in the aggregation of 
                                                
10 Endogeneity is a characteristic of phenomena that can be only explained by the very characteristics that produce the 
phenomenon in the first place. For instance, the explanation of institutional outcomes (such as the patterns of legislative 
production) by institutional factors (such as constitutional and procedural rules) constitutes an essentially endogenous 
analysis. I will discuss in depth the costs of endogeneity in institutional analysis in the quantitative analyses of the thesis 
and derive the balance of costs-benefits of this analytical choice in the final Chapter.  
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interests that representative systems are expected to engender. Entrenched interests, pork-
barreling, corruption, rent-seeking and a systematic exclusion of minorities’ interests, with 
the associated eventual weak legitimacy, lack of political trust, and erosion of the parties’ 
capacity to channel societal interests, would thus lead to a weak institutionalization of 
democratic principles.  
In addition, legislatures are “forums for deliberation and compromise among 
diverse political forces” (Shugart and Carey, 1998). The analysis of the legislative 
production process can contribute to an analysis of “how effectively the conflict over 
public issues is resolved, thus offering an initial indicator of a country’s ability to manage 
political contention and dissent” (Close, 1995: 1). Therefore, this approach offers a middle-
range analytical strategy to capture to what extent agenda control is exerted within the 
existing rules. In the broad discussion about rules, specifically constitutional rules (Chapter 
2) and procedural rules (Chapter 4), I pay particular attention to whether the existing rules 
offer comparative advantages to some political actors. This is an important effort because 
while the emphasis of studies on corruption or patronage, for instance, as a reflection of 
comparative advantages of some political actors, often focus on informal arenas of political 
interaction, this analysis asks whether it is in fact within the formal rules that systematic 
embedded advantages which privilege some actors lie. In particular, the term ‘some actors’ 
refers to majority political actors, such as majority parties, and their unilateral behavior, 
such as that of the Executive.   
The question of the effects of institutional arrangements on (aggregate) policy 
outcomes is multidimensional and difficult to unpack. This fact is a consequence of the 
several levels of operation present: rules, actors’ behavior, legislative production and the 
interaction between these. In fact, in an explicit attempt to uncover the sources of flawed 
institutional analysis, Diermeier and Krehbiel (2003) precisely underscore that “the key to 
avoiding confusion in constructing theories of institutions is to distinguish between levels 
of institutions” (p. 132). Following this advice, I unpack the issues of this thesis into three 
questions, where, hopefully, the different levels of operation of institutional analysis on 
which I will focus clearly emerge:  
1st - Are Assemblies weak actors in presidential systems, meaning unable to exert 
influence over the political agenda as a byproduct of the constitutional design of 
presidential systems or is there a range of variation related not only to constitutional rules 
but also to more subtle indicators of performance?  
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2nd – Does the procedural design of the legislative process of approval offer 
windows of opportunity to majority actors to perform unilateral action in the decision-
making process, thereby systematically exerting agenda control? Unilateral action and 
agenda control are positively related to an embedded low aggregation of interests in the 
decision-making process, by restricting the participation of all political actors in the forum 
for deliberation and the adoption of public policy decisions as legislatures are?  
3rd – At the normative level, if there is a systematic discretional employment of 
rules in the favor of majority political actors, then what are the consequences of this for the 
representative grounds of democratic regimes? What are the implications for the quality of 
democracy as derived from the decisional styles of everyday politics? 
 
The first and second questions posit empirical questions, with possibilities to offer 
empirical evidence, on the grounds of the theoretical elaboration of measurement choices, 
to the debate on forms of government and political performance. In particular, the first 
question involves analyzing constitutional design and its explanatory capacity for capturing 
variation across presidential systems and henceforth on the likelihood of political 
cooperation/conflict between the Executive and Legislative branches. This first question is, 
therefore, related to the operation of macro-institutional rules and the assessment of their 
effects on inter-branch dynamics. The question is clearly motivated by the origins of the 
debate on ‘presidentialism versus parliamentarism’, given the strong weight given there to 
constitutional design (as explained in Section 2 in this Chapter). While, as hinted by the 
general standpoint that the combination of de jure and de facto practices is necessary to 
assess both broad and specific aspects of inter-branch dynamics, we nonetheless posit this 
quest as an empirical and comparative enterprise, an effort which we have said to be crucial 
for the progress of the debate.   
In turn, the second question involves focusing on micro-institutional rules, which 
derive from the procedural design of the decisional process to get legislation passed in the 
legislature. I will pay special attention to the available windows of opportunity embedded 
within these rules for potential exercise of agenda control, such as in the committee system 
design and with regard to the availability of emergency procedures and the sequential 
design of the bills’ approval.  
The third question has a normative character in that it reflects on the potential 
dangers associated to the practices becoming institutionalized by the very nature of the 
institutional design. In an explicit effort to lay out a dialogue between the empirical and 
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comparative findings, and the normative implications of these, I will discuss whether 
endogenous or, alternatively, exogenous factors matter in explaining the institutional 
performance of legislatures and Executives. This question joins the normatively-
engendered debate concerning the available (macro) constitutional choices, such as form of 
government and electoral systems, and the effects of this choice on both other associated 
institutional design packages (such as the micro-institutional rules of the procedural design) 
and the analysis of political performance. Given that the analysis of political performance 
here is closely linked to issues of agenda control, as a reflection of the degree of 
aggregation of interests in the decision-making process, the connection with the Theory of 
Democracy in the evaluation of issues such as how representative a political system is and 
what the implications of majority rule are is facilitated.  
The range of conceptual discussion concerning this question is large, but I will keep 
attention to the issue of agenda control narrowly associated to the classical idea of 
Tocqueville of the potential reverse output of democratic regimes for their common 
privilege of majority rule over other possible institutional rules. The potential for the 
‘dictatorship of the majority’, as a surprisingly neglected issue in Theory of Democracy, 
may be linked to the debate on forms of government and the criticisms on the 
constitutional choice of the checks-and-balances system par excellence. This last question will, 
therefore, feedback to the original theoretical level of analysis of constitutional design and 
issues of constitutional choice (question 1), in the light of the empirical results assessing 
how and when agenda control is performed (question 2),  from a broader normative 
insight, hopefully consequential to the Theory of Democracy.  
I develop in the next section a short literature review on the largely heterogeneous 
approaches to legislative studies in a comparative perspective. This section will serve as an 
introductory effort to spell out thereafter my own positioning and research strategy.  
4) CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW: THE FIELD OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES 
The field of research on legislative politics is a traditionally important, and hence 
productive, one in Political Science. Parliaments have been seen as one of the core political 
institutions, and the key one when addressing issues of representation. As the main 
institutional solution to the problem of the aggregation of preferences –representation - 
and to the problem of political action undertaken for social needs –policy making - 
Parliaments have been at the heart of interest of almost all schools of thought within the 
discipline. As a consequence, there is a considerable heterogeneity among the different 
theories, making it difficult to produce a short literature review. However, there are two 
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broad characteristics in this field of research which may serve as introductory remarks of 
the nature of the field. In fact, these two characteristics constitute a consensus in the 
existing reviews on legislative studies and strongly affect the structure of this field of 
research.  
1) - Research on the U.S. Congress exceeds the volume and possibly all the efforts 
undertaken to research Parliaments in other geographical areas. The U.S. Congress has a 
particular institutional structure (bicameralism, seniority system in committees, committee 
plus subcommittees systems, weak parties despite their behavior as procedural coalitions11, 
great strength of interest groups in the policy making process), which has largely influenced 
the kind of studies produced. Despite their valuable and solid corpus of knowledge, studies 
on the U.S. Congress have seldom been connected with studies of other geographical 
regions. This is a first salient characteristic within the legislative field of research: a lack of 
comparative analysis. 
However, a positive consequence of this long-lasting focus on the U.S. Congress is 
the availability of a set of measures. Eventually, these measures offer the possibility to 
contrast these with other case evidence (whenever data is available). In this way, the 
existing analytical tools created to analyze the U.S. Congress may have a valuable role in 
generating a fruitful scientific debate in a comparative manner.  
2) – The second salient general characteristic of the legislative field of research is a 
lack of linkages between theoretical findings and empirically oriented works. Only recently 
has the emergent research agenda fostered by the formal institutionalist approach begun to 
bridge more clearly theoretically-driven hypotheses and empirical research.  According to 
the path-breaking author in the formal analysis of legislatures and legislative design, 
Shepsle, “the distancing of the analytical from the empirical has had unhappy 
consequences: it diminishes the impact of insights derived from more analytical approaches 
and it minimizes the prospects for cumulativeness from more descriptive studies” (1985: 
7).  
Furthermore, for some authors these two characteristics are, unfortunately, deeply 
entrenched in the nature of the object of research (Jewell, 1978). Given the complexity of 
legislative bodies, Jewell argues, research requires great detail, and a thus vast deal of case-
specific knowledge and analysis. In my view, comparative work can increase our knowledge 
of different specific institutional settings and allow us to draw conclusions on the outcomes 
of these for political performance. Although descriptive and intensive case-specific 
                                                
11 See Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) for the basic argument on parties as procedural coalitions in the U.S. Congress on 
the floor and Cox and McCubbins for counterarguments (1993).  
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knowledge is necessary to understand diverse patterns of legislative behavior and 
organization, a greater theoretical effort is necessary in order to generate more comparative 
analysis. In my view, the distance between theory and empirical work is not necessarily a 
consequence of the nature of the object of research, but rather a consequence of the 
difficulty of positing general theories that include both institutional detail and all the 
conditions for carrying out comparative empirical analysis. I agree with Mezey (1994) in 
that “the price for maintaining these two separate research efforts has been the persistence 
of inaccurate, often stereotypical models of how legislatures other than that which one is 
studying operate, along with a continuing inability to generalize about legislatures” (p.431).  
However, it is increasingly possible to carry out fruitful comparative research and 
empirically testable studies on Parliaments, as new efforts are developed in order to 
generate data susceptible to empirical and comparative analysis. In order to describe how 
this evolution has taken place in this field of research, I summarize in the following 
subsections two central axes of the discipline. First, I briefly focus on the objects of 
research within the possible range of investigation of legislatures. Second, I account for the 
diverse methodological approaches, from the descriptive and historically informed to the 
currently fashionable formal theories. As will become clear, the review of the 
methodological approaches is not irrelevant, as these have greatly influenced the 
conceptual realm in which questions are raised.  
4.1) - EVOLUTION OF THE LINES OF RESEARCH IN LEGISLATIVE STUDIES: A 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT  
 
The field of research on legislative studies has followed an interesting path from the 
1950s to the present. The focus of interest has evolved in parallel fashion to the different 
schools of thought that have addressed one, or more, of the different aspects of the 
legislative institution. Indeed, some shifts in the focus of interest have derived from shifts 
in methodological fashions within the discipline rather than from a change in the corpus of 
well-defined theoretical aims or findings of empirical analyses.  
I have clustered the focuses of interest into three broad groups: functions of 
Congress, links between Congress and policy outcomes, and the internal life of Congress12. 
                                                
12 Other authors have generated other classifications of the key issues in the legislative research (see, for instance, Jewell, 
1978, 1981; Eulau, 1985; Krehbiel, 1991; Mezey, 1985, 1994; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994). Hedlund (1985), for example, 
highlights the heterogeneity of the theoretical approaches assessing the legislative body, namely: structural functionalism –
especially in the 1970s-, role analysis – during the 1960s and 1970s, rational choice – from the 1980s until now - and 
organization theory – end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s. 
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The interests and corpus of knowledge developed by each of these thematic groups are 
examined separately below.  
I - Functions of Congress. This focus of attention is the most classical one of the 
three groups of analyses. Parliaments have generally been attributed many functions: to 
produce policy, control the Executive, produce legitimacy and institutionalize conflict 
(Olson, 1994); representation, political control and the articulation of interests (Sartori, 
1992); conflict management and national integration (Jewell and Patterson, 1966). Overall, 
the study of the functions of Parliaments can be seen as the effort to analyze the links 
between the legislature and the political system as a whole. Consequently, the analysis deals 
with two sides of the same coin: one related to the production of public policy, and  the 
other related to the functions of the legislative body as an institution which symbolically 
performs general functions of representation and legitimacy for the political system. As can 
be seen, the two set of functions above are highly interrelated, although analytically 
distinguishable.  
In addition, historical studies of Parliaments have looked carefully at functions of 
Parliaments, highlighting how and when Parliaments were adopted as representative bodies 
(Manin, 1997). In this way, the analysis of functions of Congress has attracted both 
descriptive and theoretical research.   
 
II- Links between Congress and policy outcomes. A second major area of research 
in legislative studies is the analysis of public policy. The production of public policy is one 
of the main outcomes of legislatures and the study of the lawmaking process includes both 
a procedural analysis - how a bill is passed within a legislature - and an analysis of 
implementation - how decisions are put into practice. Particularly in the analysis of 
presidential regimes, this branch of the literature has typically dealt with the Executive-
Legislative relations in public policy matters, especially regarding budgetary review (Jewell, 
1978, 1981).  
A good example of this branch of the literature is the recent work by Haggard and 
McCubbins (2001). They select a concrete set of policies -macroeconomic policies- and 
analyze them in relation to the characteristics of the lawmaking process. In this way, they 
posit a conceptual framework in which efficiency and resoluteness are seen in a tradeoff or 
conflictual relationship. Whereas efficiency is seen as the ability of the legislature to make 
decisions on public policy, resoluteness is defined as the ability to implement these 
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decisions13. In this framework, the lawmaking process and the implementation of public 
policy are placed together in the analysis as a strategy for studying Executive-Legislative 
relations in policy-making.   
 
III - Internal life of Congress. According to Eulau (1985), the reigning 
behavioralism of the 1950s led to a systematic neglect of the study of institutions in favor 
of the study of individual legislators. Issues like legislative careers and the goals of 
legislators strongly dominated the academic production of this decade. The leading 
references - Mayhew (1974) for the U.S. Congress, and Cotta (1979, 1983; Best and Cotta, 
2000) for European cases - are a sample of what has become a long-lasting scientific 
interest on the incentives for legislators to run for office. While legislative careers have 
been a sustained focus of interest in this field, increasing attention has also been paid to the 
procedural and organizational side of Parliaments since the 1980s. Particularly, the 
flourishing of the (new) institutionalism as a strong theoretical reaction to the previous 
behavioralism14 provided new insights to the study of institutions. In this new view, 
legislators’ decisions are considered to be constrained by institutional design. The legislative 
bodies are institutions in which many sub-organizational units are embedded, such as 
committee systems, voting rules, amendment rules or special procedures. Currently, 
virtually all or most of the research on the “internal life of Congress” deals with how the 
procedural and organizational design of Parliaments affects outcomes in several ways. 
Issues like agenda control, strategic voting or use of decree authority by the Executive 
have, interestingly, come to the forefront of the research agenda of this field. These works 
assume that the actions – decisions, non-decisions, bargains, voting, vetoes, etc – as 
undertaken within the legislature are a byproduct of the institutional setting. Hence, the 
study of organization and procedures is seen as the key to understanding political 
outcomes.  
                                                
13 These two issues, decision making and resoluteness, are actually two core questions within the legislative studies 
field of research. The first is endowed in the quest of how decisions are undertaken in a legislative environment, 
whereas the second puts forth the quest on how commitment may or may not exist. The first is a classical question 
within legislative studies from Riker’s works (1962, 1982); the second is a more recent question raised by the 
literature on “transaction costs”. As North and Weingast (1989) put it: “the literature on transactions costs and 
institutions emphasizes that while parties may have strong incentives to strike a bargain, their incentives after the fact 
are not always compatible with maintaining the agreement: compliance is always a potential problem. (...) Problems 
of compliance can be reduced or eliminated when the institutions are carefully chosen so as to match the anticipated 
incentive problems” (p.806).  
14 For an accurate analysis on the links between new institutionalisms’ theoretical grounds and the reaction against 
behavioralism, see Hall and Taylor (1996) and Immergut (1996).  
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Consequently, there are two schools of thought (closely related but with diverging 
theoretical roots) that deal with the internal life of Parliaments: organizational theory and 
formal theory. The former is more intensely devoted to the analysis of environmental and 
systemic components (see Hedlund, 1985), while the latter selects a small organizational 
unit of Parliaments and proposes an incentive-driven model that makes sense for the 
analysis of political outcomes.  
On the whole, this is a fruitful branch of the literature on legislative studies, 
offering both analytical tools and empirical analyses.  
4.2)- METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES 
 
Eulau (1985) views the lack of a common approach to studying legislatures as a 
consequence of two changing factors: first, the changes in the political system itself (i.e. 
political reforms affecting the legislative body, in this case); second, changes in social 
scientific methods. This second factor is reviewed here. In effect, as already mentioned, 
shifts in methods  have had a strong impact on the focus of interest (or objects of research) 
and on the set of analytical tools employed (since every method has its own Verstehen). 
The most salient characteristic of the methodological approaches in the field is the 
great predominance of case studies, as already mentioned. As the legislative body is one of 
the most complex political institutions, there is no overarching model which assesses every 
aspect in a single-variable analysis. Here, I have created a three-fold classification that 
summarizes the diverse methodological approaches employed in the field: historical 
approaches, public policy analysis and new institutional approaches.  
1.- Historical approaches. Associated to the strong case study content of many 
studies in the field, there are abundant historical approaches in this field (Henneman, 
1982). Consequently, there are numerous descriptive works which account for features of 
Parliaments, including the historical development of the institution (North and Weingast, 
1989; Manin, 1997) and the constitutional grounds for the appearance of legislatures (Elster 
and Slagstad, 1988). The bulk of research produced by works adopting a historical 
approach maintains a strong presence in the field, however with an increased comparative 
and theoretical content (Sartori, 1994; Goodin, 1997).  
2.- Approaches from public policy analysis. Public policy analysis is central in the 
discipline and has also developed a view on parliamentary activity as the realm – in modern 
democracies – where public policy is mostly produced. While the classical rival approaches 
of public policy analysis in the 1970s – corporatism and pluralism- saw the legislatures 
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merely as a bridge agent between interest groups and the policy-making process (Schmitter, 
1979), the 1980s provided a more central role to legislatures per se. The perceived increased 
complexity of the policy-making process was reflected in an increased attention to the 
institutional processes involved in this, thus legislatures attracted much of the attention. 
Methodologically, this incremental change in public policy analysis has been reflected in a 
shift from focusing on specific sets of policies towards a more comprehensive approach 
where policy making is a result of dynamic networks (Diani and Eyerman, 1992) where 
interest groups, mass media and political institutions interact.  
3.- New institutional approaches. The last methodological approach, which also 
involves a substantively renewed view on institutions more broadly, is the new institutional 
approach, made up of three branches (Hall and Taylor, 1996). I specifically account here 
for the historical institutionalism and the formal approach (also called rational choice 
institutionalism)15.  
Historical institutionalism adopts a macroscopic lens for analysis, with the objective 
of developing a historically-informed account of the paths to the particular shape and place 
of legislatures within the political systems. One characteristic of this approach is the lack of 
assumptions made concerning the object of research, which is, in turn, strongly present in 
the formal approach to institutional analysis. The major conceptual contribution of 
historical institutional analysis is the assessment of path-dependent mechanisms – which 
are brought into existence through critical junctures or through institutional inertia. This 
contribution has been central to the better understanding of institutional choice itself, i.e. 
the analysis of why and how certain institutions came into existence and for the assessment 
of the specific features of institutions – including legislatures.  
Although they share the institutional umbrella, formal models of institutional 
analysis differ from historical institutionalism in that the lens applied for analysis is 
microscopic, the number and relevance of assumptions on the object of research is large16, 
and a stronger normative type of analysis is produced from the belief that optimal and 
suboptimal criteria are essential for the research. The works produced in legislative studies 
employing formal models have increased exponentially during the last decade (for a review 
                                                
15 This choice is a consequence of the lack of sociological institutionalist contributions in the field of legislative studies 
(Searing, 1991).  
16 The usual assumptions are: unidimensionality of policy preferences (Plott, 1967), single-peaked preferences of 
legislators, complete information on policy preferences (Shepsle, 1979), the size of a stable voting coalition is the minimal 
winning one (Riker, 1962), majority rule is the usual decision rule (Shepsle and Weingast, 1982; Baron and Ferejohn, 
1989), institutional setting is exogenous to the models (Shepsle, 1979). Any modification of these assumptions produces 
very unstable results (McKelvey, 1976). Most of the current literature in the field tries to relax the assumption on 
complete information (Krehbiel, 1992) and on majority rule (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989). In turn, the powerful 
assumption of unidimensionality (see Black, 1971) is, still, undefeated. The field is however more convinced that 
“simplicity is a far greater virtue than the lack of descriptive accuracy is a vice” (Diermeier and Krehbiel, 1003: 129).   
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see Shepsle, 1985, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994), focusing “for the most part on 
legislative arrangements, their operating characteristics and their implications for legislative 
outcomes” (Shepsle, 1985: 6). Issues such as coalition building, legislative voting and 
amendment rules, and strategic behavior, including bargaining (Panning, 1985) lie at the 
core of formal analyses of legislative politics. The current line of research within formal 
approaches which has gained a central place in the field is the informational theory of 
legislative politics (Krehbiel, 1991). The main shift in legislative politics as analyzed by 
formal institutionalism has been from a preoccupation on how decisions are reached (with 
a view to eternal cycling and minimal winning coalitions, as in Riker, 1962) to the analysis 
of how the legislative structure provides incentives to cooperate (Shepsle and Weingast, 
1982, 1984, 1994; Krehbiel, 1988).   
Overall, we can observe moderate convergence between issues and methodological 
approaches across this short literature review, with an increased attention being paid to the 
internal features of legislative structure as a key explanatory variable of the decision and 
policy-making process (Mezey, 1994). Fortunately, there is also an increased awareness, 
reflected in recent works on legislative politics, of the need to engage more explicitly the 
different debates and methodological approaches common in the field for so long. For 
instance, the analysis of constitutional design and the characteristics of the legislature as an 
organization, together with a more empirical and comparative effort to carry out theory 
testing, is gradually being developed (as in Shugart and Carey, 1998; Krehbiel, 1998; 
Reynolds, 2002; Morgenstern and Nacif, 2002). This thesis contributes to this effort to 
facilitate the dialogue between substantive and methodological approaches. Specificallythis 
is sought by adopting a new institutional theoretical standpoint, an empirical quantitative 
and comparative methodological approach and an analytical attempt to unpack both 
institutional detail (including variation within constitutional rules and legislative procedures) 
and general conclusions for the Theory of Democracy. How this thesis contributes to this 
effort is detailed below, where I address the research design. 
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5) THE RESEARCH DESIGN: VARIABLES, HYPOTHESES AND 
ASSUMPTIONS 
In this Section I develop the research design, consisting of the variables, the 
hypotheses and the components to be kept constant (assumptions). My quest, as 
introduced in Section 3, is how institutional design in interaction with the political scenario 
affects two closely related policy outcomes in presidential systems: representation and the 
aggregation of interests (see Section 3 for an extended elaboration on the links between 
these two democratic principles).  
The research design consists of a two-stage approach. Given that the 
characterization of the patterns of legislative production in the cases under study is not 
available from previous works, I assess this as the dependent variable in the first stage, in 
order to be able to use it as the explanatory variable in the second stage.  
In the first sequence, the dependent variable is patterns of legislative production. 
The explanatory variables are the constitutional design, the legislative procedural design 
and the format of the party system (fragmentation and polarization). The identification of 
variation across the cases in terms of the strength of Assemblies from their constitutionally 
provided powers will allow for a further evaluation of how these patterns correlate to the 
policy outcomes under scrutiny in the second stage. That is, they will be taken as the 
independent variable in the second stage of the research.  
The main hypothesis in the first stage of the research consists of the analysis of 
whether some actors have powerful tools, constitutionally and procedurally guaranteed, to 
exert an overloaded influence on the legislative production. An important implication of 
this focus is the necessity to evaluate to what extent the procedural and constitutional 
devices (the de jure design) explain the de facto practices in patterns of legislative production. 
I propose to study whether the Executive and the Assembly are tied in policy matters or 
whether the Executive may impose legislation independently, that is, without any need of 
Assembly ratification. The outcome of such an analysis is expected to identify the sources 
of variation in a range of more or less powerful Legislative and Executive branches which 
determines the inter-branch dynamics.  
In the second stage, the dependent variable is policy outcomes in presidential 
systems. Aggregation of interests, as a latent17 policy outcome, is defined as whether the 
                                                
17 Agenda control is considered a latent variable because it is not directly observable. This thesis in fact adopts as a key 
objective the development of methodological strategies to measure the impact of latent variables. This effort involves 
both conceptual discussion in order to settle the limits of the phenomenon under study, i.e. definitional choices, and the 
combination of qualitative and quantitative indicators, i.e. methodological strategies.  
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legislation effectively reflects the preferences and interests of the plurality of political agents 
with a legitimate function in a given political institution. My concept of representation and 
aggregation of interests attempts to combine the descriptive perspective on Parliaments, 
developed excellently in Pitkin (1967), and the procedural view on political dynamics 
(Jupille, 2004). The latter involves evaluating whether the substantive inclusion of political 
interests is in place from the very characteristics of the decision-making process. The 
argument is that it is not only a question of how proportional or equal the distribution of 
political resources adopted is (descriptive concept of representation), but also whether 
representatives of non-majority actors can and do perform a deliberative and aggregative 
function throughout the legislative process of approval (substantive inclusiveness). This is 
why using patterns of legislative production as an explanatory variable - once power 
resources constitutionally and procedurally provided are understood - can shed light on the 
degree of interest aggregation via the assessment of systematic practices of majority 
imposition in the form of agenda control.  
On empirical grounds, obtaining an answer to the first question (are Assemblies 
powerless in presidential systems as a byproduct of the constitutional design) involves 
analyzing variation in the constitutional design of the cases. Once this variation is captured, 
the research continues to seek for explanatory sources of agenda control which fall outside 
the formal realm (or written rules as constitutional rules). Agenda control is a phenomenon 
whereby there is either a limitation of choices over alternative legislative initiatives (agenda 
setting power) or of the possible amendment or range of policy choices (agenda control 
power). When this phenomenon occurs, my argument is that there is a parallel decrease in 
the (range of) possibilities for political actors with formal representation in the political 
system (seats in Parliament) to effectively exert influence on the decision-making process, 
i.e. to effectively exert their representative mandate. The specific hypothesis is that a 
systematic exertion of agenda control is reflected in a pattern of legislative production 
characterized by the dominance of majority actors, or by unilateral action by powerful 
political actors able to employ exceptional resources to impose their legislative authority, as 
discussed earlier. This expectation - relating to Question 2 of the research - is that 
constitutional provisions of power and authority are only partially explanatory of when and 
how political actors are motivated to employ tools for agenda control. Our ex-ante answer 
is hence more geared to exploring whether the internal decisional structure of the 
legislature offers specific discretional spaces for unilateral decisions to majority actors (the 
majority party and the Executive), thus facilitating access to decisional tools for agenda 
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control, how this happens and when this happens. Notice that this view reflects the 
aforementioned objectives of combining the attention to institutional detail (which are the 
tools), the theory testing effort with respect to the contextual (when are these employed) 
and substantive (how are these employed) specifications, and adds up to an attempt to 
normatively evaluate practices becoming institutionalized by the very nature of institutions 
(representation and aggregation of interests as derived from the decisional style to approve 
legislation).   
Cox (2002) defines agenda control as being characterized by two strategies: the 
ability of political actors to put bills on the floor or keep them off the floor (agenda 
setting), and the ability [of political actors] to protect bills from amendments once they are 
on the floor (agenda control). The difference seems a relatively minor nuance, but it in fact 
entails two consequences: first, we analytically distinguish the phenomenon we are referring 
to more clearly and this fact helps in clarifying which dependent variables are necessary for 
the measurement of the phenomenon. Second, the distinction is related to the necessary 
data. Studies on agenda setting typically include data on public opinion, mass media or 
interest groups’ influence in legislative activity as factors which evidently affect the ability 
of political actors to find support for placing a new legislative initiative on the floor. In 
turn, the study of agenda control requires the analysis of how legislative initiatives are 
approved once they are placed on the floor. We will focus on the latter phenomenon not 
only due to data availability, which I describe in detail in Section 6.2., but also from the 
reasoning developed in Section 3 on the importance of focusing on the legislative 
production process.  
Because agenda control takes place once the bills are on the floor, I will 
hypothesize the choice of procedures needed to get them passed, or on the incentives of 
actors to avoid expected conflict over legislation. The hypotheses concerning agenda 
control are elaborated on the basis of whether procedural choices, such as the committee 
system choice or the urgent versus emergency procedural choice, systematically benefit a 
particular political actor: the Executive or the majority party. In addition, I pay attention to 
whether coalitional support when unified government exists and affects the pace of the 
approval of bills enacted by the Executive by employing double power resources (the 
enactment powers of the Executive and the majority voting rules in the House to speed up 
or delay bills). Finally, I also assess whether political actors, especially the Executive, are 
more motivated to employ agenda control mechanisms when the floor is divided (both in 
quantitative terms: fragmentation, and in qualitative terms: ideological polarization).  
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The general hypothesis is that the systematic and significant (statistically as a 
general characteristic of the pattern of legislative production) exertion of agenda control by 
majority actors (the Executive, the majority party) decreases the aggregation of interests in 
the decision-making process, and will thus display a low representativeness in the policy-
making output. Whether these actors may make use of endogenous comparative 
advantages is an important question, and I test for the significance of these as compared 
with the effects of exogenous drives affecting the institutional output reflected in 
legislation.  
By endogenous I mean the rules and norms that regulate the political activity under 
study: the legislative process of approval (or decision-making process). In this sense, the 
analysis of the characteristics of legislative production as related to the procedures 
employed to get legislation passed is an endogenous analysis par excellence, since the course 
of action of the political actors (passing a bill) and the procedures employed to do so are 
part of an interactive process. For instance, when the Executive chooses an emergency 
procedure to get a bill passed, the procedure and action are inseparable18.  
By exogenous, in turn, I mean factors that do not, strictly speaking, belong to the 
institutional design in the sense that, while affecting political dynamics, they are external 
drives, such as the electoral cycle. The electoral cycle is a well-defined exogenous factor 
since time is present whether political actors choose one procedure or another, although 
the closeness of elections is in fact expected to affect the patterns of legislative production 
(Lanzaro, 2000). This illustrates a standard way of analyzing exogenous factors affecting 
political dynamics.  
In an effort to theory test the hypotheses and works in the field of the institutional 
performance of presidential systems, and having chosen a particular aspect of policy 
outcomes such as the aggregation of interests, I compare the empirical evidence on the 
explanatory capacity of each of the endogenous (Chapters 2 and 4) and exogenous 
(Chapters 5 and 6) variables and reflect on their possibly interactive ability to produce 
actual outcomes in the way legislation is produced. I argue, on methodological grounds, the 
impossibility to understand inter-branch relations unless both endogenous and exogenous 
factors are accounted for, and my ex-ante expectation is that these factors are interrelated 
due to the fact that political actors possess information on both the institutional 
                                                
18 On the issue of endogenous analysis in institutional investigations described in footnote 10 of this Chapter, I will 
describe the consequences of adopting this methodological strategy and reflect on the balance between costs and benefits 
from carrying out this analysis.  
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environment they occupy and the exogenous pressures that frame the existing environment 
(Schmitter and Santiso, 1998).  
Finally, the analysis identifies some normative implications (Chapter 7), where I 
attempt to generate a fruitful bridge between institutional theory and the theory of 
democracy. For that purpose, I will connect the two-stage evaluation of the de jure-de facto 
analysis with the type of democracy that is becoming institutionalized in each of the cases 
(or the practices that are systematically employed by political actors). The patterns of 
variation discovered in the first stage of the analysis (on constitutional design) are expected 
to help in identifying a general relationship between these and the second stage of the 
analysis (the strategic employment of procedures to exert agenda control). The interaction 
between these two factors, in the light of the empirical findings, is expected to feed-back 
into the theoretical quest of analyzing the impact of institutional performance on the 
quality of democracy, as phrased in Question 3 (Section 3 in this Chapter).  
The last methodological point is to make explicit the three assumptions that I hold 
in the thesis: (1) parties are the channels of representation and the agents of policy-making, 
that is, I do not consider other potential actors (such as interest groups or social 
movements, for instance) who may affect policy-making. (2) Both the Executive and the 
Assembly want to maximize policy making, which is a behavioral assumption, and derives 
from their function as representative actors. (3) I hold constant the historical origins of the 
institutional setting, excluding from the analysis why such institutions were originally 
chosen or which broader factors deriving from the political culture of each case are in 
place19.   
Finishing this Section, for the sake of clarity, Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the 
sequence of the research design.  
                                                
19 Despite I will include some reflections, particularly in Chapter 2, where I study the constitutional design in the four 
countries under analysis and identify that the way Constitutions are designed in each of the countries under analysis is 
heavily path-dependent, and in Chapter 7, in the reflections on normative implications, including the analysis concluding 
that constitutional choice or the patterns of political culture would constitute an independent investigation on itself. 
These two areas are in fact underscored as fruitful open lines for future research from this thesis in the conclusions.  
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Table  1 .  Research des ign :  Ques t ion ,  Variab le s ,  Hypothese s  and Assumpt ions .  Sequence  one  o f  the  
Research  
SEQUENCE OF RESEARCH 1 
Research question Effects of the Constitutional design on the balances or un-balances of power of 
Executives and Assemblies in presidential systems 
Are Assemblies weak or marginal political actors as a byproduct of the constitutional design in 
presidential systems? (question 1) 
Dependent Variable Variation in types of presidential systems from the constitutional powers of 
Assemblies and Executives  
Independent Variables 1) Macro-level: Constitutional rules (type of veto power and capacity of Assembly 
to override it, type of decree authority of the Executive, exclusive areas of 
legislation, capacity of the Assembly to control the Executive, capacity of the 
Executive to dissolve Assembly) 
2) Micro-level: Legislative structure from the procedural design (type of committee 
system, type of emergency procedures, sequential design of the legislative process 
of approval) 
Hypotheses  1- Positive relationship between the (number and quality of) constitutional ties 
among the branches in matters of policy and strength of the Assembly in de facto 
legislative production  
2- The general macro-institutional design, determined by the constitutional 
structure, does not determine inter-branch dynamics, or its explanatory capacity is 
small. A configurational analysis of the constitutional rules contributes to increase 
the explanatory capacity of constitutional design on political outcomes, which 
implies: (1)taking Constitutions as part of a broader institutional package, (2) 
wherein interactions – between primary or constitutional and secondary or 
procedural rules – also exist 
3- The procedural design, in its regulatory capacity of micro-institutional dynamics 
and as a cross-sectional set of rules applying to the whole decision-making process, 
needs to be included, in addition to the broader constitutional rules, to political 
outcomes, such as the aggregation of interests in the decision-making process (or 
legislative production) 
Assumptions 1) The relationship of power between Executive and Assembly is not 
inverse: it does not hold that the stronger the Executive the weaker the 
Assembly 
2) Behavioral assumption: both Executive and Legislative actors aim at 
maximizing their influence in policy-making as derived from their 
representative function 
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Table  2 .  Research des ign :  Ques t ion ,  Variab le s ,  Hypothese s  and Assumpt ions .  Sequence  two o f  the  
Research  
SEQUENCE OF RESEARCH 2 
Research question Does agenda control make a difference for the quality of democracy 
Are endogenous sources available to majority political actors systematically determining the 
exercise of agenda control? How and when are exogenous factors interacting/framing political 
actors’ incentives to exert agenda control? (questions 2 and 3) 
Dependent Variable Latent: aggregation of interests in the decision-making process 
Observable: Procedural choice involving restriction of minority participation in the 
decision-making process 
In particular, Executive dominance (quantitative); policy dominance (qualitative); 
strategic behavior of political actors (qualitative) 
Independent Variables 1) Variation in the strength of Executive and Assembly, from the constitutional 
design: in particular, degree of the branches’ independence on their own 
survivability and degree of exclusive authority over jurisdictional areas of policy 
2) Endogenous: characteristics of the committee system (size design, informational 
advantages, availability of special committees); availability of procedures for 
emergency legislation; sequential design of the legislative process of approval 
3) Exogenous: degree of legislative scenario fragmentation and polarization; 
electoral cycle  
Hypotheses 1) – Negative relationship between strength of Assembly from the constitutional 
provision of power and authority resources, and Executive dominance 
2) – Negative relationship between the number of discretional spaces of 
procedural choice and the aggregation of interests in the decision-making  
3) – Positive relationship between informational advantages offered to majority 
actors by the committee system design and the exercise of systematic agenda 
control 
4) – Positive relationship between high fragmentation and polarization on the 
floor, weak support in Congress for the Executive, and Executive dominance of 
the agenda  
5) – Positive relationship between elections being close and Executive dominance 
with pork-barreling bias in policy-making  
Assumptions 1) Both Executive and Assembly want to pursue their policy preferences 
(behavioral assumption) 
2)  Institutional setting is exogenous (institutional assumption), in that 
constitutional choice or procedural choice is not endogeneized in the analysis  
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6) THE CASES, TIME FRAME AND DATA AVAILABLE 
6.1)- CASE SELECTION CRITERIA 
 
Three criteria have been considered for the case selection in this research, namely: 
variation in the legislative party system format, cases at a relevant stage of democratization 
and one common characteristic at the macro-level of institutional design (unicameral 
Houses). I develop the importance of these criteria below. Thereafter, I also specify the 
time frame and the data available to carry out the empirical analysis.  
 
1) The format of the legislative party system. Heeding the attributed importance of 
the party system format and features for political performance in presidential regimes 
(Mainwaring et al, 1995, 1997), I have selected two bipartisan cases with stable unified 
governments and systematic majorities within the Assembly (and thus, no need for 
coalition building), Honduras and Costa Rica, and two multiparty systems –Guatemala and 
Panama- with a high probability for necessary coalition-building within the Assembly and a 
more polarized party system.  
This case selection is expected to enrich the analysis in several ways. The first and 
most evident is the enhancement of the comparative analysis. The expectation is that each 
pair of cases (on the one side the bipartisan, and on the other the multiparty systems) will 
display similar workings, in the case that the general hypotheses of Mainwaring et alia hold 
(i.e. that the source of the difficult combination for presidential systems is found in the 
characteristics of the party system, specifically fragmentation and ideological polarization). 
In fact, if this expectation is not met, the findings will challenge one of the most stable 
beliefs on the determining impact of the legislative scenario for legislative performance. 
The main characteristics of the party systems in the four countries under study are as 
follows:  
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Table  3 Features  o f  Party  Sys t ems in  four  Centra l  Amer i can countr i e s  
Features of the 
party systems 
GUATEMALA PANAMA HONDURAS COSTA RICA 
Effective number 
of electoral parties 
5.92 7.18 2.19 2.75 
Effective number 
of legislative 
parties 
3.52 3.51 2.11 2.31 
Reducing effect of 
the electoral 
system 
2.4 3.67 0.08 0.44 
Rae fragmentation 
index 
0.69 0.69 0.53 0.57 
Electoral volatility Average 66% Average: 27,7% Average 4,3% Average 8,5% 
Average electoral 
abstention 
1984-1999: 52% 1948-1994: 27%. 1980-1997: 23%. 1990-1998: 
22,3% 
Sources for the average of electoral volatility: For Panama, the figure was calculated for the period 1994-
99, from the figures in Otero (2003: 26). The other figures of electoral volatility are from Alcantara, 1999.  
Source for the reducing effect of the electoral system are from Garcia Diez (2001).  
 
The differences between the levels of party system fragmentation (as reflected by 
the effective number of parties, henceforth ENP) among these four countries are 
considerably large. The same goes for electoral volatility and average electoral abstention, 
showing that the party systems in the bipartisan cases are more deeply rooted, from the 
notably low figures for voting changes from one election to the next, which are in turn 
dramatically high for the Guatemalan case, and moderate for Panama20.  
Another noteworthy aspect is that the bipartisan cases are classical two-party 
systems in both the electoral and the legislative realm, whereas the multiparty systems are 
much more fragmented in the former than in the latter. The explanation for this is the 
highly un-proportional working of the electoral systems for the multiparty cases, deriving 
from the very high number of small magnitude districts and the existence of a moderately 
high minimum electoral threshold21 for these cases. These two elements help to explain the 
exaggerated reducing effect of the party system from the electoral realm to the legislative 
one, particularly strong in Panama. This conjunction of factors contributes to explaining 
why both Guatemala and Panama are extreme multiparty systems in the electoral arena and 
                                                
20 In the wording of Mainwaring, who coined the term ‘party system institutionalization’ and developed a range of 
indicators to classify party systems along a scale of institutionalization (Mainwaring, 1998; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995), 
these divergences among the four countries are precisely parallel to concluding that the party systems in Honduras and 
Costa Rica possess all characteristics of highly institutionalized systems while Guatemala is a good example of a weakly 
institutionalized party system and Panama falls in a mid-way category with a mixture of features.  
21 The percentage of small magnitude districts – typically considered as those in which five seats or less are to be elected - 
is 91,3% for Guatemala and 97,5% for Panama (Jones, 1995; Garcia Diez, 2001). In turn, these figures are 44% and 
42,8% for Honduras and Costa Rica, respectively, with very proportional electoral systems. Generally, very large 
percentages of small districts strongly benefit the big parties (Lijphart, 1999). In addition, the existence of a minimum 
electoral threshold (4% for Guatemala and 5% for Panama) contributes further to favor the big parties. As a result of 
these two factors, the electoral systems in Guatemala and Panama have dramatically reduced to almost half the size the 
number of electoral parties becoming legislative parties (Garcia Diez, 2001).  
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moderate multiparty systems in the legislative one. Yet, both cases are (moderate) 
multiparty cases and therefore the empirical analysis of these four countries can still be 
expected to display significant pair-wise comparative results. 
In fact, if we are looking for conflicting multiparty cases (as the original hypothesis 
on ‘the difficult equation’ sustains), moderate multiparty systems have been shown to be 
the most problematic ones. The percentage of minority Presidents in presidential systems 
with an ENP between 3 and 4 – as is the case for both Guatemala and Panama - is 59.69%, 
almost double that of the systems with an ENP between 2 and 3 – as is the case for 
Honduras and Costa Rica (33.45%) (Cheibub and Limongi, 2002). The probability of 
facing deadlock situations is also higher for more fragmented party systems (49.22% for 
ENP between 3 and 4, in comparison with a 31.49% for the ENP systems between 2 and 
3, from Cheibub, 2002). I will now examine the percentage of seats in Congress of the 
majority party in order to identify the more or less weak conditions on which government 
was formed for the period under study:  
Table  4 .  Per c en tage  o f  s ea t s  in  Congress  o f  the  major i ty  par ty 
Institutional 
features 
GUATEMALA  PANAMA HONDURAS COSTA RICA 
Legislature 
researched 
1996-1999 1995-1999 1997-2001 1994-1998 
Majority party in 
the legislature 
under study 
PAN  
(Partido 
Avanzada 
Nacional) 
PRD 
(Partido 
Revolucionario 
Democratico/Alianza 
Pueblo Unido22) 
PLH 
(Partido 
Liberal de 
Honduras) 
PLN 
(Partido 
Liberacion 
Nacional) 
Percentage of seats 
of the majority 
party in the 
legislature under 
study 
 
55% 
 
41,6%23 
 
52.3% 
 
47.3% 
Percentage of vote 
for the winning 
President  
 
51,2% 
 
33,3 
 
52,8% 
 
49,5 
 
Source: own construction, except the figures for the last row from Alcantara, 1999.  
 
As Cheibub and Limongi point out “the discussion so far has been guided by the 
supposition that the existence of a majority, either in parliamentarism or presidentialism, 
automatically means the ability of the government to govern. (…) What matters is both the 
number of parties that must come together in order to establish a majority and the 
                                                
22 The highly un-proportional workings of the electoral system, as has been mentioned above, leads to the need of both 
pre-electoral and post-electoral coalition-building, which has historically been especially intense in Panama and of more 
recent appearance in Guatemala.  
23 The PRD indeed needed to build a coalition in Congress in order to assure the majority of the House. The coalition 
integrated three small parties: PALA, LIBRE and MORENA, with 1, 2 and 1 seat respectively, providing the PRD 
coalition with the 47,2% of the seats (Garcia Diez, 2001).  
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cohesion of the party (or parties) that belong to the majority” (2002: 156). Indeed, these 
authors demonstrate that the problematic relationship between multiparty systems and 
regime survivability significantly increases when the ENP is between 3 and 4, as is the case 
here for Panama and Guatemala. Hence, although I do not count on an ideal sample to 
speak to the literature on unified versus divided government (since unified government 
literally existed in all cases for the period under study), I take here as a proxy the variation 
among the cases regarding more fragmented legislative scenarios versus less fragmented 
bipartisan systems, including the associate differences in levels of ideological polarization.  
2) Countries in a relevant stage of the democratization process. The interest of 
these countries is also related to their stage of democratic development. All are at very 
different stages of democratic experience and development, with the Costa Rican case 
standing as the longest and most stable democratic regime of the region (with the regime 
installation dating from 1948). Honduras also has a long democratic tradition, with political 
parties existing from the early twentieth century as channels for representation and 
participation, but characterized by a more inchoate nature of the democracy, with 
authoritarian rule mingling with democratic rule until 1985. Panama is relatively similar in 
this respect, given the long life of its political parties together with the relatively shorter life 
of the democratic regime as such, since free and competitive elections only began in 1984 
(Garcia Diez, 2001, in Alcantara and Freidenberg, eds.). Finally, the weakest and most 
complex process of democratization was suffered by Guatemala, whose first attempts to 
democratize in the mid-1940s provoked a wave of violent reaction from over-conservative 
authoritarian leaders, and it was not until 1985, with the Peace Agreements, that the 
democratic regime was achieved.  
The variation is therefore quite large, with a very general pair-wise distinction, as 
also seen with regard to the party systems, between the more stable and consolidated 
democratic regimes in Costa Rica and Honduras, and the more fragile and changing, still 
developing, democratic regimes of Panama and Guatemala.  
This selection criterion is also relevant, since – even if scholarly emphasis on the 
perils of presidential systems for democratic stability and performance was strong – most 
of the countries undergoing processes of democratization in the ‘Third Wave’ (Huntington, 
1991) made the ‘wrong choice’: adopting pure presidential (as in Latin America) or mixed 
forms of government (as in Eastern Europe). The variation in democratic longevity being 
embedded in the cases under study is therefore expected to contribute to an evaluation of 
these more subtle components of democratic experience in their relationship to procedural 
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fairness, aggregation of interests in the decision-making process, and the capacity of the 
political system to deliver representative policy-making, i.e. the emphasis on that everyday 
politics matters.  
In fact, while several recent analyses of democracy have focused on the conditions 
for democratic survivability (Przeworski et alia, 1996; Cheibub et alia, 2004), as a zero 
(breakdown)-one (survivability) type of outcome, I contend that, in order to advance the 
analysis of what makes democracy work, research must pay closer attention to institutional 
performance (cf. Geddes, 1999). Hence, an empirical scrutiny of to what degree the 
legislatures perform functions of conflict solving in everyday politics, and of the more or 
less representative nature of policy from the way decisions are taken, may contribute an 
intermediate theoretical view of how democracies reach stability and survive more 
generally. As will be discussed more explicitly in the theoretical re-connection of the 
empirical findings of this thesis in the concluding Chapter, issues of procedural justice are 
manifestly engaged with issues of rule of law, regime legitimacy and quality of democracy.  
3) Common broad institutional design: unicameralism. The last criterion for the case 
selection is unicameral legislatures, in place in all cases under study. The general 
institutional features of the Assemblies in the cases under study follow:  
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Table  5 .  Ins t i tu t iona l  Features  o f  the  Assembl i e s  in  Four Centra l  Amer i can Countr i e s  
Institutional 
features 
GUATEMALA PANAMA HONDURAS COSTA RICA 
Type of legislative 
system 
Unicameral Unicameral Unicameral Unicameral 
Assembly size 113* 72* 118 57 
Actors with 
legislative initiative 
-Executive Power 
-Legislative 
Power 
-University S. 
Carlos 
-Supreme Court 
of Justice 
-Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal 
-Human Rights 
Committee 
-Popular initiative 
-Executive Power 
-Legislative Power 
-Presidents of the 
Provincial Council• 
-Permanent 
legislative 
committees 
-Supreme Court of 
Justice 
-General Procurator 
-Administrative 
Procurator 
-Executive 
Power 
-Legislative 
Power 
-National 
Electoral 
Tribunal 
-Supreme 
Court of 
Justice 
-Executive 
Power 
-Legislative 
Power 
-Legislative 
committees with 
total legislative 
power 
Type of legislation -Acts 
-Decrees 
-Agreements 
-Resolutions 
-Organic 
-Ordinary 
-Ordinary 
-Urgent 
-Ordinary 
-Decree 
Source: own construction. 
Guatemala and Panama do not have fixed Assembly size. In Guatemala, the size of the Congress is 
calculated for each electoral event according to the renewed population census. This is largely politically-
loaded in the country, where the exclusion of indigenous voters from the census is still a problem in every 
electoral event.  
In Panama, as a consequence of a complex mixed electoral system of uninominal and plurality districts, the 
Assembly size depends on the increase/decrease of population only for the plurality districts. In addition, 
the Electoral Law contemplates the possibility of adding seats for the parties that obtained enough votes 
for a seat, but did not get one, as a compensatory mechanism. 
• The Presidents of the Provincial Councils possess legislative initiative authority only for ordinary bills and 
not for organic laws, plus they require the previous authorization of the Administrative Council and the 
Provincial Council. 
 
6.2)- DATA AVAILABLE 
The data I will employ here is available thanks to a Research Project24 in which I 
participated both as a researcher and in the gathering of data. Data were collected regarding 
the legislative production process for one legislative period. The time frame for this study is 
therefore determined by the data available. The legislative periods under analysis, included 
in Table 4, cover a general period between 1995 and 2000.  
Data availability has traditionally been a drawback for legislative research in 
underdeveloped democracies and countries, as has already been outlined. One of the 
reasons for this is that young institutions, such as those in underdeveloped democracies, 
fail to offer proper data on qualitative grounds. The present data are in fact a good 
reflection of the fact that varying levels of institutional development and learning – as 
                                                
24 “El rendimiento legislativo en America Latina” (Ref. 1FD97-0906), developed at the Institute for Latin American 
Studies, University of Salamanca, under the direction of Prof. Manuel Alcantara.  
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related to the length of democratic rule - matter. For the cases under analysis, this pattern 
holds and was very much felt in the data collection during the field research. Therefore, 
while the Costa Rican Congress offered easy access to data on legislative production, 
together with complete and reliable sources, the data from the Guatemalan and the Panama 
Congresses presented less complete and less reliable information, with problems of access 
to the information for the former and problems of complete and accurate information for 
the latter. Nonetheless, these differences may have been neutralized in that the objective of 
data collection was the same for all countries, i.e. gathering information on: the actor 
enacting the bill, the committee receiving it, the number of debates on the floor, the 
Executive action (veto/pass), and the number of days the bill spent in each of these 
procedural steps.  
7) PARTIAL CONCLUSIONS AND CONTINUING THE RESEARCH 
Four partial conclusions may be drawn from this Chapter, two regarding the 
contribution and central focus of attention of this thesis and two regarding the prospects 
for continuing the research and the order in which I shall pursue this enterprise.  
First, substantively this thesis aims to place the analysis of the patterns of legislative 
production as a middle-range theoretical approach that allows for an adequate linking of 
the theory of democracy and institutional analysis. Legislatures are the key realm for 
bargaining between political actors over public policy priorities and are also central 
institutions performing crucial functions for the proper workings of democratic rule: the 
aggregation of interests in the decision-making process and representation in policy-
making. The analysis of how legislation is produced and whether, in fact, a systematic 
pattern of representative institutional output is in place or not is linked to the generation of 
both empirical discussion on the grounds of comparative assessment and normative 
discussion on the grounds of the institutional design debate.  
Second, the central focus of attention in the thesis is placed on the possible spaces 
for strategic choice, and whether these are especially available to majority political actors, as 
a methodological strategy to capture agenda control and restriction or aggregation of 
interests in the decision-making process. The importance, hence, of developing the two-
stage research design, is great for first identifying sources of variation that have gone 
unnoticed in the original treatment of presidential systems as a unique type of political 
system, and then employing this knowledge for the assessment of legislative performances. 
My substantive point here is that the most likely ex-ante answer to this is that the role of the 
constitutional design in determining inter-branch dynamics is negative. Not only because 
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typical analyses of constitutional design in presidential systems underestimate the number 
and quality of ties between the branches, and not only the individual effect of each rule or 
set of rules, but also because there exists important interaction between different packages 
of rules (such as between constitutional rules, procedural rules, partisan rules and informal 
rules historically employed by actors as a way out of political conflict).  
Finally, the central methodological claims of this thesis are that (1) the evaluation of 
political performance requires greater attention to the interrelations between macro and 
micro institutional structures. The limited account, or explanatory capacity, of the focus on 
the dichotomy survivability of regime versus breakdown – as an indicator of regime 
performance - has in addition reduced our capacity to actually communicate the findings 
on the effects of institutional design on political dynamics with a more general and 
comparative theory about the interactive nature of path-dependency in the way political 
actors relate to one another and of institutional permeability to strategic or privileged 
behavior for some political actors. These issues are of interest in this thesis in an explicit 
attempt to make institutional theory also more permeable to more empirically-oriented and 
comparative work plus detailed analysis of micro-institutional structures (such as 
procedural choices or institutional pressures from the electoral cycle).  
As Horowitz (2002) points out, we do not only lack a precise theory of 
constitutional design but also a minimal consensus over preferred political outcomes, even 
if international insistence on and assistance for the institutionalization of democracy is 
nowadays at the greatest level of all times. While I basically agree on that institutional 
design determines most of the available courses of action for political actors, there is a 
broader net of interactions between rules themselves, between rules and actors, and 
between actors and partisan structures that needs to be accounted for. On the contrary to 
many debates in the discipline, which are designed in favor of simplicity, I argue that in the 
forms of government and political performance debate we need to inject complexity, as the 
original specification of the debate suffered from severe misspecifications and a lack of 
comparative empirical evidence. The quest will be, hence, to make sense of the varying 
operating levels of individual and collective institutional effects. In an attempt to avoid 
confusion between levels of institutional operation (Diermeier and Krehbiel, 2003), my 
second and last methodological claim is in support of delivering empirical, comparative and 
contrastable results before conclusive and normative insights are derived from the debate 
on the forms of government.  
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Along these argumentative lines and methodological objectives, the continuation of 
the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 deals with the importance of measurement options to 
capture the effects of constitutional design in presidential systems. Chapter 3 deals with 
the empirical examination of the patterns of legislative production in the four countries 
under analysis, and hints at how strategic behavior or Executive dominance of the agenda 
takes place. Chapter 4 deals with the procedural choices of political actors to get legislation 
passed, arguing in terms of agenda control. Chapter 5 examines the hypothesis that the 
legislative scenario determines the level of political conflict over agenda control. Chapter 6 
examines the effects of the temporal dimension on both the internal sequential design of 
the legislative process of approval and the exogenous effects of the electoral cycle. Chapter 
7 presents a summary of findings and includes normative reflections from these.  
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AS EXPLANATORY VARIABLE OF 
INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE IN PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Looking at legislatures gives a sense of how and 
how well those in power are held accountable for their 
acts, an inchoate measure of a system’s 
constitutionalism.”25 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
25 Close, D. (1995: 1).  
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1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
Students of the institutional design of political systems as a key explanatory variable of 
political outcomes have been aware that constitutional design alone matters to a great 
extent, but does not determine all possible dynamics in a political system. Specifically, 
constitutional design can contribute to explaining the distribution of jurisdictional domains, 
which determine authority, and therefore create a limit power simultaneously (Ferejohn et 
al, 2002). In addition, constitutional design contributes to estimating the likelihood of a 
political outcome taking place. For instance, whether presidential veto power can be used 
more or less easily (i.e. requires a more or less demanding majority of votes in Congress to 
override) undoubtedly affects the likelihood of veto usage and the strategic use of this 
decisional tool by the Executive.  
Overall, constitutional design has attracted much attention in the debate on 
presidentialism, with a particularly strong causal claim: the constitutional structure typical 
of presidential systems over-strengthens the capacity of Executives to monopolize power 
resources, leaving the legislative branch with a marginal or rubber-stamp function.  
This Chapter attempts to identify which decisional rules in fact strengthen the actual 
power capacity of political actors, specifically the two branches of power - Executive and 
Legislative - and which decisional rules possess the potential for strategic use (addressed in 
more detail in the remaining Chapters of this thesis). This idea emphasizes that political 
actors are not only constrained or encouraged to employ power or authority by formal 
rules, but rather, and most importantly, by the usage they can make of these in bargaining 
processes. This view also underscores a more dynamic approach, adopted by neo-
institutionalism, whereby actors’ behavior is not determined by institutions, but institutions 
act as a frame within which procedural rules (in legislative politics) generate incentive 
structures that are then susceptible to diverse employment by political actors.   
In this bargaining process between political actors, and from this chapter’s perspective 
on between the two separate branches of government in presidential systems, 
constitutional rules are part of an institutional package that, while determining what actors 
can or cannot do, does not fully explain what they will actually do. Hence, the point of 
departure here is that constitutional rules alone cannot capture the effects of a broader 
institutional structure, as this includes the procedural design for the approval of legislation, 
the characteristics of the political scenario, and the historical patterns of political 
interaction, all of which are generally present in the determination of political outcomes.  
 
48 
My claims are both substantive and methodological. Substantively, my claim is that only 
attending to constitutional design gives us little information useful for making predictions 
about inter-branch dynamics. While constitutional rules do settle the macro parameters of 
variation, by determining sources of authority and the limits of power resources, I argue 
that constitutional design is part of a larger web of rules that matters in the latter’s 
configurational dynamics (cf. Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997).  
Methodologically, I will argue that the causal weight given constitutional design to 
explain democratic performance in presidential systems is weak and biased. The argument 
is weak, I contend, because our explanatory capacity is restricted to what political actors 
can do, and hence underestimates what they actually do with their constitutionally provided 
capabilities. In fact, there are good examples of cases with a reputation for ‘hyper-
presidentialism’ which display a low figure on the constitutional strength of the Executive 
if only formal written rules are considered (such as Mexico, Venezuela or Guatemala, 
Shugart and Haggard, 2001). This empirical evidence shows that more information is 
needed to explain the political dynamics of inter-branch relations, that is, not only the way 
political actors make use of the authoritative tools they are constitutionally provided, but 
also the historical patterns of interaction between actors, which shall be centrally included 
in the assertion of causal drives.  
In addition, the argument is biased because it underestimates variation, assuming that 
all and any presidential systems share a core set of constitutional rules. Whilst it is true that 
there are three or four basic constitutional characteristics of presidential systems 
(particularly in their ‘pure’ form), as we discussed in Chapter 1, the largely diverse 
performance of democracies adopting this type of regime discredits the idea that 
commonalities are larger in number or qualitatively more important than the differences. 
Hence, judging from the largely varied ways in which both Executives and Legislatures in 
Latin America and elsewhere have employed their supposedly common set of rules, it is 
difficult to still view the presidential system as a unitary political system that delivers similar 
measures of performance.  
Finally, in the intersection between substantive and methodological biases, the analysis 
of constitutional design in presidential systems has generally suffered from a static 
analytical approach. This approach has typically adopted an asymmetric assumption of 
inter-branch dynamics, usually described by powerful Executives and weak legislatures. The 
static nature lies in the fact that a separate evaluation of the power resources of each of the 
branches has dominated, consequentially dismissing the importance of constitutional ties 
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between the branches in the checks-and-balances system - typical of democratic regimes, 
and especially presidential systems. This point links in with the first substantive point made 
above: the proposal that constitutional design analysis be inserted into a configurational 
analysis of institutional rules (of both macro and micro leverage26) and of political actors’ 
patterns of interaction.  
This Chapter first examines in detail, in Section 2, the arguments offered in the debate 
on constitutional design where Assemblies are deemed to have a weak, or at most reactive, 
role in decision-making in presidential systems. Here, I elaborate my arguments in favor of 
adopting a configurational, comparative and symmetric analysis of constitutional design in 
presidential systems. I then proceed to discuss the indicators employed to carry out such an 
analysis (Section 3). In the following section, I apply the empirical analysis to the four 
countries under analysis, in an effort to unpack variation and hence identify sources of bias 
in the assertion of causality as previously hinted. Therefore, the empirical bulk of this 
Chapter contributes to answering the question of ‘Are Assemblies weak actors in 
presidential systems as a byproduct of the constitutional design?’ My ex ante answer, as may 
be guessed from the paragraphs above, is negative, for both substantive and 
methodological reasons, as is developed in detail in this Chapter.   
In a final section, I suggest that the analysis of the constitutional design per se does not 
enlighten us about the dynamics between the Executive and the Legislative branches of 
power unless we incorporate as a central piece of analysis the procedural design. As a key 
arena where interaction between the branches of government takes place, legislative 
production is submitted to and ruled by an independent set of norms and procedures that 
political actors must observe. These ruled spaces of negotiation, bargaining, rejection and 
approval of policy proposals may also include spaces for the discretional use of rules where 
political actors find opportunities to restrict the aggregation of interests and exert agenda 
control. I present the line of argument in theoretical terms in the last section, which also 
offers an adequate link to Chapter 3, where I assess the de facto practices of Executives and 
Legislatures behavior employing the original data on the patterns of legislative production.  
                                                
26 This distinction refers to the constitutional design as determining the macro institutional structure, and the procedural 
design, the electoral rules, or other ruling packages as the determinants of micro institutional design.  
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2. - STATE OF THE FIELD: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AS CAUSALLY 
EXPLAINING DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE 
The claim that legislatures in presidential systems, and more particularly in Latin 
America, are rubber-stamps or marginal actors was first made by Linz (1989), who then 
emphasized the problems of this for democratic stability and political representation. The 
main argument was that, by design, presidential systems are characterized by strong 
Executives: these are directly elected, so they have direct legitimacy, possibly leading to 
develop direct links with the citizenry and thereby weakening party identifications and 
increasing the possibilities of populism. In addition, Executives in presidential systems 
often enjoy special and strong ordinary powers, such as veto and decree power, and strong 
emergency powers, such as the capacity to introduce emergency legislation. Consequently, 
legislatures are deemed to have little power in policy-making (in contrast to the powerful 
legislatures in parliamentary systems, Linz argued). The likelihood of inter-branch conflict, 
the low capacity of the political system to translate social demands into political action, and 
of policy deadlock, were, thus, generated by the very characteristics of the constitutional 
design of presidential systems. The conclusion, for Linz, was that presidential systems are 
more prone to regime instability and to fostering conflict rather than consensus between 
the political actors.  
Essentially, Linz saw the special and strong powers of Executives as a problem of 
the aggregation of interests. As the Executive is one political actor, elected by First-past-
the-post devices and possessing strong legislative authority, the majoritarian nature of this 
recipe cannot lead to the aggregation of interests. Linz believed that the institutional 
devices present in parliamentary systems, where support for the government in the 
Parliament is central to its survival, facilitate the aggregation of interests because political 
actors need to be consensus-oriented to cultivate and sustain mutual support, plus they are 
elected on proportional rules. The combination of majoritarian electoral rules and 
independence in both origin and survivability of the Executive, typical of presidential 
systems, and determined by constitutional design, offered the grounds for a strong causal 
attribution to constitutional structure as responsible for the frequent breakdown of 
democracy in countries with such a form of government.  
Despite the generation of work this hypothesis created, we still do not know what 
makes a legislative body powerful or powerless, nor which is the key element that 
determines this variation, nor how diverse, institutional or non-institutional, mechanisms 
lead to a smoothly functioning representative government that fosters the aggregation of 
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interests instead of the exclusive entrenched representation of some interests. In sum, we 
do not know which part of the original hypothesis was not well-specified (Cheibub et al, 
2004).  
The reasons for this reduced ability to generalize a theory of constitutional design 
have allegedly been diverse. One difficulty derives from the fact that similar constitutional 
designs have produced different outcomes, as Horrowitz (2001) argues in discussing the 
faith Lijphart and other scholars have placed in proportional (PR) electoral systems and 
parliamentary systems for successful democratic institutionalization and performance. A 
second difficulty arises from the exclusion of the informal arena in the original analysis. As 
a general condition for democratic installment, there shall be a lack of entrenched and non-
elected decisional gatekeepers (Schmitter and Karl, 1991). But outside the decisional arenas, 
there is evidence that informal procedures may limit changes to the status quo, the ability 
of elected actors to actually take decisions, or provide a way out of stalemate situations (see 
Carey and Baldez, 2001 for the Chilean case; Mejia 2004 for Ecuador; Guevara Mann, 2001 
for Panama; Levitsky and Helmke, 2003 for a general claim on the need to include informal 
politics in the research agenda).  
A third difficulty, the so-called ‘difficult combination’, is the fact that many 
presidential systems have been adopted in multiparty, divided societies (Mainwaring, 1990), 
which do not facilitate the adoption of compromises for consensus.  The argument 
emphasized the crucial fact that rules do not exist in a vacuum, but rather interact with the 
characteristics of the legislative scenario, which are themselves a byproduct of other sets of 
rules (the electoral and the partisan). This argument is assessed in detail in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis; here it suffices to underpin the change of lens from formal aspects towards a more 
interactive approach that includes political actors and rules in an interrelated manner. A 
fourth general difficulty is the lack of academic consensus on how to evaluate democratic 
performance, which is a broader problem common to the Theory of Democracy (which 
generates a separate debate on ‘democracy-with-adjectives’ versus ‘democracy-without-
adjectives’27).  
In sum, contributions and responses have been diverse, from both methodological 
grounds and theoretical standpoints. There has been a decade of continuous re-
examination of the many possible institutional analyses in the debate on forms of 
government. Three works that have been very influential in the re-examination of 
arguments on constitutional design in presidential systems are Shugart and Carey (1992), 
                                                
27 See Bollen, 1990; Collier and Levitsky, 1997; O’Donnell, 1996; Collier and Adcock, 1999; Elkins, 2000.  
 
52 
Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) and Haggard and McCubbins (2001, influenced by 
Tsebelis, 1999).  
Shugart and Carey (1992) offer a complete volume on comparative constitutional 
design and electoral dynamics in which they call attention to the advantages of presidential 
systems for responsiveness, representation and accountability, three key aspects for the 
ideal of democratic performance. In particular, they critically assess Linz’s main arguments 
on constitutional design by offering empirical and comparative evidence that the most 
unstable regimes appear to be hybrid, not the pure forms of either parliamentary or 
presidential forms of government. Their concrete contribution is to generate an index of 
the constitutional powers of Executives, which allows for an evaluation of the alleged 
connection between the strength of the Executive branch in terms of power and authority 
and the probability of regime breakdown or political instability. This index serves as a good 
point of departure to examine, both empirically and comparatively, the constitutional 
structure, unpacking into detailed indicators the possible varying tools of power and 
authority, including the legislative and non-legislative powers of Executives. Although this 
index retains the asymmetric view, by paying exclusive attention to the power resources of 
the Executive, it generated a path-breaking offer for comparing across political systems, 
including across forms of government.  
Furthermore, their work contributed to a change in the general approach to the 
perils of presidential systems, as they called attention to the possibility of the (deliberate) 
delegation of powers from the legislature to the Executive. This hint, which then opened a 
fresh line of investigation28, contributed to unpack another way of viewing political 
dynamics as regards inter-branch relations: the possibility of strategic behavior. This finding 
is important, and narrowly relates to the general viewpoint of this thesis, as I will outline in 
the last Section of this Chapter.  
A second change of approach takes place with the explicit effort by Mainwaring 
and Shugart (1997) to ‘rethink the terms of the debate’. Essentially, they recognized that the 
flaws in Linz’s hypothesis on constitutional design derived from misspecification, in the 
sense that institutional design needs to be understood as a package. They directed the 
attention to the explanatory capacity of context, including the characteristics of parties and 
party systems (specifically party discipline, ideological polarization and fragmentation). 
                                                
28 Because delegation is not equivalent to marginal behavior from the legislature or to the capacity of the Executive to 
monopolize power resources, in that the branch that delegates always keeps the power to withdraw the delegation, 
constrain it temporally or to a set of policy issues, and exert capabilities of oversight over the agent action. This analytical 
way of approaching inter-branch relations basically underscores (1) that we need more complexity to understand the 
effects of the constitutional design on the behavior of political actors, mainly because (2) rules constitute a net wherein 
interactions also occur.  
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Their attempt to change the perspective was based on a partial support for Linz’s 
hypothesis that presidential systems present some inherent characteristics that may be 
problematic for democratic institutionalization and political stability, with the nuance that 
looking at sets of rules alone may lead to the wrong conclusions. In this sense, their effort 
to rethink the terms of the debate was to suggest what is labeled in this chapter as the 
configurational approach to rules and incentives, because the type and nature of the 
interrelation between ruled spaces and actors’ behavior determines political outputs more 
than the independent effect of each separate group of factors.  
Finally, a third useful contribution in this discussion is Haggard and McCubbins 
(2001) recent work on how and when institutional rules help in explaining policy outcomes. 
With theoretical ambition, they put forward an analytical distinction between the separation 
of powers and the separation of purpose in policy-making. Their work is also related to 
Tsebelis’ (1999) proposal to look at the number and structure (or ideological distances) of 
veto players, as a proposed theory with predictive capacity for any form of government or 
party system format. The potential variation captured by the combination of the analytical 
propositions of these authors may contribute to unpacking variation regarding the 
explanatory variables of the political dynamics of bargaining, understood as the number of 
actors and the number of veto players, the ideological distances between them, and the 
binding decisions once adopted. These may be captured by the idea of the degree of 
separation of purpose.  
In this context, Linz had only explored - when compared with this recent 
contribution - one particularly difficult institutional combination when characterizing 
presidential systems: few but strong veto players, a large ideological distance between the 
branches of government, low separation of purpose, and rigid constitutional rules on fixed 
terms that do not foster consensual-oriented actors.  
Thus, Haggard and McCubbins bring two basic and crucial nuances to bear on this 
debate: (1) the possibilities of variation are larger, where (2) constitutional rules are only a 
(very determinant) part of this variation - which also includes ideological distances and 
other outcomes from electoral rules29.  
Their proposal implies analyzing not only how the Executive and Legislative 
branches are placed in terms of power domains within the overall political system 
(separation of powers) but also how far they are tied in policy matters (separation of 
                                                
29 In particular, concurrent or non concurrent electoral cycles – with effects on the congruence of the government and 
the legislature -, the staggering rule – which affects the renewal rule of the Legislative Chamber(s) and hence the 
ideological distances between the branches – and the electoral formula – which affects the type of discipline and loyalties 
developed towards the party, the President or others. See Shugart and Haggard in Haggard and McCubbins (2001).  
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purpose). The argument here is that the more the branches are tied in policy matters, the 
more consensus oriented actors will need to be. The opposite, hypothetically, holds.  
I have underscored how these contributions have introduced different innovative 
points in the debate on the effects of constitutional design, in both substantive and 
methodological terms. Basically, these different contributions converge on one key 
conclusion: that there is more variation within presidential systems than derives from the 
constitutional design alone, and that this variation is better captured if we include detail 
from both the broader institutional structure where political actors play and the particular 
context. In this thesis, the broader institutional structure is composed by secondary rules, 
such as those contained in procedural design, the ideological parameters of competition, 
the electoral rules and the fragmentation of the party system, and the context is composed 
by the time factor or electoral cycle.  
In addition, these contributions also converge on one substantive conclusion: 
constitutional design also matters more in its configurational manifestation, as a net 
wherein interactions take place and this should be included in the analysis. The divergences 
fall into the different sets of independent variables, which essentially refer, albeit 
differently, to the characteristics of party systems.  
The following empirical proposal attempts to combine a configurational analysis of 
constitutional design in presidential systems together with a symmetric assessment of the 
powers of the two branches of government.  
3- INDICATORS TO MEASURE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROVIDED SOURCES OF 
AUTHORITY AND POWER IN PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS: THE CHECKS-AND-
BALANCES SYSTEM 
“Like other constitutional provisions, 
the separation of powers remains government-
enabling: it disentangles overlapping 
jurisdictions, sorts out unclear chains of 
command and helps overcome a paralyzing 
confusion of functions”30  
 
I have already pointed out the lack of sufficient and complete studies of 
constitutional design adopting a comparative perspective. The standard analysis, which was 
present in Linz’s original hypothesis, combines two different levels where norms 
(constitutional rules, in this case) operate: first, macro constitutional design with respect to 
the authority to name the cabinet (the distinction between independent Executive naming 
versus parliamentary floor, central in distinguishing presidential and parliamentary systems, 
                                                
30 Holmes, in Elster and Slagstad, 1988: 228.  
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respectively), referred to as independence of origin of the branches. Second, the specific 
norms of the constitutional design determining resources of power, typically focusing on 
three of these: veto power, decree power and reserved jurisdictional domains of exclusive 
enactment by the Executive.  
If we attend to these aspects of the constitutional design we obtain no variation 
among the cases under study either with regard to the macro aspects or to the specific 
ones, since all cases share veto and decree power provision for the Executive, 
independence on cabinet formation for the Executive, and some specific reserved 
jurisdictional domains of policy for the Executive. While this holds, the analysis is still 
however intrinsically incomplete, since the Assemblies in the four cases under analysis and 
in virtually all presidential systems in Latin America, possess power resources to 
counterbalance the ones above in an explicit recognition of the checks-and-balances 
system.  
Also important to note is that most of the elements considered above exclusively 
attend to the institutional independence of origin between the branches. However, this 
view disregards the importance of the independence of institutional survivability. In fact, 
the usual normative claim in favor of parliamentary systems springs from the link of 
survivability between the branches in this political system with the central role given to 
devices of mutual confidence. Hence, in parliamentary systems, institutional independence 
neither of origin nor of survivability exists, and this has been seen as a fostering element 
for consensus-oriented actors. The superior complexity of presidential systems is 
characterized by a mixed rule whereby there is independence of origin, but available 
institutional devices assuring a relative dependence of survivability. This piece of evidence 
shows that there are binding devices in the constitutional design of presidential systems as 
important for determining whether actors will be more likely to seek consensus or to 
employ threats of mutual dissolution, as those determining impeachment procedures or 
mechanisms of mutual oversight, and involving a relative dependence of survivability. My 
argument is that the nature, number and quality of such rules matters more in explaining 
democratic outcomes and political stability than the individual effects of separate rules that 
strengthen either the Executive or the Assembly.  
In my view, the emphasis on individual rules as empowering a single political actor 
is a consequence of an asymmetric and static analytical style, inadequate for approaching 
presidential systems, which may combine mixtures of constitutional rules. These mixtures 
may not be exhausted in the macro structure of power of separate and independent 
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electoral devices for each branch’s composition. Instead, I attempt to generate a more 
detailed analysis that includes the proactive and reactive powers of both Executives and 
Assemblies.  
This analysis will help in understanding which elements make a legislative body 
powerful or powerless in the face of the proactive powers of Executives, or an independent 
institution, through the separate inclusion of legislative proactive powers. In addition, the 
analysis aims at generating a methodologically viable way of measuring and capturing 
variation within presidential systems.  
Notice that, from my previous arguments, I will pay special attention to the 
inclusion of indicators which refer to the constitutional rules that tie the two branches of 
power together in a common rule, either by putting them under co-decision or by 
providing them with capabilities for mutual oversight. Since “in two-agent constitutional 
designs [presidential systems], how identifiability and representativeness are balanced in the 
final policy output depends on the ways in which presidential and assembly powers are 
balanced, shared, and checked”(Shugart and Carey, 1992: 274).  
Given that this effort combines the elaboration of indicators that measure both 
power resources and how they vary on theoretical grounds and their possible empirical 
variation, I gather the indicators together in an empirical coding scheme adopted for each 
set of powers (proactive and reactive for Executives, proactive for Assemblies, reactive for 
Assemblies). These are set out in three separate tables, for the sake of clarity. The first 
refers to the proactive powers of Executives, defined as those powers of enactment that 
allow this actor to propose policy change. I then proceed with the reactive powers of the 
Legislative branch in presidential systems, defined as those powers of blockage or 
counteraction that allow a political actor to maintain the status quo as such. Finally, I also 
include the proactive powers of the Assembly, defined as above for the Executive.  
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Table  6 .  Proac t iv e  and reac t iv e  powers  o f  Execut iv e s  f rom cons t i tu t iona l  des ign  in  pres ident ia l  sy s t ems 
Type of tool Executive Coding scale (Variation) 
Authoritative  Cabinet formation 0 Has no independency in cabinet formation 
1 Names members of cabinet but needs Assembly 
ratification 
2 Names and forms cabinet independently 
Ordinary legislative 
initiative 
0 Has no ordinary legislative initiative 
1 Has ordinary legislative initiative 
Jurisdictional areas  0 Has proposal authority for budget bill but it can be fully 
amended in the legislature 
1 Has proposal authority for budget bill and unlimited 
material amendments by the legislature 
2 Has proposal authority and limited formal amendments 
by legislature 
4 Has proposal authority and bill cannot be amended by 
legislature 
0 Executive alone cannot propose Constitutional reform 
1 Executive can propose Constitutional reform subject to 
review by Judiciary or legislature 
4 Executive can propose Constitutional reform with full 
independence 
0 Executive alone cannot propose referenda directly 
1 Executive can propose referenda directly to ratify by 
legislature 
4 Executive alone can propose referenda directly with full 
independence 
Power tools Veto power 0 Has no veto power 
1 Has total veto power, one-shot 
2 Has partial veto power, one-shot 
3 Has total veto power for an unlimited number of times 
4 Has partial veto power for an unlimited number of times 
Decree power 0 Has no decree power 
1 Has decree power but must be submitted to legislature 
immediately  
2 Has decree power with temporal effective application 
once legislative ratification obtained 
3 Has decree power with temporal effective application 
without legislative ratification 
4 Has decree power without restrictions 
Institutional 
independence 
(of survivability) 
Power of dissolution 
of the legislature 
0 Has no power of dissolution 
4 Has power of dissolution without jeopardizing own term 
Own-budget 
determination 
0 Has no own-budget determination 
1 Has own-budget determination but can be reviewed 
(decreased) by legislature 
3 Has fully independent own-budget determination 
Appointive 
powers (apart 
from cabinet) 
Executive names 
members of the 
Judiciary  
0 Executive cannot name members of the Judiciary 
1 Executive can name members of the Judiciary but need 
legislative ratification 
2 Executive names a quota of members of the Judiciary 
4 Executive can name members of the Judiciary with full 
independence  
Emergency 
powers 
May declare war  0 No 
4 Yes 
Calls for 
extraordinary session 
0 No 
1 Call for extraordinary session on a constrained policy 
issue 
2 Call for extraordinary session for consideration of urgent 
issues (decrees) 
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4 Call for extraordinary session any time  
Assumes special 
powers  when 
Congress not in 
session 
0 No 
4 Yes 
Note: The range of the empirical variation is settled between zero and four, zero implying no power 
provision for the branch under consideration and four implying full power provision for that indicator for 
the branch under consideration. The coding scheme is further explained below in the text.  
 
I have distinguished between different levels where constitutional rules operate and 
may be unpacked to incorporate detail: authoritative tools, power tools, institutional 
independence, appointive powers, and emergency powers. Each of these has a set of 
indicators together with a coding scheme designed to capture variation. While some 
indicators are adopted from the index elaborated by Shugart and Carey (1992: 150)31, the 
proposed index still stands as an innovative proposal.  
I have also distinguished, adopting a continuous coding scheme, between different 
degrees of importance for each power resource, with the theoretical ceiling fixed at the 
value four. As can be seen, not all indicators display all five possible figures (from 0 to 4), 
so some indicators jump from the lowest value to the highest. This strategy is equivalent to 
the adoption of a theoretical weighting, attaching value four to a power device that is 
theoretically believed to maximally strengthen the authority of the political actor.   
Authoritative tools refer to the proactive ability of a political actor to propose new 
legislation and to form a government with more or less independence. Within the former I 
have only considered ordinary legislation32 and three particular jurisdictional policy areas of 
special importance. First, the authority on the budget bill, which is typically enacted 
exclusively by the Executive. Second, the authority for Constitutional reform, for its 
importance in terms of a potential unilateral ability to propose a reform to strengthen 
his/her own power, as seen in some mid-twentieth century authoritarian regimes in 
Europe, which employed constitutional rules to acquire extra sources of authority via 
constitutional reform. Third, the authority to propose a referendum directly, designed to 
capture an important resource that allows the development of direct linkages with the 
citizenry, circumventing other institutions, such as the legislature. This latter authoritative 
tool, if provided to Executives, has been seen to foster populist Executives by weakening 
party identifications, developing the desire to remain in office, and finally provoking a 
systematic representation of entrenched minorities despite the broad discursive image of 
                                                
31 In particular, the indicators related to cabinet formation, veto power, decree power, ordinary legislative initiative and 
the last indicator ‘assumes special powers if Congress not in session’ are common to Shugart and Carey’s index, logically 
deriving from the corpus of constitutional rules employed for comparisons among forms of government.  
32 Here, it is obvious that the value zero has a heuristic value, since no known political system forbids the authority of the 
Executive or the cabinet to propose ordinary legislation. 
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populist Presidents. Besides this having the power to call referenda directly opens the 
possibility to legislate in any policy area that would be subject to legislative review were it to 
follow the ordinary process of legislative approval, i.e. it allows the circumventing of the 
legislature. Hence, referenda power provides an important resource for unilateral action, 
thereby restricting the aggregation of interests in decision-making.  
Second, power tools include the two typical power devices generally considered to 
strengthen the Executive’s resources for maximizing its potential for unilateral action: veto 
power and decree power. Here, while veto power is assessed as a reactive power invoked 
by the Executive as a response to a conflict over legislative drafting with the Legislature, 
decree power is assessed as an exceptional proactive power that may be employed to 
legislate under more or less demanding circumstances. Within veto power, the partial veto 
(also called item veto in the literature) ranks higher than the total veto (also called package 
veto). The variation is judged according to the number of times veto power may be 
exerted, that is whether the legislative initiative can be introduced again once it has been 
discarded via veto and not insisted. Here, the most powerful Executive would be one who 
can exert total and item veto at its own discretion and can also keep on vetoing for an 
unlimited number of times; this would be equivalent to quasi-authoritarian powers over the 
content of legislation.  
With respect to decree power, I have also included the equivalent possible axes of 
variation, as for veto above: form of decree and temporal constraints. Decree power is 
usually employed as an exceptional power tool (typically as a way out of a deadlock 
situation), with a constrained policy content (as a way out of an economic crisis, for 
instance, or to speed up a political response to a natural disaster, as happened with 
Hurricane Mitch in the area of study) and with a constrained temporal validity (for short-
term policy-making of priority for the government). Again, the most powerful Executive 
with regard to this power tool would be one for whom unilateral action, or quasi-
authoritarian legislative powers are available: that is where decree power may be used 
without restriction. However, the range of variation captured in the Table above portrays 
once more the idea of how far the branches are linked via bonds of approval, ratification or 
potential rejection of mutual initiatives.  
Third, appointive powers are included in order to capture possible incursion or 
intrusion that the Executive branch may make into the other two branches. While the 
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Legislative branch is by definition in (pure) presidential systems independently elected33, the 
Judiciary may lend itself to be a politicized arena if its composition is fully determined by 
one branch. Hence, whereas more and diverse appointive powers are usually attributed to 
Executives in all political systems, be they parliamentary or presidential in this context, I 
have chosen to include only the appointment of the Judiciary for its importance as the third 
branch in the separation of powers doctrine embedded in all modern constitutions.  
In the fourth place, the powers of the branches to determine their mutual 
institutional independence of survivability is characterized with only two indicators, one on 
the Executive’s power of dissolution over the legislature (reactive tool) and one on own-
budget determination (proactive tool).  
Finally, emergency powers are also seen as an important device determining the 
strength of a political actor from the constitutional design, due to the exit points these tools 
may offer when conflictive situations emerge (deadlock situations, inter-branch blockage or 
urgent legislation, such as a deadline on an International Treaty). Again, while the potential 
variation within this type of power resource is very large, I have only considered here three 
types of emergency procedures of constitutional rank34 that provide important power 
resources to the Executive in adopting unilateral decisions (such as in the case of war or in 
the case of assuming special powers if the Assembly is not in session), or in enforcing its 
agenda-setting powers (such as the authority of the Executive to call on extraordinary 
session).  
Next, Table 2 displays the indicators for measuring the reactive powers of 
Assemblies. I underscore the importance of these in order to assess the capacity of the 
Legislature to counterbalance and oversee Executive action.  
                                                
33 In very few cases there is or has been a collegial election of the Executive or, in the opposite case, the requirement of 
investiture of the Legislature by the Executive. Again, in the pure presidential form a common constitutional design 
characteristic is institutional independence of origin, unlike institutional independence of survivability, as indicated in the 
Table.  
34 Chapter 4 deals precisely with emergency procedures of legislative procedural rank, that is, procedures that allow the 
Executive to either modify the sequential treatment of the bill (like reduction of the number of debates, assignment of  a 
special committee to emit a dictum or call for an extraordinary session) or the status of the bill (from ordinary to urgent) 
in order to get legislation passed.  
 
61 
Table  7 .  Leg i s la t iv e  branch r eac t iv e  powers  f rom cons t i tu t iona l  des ign  in  pres ident ia l  sy s t ems 
Type of tool Reactive capability of 
Legislature 
Coding scale (Variation) 
Authoritative  Capacity to ask for 
government reports 
0 Has no capacity to ask for reports 
1 Has capacity to ask for reports in following-up emergency 
legislation 
2 Has capacity to ask Ministries for reports in the areas of 
their competence any time any policy issues 
3 Has capacity to ask for reports with immediate effect on 
control mechanisms (may lead to investigation, vote of 
confidence, etc) 
4 Has capacity to initiate independent investigation on the 
actions of Ministries, validating report information 
Capacity of oversight 
of Executive action 
0 Has no capacity to oversee the Exe. Action 
1 Has capacity to oversee Exe. Action with no judicial 
implications 
2 Has capacity to investigate Executive action 
independently and open an independent judicial process 
3 Has capacity of vote of confidence with a supermajority 
4 Has capacity of vote of confidence with a simple majority 
Power tools Rule to override veto 0 Has no capacity to override vetoed bills 
1 Has capacity to override total vetoes with simple 
supermajority (2/3) 
2 Has capacity to override total and partial vetoes with 
simple supermajority (2/3) 
3 Has capacity to override vetoes and the bill cannot be 
vetoed once insistence 
Amendment or 
temporal constraint 
on decree 
0 Has no capacity to ratify or review decrees 
1 Has capacity to review decrees with supermajority vote 
2 Has capacity to review decrees within a temporal 
constraint when the bill is effective 
4 Unless legislative review, the decree is ineffective  
Institutional 
independence of 
origin and 
survivability 
Power of dismissal of 
Ministries (censure or 
vote of confidence) 
0 No 
4 Yes 
Power to ratify 
cabinet formation 
0 No 
4 Yes 
Impeachment of 
President 
0 No 
4 Yes 
Own-budget 
determination 
0 Has no own-budget determination 
1 Has own-budget determination but can be reviewed 
(decreased) by Executive 
3 Has fully independent own-budget determination 
Jurisdictional 
areas 
Amendment of 
budget bill 
 
0 Has no power to amend budget bill  
1 Has power to propose formal amendments, but cannot 
increase budget entries 
2 Has power to propose material amendments, like 
redistribution among budget entries 
3 Has power to propose amendments including an 
increase/addition of a budget entry 
International/ Foreign 
policy 
0 Has no say in foreign policy of the government 
4 International Treaties need Assembly ratification to be 
effective 
 
As seen in this Table, a range of varied tools to control and constrain Executive 
actions is also available to Assemblies from the constitutional design. In their reactive form, 
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I have followed the distinction between normative levels of operation I employed for 
Executive proactive powers, in order to facilitate their comparative assessment. Again, I 
have ranked in a continuous scale the powers of Assemblies to counterbalance the 
proactive powers of Executives as included in Table 6. While most indicators are simple a 
replica of the indicators employed to measure the powers of Executives, the last one, 
jurisdictional areas, is novel: the capability to review the foreign policy of the government. 
Foreign policy is one typical prerogative of the exclusive jurisdiction of Executives in 
presidential systems, as is the budget bill. For this reason, I have considered as a key 
reactive tool the capacity of the Assembly to review these two policy areas where the 
Legislature is excluded from enactment, but may not be from the final drafting and 
approval.  
Finally, the third piece of information to be considered is the proactive power of 
the Legislative branch, stemming from the constitutional provisions. Here, I have also 
adopted the basic distinction of the normative levels of operation of the constitutional 
design of authoritative, appointive, policy related and emergency powers. The indicators 
are, however, adapted to suit the Legislative institutional structure and functions.  
Table  8 .  Leg i s la t iv e  branch proac t iv e  powers  f rom the  cons t i tu t iona l  des ign  in  pres ident ia l  sy s t ems 
Type of tool Proactive capabilities 
of Legislature 
Coding scale (Variation) 
Authoritative 
powers 
Ordinary legislative 
initiative 
0 Has no ordinary legislative initiative 
1 Has ordinary legislative initiative 
Appointive 
powers 
Legislature names 
members of the 
Judiciary  
0 Assembly cannot name members of the Judiciary 
1 Assembly can name members of the Judiciary that need 
Executive’s ratification 
2 Assembly names a quota of members of the Judiciary 
4 Assembly names members of the Judiciary with full 
independence 
Jurisdictional 
areas 
Constitutional reform 0 Assembly alone cannot propose Constitutional reform 
1 Assembly can propose Constitutional reform, subject to 
review by Judiciary or Executive 
4 Assembly can propose Constitutional reform with full 
independence 
Referenda directly 0 Legislative alone cannot directly propose referenda  
1 Legislative can directly propose referenda but ratified by 
Executive 
4 Legislative branch alone can directly propose referenda 
with full independence 
Power of amnesty 0 No 
1 Yes 
Emergency 
powers 
Calls for 
extraordinary session 
 
 
0 No 
1 May call for extraordinary session on a supermajority 
vote 
2 May call for extraordinary session on a simple majority 
vote 
3 Any member of the Legislature may call for extraordinary 
session  
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The number of indicators is overall lower for the Assembly than for the Executive 
concerning proactive powers, but notice that this does not hold if we add the reactive and 
the proactive. Shugart and Carey (1992) therefore had the right intuition when they called 
attention to the fact that the dual structure of presidential systems does not necessarily lead 
to marginal legislatures and extra-strong Presidents. This depends, therefore, from the 
frame of this analysis, on the kind of interrelation between normative levels of operation 
(in both number and quality) and on the way the branches are interrelated within this set of 
rules, that is whether political actors are in a position of confrontation, negotiation or 
consensus-seeking. The next Section is devoted to the empirical testing of these arguments.  
4- PRESIDENTS AND PARLIAMENTS IN FOUR CENTRAL AMERICAN 
COUNTRIES: UNPACKING VARIATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RULES IN 
PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS 
“Fair procedures lead to fair outcomes, 
while fair outcomes generally result from 
fair procedures. But the two are 
distinguishable in practice as well as 
theory”35 
 
In this section, I first empirically apply the theoretical indicators elaborated in the 
previous section and then analyze whether it holds that Assembly and Executive powers 
are inversely related (the stronger the Executive the weaker the Assembly) or whether my 
argument that not only the number but also the qualitative nature of the ties between the 
branches matters more in an interrelated way than the individual effect of each 
constitutional rule. This analysis will shed light on the explanatory capacity of constitutional 
design for political performance, which I expect to be low.  
                                                
35 Klosko, G. (2000: 208).  
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Table  9 .  Gross  r e su l t s  o f  the  cons t i tu t iona l  powers  o f  Execut iv e s  in  four  Centra l  Amer i can countr i e s   
Indicators from the 
constitutional design 
PANAMA GUATEMALA HONDURAS  COSTA RICA 
AUTHORITATIVE TOOLS 
Cabinet formation 2 2 2 2 
Legislative initiative 1 1 1 1 
Budget bill exclusive 
introduction 
0 2 1 0 
Constitutional reform exclusive 
introduction 
1 1 0 0 
Referenda proposal exclusive 
introduction 
0 4 0 1 
POWER TOOLS 
Veto power 4 1 1 1 
Decree power 3 1 3 1 
INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE 
Power of dissolution 0 4 0 0 
Own-budget determination 1 3 3 3 
APPOINTIVE POWERS 
Names members of the 
Judiciary 
1 0 0 0 
EMERGENCY POWERS 
May declare war independently 0 0 4 4 
Extraordinary session 1 1 1 1 
Especial powers when Congress 
not in session 
4 0 4 4 
 
The general picture from the empirical analysis of the constitutional powers of the 
Executives in these four countries is that (1) more variation stems from the indicators 
related to power tools and emergency powers than any other set; (2) there is no variation in 
the appointive powers, indicating that the separation of powers is fully in place in these 
countries; (3) there is moderate to large variation between the possible courses of action 
that Executives may adopt to achieve unilateral action, but this will depend and be curtailed 
by the capacity of legislatures to oversee and review this action.  
Secondly, and with more case-detailed information in mind, the set of indicators 
that is particularly revealing is that concerning the specific jurisdictional policy areas of 
exclusive introduction by the Executive. This domain constitutes part of what I will include 
in the last Section of this Chapter under procedural rules, that is those exclusively related to 
the process of legislative approval.  
Thirdly, with this empirical information, we can only be sure that Executives in 
presidential systems generally possess the ordinary legislative initiative, independence in 
cabinet formation, total veto power for at least once, no authority in naming members of 
the Judiciary, the capacity to call an extraordinary session if a policy issue demands 
immediate legislative approval, and full own-budget determination. In all the other areas of 
power and authority there is variation, including the possible range of veto powers and 
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decree powers, both of which have been seen as particularly strong tools of power in 
presidential systems.  
Finally, a rather surprising source of weakness for legislative action is the fact that 
in three cases out of four the Executive may assume special powers when Congress is not 
in session, thereby opening a window of opportunity for Executives to take important 
unilateral policy decisions during this temporal lapse. Despite the fact that in all four 
Constitutions under analysis the provision for this prerogative is constrained to special or 
urgent legislative needs36, the existence of this power tool strengthens the Executive’s 
resources to marginalize the legislature if conflict is expected during the ordinary term (as 
in cases of divided government or of weak party discipline when there is unified 
government but a scarce majority in Congress).  
Before elaborating any conclusions on the comparative strength of Executives in 
these countries, I shall carry out the corresponding empirical analysis with the chosen 
indicators for the reactive and proactive powers of Assemblies from the constitutional 
design of the four countries under analysis. 
Table  10.  Gross  r e su l t s  o f  the  cons t i tu t iona l  powers  o f  Assembl i e s  in  four  Centra l  Amer i can countr i e s  
Indicators from the 
constitutional design 
PANAMA GUATEMALA HONDURAS  COSTA RICA 
REACTIVE POWERS 
AUTHORITATIVE TOOLS 
Asks for reports 2 3 2 2 
Capacity of oversight 1 1 2 2 
POWER TOOLS 
Overrides veto 3 3 3 3 
Reviews decree 2 4 2 4 
INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE 
Power of censure over 
Ministries 
0 4 0 4 
Ratifies cabinet formation 0 0 0 0 
Impeachment of President 0 0 0 4 
Own-budget determination 3 3 3 1 
JURISDICTIONAL AREAS 
Amendment of budget bill 3 2 2 3 
Foreign policy 4 4 4 4 
PROACTIVE POWERS 
AUTHORITATIVE TOOLS 
Ordinary legislative initiative  1 1 1 1 
APPOINTIVE POWERS 
Names members of the 
Judiciary 
0 4 4 4 
JURISDICTIONAL AREAS 
                                                
36 In the case of Panama, the Executive must ask for delegation from the Assembly; in the case of Costa Rica, the 
Executive may assume special powers in cases of war or public disorder generally phrased; and, finally, in Honduras the 
Executive may also take unilateral action or use special powers in the case of war, although in this latter case Congress 
must be called to session as soon as possible. Another institutional solution is provided in Guatemala, where there is a 
Permanent Committee, formed after a vote in Congress before the closure of the ordinary session.  
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Constitutional reform 4 4 4 4 
Referenda 4 4 0 4 
Power of amnesty 1 1 1 1 
EMERGENCY POWERS 
Extraordinary session 0 2 1 0 
 
Legislatures in presidential systems, according to the empirical results for these 
countries, are generally provided with the capacity to ask for reports from the cabinet, that 
is, they have administrative capabilities of oversight, own-budget determination, strong 
reactive capacities to override the veto power of the Executive, no say in cabinet formation 
(or total mutual independence of origin of legitimacy and authority), strong ratification 
powers in foreign policy, and strong jurisdictional authority on constitutional reform, 
referenda and amnesty.  
A first element in this list that reinforces the power of the legislative bodies in 
Honduras and Costa Rica, where vetoed bills cannot be reintroduced in the same legislative 
term. Also for these two cases, the legislative capacity to amend the budget bill is 
strengthened, since the Executive veto cannot apply after approval in the House37. These 
types of rules constitute an empowering device for these legislatures, and are absent in the 
other two cases (Guatemala and Panama). The example illustrates my theoretical point that 
constitutional ties between the branches are more relevant in determining power resources 
than each separate rule. While it is true that veto power is available to all Executives in 
these countries, as a typical power device of presidential systems, limitations exist in some 
important areas where the representative input of Congress is privileged. Also in the case 
of the budget bill, the tie between the branches actually neutralizes the first-mover 
advantage of the Executive of exclusivity in proposal authority, since henceforth 
amendments in the legislature are unlimited.  
In fact, Costa Rica displays a pattern that constitutionally reinforces the political 
functions of the legislative without an equivalent reinforcing of the Executive. This fact 
hints that the possibilities for combining varying power resources and the distribution of 
these among the two branches is not always inversely relating the two branches (the 
stronger the Executive the weaker the Assembly). In this respect, the legislative design of 
Panama is relatively surprising as the written rules, shown by the indicators employed here, 
put the House in a powerful position: it can increase entries in the budget bill, for instance, 
typically a scarce power resource for legislatures in presidential systems, and it also has full 
                                                
37 The veto in both Honduras and Costa Rica is also forbidden for International Treaties and contracts, once submitted 
by the Executive to the House. For constitutional and electoral reforms the Costa Rican Constitution designates the 
Congress as the only sovereign actor, and for reform of the University system, which must be approved by the University 
San Carlos.  
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independence to call referenda. For the authors of the few existing studies on the Panama 
legislature (Guevara Mann, 2001; Otero, 2003) this picture of a powerful legislative body 
would come as a surprise. Explanations for this particularly rich case of de facto practices are 
described in the analysis of legislative production (Chapter 3).   
Finally, if Costa Rica appears to have a strong Legislative branch and Panama 
middle-to-strong one, Guatemala displays the trickiest combination for interpretation in 
these terms. As a case where constitutional drafting involved a many of the international 
advisory institutions38, the Constitution in fact developed as a collage of elements that 
strengthen both the legislature and the Executive, clearly inspired by the theory on the 
benefits of independence of the branches. For this country, then, the constitutional design 
provides few ties between the branches, settling their areas of authority in an independent 
fashion. Nonetheless, the Guatemalan legislature has a strong power to censure Ministries, 
as does Costa Rican, and an authority parallel to that of the Executive to call for 
extraordinary sessions. Yet it may face independent dissolution powers by the Executive 
and an appealing call to direct legitimacy from this actor through its full independence on 
referenda proposals.  
This comparative result is indicative of clear-cut differences and I will analyze the 
reflection of this difference in legislative performances of the political systems 
constitutionally designed to place political actors in two interrelated axes of dependence-
independence: decisional involvement and consensus or conflict seeking. My point here is 
that where there is high dependence, in terms of constitutional ties (in both number and 
quality) there is an associated decisional involvement of political actors which practically 
leads to consensus-oriented actors. Provided that political actors need each other for the 
decision-making process and for agreement on possible ranges of amendments39, they will 
need to be consensus-seeking and agree upon a satisfying scheme of decisional interaction. 
On the opposite extreme, where there is high independence of political actors in terms of 
the number and quality of (absent) constitutional ties, actors are not forced to take on any 
scheme of decisional involvement and conflict may easily appear if divided government, 
low party discipline or a pork-barreling style of policy-making is in place.  
                                                
38 The Peace Agreements in Guatemala in 1985 in fact involved the International Community in all aspects, from the 
negotiations between political parties and the schedule of their compromises, to the actual drafting of the institutional 
design. Hence, while the faith of scholars continues to be high on the role of advisory assistance in the constitutional 
design of institutions, Guatemala is a case that certainly raises doubts on the efficiency of this tool. While political will 
only made the long lasting Peace process feasible in 1985 (when Arzu held the Presidency), Guatemala is a clear case 
where the complex legacy of the past and the low renewal of the political elite have prevented the disappearance of the 
status quo.  
39 Or what Tsebelis (2002) calls the positional dimension, characterized by the leverage of discretion of the agenda setter 
– or the size of the choice set of amendments/proposals – and the closeness to the median voter of the legislature.  
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If these two scenarios may be clear both theoretically and empirically (the 
illustrative cases being Costa Rica for the first scenario and Guatemala for the second), 
what is the range of possible fuzzy spaces between cooperation and gridlock? My answer to 
this question, which is central to the contribution of this thesis, is the capacity of political 
actors to behave strategically (for instance by making credible threats of blockage or 
delaying legislative initiative, as Farrell and Heritier, 2003, suggest) and the pattern of 
historical interaction between political actors as explanatory variables. On this latter aspect, 
a crucial point needs to be made: while constitutional rules may or may not tie political 
actors to a mutual crossroad, the final decision to follow the conflictive or the cooperative 
pathway largely depends on the will of political actors. There are abundant examples of 
both routes, where consensus constitutional design has led to conflict between political 
actors (the Nixon term in the U.S.) and where conflictive constitutional design has led to a 
cooperative output induced by the will of political actors and their interaction (Holland 
before the Second World War). 
So far, the overall variation identified from the empirical analysis of the 
constitutional design as carried out here is mostly based on the set of indicators for reactive 
powers. Like the Executives, where convergence on the proactive powers was great, the 
legislative branches also diverge in their variety of responses to the two typical power tools 
(veto and decree) that are available to the Executive, as well as with respect to the 
responses of the legislature to the exclusive enactment of some policy jurisdictions by the 
Executive.  
A final exercise to test the performance of this ranking set of indicators is to assess 
the captured variation in a comparative way. Here I have employed a simple additive rule as 
a heuristic strategy40, adding all the indicators for each of the branches given that weighting 
was adopted on theoretical grounds. This simple comparison displays a pattern of variation 
susceptible to interpretation as a two-way combination of the branches’ powers. As shown 
below, a simple correlation analysis between the total figure of Executive constitutional 
powers and the equivalent for the Assemblies shows that the relationship is not inverse but 
positive, weak and non-significant.  
Table 11. Comparing the constitutional powers of Executives and Assemblies in 
presidential systems 
                                                
40 My disclaimer here is that I do not aim to fully argue that the indicators of constitutional design as developed in this 
Chapter are possible to gauge in single indexes. I have, on the contrary, pursued the point that the effort of unpacking 
variation is relevant and that, generally, adding institutional detail and complexity is necessary for adequate empirical and 
comparative institutional analysis. The only function of adding the ranks from the previous unpacking exercise is to show 
that, in fact, the standard asymmetric view on the powers of Executives and Legislatures does not hold empirically with 
the data available for the cases under analysis.  
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Total  PANAMA GUATEMALA HONDURAS COSTA RICA 
Executive branch 18 20 20 18 
Legislative branch 28 40 29 41 
Weighted by number of 
indicators for Executive 
1.38 1.53 1.53 1.38 
Weighted by number of 
indicators for Legislative 
1.75 2.5 1.81 2.56 
Correlation analysis Pearson Coefficient=0.034; significance value=0.966 
 
From this last comparative summary, we obtain three general pieces of information: first, 
the Legislatures display more diversity than the Executives. This suggests that while the design of 
Executive powers in constitutional provisions is fairly homogeneous in presidential 
systems, that there is a homogeneous range of powers available to Assemblies from the 
constitutional design is more difficult to capture. This empirical evidence indicates that 
while there is a clear conception in the presidential constitutional tradition of what a 
President in such a political system is provided with, in terms of power and authority 
resources, there seems to be a wider variety of tools for endowing Assemblies in a 
continuum of authoritative, appointive and oversight resources of power. Second, this fact 
also appears to indicate that what makes the difference for overall political performance is 
the degree of aggregation of interests (or the representative function) that legislatures are 
assigned, and not, (or not exclusively), what Executives can or cannot do. From the 
perspective of this work, the three levels of power operation matter (the powers of the 
Executive, the powers of the Assembly and the interaction between the branches), with 
larger weight given to the latter.   
Thirdly, it seems possible – and indeed becomes clear when historical insights of 
case-specific nature are taken into account - that the figures above display a two-way 
prototypical combination of constitutional powers: Panama and Honduras represent very 
balanced political systems, with very similar ranking for both Executive and Legislative 
constitutional powers (in the additive version) while Guatemala and Costa Rica represent a 
type of political system that strengthens the constitutional powers of the legislature as 
compared to the Executive. Despite these relatively counter-intuitive results, as may be 
derived from the reputation of the Costa Rican democracy, here coupled with Guatemala, 
which does not enjoy such a reputation, the results hold empirically in that equal indicators 
were employed for the constitutional analysis.  
In sum, what appears to happen is that multiple possible combinations are in place: 
for instance, while Panama and Guatemala are closer and highly comparable in terms of the 
political dynamics, and the same applies to Costa Rica and Honduras, this pair-wise 
comparative effort shows a different combination with respect to constitutional rules. The 
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problem with employing aggregate measures is precisely this: that it becomes difficult  to 
identify what the final figure implies. This fits well with the theoretical aim of first 
unpacking the details of constitutional analysis and then proceeding with a comparative 
general analysis of this factor’s weight (constitutional design) in determining political 
performance.  
The historical context of the constitutional drafting moment sheds light on the 
apparent similarities between Guatemala and Costa Rica: Guatemala enjoyed international 
assistance and a recent past of hyper-authoritarian tradition, which a long process of 
negotiation among political actors attempted to limit. The result was thus inspired by 
claims that strong legislatures may solve the problem of presidential systems breaking 
down into authoritarian regimes. Costa Rica, with a similar context at the time of the 
Constitutional approval in 1949 (after a recent civil war generated by a crude conflict 
between personalized leaders both of whom were strong candidates for the Presidency), 
attempted in fact to limit the reproduction of such a conflictual situation, by designing a 
Constitution strongly inspired by the checks-and-balances doctrine. The Assembly thus 
ended being clearly strengthened and the Electoral Tribunal was created with the 
prerogatives of a fourth power.  
In turn, the constitutional comparability between Honduras and Panama derives 
more directly from the limited but stable nature of the democratic regime in these 
countries, where long-standing parties (fronts for the personalized figures of Torrijos in 
Panama and Bonillas in Honduras) have acted as hegemonic political designers. The 
balanced constitutional design that appears to exist may thus be seen as a byproduct of a 
long historical process where hegemonic actors agreed to distribute independent power 
prerogatives among different institutions as a concessionary strategy that would allow them 
to keep control of power resources in all institutions. This strategy has in fact been 
successful in both cases, where a largely fragmented electoral offer translates with relative 
stability into bipartisan scenarios in the legislature41, so that the two main political actors 
can ‘split-the-cake’ in terms of both institutional and electoral resources42.  
Finally, it appears to be clear that, according to the empirical analysis carried out 
here, with these indicators and for these countries, Assemblies are not in a weaker or 
                                                
41 In Honduras, for the legislative term under study (1998-2001), 94% of the seats in Parliament were occupied by 
legislators of the PNH or of the PLH, the two largest parties in the country historically dominating the institutional and 
electoral resources (Ajenjo, 2001, in Alcantara and Freidenberg). In Panama, for the legislative term under study (1994-
99), 64% of the seats were occupied by the PA or the PRD, similarly the two largest parties of the country (Garcia Diez, 
2001, in Alcantara and Freidenberg).   
42 This line of reasoning is further developed – empirically and substantively - for specific characteristics of the 
institutional design, such as the size of the committee system, in Chapter 4.  
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marginal position as compared to Executives in terms of the constitutional provision of 
power and authority resources. Looking at the last row of the weighted figures (in Table 6), 
where these can be compared more directly, all Legislative bodies in these countries rank 
higher than the Executives, even in the cases with slight numerical differences that is 
Panama and Honduras.  
5 – A CALL FOR ATTENTION TO THE PROCEDURAL DESIGN 
So far I have obtained an empirical endorsement of the main expectation and 
hypothesis of this Chapter: (1) there were biases in the attribution of little variation to 
constitutional design in presidential systems, and (2) there is a net of rules whose 
interaction is more important in determining political actors’ behavior than the individual 
effect of each rule. What remains to be addressed is the specific causal attribution to 
constitutional design as the responsible for the legislative performance in presidential 
systems.  
Having chosen relatively similar cases for the empirical analysis of this thesis in 
terms of constitutional structure (presidential systems, unicameral and a similar set of 
actors with legislative authority) where does the variation that determines diverging political 
performance come from?  
My answer to this question is that given that, as empirically shown, Assemblies are 
not necessarily weak as a result of the constitutional design (question 1), there are two 
additional elements that may help to capture the potential agenda control capabilities of 
Executives or majority parties in the legislature: (1) the endogenous institutional design of 
the legislative process allows political actors, in particular majority actors (the Executive or 
the majority party in the House) to exert agenda control as defined earlier; Or (2) the 
explanatory sources are to be found in exogenous pressures, such as the electoral cycle and 
the characteristics of the political context (such as polarization and fragmentation).  
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The exogenous pressures have been explored, showing significant effects, in several 
works looking at presidential systems (Shugart, 1995). I will examine these factors further 
in Chapters 3 and 6. I will now focus on endogenous institutional design, given its 
exceptional importance for democratic rule. The argument is that if political actors may 
restrict the aggregation of interests as a consequence of a strong economic shock in the 
country (let us say an external debt shock, suffered by many governments in Latin 
America), then a discretional use of endogenous procedures to the decision-making may in 
fact take place. A problem appears if the discretional employment of endogenous 
procedures occurs systematically. The emphasis of the argument is that, while the 
institutional design should not tie the political actors to highly inflexible decisional 
structures, especially given the increased complexity of the policy-making process, the 
question of to what degree the discretional use of endogenous decisional tools is in place as 
a structural decisional style matters, in our analytical frame, for the effective application of 
the rule of law, which is so essentially associated with democratic regimes.  
The range, or degree, that I refer to is whether the possibilities for unilateral action 
for a single political actor are embedded in the normative design. In line with the legal 
studies related to constitutional design, I agree that there is no rule or set of rules that may 
predict all possible courses of action. Therefore, there is a structural lack of accuracy in any 
institutional design, with respect to the spaces where a more discretionary employment or 
interpretation of a rule or procedure may be made. When these discretional spaces of 
decision allow specific actors to undertake unilateral actions or enjoy comparative 
advantages is a manifestation of agenda control. In this context, it is important to identify 
which rules are available to the Executive that allow the circumvention of the legislature’s 
capacity of oversight, review and authority. Assessing de facto practices, as I claimed at the 
beginning of this Chapter, may contribute to this effort, particularly by the detailed 
examination of which procedures are employed to get legislation passed with a view to 
identifying systematic patterns.  
This call to pay increased attention to the importance of procedural design derives 
from the recognition that it is not only the broad institutional design – as determined by 
the Constitution – but also the auxiliary sets of rules and normative levels regulating who is 
entitled to present legislative initiatives, the general of approval or rejection of a bill, and 
the specific procedures that may offer comparative advantages. Within the latter, 
procedural design essentially establishes the committee system design (number and 
electoral rules of committees, specialization scheme and voting rules); the organization of 
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the legislative workload (the organization and composition of legislative blocks, ); the 
functions of and voting rules for electing the Directive Board; the sequential design of the 
process of legislative approval (including number of debates, length of speeches, type and 
adoption rule for ordinary and urgent procedures, deadlines for committee dictums and for 
the revision of dictums in committees, set up of the agenda); the general calendar of 
legislative work (defining the ordinary period of sessions); the type of amendments and 
available processes for the review of a decision; the mechanisms for reform of the 
Legislative Proceedings; and the voting rules for ordinary and organic legislation and 
quorums.  
These rules are all important for determining the powerful or powerless position of 
political actors, in that they specify in detail the ordinary and exceptional procedures within 
which these can exert their political capabilities in the process of legislative production. I 
will now introduce the characteristics of the procedural designs in the four countries under 
analysis to proceed subsequently, in Chapter 3, with the analysis of de facto practices in 
patterns of legislative production. This descriptive information, therefore, serves an 
illustrative objective of identifying sources of variation and commonalities between the 
cases. The four countries share similar procedural designs at an aggregate level, in the 
unicameral composition of the House, but diverge in their specific provision of legislative 
authority to varying societal and political actors and on the design of the ordinary and 
urgent procedures for approving legislation. The comparative description of the legislative 
procedural design follows in Table 7.  
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Table  12.  Leg i s la t iv e  procedura l  des ign  in  four  Centra l  Amer i can countr i e s  
Components of 
the procedural 
legislative design 
HONDURAS COSTA RICA GUATEMALA PANAMA 
Authority to call 
for extraordinary 
session 
Executive Power 
Directive of 
Congress 
Absolute majority 
of deputies 
Executive Power 
 
Executive Power 
Directive of 
Congress 
25% of deputies 
request to 
Directive 
Absolute majority 
of deputies  
Executive Power 
Majority for 
ordinary legislation 
Simple majority Simple majority Absolute majority Simple majority 
Types of 
committees 
and sizes 
1) Ordinary: 3-7 
deputies 
2) Special: 3-5 
deputies 
1) Ordinary: 9 
deputies (Finances 
committee:11) 
2) Full legislative 
authority**:3 with 
19 deputies each  
3) Special: 3-5 
deputies 
1) Ordinary: 5-8 
deputies (max. 11) 
2) Special with 
assigned tasks*: 3 
with one deputy of 
each bloc 
3) Special without 
assigned tasks: n.a. 
1) Ordinary: 7 
deputies  
(Budgetcommittee:15) 
2) Ad-hoc: min. 6 
deputies 
3) Special for 
research: min. 6 
deputies 
4) Special (known as 
‘accidental’): n.a. 
 
Assignment rules 
to committees 
Ordinary: 
proportional to 
seats 
Special: President 
of Assembly 
Ordinary: 
proportional to 
seats 
Full legislative 
authority: 
proportional to 
seats Special: 
President of 
Assembly 
 
Ordinary: 
proportional to 
seats (always a 
min. of one deputy 
of each bloc in 
each committee) 
Special with tasks 
assigned: designed 
by Constitution* 
Special without 
tasks assigned: 2/3 
majority vote in 
floor 
Ordinary: voting in 
the floor*** 
Ad-hoc: voting in the 
floor or consensus 
Special for research: 
voting in the floor 
Special: President of 
Assembly (previous 
discussion with 
speakers of blocs) 
Number of 
debates on floor 
for ordinary 
legislation 
Three  Two Three  Three (first is 
committee dictum) 
Types of 
emergency 
procedures 
available 
Reduction of 
number of debates 
Special committee 
formation 
Urgent status of 
bill 
Alter the agenda-
of-the-day 
Special committee 
formation 
Urgent status of 
bill 
Reduction of 
number of debates 
Urgent status of 
bill 
Special committee 
formation 
Urgent status of bill 
Assignment rule of 
bill to 
committee**** 
Secretary of 
Congress 
Secretary of 
Congress 
Agreement on 
floor 
Secretary of Congress 
Quorum for 
ordinary session 
Absolute majority Supermajority 
(2/3rds) 
Absolute majority Absolute majority or 
25% of deputies 
Source: own construction from the Constitutions and Internal Proceedings of the Assemblies collected in field research.  
* For Guatemala, the special committees are not named ad-hoc by the President of the Assembly. The special committees 
are designed in the Constitution with determined tasks (“Technical support for Congress activities”, “Extraordinary for 
electoral reforms” and “Studies for the Peace Agreements”).  
** The three committees with full legislative authority in Costa Rica have the full right to initiate and pass legislation. 
They may also receive bills from the floor if a 2/3 majority of the vote decides to delegate the bill to any of these. The 
delegation can be retrieved with an absolute majority vote in the floor. Delegation is not possible if a given bill concerns 
electoral issues, treaties or international agreements, budget, public credits or constitutional reforms.  
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*** In Panama the assignment rule of deputies to committees follows a formalized electoral rule as follows: the total 
number of deputies is divided by the total number of deputies to be elected for each committee. This constitutes the 
quotient. Each legislator votes over the list of self-standing deputies for each committee and the legislators elected are the 
ones who received as many votes as the quotient.  
**** From Garcia Montero (2004).  
 
There are three general points of convergence in the procedural designs of the four 
countries under analysis: (1) the centrality of the committee system in the decision-making 
process, implying that the committee system is an effective gate-keeper; (2) the centrality of 
the political parties in organizing and channeling the legislative activity; (3) the availability 
of special procedures that may allow the circumvention of the ordinary procedure for 
passing legislation.  
First, the committee system is a key gatekeeper in all four countries. The gate-
keeping role of committees derives from their contribution to legislative work of a key 
good for the overall decision-making process: specialization (Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997; 
Krehbiel, 1997). There is divergence between the designs of the committee systems along 
two lines: the size of the committee system as a whole and as single committees, and 
diversity in specialization. In particular, Costa Rica and Panama have adopted a committee 
system with a limited number of committees whose specialization is thus not great (the 
jurisdictional area of each committee is broadly defined). In turn, in Guatemala and 
Honduras we find a large number of committees, and thus the jurisdictions of each 
committee concern very specific policy areas. I will assess these differences, hypothesizing 
on the likelihood of strategic use by majority actors of both informational advantages 
produced by committees and the size of relevant committees, in Chapter 3.  
Second, the organization of Assemblies around party blocks is common to these 
four countries. In the multiparty cases, Guatemala and Panama, legislative block switching 
has been a common pattern, since often pre-electoral coalitions are renegotiated once 
deputies have secured their seats, thereby reshaping party affiliation and consequently party 
discipline. In turn, in the bipartisan cases, Honduras and Costa Rica, party switching is 
much less common and only the small parties need to build post-electoral coalitions in 
order to constitute a mixed block within Congress. But the general centrality of blocks as 
channels for legislative activity implies that the possibilities for action and proposal by each 
individual legislator are limited, both in terms of the possibilities to place proposals 
individually and in terms of the position of legislators in bargaining processes which is also 
mediated by the parties. Generally, the centrality of legislative blocks in organizing the 
workload involves the need for legislators to follow some disciplinary mechanisms, usually 
lacking in more individual-based legislative settings (such as the U.S. Congress).  
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Finally, the availability and type of special procedures for legislative approval also 
display diversity. The only convergence is found in the capacity of the Executive to call an 
extraordinary session, as we found in the analysis of constitutional rules. There is also some 
general convergence concerning the ordinary procedure of legislative approval, with the 
lowest variation found on who sends the legislative initiative to committee and the largest 
variation on the sequential design of the legislative process (see Appendix 2). The 
characteristics of each country’s procedural design in this respect will clearly emerge in the 
following empirical exploration in Chapter 3, where the available data on the legislative 
production in a legislative term is specifically analyzed with respect to which procedures 
were employed for the approval of each bill, including committee assignment.  
6. - PARTIAL CONCLUSIONS AND CONTINUATION OF THE RESEARCH 
The main conclusions of this Chapter are listed below. This should clarify the 
possible further lines of the research that spring from this analysis. There are three main 
theoretical or substantive claims and two methodological implications of central 
importance to the main claims of this thesis as well as for the redirection of the debate on 
the forms of government. First, the theoretical conclusions reached on the basis of the 
argumentative claims and the empirical evidence presented in this Chapter are:  
1- I have shown the usefulness of the distinction between proactive and reactive 
powers for assessing the explanatory capacity of constitutional design and for 
unpacking hidden variation that incorporates important differences to the 
existing approaches. In fact, this distinction (proactive and reactive types of 
power resources) may be seen as the quintessential characteristic of presidential 
systems, with both branches able to vary in proactive and reactive powers43. 
These powers may be conceptualized as a continuum able to capture a wider 
variation than that deriving from an exclusive focus on the Executive powers. 
In addition, the inclusion in the analysis of the number and quality of normative 
ties between the branches has brought a fruitful component to the evaluation 
of constitutional design. I have emphasized that what matters in constitutional 
provisions is not whether the Executive has strong proactive powers (for 
                                                
43 The ideal-typical of presidential systems would be, then, characterized by an Assembly with high proactive and high 
reactive powers and an Executive with high proactive and high reactive powers. In turn, an ideal-typical parliamentary 
system would also rank high in all power resources but in the reactive powers of Executives. Once more, my claim that 
there is wider variation than may appear at first sight from a general macro analysis of constitutional rules, since all 
possible combinations between high-low of Executive and Assembly powers would display a sixteen-cell table. 
Parliamentary and presidential are only two cells of these, and each unified and divided government may also display 
variation. This analytical proposal is brought back in the conclusions of this thesis as a field narrowly related or derived 
from this thesis work.  
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instance, decree power) but also how many and how strong the reactive powers 
of Assemblies are (typically review and rejection of decrees or imposition of a 
temporal constrain on decrees). This continuum may serve the purpose of 
generating a typological classification of presidential as well as parliamentary or 
hybrid systems, offering an increased potential for comparative analysis. In 
particular, for the further empirical analysis in the Chapters that follow, I will 
employ three different measures for Executive authority, Executive 
independence, and Executive dominance. These measures emphasize that the 
existence of cooperation or independence between the branches is in fact a 
function of the constitutional provisions, but regards these as a result of the 
branches’ relative positions, not only of the Executive’s unilateral position.  
2- A strong legislature is characterized by a wider range of rules and powers than 
those ones provided to Executives. The measurement scheme developed in this 
Chapter shows that the convergences among Executives are certainly larger 
than those among Assemblies. I have already pointed out that this may come as 
a consequence of a clearer conception of what an Executive is in a presidential 
system drawn from a legal theory perspective (Sunstein, 2001), while there is a 
fuzzier equivalent for the Assembly. A second element here derives from the 
fact that I have included in the analysis not only typical authoritative tools and 
power resources, but also appointive powers, special or emergency powers and 
powers of control as relevant sources characterizing the checks-and-balances 
system.  
3- Finally, the plausible conclusion on theoretical grounds is that any general 
model of macro-institutional rules, such as those laid down in Constitutions, 
does not make sense of political outcomes unless a path-dependent analysis of 
constitutional choice is endogeneized in the explanation, plus a historical 
account of the patterns of interaction between political actors. As we have seen, 
the constitutional drafting moment appears relevant for both stable and long-
standing democracies (such as Costa Rica, since 1949) and young and fragile 
democracies (Guatemala since 1985). Only by incorporating knowledge about 
the relative position of political actors at the moment the Constitution was 
drafted and of the objectives of political conflict prevention privileged in each 
Constitution is it possible to understand why the two cases fall in the same 
comparative cell. I have also reflected that political will – or what I label the 
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historical patterns of interaction between political actors – may counter-balance 
or turn around the general character of the constitutional design. Calling 
attention to the importance of these two factors again emphasizes that 
constitutional design only settles broad parameters of variation, which are then 
given meaningful explanatory capacity depending on environmental and other 
micro-institutional factors, as I argue with respect to the importance of 
procedural design.  
Last, the methodological implications of the findings in this Chapter are:  
1- The central piece of information we can infer from the differences in the levels 
of proactive and reactive powers is how far political actors may make use of 
strategic threats on mutually dependent areas of authority, in terms of 
cooperation in exchange for support of a policy proposal or blockage in order 
to make political conflict public. In this sense, an adequate hypothesis for the 
effects of the balance or un-balances between the proactive-reactive powers of 
the branches is that the more proactive powers are concentrated in a political 
actor, the more independent dynamics will be seen in inter-branch relations (as 
in Guatemala). Similarly, the more reactive the branches are, the more 
consensus-seeking actors need to be. From a normative standpoint, scholars 
and constitutional designers have tended to prefer the latter option, with 
consensus seen as a powerful device for generating representation and conflict 
resolution (Lijphart, 1994, 1999). The nuance on this general view of 
constitutional design, as my contribution has developed in this Chapter, is that 
consensus is closely associated to the existence of normative ties between the 
two branches. Hence, representation and conflict resolution may be both 
fostered when political actors, particularly the two branches of government, 
need each other in order to pursue their own political priorities. As argued, 
political will is also essential for sustained conflict resolution and 
representation, together with incentives from the institutional design linking the 
decisional structure of both the Executive and the Legislative.  
2- The original model that Linz (1984) attached to the pure presidential system 
was in fact an unusual type. Not only because the arguments and rules included 
in the original analysis were blind to the powers of Assemblies in place, as we 
have empirically shown, but also because it was institutionally extremely 
deterministic, accounting only for the macro parameters of variation flowing 
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from constitutional rules. The existence of other institutional determinants of 
political outcomes, such as the micro rules settled by the procedural design, the 
possibly interactive nature of these rules with the constitutional ones, and the 
way political actors have, historically, solved conflict, appears more to be the 
complex net that explains political outcomes. In fact, procedural design 
constitutes a cross-sectional set of rules that is not dependent on, say, the type 
of policy, but must instead be observed by all political actors as the central 
determinant of the decision-making process. The characteristics of procedural 
design and de facto practices characterizing legislative production are analyzed in 
the next Chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE PATTERNS OF LEGISLATIVE PRODUCTION IN  
FOUR CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Examining parliament shows if there are 
interests or opinions that are grossly over or under-
represented, thus providing a rough estimate of the 
polity’s inclusiveness. (…) The proceedings of 
representative assemblies help us gauge the conflict that 
arises over public issues and show how effectively that 
conflict is resolved”44 
 
 
                                                
44 Close, D. (1995: 1).  
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- Introduction 
 
In this Chapter I present an original and extensive empirical analysis of the de facto 
practices of legislative production in the four countries under analysis during one legislative 
term. This descriptive effort serves one general and three particular objectives. The general 
objective is to provide empirical knowledge about the legislative workings in the four 
Central American countries under analysis that compliments the previous de jure analysis in 
Chapter 2. The analysis will result in an introductory guide that both explores the extent to 
which political actors employ their constitutionally provided tools of power and authority, 
and identifies the set of questions central for agenda control which will then constitute 
separate chapters in the remainder of the thesis. The expectation is that having this 
information at hand – the constitutional design analysis and the empirical examination of 
the patterns of legislative production – we will be better qualified to generate hypotheses 
about the suspected interactive effects between written rules and political output.  
In addition, the analysis fills a gap in the knowledge about the legislatures, the 
Executives and the decision-making process in the four countries of the Central American 
region under analysis. Once data is available, the inclusion of this region in broader 
empirical studies of presidential systems, legislative performance and inter-branch dynamics 
will be facilitated by the present study.  
The three particular objectives are:  
1) Obtain detailed information of the overall balances or unbalances in 
comparative terms between Executive and Legislative initiatives, in terms of 
volume and in qualitative terms, which affect the aggregate characteristics of 
the decision-making process and provide information about where the 
differential use of power resources is placed;  
2) Obtain detailed information about the differences in how legislation is 
approved depending on whether the Executive or Legislative actors enact the 
bill. The general hypothesis on this point is that the procedural design, in its 
micro-institutional regulating function, may leave spaces for the discretional use 
of rules by majority actors, which is consequential on the aggregation of 
interests in the decision-making process. The specific hypotheses are elaborated 
with respect to each procedural rule under assessment: committee system 
design with respect to the informational advantages offered by the 
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specialization scheme adopted; emergency procedure design with respect to the 
reduction of time available to political actors for amendments, as a tool that 
manifestly affects the deliberative function of legislative debates by reducing a 
key resource such as time; the sequential design of the legislative process of 
approval with respect to the tools available to delay or speed up some legislative 
initiatives as compared to others; and the policy characteristics of the bill, 
exogenous to the procedural design, but usually affecting the choice of 
procedures for getting the bill passed.  
3) Finally, the comparative analysis will pay attention to whether procedural rules 
or patterns of actors’ behavior offer windows of opportunity to majority actors 
generally (that is, not only the Executive but also the majority parties). This is 
of particular importance for assessing the potential problem of democracy in 
systematically excluding minorities’ will by consistently privileging majority rule 
for the adoption of decisions.  
 
The Chapter proceeds as follows: I first look at the aggregate volume of legislative 
production in quantitative terms, identifying the general characteristics of the data available. 
I then unpack the qualitative information of interest in three sections45. The first of these 
deals with the committee system and the degree to which the committees perform a gate-
keeping function. Second, I pay attention to the time factor with respect to the sequential 
design of the legislative process of approval in each of the four countries and the effects of 
the closeness of elections on the pattern of legislative production. I explore honeymoon 
effects in cases of unified government and the rupture of party loyalties towards the end of 
the term in cases of internally fractionalized party systems. The final qualitative section 
addresses the policy domain of the bills, attempting to capture whether the exercise of 
agenda control by majority actors (the Executive or the majority party) is especially 
concentrated in relevant policy areas, such as economic policies and political reform. The 
inequality between the branches in this aspect has largely been researched for only a few 
countries (as usual, by and large the U.S. heading the list with numerous studies on the link 
between public opinion and policy promotion). But the existing policy classifications and 
their validity have only been discussed to a limited extent and the difficulty of such an 
enterprise is also manifested in the analysis carried out here. I discuss on theoretical 
grounds the importance of each of these quantitative and qualitative analyses for the 
                                                
45 I do not deal with vetoes, insistence on vetoes, amendments or roll-call votes, due to the unavailability of this data for 
these countries at the Legislative Archive Services.   
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objectives above in each corresponding section before displaying the actual analysis applied 
to the four cases under study.  
I conclude the Chapter with a summary of the comparative results and the 
hypotheses developed through the findings in this chapter, which allows for an adequate 
linking of arguments with the Chapters that follow.  
– The empirical workings of legislative production in 
four Central American countries.  
1.1. 2.1.) -  QUANTITATIVE OVERVIEW 
The first descriptive measure provides a general picture of whether there is 
Executive or majority party dominance of the agenda, or of the non-dominance of any, as a 
general overview, for each country under analysis:  
Table  13.  Quant i ta t iv e  overv i ew o f  the  or ig in  o f  the  l e g i s la t iv e  produc t ion 
Descriptors HONDURAS COSTA RICA GUATEMALA PANAMA 
Legislative term under study 
(data available) 
1997-2001 1994-99 1996-1999  1995-1999  
Total bills passed (total 
sample)  
887 408 435 335 
Number of bills enacted by 
Executive branch (and %) 
529 (60%) 169 (41%) 228 (52%) 257 (77%) 
Number of bills enacted by 
Legislative branch (and %) 
322 (36%) 207 (51%) 173 (40%) 68 (20%) 
Percentage of bills enacted by 
majority party (in Parliament) 
PLH: 282 or 
88%     
PLN: 99 or 
48% 
PAN: 119 or 
69% 
PRD*: 51 or 
75% 
Notes: for the calculation of the bills enacted by each of the branches, I class missing values bills that 
were enacted by other actors with legislative initiative. This is why the addition of the third and fourth 
rows is not equal to the total number of bills in the sample (or the universe of bills approved in the 
legislative term under study).  
Similarly, for the last row, I only accounted for bills that were enacted by the legislators, within these 
taking the figure for those enacted by the majority party.  
* In Panama, I considered the bills enacted not only by the PRD, the majority party, but also from the 
parties that entered into coalition with this party in the House: the PALA, LIBRE, MORENA. (Garcia 
Diez, 2001).  
 
What is learnt from this first empirical piece of information is that the volume of 
legislation initiated by the Executive and the Legislative is more or less balanced, with the 
largest imbalance found in the House, where the majority party clearly dominates the 
agenda (or the enactment of bills that were finally approved). The majority party 
dominance within the House may be seen as an indicator of a low degree of aggregation of 
interests in the legislative decision-making process. Especially under unified governments, 
the number of devices available to exert agenda control may double, since the Executive 
may employ tools exogenous to the legislative procedural design to impose legislation (such 
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as decree power) and the majority party in the House may be able to dominate the internal 
workings of the legislative process in the Congress (cf. Lupia and McCubbins, 1994). 
However, this hypothesis is not fully supported by the empirical evidence above, because 
of the large divergence between Costa Rica and Honduras (both with unified government 
for the term under study) concerning the patterns of both Executive and majority party 
dominance. In particular, the PUSC in Costa Rica, the major opposition party in the term 
under study, was able to approve 44% of the total amount of legislation enacted by 
legislators, while the PNH in Honduras, the equivalent major opposition party, only 
enacted 6% of all legislation enacted (and approved) by legislative actors. This pattern 
indicates that the expected interaction between secondary rules46, that is between the 
procedural design in the House and partisan rules and format, does not follow a linear 
shape, and more detail is needed in order to explore the way those interactions take place. 
The strength of the PUSC as compared to the PNH, the differences in the intensity of 
ideological competition between these two countries and the longer democratic tradition in 
Costa Rica are all relevant elements at work in explaining the pattern here.  
Giving greater attention to cross-country differences, there is a pattern that allows 
connection of the previous analysis of the constitutional design in Chapter 2 and these 
results: the most powerful Assembly on constitutional grounds, the Costa Rican one, is in 
fact the only one where the gross legislation enacted and approved by legislators exceeds 
the volume for the Executive. In turn, the middle-range47 legislature from the constitutional 
analysis, that is Panama, displays the opposite pattern, in that the legislature’s input in the 
aggregate legislative production is only 20%. The two intermediate-to-strong legislatures 
according to the constitutional rules, Guatemala and Honduras, also appear here to be 
intermediate combinations of legislative production from the Executive and the Legislative 
branches. In comparative terms, the Guatemalan legislative body appears slightly stronger, 
from its larger capacity to approve bills of its own enactment, but the majority party in 
Honduras is in fact stronger in dominating the legislative agenda.  
In sum, there is a general pattern of Executive dominance that may be a 
consequence of the number of its jurisdictional areas of exclusive competence (Lanzaro, 
2000) or the consequence of a broader phenomenon of delegation of legislative powers 
                                                
46 I refer here generally to secondary rules as distinct from primary rules which are of constitutional rank. Secondary rules 
include procedural rules but also electoral rules and partisan rules, as referred to in this point.   
47 Panama was the case displaying a mixture of powerful and powerless devices assigned to the Legislative branch from 
the constitutional rules. As was referred to at that point in the previous Chapter, from the case studies available for 
Panama (Guevara Mann, 2001; Otero, 2003), this would be a case where the de jure and the de facto practices was expected 
to display a larger difference between the placement of the legislature as a powerful actor from the constitutional design 
and the actual underperformance of this institution in the country, as is well-illustrated in Guevara Mann dissertation on 
the issue.  
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from the House (Shugart and Carey, 1998; Morgenstern and Nacif, 2001). I examine next 
whether the policy content of a bill brings a powerful explanation to the relatively fuzzy 
pattern resulting from this quantitative indicator.  
1.2. 2.2.) -  CLASSIFYING LEGISLATION 
The first qualitative measure is the classification of legislation in broad policy areas 
in order to identify whether variation in this matter is related to the actor proposing the 
legislative initiative. Classifying the bills of a legislative term in broad policy areas is not an 
easy task, since case-specific shocks may be mixed with general classifications and produce 
bias. Therefore, while expert knowledge on the case under study is relevant for this task, I 
have attempted to generate a classification susceptible to comparative analysis. In order to 
allow for synthetic measures of policy areas which may avoid the loss of information, I 
have created two measures. The first measure captures whether the bill entails spending, as 
phrased in the name of the bill, or not (i.e. belongs to a broader policy-making area). 
Although all legislation entails spending at some point or another (implementation is not 
part of the present analysis), I attempt to capture with this variable whether bills directly 
belonging to the budget bill are more likely to be enacted by the Executive or another 
actor. Nota bene that while, for all cases under study the General Budget bill is exclusively 
introduced by the Executive, the legislature may introduce amendments, budget entries or 
policy proposals that suck resources from the budget bill. In this sense, while a departure 
bias is expected –this time explained exclusively by the constitutional rules – this 
information also contributes to evaluating legislative performance as characterized by a 
distinctive role for Executives and Assemblies in these cases. In order to generate this 
variable without the full text of each bill, I took as a good proxy whether the bill was 
examined by a committee with economic competences. The pattern for the countries under 
analysis for this measure is as follows:  
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Table  14.  Budge t  l e g i s la t ion and or ig in  o f  the  in i t ia t iv e 
Country / Committee  Bill entails other policy areas Bill entails spending 
Costa Rica (total) 
Executive 
Legislative 
251 (74%) 
95 or 62% 
156 or 85% 
87 (26%) 
59 or 38% 
15 or 28% 
Honduras (total)  
Executive  
Legislative 
554 (64%) 
264 or 50% 
262 or 82% 
316 (36%) 
260 or 50% 
56 or 18% 
Guatemala (total) 
Executive 
Legislative 
241 (60%) 
96 or 43% 
124 or 79% 
164 (40%) 
126 or 57% 
33 or 21% 
Panama (total)  
Executive 
Legislative 
267 (80%) 
200 or 78% 
59 or 87% 
67 (20%)  
57 or 22% 
9 or 13% 
Note: The first figure is the number of bills and the second is the percentage as from the total volume of 
legislation enacted by each political actor (i.e. the percentages are calculated by row). 
 
From the data above, there is an indication that in fact a more parochial or pork-
barreling decision making style is present in the legislation enacted by the legislative 
(Shugart and Carey, 1992) in these countries. It appears that legislatures are mostly 
dedicated to enacting legislation in all policy areas other than budget. Hence, the Executive 
has both first-mover and last-mover advantages with respect to the allocation of resources 
for its policy priorities. Based solely on this piece of information, it is difficult to conclude 
whether these differences may be attributed to an efficient distribution of the legislative 
workload or whether they imply different decision-making styles involving a lower 
proactive role for legislatures in these countries.  
The second measure for examining the policy content of the bills adds a relevant 
qualitative dimension to the assessment of the explanatory source of the above divergence. 
This second measure refers to the scope of the bill and follows Di Palma’s (1976) 
exhaustive and general coding for the Italian legislation diachronically. A three-way 
classification according to whether the bill has a national, sectional or micro-sectional 
scope is produced. The definitions may be tracked for precision in Di Palma’s (1976) 
original work, but they refer to the target or objective of the policy as it is designed48. 
Specifically, a bill is coded as national when the target of the policy is the whole population 
(like a regulation on the minimum wage); as sectional when a sector of the population is 
targeted but this group may be a heterogeneous one (like a regulation on the minimum 
wage of civil servants); and as micro-sectional when a sector of the population is targeted 
and this group is homogenous (such as a regulation on the minimum wage of civil servants 
in the public telecommunications sector). In effect, the differences between these 
                                                
48 Di Palma (1976) also created an additional measure to account for the effects of the bill, while here I only adopt his 
measure accounting for the objective of the bill. The measure for effects would require data on policy implementation.   
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categories are most fuzzy for the sectional versus micro-sectional, but overall the 
classification is expected to capture whether a more general interest as compared to a more 
particularized policy-making style is in place.  
The contribution of this qualitative measure is expected to allow us to identify 
whether a more parochial legislative style exists in fact for the legislative bodies in these 
countries, functioning as an ‘efficient secret’ for the distribution of the legislative workload 
and for the divergent electoral constituencies of the two branches in presidential systems. 
The general hypothesis with respect to this issue is that legislatures have incentives to 
pursue parochial (or, in the language of Di Palma coding labels, more micro-sectional 
oriented) interests due to the devices deciding their election (and possible re-election) 
(Shugart and Carey, 1992). Especially in presidential systems the dual electoral design for 
the Legislative (generally employing proportional formulas and smaller district size than for 
the Executive) and for the Executive (generally majority formula, first-past-the-post) may 
be expected to generate this parochial versus national policy-making style. For the 
countries under analysis, there is a mixed pattern of cases with a clear split of functions in 
policy-making between the two branches along the parochial-national divide for the two 
branches, as in Costa Rica, and a stable bias in favor of the national scope of legislation, as 
in Guatemala. The specific results are as follows:  
Table  15.  Leverage  o f  the  b i l l  and or ig in  o f  the  in i t ia t iv e 
Country / 
Committee  
Bill is national Bill is sectional Bill is microsectional 
Costa Rica (total) 
Executive 
Legislative 
144 or 39% 
88 or 55% 
56 or 27% 
85 or 23% 
30 or 19% 
55 or 27% 
136 or 37% 
43 or 26% 
46 or 93% 
Honduras (total)  
Executive  
Legislative 
288 or 34% 
203 or 38% 
85 or 27% 
223 or 26% 
64 or 21% 
223 or 26% 
328 or 39% 
162 or 52% 
328 or 39% 
Guatemala (total) 
Executive 
Legislative 
215 or 56% 
132 or 60% 
83 or 50% 
81 or 21% 
35 or 21% 
81 or 21% 
91 or 23% 
44 or 20% 
47 or 28% 
Panama (total)  
Executive 
Legislative 
160 or 51% 
141 or 56% 
19 or 30% 
68 or 22% 
60 or 24% 
8 or 13% 
86 or 27% 
50 or 20% 
36 or 27% 
Note: The percentages are calculated by row, that is, within the whole legislative volume enacted by that 
political actor.  
    
 
89 
The indication we obtained from Table 2 is supported by this analysis of the 
leverage of the bill in terms of territorial scope. Here, we obtain a pair-wise pattern of 
legislative performance and policy content, where Costa Rica and Panama stand together as 
characterized by legislatures more involved in micro-sectional legislating and by Executives 
mostly oriented to national legislation. For the time being, we cannot know whether this 
national scope also includes a bias from the constitutionally assigned authority of the 
Executives over foreign policy or whether the performance of both political actors involves 
an efficient distribution of the legislative workload in this form. In the middle-range of 
variation, Honduras shows the most stable or equal share of the policy-making style 
between the Executive and the legislature in all three categories. In turn, in Guatemala both 
branches are involved in national legislation on equal terms, as expected from the very 
balanced constitutional powers provided to both branches. In fact, Guatemala appears as 
the case where coherence between the expectations from the de jure analysis is in place in 
the de facto patterns from the data available.  
Finally, there is no clear pattern of divergence among the legislative actors 
(Executive or legislature) concerning the sectional policy-making style, an intermediate 
category that may in fact capture a large range of policy types. Next, I proceed with an 
examination of how the time factor affects the pattern of legislative production for each 
branch of government.  
1.3. 2.3.) - THE TIMING FACTOR: ELECTORAL CYCLE AND SEQUENTIAL 
DESIGN 
The motivation for including the time factor as central in affecting the incentives of 
actors to exert agenda control or to push pork-barrel legislation targeted at groups of 
voters (when elections are closer) derives from a bulk of research claiming that the electoral 
cycle, specifically, but also the broader time component affecting the rhythm and 
succession of events (Schmitter and Santiso, 1998), is central to the comprehension of 
inter-branch dynamics.  
This measure aims to capture whether the legislative initiatives proposed by the 
Executive are processed more quickly than those enacted by the Legislative, as has been 
shown in several presidential cases (see Lanzaro et al, 2000, for the Uruguayan case; 
Figueiredo and Cheibub, 1999, for the Brazilian; Binder and Maltzman, 2002, for the U.S. 
Senate case). The ability to delay or speed up a bill may be therefore seen as a procedural 
tool, exogenous to the constitutional design, and available to majority actors (especially 
when facing a situation of divided government – see Shugart, 1995) as a cross-sectional 
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tool, potentially applicable to all types of legislation, and expected to be employed with the 
most intensity when elections are close. The hypothesis is that majority actors will attempt 
to delay the approval of opposition actors’ bills and to speed up their own initiatives. 
However, the use of time in this strategic way may not be linearly employed, interacting 
instead with other characteristics of the decision-making process.  
In fact, in the empirical studies available on the matter, there have been some 
sustained counter-intuitive findings which may be placed under comparative analysis and 
theoretical reflection. Specifically with respect to the studies on the effects of the electoral 
cycle (not so much with respect to the sequential design of the legislative process of 
approval, as in Lanzaro et al, 2000), the finding is that the volume of legislative approval 
(enacted either by the Executive or the Legislative) decreases towards the end of the term 
of office (or when new elections are close). While the expectation could intuitively be that a 
larger volume of legislation is approved towards the end of a term, as a strategy to deliver 
more policies fostering an increased support for the party in power (thus taking advantage 
of the comparative advantages offered by the power resources available while in office), the 
empirical result has been the opposite. The explanation of this difference is placed in the 
qualitative realm regarding the characteristics of the policies: the legislation tends to be 
more micro-sectional in scope and entail spending.  
Explanations for this pattern have clearly referred to the intensification of pork-
barreling policy-making towards the end of the term for two key reasons: (1) Executives 
denied re-election – as is the case in most presidential cases in Latin America - will pursue 
corrupt practices towards the end of their term in order to fill their pockets before leaving 
office, given that no electoral punishment or accountability may be suffered by the actor. 
And (2) majority parties will attempt to make use of the comparative advantages they still 
possess to foster loyalty in targeted groups of voters that would eventually favor the 
success of the party.  
The time component, which is examined in detail in Chapter 6, has typically been 
neglected within the discipline, and only recently have there been both modeling strategies 
and well-grounded hypotheses able to capture the effects of such an intrinsic element to 
political reality as time. Here, I limit my attention to the descriptive account of two time-
related factors that may affect patterns of legislative production: first, the electoral cycle 
and, second, the internal sequential design of the legislative process of approval. This 
descriptive account involves, similarly to the previous analyses in this Chapter, a 
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comparison between the proposals of the Executive and the Legislative on each of those 
time-related factors.  
Table  16.  Ele c tora l  cy c l e  and or ig in  o f  the  in i t ia t iv e 
Electoral cycle COSTA RICA HONDURAS GUATEMALA PANAMA 
YEAR 1  
Executive 
Legislative 
 
32 or 48% 
34 or 51% 
 
131 or 59% 
91 or 41% 
 
70 or 61% 
45 or 39% 
 
65 or 73% 
24 or 27% 
YEAR 2  
Executive 
Legislative 
 
48 or 56% 
38 or 44% 
 
219 or 72% 
87 or 28% 
 
61 or 47% 
68 or 53% 
 
44 or 85% 
8 or 15% 
YEAR 3  
Executive  
Legislative 
 
40 or 45% 
48 or 54% 
 
112 or 57% 
84 or 43% 
 
68 or 67% 
33 or 33% 
 
33 or 73% 
12 or 27% 
YEAR 4  
Executive 
Legislative 
 
87 or 64% 
49 or 36% 
 
67 or 53% 
60 or 47% 
 
28 or 52% 
26 or 48% 
* 
79 or 80% 
19 or 20% 
YEAR 5* 
Executive 
Legislative 
- - -  
36 or 88% 
5 or 12% 
Notes: Percentages are calculated by column, that is, the whole legislative approval of that year and how the 
Executive and the Legislative behaved.  
For Panama, the legislative term is five years. The beggining of the term in 1994 was towards the end of the 
year, and so the legislative approval in that year was 10 bills (7 enacted by legislators, 3 enacted by the 
Executive). This year has been added to the legislative production of 1995, considering this year as Year 1 of 
the term.  
 
The results for these countries are in line with previous research: the volume of 
legislative production tends to start off with the largest figure and is then stable (as for 
Panama) or decreases (as for Guatemala and Honduras) in the last year of the term. The 
exception here is Costa Rica, with a differential pattern in this respect: here there is an 
increase in the total amount of legislation approved with an associate increase of Executive 
dominance of the agenda in the last year of the term.  
In fact, with respect to Executive dominance of legislative production during the 
electoral cycle, there is evidence that the balance between the volume of legislative 
enactment by the two branches is broken towards the end of the term in all cases. The 
beginning of the term is comparatively hyper-productive, in all cases, due to the 
combination of two factors: (1) the honeymoon effect, especially under unified 
governments, and (2) the availability of clear political agendas when political actors have 
just taken office, especially for concurrent electoral cycles (cf. Shugart, 1995).  
Despite the fact that these two factors (unified government and the honeymoon 
effect of mutual support between the branches) are present in all the cases under analysis, 
there is relevant variation among the cases concerning the strength of the majority party in 
the House, in terms of seats. This results from the varying degree of fragmentation in the 
party systems, with multiparty systems and a weak majority of the largest party in Congress 
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in Panama especially, but also in Guatemala, and stronger majorities for Honduras and 
Costa Rica. My claim is that we can find an explanatory source for this divergent pattern of 
legislative production and the effect of the electoral cycle in the interaction between 
partisan and electoral rules. Running a simple correlation analysis, we obtain a negative and 
highly significant relationship between the honeymoon effect and the fragmentation of the 
party system49, indicating that the higher the fragmentation of the party system, the smaller 
the honeymoon effect will be. As is in fact supported by empirical evidence, this result 
implies that the display of high support for the Executive agenda in the beginning of the 
term, which is then broken towards the end of the term is more likely to appear in cases 
with low fragmentation in the party system (among these cases, Honduras and Costa Rica).  
My explanation of this rather hidden pattern relates to the worries of political 
actors for their survivability in the political system, which depends upon the number of 
parties competing in the electoral realm and the electoral rules. The hypothesis is as 
follows: in the bipartisan cases, given the low number of parties competing and the 
electoral rules fostering centripetal competition (Sartori, 1976), legislators will find more 
incentives to push the agenda of their constituencies when seeking for re-election and 
therefore diverging from the Executive agenda (the support decreases when elections are 
closer at the end of the term). Given that the Executive cannot be re-elected50, the 
legislators find no reward for supporting the Executive agenda other than party label 
prestige. In addition, electoral rules (different constituencies and electoral formulas for each 
of the branches) interact with partisan rules: in the bipartisan cases here the degree of 
internal fractionalization in the parties is either large (Costa Rica) or very large (Honduras). 
The solution to the problem of internal fractionalization has been different in the two 
countries, but a common element is the presence of primary elections within parties to 
elect the order of the standing competitors. This is expected to impose further pressure on 
legislators to deliver their own political agenda, pressuring them to adopt differential 
positions to that of the Executive agenda when elections are closer.  
In turn, in the multiparty cases, the incentives to support the Executive agenda are 
larger, given that actors are more uncertain about their own survivability in the political 
system due to the higher number of parties competing. The higher degree of party 
                                                
49 The correlation was made employing the pooled dataset, with dummy variable honeymoon (value 1 for the legislation 
approved in the first year of the term, value 2 for the legislation approved in all other years of the term) and dummy 
bipartisan-multiparty countries (with value 1 for Panama and Guatemala together and value 0 for Honduras and Costa 
Rica). The coefficient of correlation is -.09, with a significance value of .000 (for both two-tailed and one-tailed tests).  
50 For the legislative term under study, Executive re-election was forbidden in both Honduras and Costa Rica, which are 
the referent cases for this hypothesis. But in January, 2005, there is a lively political debate in Costa Rica on the initiative 
by the Constitutional Court to legalize the Executive’s re-election. 
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competitiveness in multiparty cases would support the argument that legislators are more 
likely to support the Executive, especially towards the end of the term. Because the 
Executives are more visible in the public discourse on the political agenda of the party, 
legislators may find supporting this agenda rewarding in the strategy to stand for a party 
label, which in a multiparty setting may bring more benefit than the individual 
differentiating from the party line.  
The fact that both multiparty cases here, Guatemala and Panama, possess highly 
stringent electoral systems, with an exceptional reduction effect of the effective number of 
electoral parties (enep) into the effective number of legislative parties (enlp)51, explains why 
despite the relationship between honeymoon effects and the fragmentation of the party 
system being very significant, it is also weak.  
Now that the exogenous time-related factor, the electoral cycle, has been explored, 
I shall now turn to the endogenous time-related variables: the sequential design of the 
legislative process of approval. I explore here the total time of approval depending on the 
origin of the initiative, differentiating whether the legislative procedure is ordinary or 
urgent. This detail is included in order to assess more systematically whether, in fact, 
political actors possess information about the length of the process of approval and 
whether emergency procedures are systematically employed as a tool of agenda control. 
The reduction of the time available to political actors to consider and hold a vote on the 
bill is an essential piece of information with regard to the aggregation of interests. 
Therefore, reducing the time of approval is considered, in the context of this thesis, as 
analogous to the reduction of the aggregation of interests in the decision-making process, 
based on the assumption that less time available for approving a bill implies a restriction on 
the possibilities for amendment by other political actors or time to propose alternative 
policy design.  
I also consider the average time the bills spend in committee, as a central micro-
institution that has been attributed a key role in the overall decision-making process 
precisely for the fact that time-wise, it constitutes the main gate-keeper (see Section 5 in 
Chapter 2 and Appendix 2). Hence, identifying whether the average time a bill spends in a 
committee may be used as a tool to delay or speed up some bills as compared to others is 
relevant for the purposes of this Chapter. The application to the four countries under 
analysis follows.   
                                                
51 See Table 3 in Chapter 1; enep refers to effective number of electoral parties and enlp to effective number of legislative 
parties. Refreshing these figures for Guatemala and Panama, the electoral rules almost halve the former figure into the 
latter, therefore possessing some close characteristics to moderate multipartism on the workings of the party system in the 
legislative realm.  
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Table  17.  Procedura l  t iming  and sequenc ing  by  or ig in  o f  the  in i t ia t iv e 
Country/Sequence Total time of 
approval ordinary 
Total time of 
approval urgent* 
Time in committee 
Ordinary versus Urgent  
COSTA RICA 
Executive 
Legislative 
 
877 (Mo=5) [n=46] 
224 (Mo=11) 
[n=362] 
 
541 (Mo=3) 
[n=107] 
1002 (Mo=56) 
[n=11] 
 
430 (Mo=0) vs 214 (Mo=229) [n= 
44] 
197 (Mo=34) vs 469 (mo=113) [n= 
316] 
HONDURAS 
Executive  
Legislative 
 
232 (Mo=15) [n=33] 
347 (Mo=41)[n=12] 
 
89 (Mo=56) [n=493] 
72 (Mo=7) [n=307] 
 
83 (Mo=2) vs 37 (Mo=1) [n=26] 
164 (Mo=16) vs 44 (Mo=1) [n=7] 
GUATEMALA 
Executive 
Legislative 
 
107 (Mo=28) 
[n=151] 
114 (Mo=9) [n=66] 
 
103 (Mo=1) [n=17] 
9 (Mo=0) [n=17] 
 
50 (Mo=6) vs 12 (Mo=1) [n=103] 
73 (Mo=1) vs 31 (Mo=31) [n=65] 
PANAMA 
Executive 
Legislative 
 
85 (Mo=72) [n=207] 
124 (Mo=40) [n=50] 
 
56 (Mo=12) [n=48] 
93 (Mo=3) [n=14] 
 
36 (Mo=22) vs 34 (Mo=7) [n=206] 
51 (Mo=10) vs 18 (Mo=0) [n=49] 
Notes: The calculation of the time differences (in number of days) to obtain the total time of approval is case-
specific, that is, for each country the first and the last step of the legislative process is considered. The last 
step is for all cases considered to be the last debate on the floor, given that all bills in the sample were passed, 
and the lack of information on vetoes.  
The figures are means (in number of days); in parentheses the mode, as a further descriptive measure given 
the over-dispersion present in all time-related variables; in brackets the number of cases for each sub-sample 
analysis.   
* The figures displayed correspond to the change of status of the bill from normal to urgent. This may bring 
some bias, because in some cases another urgent procedure may be employed and we may not then be 
capturing the same phenomenon with the same accuracy for all cases. However, this analysis serves an 
introductory descriptive purpose of identifying gross differences and patterns in legislative production. A 
thorough analysis of emergency procedures is carried out fully and in detail for each case in Chapter 4.  
 
From the endogenous time-related variables, we obtain three general characteristics 
with remarkable descriptive contribution to de facto analysis of the patterns of legislative 
production. First, there is wide variation concerning the efficiency of approval, in temporal 
terms, among the four countries under analysis. All the distributions of the total time of 
approval are over-spread, with a departure bias of a larger volume of urgent legislation in 
Honduras and Costa Rica, as compared to the opposite in Guatemala and Panama. This 
result indicates that in the bipartisan cases there is a higher likelihood of getting a bill 
passed if it bears the urgent label, although it holds for all cases that labeling the bill as an 
urgent is a synonym for increasing the speed of bill approval. There is, therefore, a window 
of opportunity for political actors to arbitrarily change the status of the bill, adopting the 
urgent label if political conflict is expected to arise.  
Second, there is no clear pattern for classifying the cases according to Executive 
dominance via the employment of emergency procedures. Most notably, the case of 
Panama reveals that Executive dominance exists on both ordinary and urgent procedure, 
so basically the Executive has no need to employ procedural choice as a tool for agenda 
control. On the contrary, the Honduran case represents a delegative model, where 
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Executive initiatives are systematically treated more efficiently when compared with 
Legislative initiatives. In the middle-range of variation, both Guatemala and Costa Rica 
display a mixed pattern characterized by a more efficient treatment of bills enacted by the 
Legislative under ordinary procedure, especially in Costa Rica, and a quicker treatment of 
bills enacted by the Executive with urgent status. This pattern suggests that the Executives 
may have the comparative advantage over legislators to claim the urgency of legislation on 
the basis of government performance52, while legislators find it more difficult to claim 
credibly that a bill must be treated as urgently.   
Finally, the average time a bill spends in the committee constitutes a substantive 
segment of the total time of approval. In all cases, whatever the procedure, the average 
time in committee represents over the 50% of the total time of approval, as will be further 
elaborated in the next sub-section, along with a more detailed analysis of committee 
centrality and design. If this pattern holds, then committee choice may also be seen as a 
possible tool for exerting agenda control and getting legislation passed efficiently.  
1.4. 2.4.) -  COMMITTEE SYSTEMS: INFORMATION, SPECIALIZATION AND 
SIZE CHOICES  
The final descriptive analysis of this Chapter is devoted to the committee system. 
The committee system is a central piece of the whole procedural design of the legislative 
process of approval. This centrality has been explained as a result of several conditions 
concurring in this institution. Committees offer specialization as a key good to the overall 
decision-making process, with an associated production of information flows between 
political actors (Krehbiel, 1991). Some authors have even seen committees as the key arena 
where the bargaining process takes place (Shepsle and Weingast, 1987) or the determining 
factor in making legislatures powerful amenders (Bowler and Farrell, 1995). In fact, for all 
four cases under study, a simple analysis of the weight of time spent in committee and the 
positive relationship between time spent in committee and the total time of approval 
provides some empirical evidence on the centrality of this institution to the whole 
legislative performance. This centrality has been seen as performing a gate-keeping 
function, that is, committees function as a filter for legislative initiatives and therefore 
determine their success or failure. An overview of the dependence relationship between the 
committee treatment of the bill and the total time of approval follows:  
                                                
52 Such as, for instance, the commitment to deadlines, as associated with International Treaties between governments, 
which may affect the international credibility of the government.  
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Table  18.  The ga te -keep ing  func t ion o f  commit t e e  sy s t ems 
Committees COSTA 
RICA 
HONDURAS GUATEMALA PANAMA 
Percentage of total time of approval that a 
bill spends in committee on average 
99% 47% 59% 44% 
Explanatory capacity of total time of 
approval as a function of time in committee 
46% 43% 61% 34% 
Increase in total time of approval as a 
function of time in committee 
+.96 +1.03 +.87 +.82 
Notes: First row displays average time figures in number of days for the whole sample in each country.  
Second and third row are the R Square and the coefficient of a linear regression equation with dependent 
variable total time of approval and independent variable time in committee. This regression is not orthodox, 
since it suffers from both endogeneity and autocorrelation problems by definition. However, it nonetheless 
serves our general descriptive purposes of identifying positive/negative, strong/weak relations between 
procedural choices, actors’ behavior and political output in the form of legislative approval. All regressions and 
coefficients were significant at the .01 level of confidence.  
 
The information above supports the argument, general to all analyses of committee 
systems in legislatures, that committees perform a gate-keeping function. The relationship 
between the time in committee, where bargaining over amendments and voting on the 
approval or rejection of the bill as a pre-floor procedure takes place, and the time of 
approval, is positive and highly significant. This result holds for all cases. Slightly counter-
intuitively, this result means that the longer a committee spends in the bargaining process 
over the content of the policy, the longer the process of approval is, marking the centrality 
of a positive dictum in committee for a bill to be approved.  
The relevant characteristics of the committee system operate on two levels: (1) as a 
system and (2) as a number of committees with internal rules of operation. As Bowler and 
Farrell point out “the number of committees and their degree of specialization are good 
indicators of the degree to which a legislature has the potential to challenge the executive” 
(1995: 221). Thus, examining the number of committees gives an indication of the degree 
of specialization of the legislative work and examining the number of components per 
committee (committees as units) gives an indication of the power resources committees 
provide to parties. In the first realm, the committee as a system, specialization is important 
because it contributes to explaining how information on policy matters is collected and 
processed within the whole legislative process of approval. This generation of flows of 
information has been seen as a potential tool for controlling the agenda and the decision-
making process (Bimber, 1991; Lupia and McCubbins, 1994). This is where committees as 
units become relevant; not only the size of each committee but also the composition rules, 
the definition of the jurisdictions of each committee and the decisional rules for majority 
actors to possess privileged access to specialized information of central importance for 
policy-making. Therefore, committees operate as both decisional gate-keepers and as 
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information providers. The design of the committee system is thus central when examining 
the patterns of legislative production.  
Empirically, as already seen in Table 7 of Chapter 2, there is a pair-wise variation 
across the four cases under study concerning the size of the committee system and the 
rules for assigning deputies to committees, with both elements affecting the role of this 
institution for the legislative production. Adding detail to this, I assess here how far 
informational advantages are in fact offered to majority actors, in this case majority parties, 
as a consequence of the committee system size and the actual assignment of seats among 
the legislative blocks in each Parliament. Whether majority parties can in fact monopolize 
informational and time resources via the characteristics of the committee system is a major 
question that falls outside the constitutional rules, yet belongs to the effects of rules on 
performance. Below, I provide empirical information on these aspects of the committee 
system design for the four cases under analysis as committees were in the legislative term 
under study:  
Table  19.  Commit t e e  sy s t em des ign :  s ize ,  s ea t s  and in format iona l  advantages 
Institutional 
features 
GUATEMALA  PANAMA HONDURAS COSTA RICA 
Percentage of seats 
of the majority  
 
55% 
 
41,6% 
 
52.3% 
 
47.3% 
Assignment rule of 
deputies to 
committees 
Qualified 
proportional 
Majority rule on 
self-standing 
candidates 
Proportional 
rule 
Proportional rule 
Number of 
committees 
(including special 
ones) 
26 21 53 24 
Number of deputies 
per committee 
Ordinary: 5-8  
(11 maximum if 
requested by 
President of 
committee) 
Special: 
undetermined 
Ordinary: 7 
Budget 
committee:15  
Special: 
Undetermined 
Ordinary: 5-7 
Special: 3-5 
Ordinary: 9 
Budget 
Committee: 11 
Full legislative 
authority 
committees: 19  
Special: 3-5 
Average 
percentage of seats 
in committees of 
the majority party 
52% 
(Mode=62%) 
44% 
(Mode=43%) 
61%  
(Mode=67%) 
43% 
(Mode=44%) 
Range of variation 
Minimum %  
Maximum % 
Range 86%  
Min 14% 
Max 100% 
 
Range 18% 
Min 36% 
Max 54% 
Range 48% 
Min 37% 
Max 85% 
 
Range 22% 
Min 33% 
Max 55% 
Un-proportionality  -3% +3% 
 
+9% 
  
-3% 
Correlation 
between size of 
committees and 
seats of majority 
party 
-.19*** -.18* -.71*** -.18*** 
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*** Significant at .001 level of confidence; * significant at .050 level of confidence. Chi-square 
distribution employed; Spearman measure of correlation displayed.  
 
In addition to the general pair-wise characterization of the committee system with 
regard to the size of the system as such, we obtain two specific important pieces of 
information from this more detailed account. First, there is an interactive relationship 
between the size of the committee system (number of committees) and the size of the 
committees (number of deputies per committee), that appears largely beneficial to the 
majority party in the House. This characteristic is particularly outstanding in Honduras, 
with the largest committee system size, which neutralizes the proportional rule of 
assignment of deputies to committees53. This is the case where the largest bias exists in the 
explicit benefit of the majority party, as supported by an average gain of 9% of seats in 
favor of the majority party in committees.  
The Honduran and Panama cases show that the majority parties are able to 
neutralize the proportional rule of assignment of deputies to committees, which is an 
illustrative example of how written rules may perform very differently in practice. In both 
cases there is a systematic over-representation of majority party deputies on average in any 
random committee. This over-representation averages positive but it is indeed more biased 
the more important a committee is regarding jurisdictional area or policy domain of 
specialization. This analytical detail is brought in the analysis in Chapter 4, where an 
assessment of the design of special committees (where more discretional rules are likely to 
prevail with respect to the size and the composition rules) is included.   
The most interesting aspect of this apparently strategic choice of a committee 
system in favor of majority parties is that committee size and tools available to majority 
actors to gain over-representation follow a negative relationship (last row in Table 7). This 
second result is stable and highly significantly for all the cases, indicating that a general 
finding is embedded in this relationship. This finding is that, while there is evidence of 
informational advantages available in committees depending upon the size of this system, 
the availability of these comparative advantages decreases with the size of committees as 
units. The finding is relevant in that we may conclude that the larger the size of the 
committees, the lower the advantages for the majority party. In fact, it is precisely the 
                                                
53 This neutralizing the proportional rule of assignment is a product of two interrelated factors: the human resources of 
small parties in the House and the ratio between the size of committees and the size of the Assembly. If the committee 
system is large, the legislators of small parties in the House need to be present in a very large number of committees, with 
the associate workload. A large workload will probably end in a low attendance to committee sessions, or in a low 
involvement with the specialized character of each committee. Notice that self-standing is a characteristic of the 
assignment rule of deputies to committees only in Panama, where a better fit between the interests of legislators in policy 
areas and the matching of legislators to committees would be expected. For studies in this area, see Gilligan and Krehbiel 
(1989).  
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combination of a very large committee system (53 committees) and small committee size as 
a unit (from a minimum of 3 to a maximum of 7 deputies per committee) which lays the 
basis for the large over-representation of the majority party in the committees in Honduras. 
On the contrary, it is the combination between a relatively small committee system (with 24 
committees) and a fixed, high number of deputies per committee (nine) in Costa Rica 
which explains why there is no systematic over-representation of the PLN members 
despite this party had a solid majority in the House.  
Once more we have empirically seen that the analysis of de facto practices in 
decision-making, via the assessment of procedural choices in legislative production, 
involves a complex interaction between rules, actors and procedures that is not constrained 
by the macro constitutional structure. The dynamics identified through the findings of 
these Sections may stimulate further hypotheses if we undertake a more general 
comparative analysis that allows for interactive relationships between the factors previously 
assessed separately, to emerge. This forms the content of the next Section, followed by a 
summary of the findings and hypotheses of this Chapter.  
Comparative results: Looking ahead  
 
The question of whether there are tools, embedded within the rules of the 
legislative structure and design, available to majority actors – be it the Executive or the 
majority parties – involves the assessment of potentially interactive patterns between the 
factors examined in the previous sections. The reasons for this are that is important to 
identify whether political actors are in a privileged position and able to exert an unbalanced 
influence on the volume of legislative production or on differential policy enactment and 
approval, and also whether these manifestations of agenda control follow any systematic 
pattern when contextual factors are present or when some procedures are employed for 
legislative approval. The identification, therefore, of interactive effects is central to the 
contribution of the present work to understanding how the incentives of Executives or 
majority actors work to restrict the aggregation of interests in the decision-making process. 
The analytical effort constitutes a contribution to the investigation of how constitutional 
and procedural rules interact with contextual factors, and thus affect the institutional 
performance of legislatures.  
In fact, from a general overview of the findings of the previous sections, the results 
point to three main elements to be more closely analyzed: (1) the characteristics of policies 
in interaction with the contextual time pressure of the electoral cycle, in order to examine, 
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in a comparative manner, the hypothesis developed on the interactive relationship between 
party system fragmentation and honeymoon effects; (2) the interaction between levels of 
procedural choice, such as between ordinary-emergency procedures and committee choice; 
(3) the interaction between type of policy, procedural choice and the fragmentation of the 
legislative scenario.  
For these analyses, I employ the pooled dataset of all cases, however using the 
weights of the country frequencies in order to not lose detail of a case-specific nature54, 
useful for comparative purposes. With respect to the first analysis, there is a positive, weak 
and very significant relationship between the scope of the bill as defined by Di Palma 
(1976) and the electoral cycle, implying that one additional year in the office term tends to 
increase micro-sectional legislating. The multiparty cases have a negative relationship with 
scope, that is, thus tend to more national-scope legislation even when controlling for the 
effect of the electoral cycle55. The analysis therefore supports the hypothesis on the 
differential rupture of loyalties on the Executive agenda under more or less fragmented 
legislative scenarios, with the micro-sectional legislating style more likely in bipartisan 
systems. This type of relationship also holds when employing honeymoon effect as 
explanatory variable of scope56.  
With respect to the second analysis, there is also some suggestion that procedural 
choices are not independent of one another. For instance, with ordinary versus urgent 
procedure of approval, there is a systematic positive and highly significant relationship 
between the bill being submitted as urgent and an economic committee assessing the bill, 
indicating that political actors tend to employ urgent procedures according to policy 
characteristics, and that this has an effect on committee choice57.  
Similarly, there is a negative and highly significant relationship between the size of 
the committees and the ordinary versus urgent status of the bill (Pearson R=-.34***), 
indicating that the smaller the size of the committee, the more likely it is to assess urgent 
                                                
54 The frequency weights serve to avoid the data of one country overweighing in the determination of results. For 
instance, the volume of legislation approved in Honduras is almost double that of the other three countries. When 
employing the pooled data, this fact might create biases from the distributional properties of this country. Employing the 
frequency weights solves this problem by weighting the models by each country’s number of cases.   
55 From a chi-square test of scope and the electoral cycle, the Pearson chi-square is 54.94, with a p-value of .0000, that is,  
it indicates a positive, weak and significant relationship. For the multiparty-bipartisan hypothesis, I run a linear regression, 
where the coefficient for the electoral cycle is .03*** and for the dummy country (with Panama and Guatemala falling in 
the same category of multiparty systems) -.33***, with frequency weights for each country.  
56 With the same linear regression equation, substituting the continuous variable for each year of the electoral cycle by a 
dummy capturing the honeymoon (first year of term=1, all other years=2), the coefficient for honeymoon effect remains 
positive and highly significant (.08***), as well as the coefficient for the dummy multiparty-bipartisan countries remains 
negative highly significant.   
57 Running a chi-square test between the type of committee, having classified these in broad policy areas (economic issues, 
political reform issues, socio-cultural, infrastructure) and the ordinary versus urgent procedure employed for legislative 
approval we obtain a Pearson chi-square of 99.24, with a p-value .000.  
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legislation. In the previous Section, evidence was obtained that the smaller the committee, 
the larger the bias in favor of majority parties in terms of holding a proportion of seats in 
the committee that would assure enough support on any vote. Hence, the procedural 
choice of labeling a bill as urgent and choosing a committee expected to emit a dictum, are 
not independent choices. Instead, they follow a systematic and significant relationship that 
allows the majority actors to monopolize informational advantages produced within 
committees.   
Finally, the third analysis also displays the expected results for the comparative 
dataset, revealing relevant interactions between rules and context: first, the choice of 
ordinary versus urgent procedures is negatively associated to fragmentation in either the 
electoral or the legislative realm58. This result implies that bipartisan systems tend to make 
greater use of urgent procedures for legislative approval, and so we can confidently 
conclude that procedural choices are also dependent upon the characteristics of the 
legislative scenario. Further exploring this relationship, we obtain robust results for the 
negative original pattern above ever when including the scope of the policy and the effects 
of the electoral cycle, both of which have a small positive effect on the adoption of an 
urgent procedure.  
The results in this Chapter have provided substantial evidence that, apart from and 
in addition to constitutional rules, a large array of contextual effects and secondary rules, 
such as procedural choice, contribute to explaining inter-branch dynamics. However, 
despite the evidence from the analyses in this Chapter, we still lack a general theory of the 
precise way in which the interaction between constitutional rules, procedural rules and 
actors’ incentives works. Assessing the shape, leverage and variation of those interactions 
in different contextual specifications demands a comparative effort, which is accordingly 
generated in the next three Chapters of the thesis. The final Section is a summary of the 
results and hypotheses developed in this Chapter. It also sketches how the research is to be 
continued.  
                                                
58 Running a linear regression equation with dependent variable dummy for ordinary versus urgent procedure of approval 
and independent variable electoral fragmentation (Rae’s index), the coefficient is -4.8***; for independent variable 
effective number of parties in the legislature, the coefficient is -.54 (both equations with frequency weights of variable 
country), with a 54% of the variance explained by these single variables, respectively.  
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Partial conclusions of the Chapter and continuing the 
research 
The partial conclusions of this Chapter are several, as it has enriched our 
understanding of inter-branch dynamics, and particularly on the conditions under which 
Executive dominance or majority party advantage take place. This analysis of the de facto 
patterns of legislative production has included the contextual and procedural factors that lie 
outside constitutional design as crucial factors affecting the structure of incentives of 
political actors to pursue agenda control in order to get legislation passed.  
The main finding of this Chapter is that, as predicted constitutional structure settles 
the parameters of variation to a significant degree. From the quantitative overview of 
Executive-Legislative performance in terms of legislative enactment and approval, the 
Costa Rican legislature displays the most balance between the branches, while the Panama 
legislature displays the least, as it appeared in the previous Chapter as a stable result. Yet 
outside this general overview in terms of quantitative balance or imbalance, further insights 
on what explains the imbalance as a general output have also been obtained.    
The finding has an impact on the debate on presidential systems supposed inherent 
tendency to Executive dominance and weak legislatures: much caution is needed to pursue 
the argument that constitutional design determines all dynamics between branches. From 
the empirical evidence of this Chapter, the answer to the second question (‘do endogenous 
sources of legislative procedural design explain agenda control’) is positive. Having found 
support for this positive answer, we can also derive an implication for the last question left 
open in Chapter 2: ‘what specific causal weight can we give to constitutional design’. The 
answer to that question is that there is a spurious relationship between constitutional rules 
and other rules, in that secondary rules mirror primary or macro rules. Within these, 
procedural rules appear to matter strongly in determining how political actors behave in 
pursuing their political agendas. In addition, there is no independence between different 
operative levels of the procedural design, since support for the hypothesis that procedural 
choices are associated has also been found.  
In terms of hypothesis generation, this Chapter has also enriched the general 
expectations collected in the research design Tables in Chapter 1. It appears that the party 
system format, the characteristics of the legislative scenario, the size of the committee 
system as a system and as a set of committees as units, the availability of urgent procedural 
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choices, the sequential design and the context of time pressure derived from the electoral 
cycle all have a significant impact on patterns of legislative performance  
Particularly, the hypotheses developed on the effects of electoral rules, honeymoon 
effects and partisan rules, contextual pressures from the electoral cycle affecting the 
likelihood of cooperation and support between the branches; the committee system design 
as a system offering informational advantages; and emergency procedures as tools 
restricting time resources for amending legislative proposals, point out that these factors 
constitute important explanatory variables and need to be included in the assessment of 
inter-branch dynamics and legislative performance.  
These tools determine agenda control and the capacity of the branches to 
maneuver and participate with more or less power resources in the decision-making 
process. These issues provide an outline for the continuation of research as follows:  
Chapter 4 deals with the endogenous (to the decision-making process) tools for 
agenda control, assessing in particular the emergency procedures and the committee system 
design.  
Chapter 5 deals with institutional exogenous factors, particularly the degree of 
polarization and fragmentation in the party system and how this is transferred to the 
legislative scenario.  
Chapter 6 deals with the timing factors of both an exogenous (the electoral cycle) 
and endogenous (the sequential design) nature.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ENDOGENOUS PROCEDURES FOR AGENDA CONTROL:  
THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“If the institutionalists are correct, 
much or all of political behavior and 
collective decision-making is an artifact of 
the procedures used to make decisions, (...) 
as institutional analysis focuses on 
showing how preferences and decisions are 
artifacts of institutions”59 
 
                                                
59 Immergut, 1996: 327-329.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter addresses the specific weight of endogenous procedures in explaining 
agenda control. Endogenous procedures are understood as the rules of the decision-
making process for passing bills. The effects of endogenous rules have only recently 
entered the analysis of politics, as was discussed in Chapter 1, but the field has developed 
powerful analyses to understand in a more interrelated fashion the incentives of political 
actors to undertake a particular course of action and political outcomes.  
The study of agenda control demands by its very nature the inclusion of an endogenous 
analysis. Since the main quest of the analysis is to understand how political actors make use 
of comparative advantages that are embedded within procedural rules, i.e. there is a 
strategic procedural choice explaining the political actors’ incentives and behavior, the 
assessment of the procedural structure is central. In the analysis carried out here, the 
empirical scope is to identify which are those tools, while in the following Chapters (5 and 
6), the objective is to refine the analysis by exploring how and when – that is how sensitive 
the findings are to different contextual (the characteristics of the legislative scenario) and 
temporal (the point in time) specifications.  
The previous Chapter confirmed the expectation that the de facto patterns of legislative 
production are better explained by an interaction between constitutional (as exogenous) 
and procedural (as endogenous) rules. Once this expectation has been descriptively 
confirmed, I aim to identify which type of procedural structure is in fact employed by 
Executives or majority parties to control or dominate the agenda. I generate original 
hypotheses specifically concerning the characteristics of the committee system and the type 
of especial and emergency procedures available from the procedural design.  
Within the endogenous procedures, I account for procedural choice, organizational 
choice, and the interactions between these choices, in the assessment of which tools from 
the endogenous decision-making design are employed. Accounting for the potential 
interaction (or multi-layering) of decisional tools to get the bill passed is innovative and 
important, since the two aspects are narrowly interrelated in legislatures. For instance, a 
rule determining the assignment procedure of deputies to committees requires the 
existence of committees as institutional bodies within Congress. At the same time, the 
procedural rule determining the size and composition of committees affect their capacity to 
work as organizations within Congress. This is a good illustration of the interactive nature 
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of the procedural and organizational dimensions of legislatures. Nonetheless, the 
procedural and organizational rules, interrelated as they may be, can be unpacked to 
measure their separate impact on the performance capabilities of legislatures as a whole, in 
addition to their potential overlap also included in the analysis.  
The Chapter explores the links between the broad theoretical questions (1) what makes 
a legislative body powerful and (2) what procedural rules offer systematic comparative 
advantages to some political actors. To that end, I carry out an empirical analysis of how 
the organizational (the characteristics of committees) and procedural (the availability or 
rules that allow the circumvention of the ordinary process of approval, or emergency 
procedures) characteristics affect legislative performance with a view to agenda control. 
This research belongs more directly to “those theoretical investigations that seek to 
uncover the effects of procedural rules and institutional constraints, [which] must take 
cognizance of incentives and opportunities for people to disregard those rules and 
constraints” (McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1984: 201).  
The Chapter proceeds as follows: in the following section, I unpack the research 
questions more clearly and describe the hypotheses that will be tested for each dependent 
variable, whether organizational (committee systems) or procedural (emergency 
procedures). Section 4 displays the results in a comparative light. Finally, I gather the key 
results of the Chapter and outline the issues to be covered in the following Chapters.  
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
“The distancing [in legislative studies] of the 
analytical from the empirical has had unhappy 
consequences: it diminishes the impact of insights derived 
from more analytical approaches and it minimizes the 
prospects for cumulativeness for more descriptive studies”60 
 
 Rules of procedure have been seen to affect both decision-making 
processes and the outcomes of policy-making processes in Congresses. Cox expresses this 
clearly: “rules can change the set of bills that plenary sessions of the legislature consider; 
they can change the menu of amendments to any given bill considered in the plenary; they 
can affect how members vote; and – putting the first three effects together - they can affect 
which bill pass” (2002: 247). Within the set of procedural rules, I look particularly at the 
way in which actors may employ available institutional procedures in order to get a bill 
passed with the least number of amendments and hence, and thus as closer to their 
preferred policy. This constitutes the general object of research and the point of departure 
                                                
60 Shepsle, 1985: 7.  
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for generating specific hypotheses with respect to organizational advantages afforded by 
the committee system, and purely procedural advantages such as the call for special or 
emergency procedures.  
 Although each type of rule and procedure will require a modeling 
specification (i.e. taking into account case-specific variation for different institutional 
designs), I develop here two general hypotheses that are expected to hold for both 
dependent variables.  
First, the degree of support for the Executive agenda in Congress is determinant 
for the strategic choice of procedures. When the Executive is certain that his/her own 
party in Congress will back the legislative initiative, the incentives for strategic choice and 
hence for agenda control diminish. In turn, when the Executive is either not certain of the 
size of its legislative support, or is certain that as a result of majority rule requirements its 
proposal will not be passed with the least number of amendments, the incentives for 
procedural choice increase. This hypothesis is stable both for the literature on divided 
versus unified governments (for instance, in Lupia and McCubbins, 1994) and for studies 
of administrative procedures (as in Bawn, 1995). The argument generally relates the 
incentives of Executives – or, for the sake of argument political actors in the position to 
propose legislation independently – to expectations of political conflict over policy. The 
argument is that the deputies of the majority party when there is unified government, also 
find benefit in supporting the Executive agenda. Whatever legislators of the majority party 
may seek (good public policy, reelection or prestige – Mayhew, 1974) the good 
performance of the Executive increases the legislators’ utilities. In turn, under divided or 
fragmented scenarios, it is more costly for the Executive to attract the pivotal actors (those 
needed to get a majority of the votes - Krehbiel, 1998), than it is to employ other available 
institutional procedures that allow bill to pass with the least number of amendments, 
therefore avoiding political conflict on the floor.  
Overall, what the hypothesis brings to the analysis is the capabilities of political 
actors to anticipate conflict, and the type of behavior (in my wording: strategic) that is 
associated with this anticipation. These capabilities depend, most importantly, on the 
information flows within Congress and between the branches, but also on the aggregate 
size of the support for or coherence of the legislative agendas of the parties. It is, hence, 
“when there is significant disagreement, [that] the choice of procedures will be affected by 
the institutions that structure legislative bargaining:” (Bawn, 1995: 70), that is, by 
procedural rules and the organizational characteristics of the legislative process of approval.  
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The second hypothesis is more straightforwardly concerned with the role of 
information in informational advantages. Political actors are surrounded by uncertainties 
that may be partially solved with the acquisition of information (Krehbiel, 1991). The 
bodies that provide specialized information, and judgment, on the links between (1) policy 
alternatives and policy goals and (2) the space between the proposer’s preference and the 
median legislative preference61, are the legislative committees. These, in turn, possess very 
especial characteristics (assignment rules, size and voting procedures) which are expected to 
be susceptible to strategic use. The choice of general institutional characteristics, such as, 
most importantly, the number of committee members (or what was called the committee as 
a unit in Chapter 3), displayed an effective positive correlation with the (dis)proportionality 
of the assignment rule and the size of the majority party in the House (Chapter 3, Section 
2.4). However, I also identified a non-linear relationship between these three factors (rules, 
organizational characteristics and actors’ incentives). Here, I want to push the argument 
further in a more explicit effort to engage these previous findings with a general assessment 
of how informational advantages are associated to procedural choices.  
The hypothesis runs as follows: informational advantages are a key good associated 
to agenda control, i.e. I expected a positive relationship between these. The question is how 
the access to informational resources is strategic and which specific informational resources 
are at hand to majority political actors. The sub-hypotheses concerning these questions are: 
1) Political actors are able to anticipate conflict over legislation (General 
Hypothesis 1), so their procedural choice is mediated by their estimation 
of political conflict. The specific hypothesis here is that when conflict is 
expected to arise from serious divergences over the policy proposal (i.e. 
that are not possible to resolve with usual bargaining or where this 
would be too costly62), political actors empowered to employ emergency 
procedures will use these to get the legislation passed (with the least 
number of amendments); 
                                                
61 In the legislature, the median preference is equivalent to the point where there is no possible coalition to defeat it, as is 
common knowledge in legislative studies. See Shepsle and Weingast (1982, 1984) and Riker (1962, 1982).  
62 In formal models of legislative politics, such as those that assess transaction costs or those studying distances between 
veto players (Tsebelis, 2002) or pivotal actors (Krehbiel, 1998), the concept of “too high costs of bargaining” is 
quantitatively determined. Here, my hypothesis is attentive to political dynamics when conflict is anticipated (as 
determined by the size of mutual support, fragmentation in the legislative scenario or the degree of ideological 
polarization between political parties) and I am hence not interested in formalizing the analysis, which may well be a 
future extension of the work nonetheless.  
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2) Political actors have privileged information about the spaces of arbitrary 
or discretional procedural design; particularly, when the committee 
system (emphasis: as a system) is large, the jurisdictions of the 
committees will tend to overlap and offer opportunities for strategic 
choice of the committee receiving a bill. While procedures to assign a 
certain bill to a certain committee tend to vary across countries (Garcia 
Montero, 2004), it is still possible to attempt to generalize a distinction 
between the most discretionary rule, which gives the President of the 
House complete freedom to assign bills to committees (as in Honduras), 
and the least discretionary rule which requires a general vote on the floor 
with majority rule (as in Guatemala). The bottom line is that 
discretionary spaces increase the possibilities to employ informational 
advantages and these are positively associated to agenda control.  
These sub-hypotheses entail one key assumption that should be made explicit: that 
political actors do not behave strategically unless they have exhausted all other ‘ordinary’ 
mechanisms (i.e. the usual bargaining between preferences and the use of majority rule). 
Hence, my assumption is that when political actors are certain that their policy proposal 
will gather the necessary votes (majority rule) or that it is a type of policy that no legislator 
will oppose (it is a ‘valence’ issue), they will not employ resources that, even if available, are 
costly – either because they are scarce, as informational advantages, or because they 
increase the possibility of critical public opinion, as the overuse of emergency procedures 
would produce. 
This assumption is equivalent to giving a central role to political conflict (or, as 
Tsebelis would say, to the ideological distances between veto players), and to the 
capabilities of political actors to predict conflict based on their knowledge of the policy 
positions of other political actors and on how far the institutional structure allows these 
preferences to gain support (see Krehbiel, 1998, on the theory of pivotal politics).  
The generality of these hypotheses and sub-hypotheses does not allow for the time 
being, the addition of case-specific detail. This information is offered in the next sections, 
which distinguish between the specific hypotheses for the organizational (the committee 
system) and procedural (the emergency procedures) advantages.  
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1.5. 2.1.) -  THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 
 The committee system is one, if not the, most important gates to getting legislation 
passed: “the power to decide which bills make it to the floor is arguably the least 
appreciated but most fundamental power in terms of influencing final outcomes” (Cox, 
2002: 261). The committee system is also a collective solution to the problem of 
information (Krehbiel, 1992). In order to produce information, specialization facilitates the 
development of expertise. In fact, specialization is a traditional way by which informational 
dilemmas can be solved. But the fact that committees produce information does not ensure 
that access to information is the same for all legislative actors. In other words: 
“organizational choices in the information area, thus, do not  simply involve questions of 
efficiency or effectiveness with which information is generated, distributed and used; they 
also involve questions of the basic distribution of power” (Cooper and MacKenzie, 1981, 
cited in Bimber, 1991: 592).  
 Hence, committees are resource-centers of power and information and the 
distribution of these is crucial. Committee power has been attributed to the sequential 
design of the legislative process of approval, which commonly demands the assessment of 
every legislative proposal by a specialized committee. If it is true that “the explanation of 
committee power resides in the rules governing the sequence of proposing” (Shepsle and 
Weingast, 1984: 86), then the possible space for strategic behavior must reside in which 
committee receives the bill. In other words, the centrality of committees derives not only 
from sequential design (which makes mandatory the assessment of every bill by a 
specialized committee before the bill proceeds to the floor63), but also from the distribution 
of tasks and power resources (in terms of assignment rules of bill to committee, and 
legislators to committees). The underlying question is whether there is any significant 
difference in the assignment of bills to committees depending upon who enacts the bill, its 
policy characteristics or the point in time in the electoral cycle.   
Therefore, the main question becomes how these resources are made available or 
not, whether they are equally accessible or inaccessible to all political actors. While variation 
is usually high among different committee systems, there are several well-studied aspects of 
committee systems in general which define these as powerful gatekeepers. The first of 
                                                
63 In some cases, as in Guatemala, the bill is first read on the floor (which is considered the first debate) and then 
proceeds to the specialized committee for assessment. However, there is no possibility of vetoing a bill in the immediate 
first stage (the floor), but there is in the second one (the committee emits a negative dictum on the bill); hence, the 
centrality of the committees as gatekeepers and strong actors as determined by the sequential design remains intact. For 
an overview of these procedures in Latin America, see Garcia Montero (2004).  
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these is the rule for assigning bill to committee: whether there is more a discretionary 
power to decide which committee is appropriate one to assess each bill or, in turn, majority 
rule is employed. While, at first sight, committee systems appear as jurisdictionally more or 
less complex, with a large range of factors determining the ‘optimal’ committee size64, 
jurisdictional complexity may affect the possible courses of strategic behavior. It is difficult, 
though, to generalize any hypothesis on the relationship between jurisdictional 
specialization and the possibilities offered to political actors to choose a specific committee 
where they expect the likelihood of bill approval without amendments to be higher. Francis 
(1982), in a stylized formal analysis of committee sizes and decisional costs, suggests that 
the larger the committee, the least special interests oriented committees will be, thereby 
offering fewer possibilities for strategic maneuvering. In turn, in the exploratory analysis of 
Chapter 3, Section 2.4, specifically devoted to committee systems, I obtained partial 
endorsement of that general assertion (the larger the committee, the least advantages for 
single actors or majority parties). A specific finding was added to this however: the larger 
the committee as a system, the greater the possibilities to neutralize proportional rules for 
the assignment of deputies to committees, and the greater the possible advantages to 
majority parties. The two findings may yet be compatible and relevant for the assessment 
of informational advantages, but they demand a refinement of the hypotheses in order to 
be able to combine them. Two hypotheses contribute to this, which follow:  
1) While the general hypothesis that the larger the committee (as unit), the least 
special interests-oriented it will be – since the committee majority becomes 
closer to mirror of the parent majority – holds, this may change if 
coordination between political actors is possible in a split-the-cake strategy. 
This type of strategy, developed in evolutionary game theory, is generally 
characterized by the following situation: there are two actors and one cake; 
the actors know they will need to bargain over the proportion of cake they 
will obtain, but they both want to get the bigger slice. There are several 
possible solutions, presenting a range of fair or unfair divisions of the cake, 
but one general result is that actors will reach a satisfactory agreement (a 
good piece of the cake that approximates a half-half partition) if they can 
                                                
64 According to Francis (1982), the optimal committee size – as evaluated with respect to alternative decisional costs – is 
characterized by small committees which can delegate to sub-committees. The range of factors affecting optimal 
committee sizes includes the size of the House, voting rules in committees and bargaining complexities. The author does, 
however, recognize that this theoretical approach lacks detail on how sensitive chambers and committees may be to 
different issues and proposals, as to their political content and public opinion attention to each policy.   
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trust in each other65. Applying the underpinnings of this game to the frame 
of legislative committees and political actors running for resources 
(informational and distributional), a split-the-cake strategy can appear under 
three conditions: (1) actors are acquainted with each other’s preferences, as 
happens when the size of committees tends to be small; (2) actors have a 
long history of interaction, and so trust (or distrust) is built on experience; 
(3) the split-the-cake strategy, or the distribution of power resources in the 
form a-bit-more-than-half, is possible because between the two actors there 
is no minimal-willing coalition that can defeat their preferences – or, 
similarly, the two actors constitute all minimal-winning coalitions.  
The main point that this hypothesis makes, in this more refined specification, is 
that the historical patterns of interaction between political actors matter, because they 
endow political actors with sources of key information in the bargaining process, be they 
over power resources, informational advantages or on the shape of the institutional design 
(such as committee size and assignment rules).  
With more specific reference to the cases under study, my hypothesis is that the 
cases with bipartisan systems and a longer democratic tradition (Costa Rica and Honduras) 
will be more prone to employ the split-the-cake strategy than the multiparty cases with 
young democracies (Guatemala and Panama). Mainly because experience of political 
interaction matters, as described above in terms of trust-building and the mutual 
knowledge of preferences, political coordination that offers majority actors opportunities 
for splitting the power resources in mixes of a-bit-more-than-the-half and a-bit-less-than-
the-half, is expected to appear in Honduras and Costa Rica and not in Guatemala and 
Panama. The only disclaimer here, as usual, is that case-specific light is necessary to smooth 
the expectation, but generally the hypothesis should help in distinguishing between 
country-specific and general factors affecting and explaining patterns of legislative 
production.  
The second refinement to the general hypotheses on the interaction between 
committee size, rules for assigning bills to committees and political actors’ incentives to 
gain access to informational advantages is:  
                                                
65 Trust is in this context employed in its economic meaning: as a concept that captures expectations on the length of the 
relationship (Axelrod, 1984). In the original formulation of the split-the-cake game, economists usually assume that actors 
have perfect information about each other and hence can anticipate – using backward induction – a satisfactory solution 
for both. Here I have deliberately employed trust in that the concept gathers two properties: it does not only refer to 
knowledge of preferences (perfect information) but also to the mutual confidence that emerges in lengthy interaction (so 
that an equilibrium other than defeat – or the prisoner’s dilemma – can emerge).  
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2) Discretional procedures for assigning a bill to a committee range from the 
minority of the majority deciding the maximal discretionary assignment rule, 
to a supermajority vote on the floor the minimal discretional rule. The 
minority of the majority means that a single actor may decide on which 
committee receives the bill, and that this actor belongs to the majority party. 
Such is the case when the Head of Congress, who commonly is the leader or 
the speaker of the majority party, is responsible for the assignment of the 
bills to committees. This is clearly a minority of the majority type of rule and 
increases the discretional use of power this actor may wield pro doma sua. 
In turn, if the bill must be voted on the floor before it is sent to committee, 
the rule allows for a greater participation of political actors (especially those 
not belonging to the majority party or those who did not propose the bill) 
and co-decision in the assignment may be expected to exist. A supermajority 
rule for such a vote would eventually be the most demanding and 
participatory (or aggregative) rule, explicitly avoiding discretional 
procedures.  
Among the cases, there is some variation with respect to this rule, with only the 
Guatemalan case requiring a vote on the floor to assign the bill to a committee. The most 
discretional cases, with a minority of the majority rule – or leaving complete discretion to 
the President of the House to determine which committee receives each bill – are 
Honduras and Costa Rica. The fourth case, Panama, falls in a medium category which is 
relatively difficult to assess, as it usually displays a mixed rule as follows: the committee is 
the “adoptive body” (prohijador) of every legislative proposal of constitutional rank, which 
practically implies that no legislative proposal can go to the floor without a committee 
having adopted the role of proposer. For ordinary proposals, in turn, the presentation of 
the proposal is made to the floor by the proposer, but the concept of “adoptive committee” is 
still employed. So, even if every committee adopts a symbolic role of ‘step-adopter’ of the 
proposal, the minority of the majority still has the power to determine which specific 
committee is the recipient of that authority.  
Overall, the expectation is that we observe more embedded informational 
advantages for majority parties in Honduras and Costa Rica, where not only is the split-the-
cake strategy to divide resources expected to be in place, but also the most discretional rule 
to determine the assignment of bills to committees.  
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There are two additional general elements in the studies of committee systems 
which offer additional hypotheses. A key well-studied aspect is the interaction between the 
size of the committee system and the rule for assigning deputies to committees. While 
above I have brought to the analysis the interaction between committee size and 
assignment rule of bill to committee, I shall now turn my attention to another assignment 
rule that determines the composition of committees. The size of the committee system – as 
the number of committees available for distributing seats –, the size of committees – as the 
number of seats within each which is turn determines the workload of legislators and hence 
the amount of attention available to dedicate to each specialized area – and the assignment 
rule are all determinant for the functioning of committees as expertise providers. If, in fact, 
we subscribe to the view that “institutional arrangements shape the relevance of expertise 
to political outcomes” (Bimber, 1991), the assignment rule determining the composition of 
committees is central to the shape of distributional advantages (as complimentary to the 
purely informational ones, Cooper and McKenzie, 1981). Some aspects of the 
distributional advantages offered to majority parties have already been calculated through 
the un-proportionality figures in the previous Chapter (Table 7). But case-specific light on 
which jurisdictional areas are privileged by majority parties still lacks. Such information 
would reveal whether in fact the un-proportionality observed in Panama and Honduras 
derives from the unequal distribution of relevant policy resources. The following Table 
displays detailed information on those committee jurisdictions where the majority party 
disposes of a working majority, and the volume of legislation that was passed in each of 
these committees.  
Table  20.  Per c en tage  o f  l e g i s la t ion approved  through commit t e e s  where  the  major i ty  par ty  he ld  fu l l  
major i ty  on i t s  own 
VARIABLES GUATEMALA PANAMA HONDURAS COSTA RICA 
Percentage of bills approved that were processed by committees classified in four broad policy areas 
where the majority party had the majority of seats 
Political reform 
issues 
36 % 79 % 100 % 49 % 
Economic issues 9 % 0 % 100 % 0 % 
Socio-cultural 
issues 
97 % 36 % 70 % 0 % 
Infrastructure 
issues 
63 % 18 % 92 % 95 % 
Note: The benchmark to classify the committees as the majority holding the majority is 50% of the seats 
or higher. This high benchmark serves the conceptual objective of capturing those situations where the 
majority party does not need to build coalitions or negotiate any point of its most-preferred policy 
preference.  
 
From the Table above, one key piece of information brings further detail to the 
general hypothesis. There is a varying sensitivity among the cases with respect to the policy 
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areas where actors are most interested in monopolizing key informational resources 
through advantageous positioning in committees. In particular, an intuitive hypothesis that 
is not supported by the data is that majority parties concentrate their attempt to 
monopolize informational resources on economic policy, because the availability of 
resources is essential for the success (especially for implementation) of policies. Instead, we 
find that majority parties tend to place bills in committees where they have an assured 
majority with respect to infrastructure issues (which include committees assessing bills on 
transportation or energy resources) and to political reform issues (constitutional issues, 
international relations or committees for assessing decentralization or municipal reforms). 
These two broad policy areas form the majority of bills passed in committees where the 
majority party was sure of winning the vote. This observation is equivalent to 
acknowledging that variation in the patterns of legislative production also derives from 
differences in policy priorities across the countries, or that case-specific factors in 
determining different policy areas that matter more or one country and less for another 
bring qualitative detail and can, hence, partially explain differences in the policy biases of 
the legislative production in these four countries. The qualitative aspect may hence be a 
further element, of case-specific nature, to account for in the interpretation of the results 
related to the hypotheses laid out above.  
The last aspect of committee systems to be studied is the existence of ad-hoc 
committees. Ad-hoc committees (called “accidental” in Panama, “special” in Costa Rica, 
“urgent” in Honduras and “ad-hoc” in Guatemala) serve the general objective of assessing 
legislative proposals that no other committee can, for reasons of lack of expertise or for 
reasons of the urgency of the dictum. Hence, these ad-hoc committees are collective 
solutions to the various needs of the legislature, in both time pressures and technical 
capabilities – in principle. Ad-hoc committees, despite not belonging to the permanent 
institutional structure of the legislature, also have naming and composition rules. Here, a 
distinction between discretionary rules and majority rules for the naming and composition 
of these committees may again be drawn, as well as on when it is decided that a bill 
requires an ad-hoc committee assessment.  
Precisely because these committees are usually smaller in size than ordinary ones in 
order to facilitate temporal and decisional efficiency, naming becomes a central question in 
characterizing variation among these special bodies. For instance, while an ordinary 
committee in Costa Rica is composed of 9 to 11 deputies, special or ad-hoc committees are 
only composed of 3 to 5. If the naming rule is once more discretional in favor of the 
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majority party (as called before: the minority of the majority), then only two deputies in an 
ad-hoc committee guarantees a majority for the majority party. If this fact concerns the 
enactment of bills of policy relevance (for instance, that entail spending), elections are 
closer and the status of the bill is changed to urgent, then the preferences of the majority 
party are the only ones assured in the legislative process of approval. That is, if procedural 
and organizational tools for agenda control are coincidentally employed, the resulting 
legislation will surely display a low aggregation of interests.  
Among the cases under study, only Guatemala has no recourse to ad-hoc 
committees from its constitutional rules, which designed ad-hoc committees with pre-
defined tasks. These thus belong to the permanent structure of the legislature. The tasks 
assigned were, obviously, largely related to the broad peace process in which the country 
was involved for almost a decade, particularly in three areas of expertise: technical 
assistance to Congress, extraordinary for electoral reforms and specialized on studies of 
peace-building. All other cases have some ad-hoc committees and are designed according 
to the following rules:  
Table  21.  Ad-hoc  commit t e e s  des ign :  s ize ,  ass ignment  ru l e s  and types 
Characteristics GUATEMALA PANAMA HONDURAS COSTA RICA 
Type of ad-hoc 
committees 
With tasks 
assigned:  
1)Technical 
assistance to the 
legislature 
2)For electoral 
reform  
3)For Peace 
studies 
 
Without tasks 
assigned: No  
 
Possible to create 
subcommittees: 
No 
With tasks 
assigned: No 
 
Without tasks 
assigned: Yes 
 
Possible to create 
subcommittees: 
Yes 
With tasks 
assigned: No 
 
Without tasks 
assigned: Yes 
 
Possible to create 
subcommittees: 
No 
With tasks 
assigned: 
1)For research on  
the death of 
Wagner Segura 
2)For 
Constitutional 
reforms 
3)For research on 
sustainable 
development 
Without tasks 
assigned: Yes 
Possible to create 
subcommittees: 
Yes 
Size of committee 
(number of 
deputies) 
1 has 6 deputies 
2 has 11 deputies  
3 has 10 deputies 
Minimum 6 
deputies  
3 to 5 deputies 3 to 5 deputies  
Assignment rule  Belong to 
permanent 
legislative 
structure  
Minority of 
majority 
(President of the 
House) – after 
consultation with 
party leaders 
Minority of 
majority 
(President of the 
House) 
Minority of 
majority 
(President of the 
House) 
Voting rule Majority  Majority Majority Majority 
Note: for Guatemala, the number of deputies in the especial committees is that for the legislative term 
under study, as for the data collected in field work.  
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This procedure is an exceptional one yet the departure expectation would naturally 
be that it is not employed often. In Honduras, as the case where the procedure is most 
frequently employed compared to the other three cases, 28% of the total legislation 
approved employed an especial committee for dictum. Since this case has the most 
specialized committee system (with 53 committees, each with very specific jurisdictions – 
such as the Committee for Sugar issues and the like), this pattern has attracts attention as it 
would seem these committees are employed in order to avoid political conflict on the floor. 
In order to carry out such an assessment, I detail below the type of bills and procedures 
associated to the employment of especial committees in this case66.  
Table  22.  Ad-hoc  commit t e e  employment  in  Honduras   
Ratio of use ordinary versus especial committee 27% of bills approved assessed by especial 
committee 
Enactment when bill is assessed in especial 
committee 
58% Legislative actors (within dummy Executive-
Legislative enactment), with significant correlation 
of size  .-25 
Within parties: 97% PLH (government party), no 
significant correlation  
Average proportion of seats of majority party in 
committee 
Proportion is in all cases the minimum legal (3 
deputies), of whom in all cases the majority party 
holds the 67% of seats (that is, two deputies are 
from PLH) 
Type of procedures employed when especial 
committee emits dictum  
97% of cases bills after especial committee dictum 
is approved in one or two debates (alter -order-of-
the-day) 
Median time in especial committee as compared to 
ordinary committee dictum 
Median for especial committee= 5 days (mean=32) 
Median for all other committees= 17 days 
(mean=48) 
Scope of policy when bill is assessed by especial 
committee 
(Di Palma, 1976 coding) 
Bill is national in the 35% of cases  
Bill is sectional in the 27% of cases 
Bill is micro-sectional in the 37% of cases 
 
The empirical evidence clearly indicates that the majority party employs special 
committees to its own advantage, as the ad-hoc committee endows the party with an 
assured majority (see third row: in 100% of the cases, the majority party hold 67% of seats, 
or two deputies out of three in the ad-hoc committees). As the President of the House is 
the agenda-setter, or the actor in charge of sending the bills to ad-hoc committees and 
naming the deputies who will form these, the rule allows for the discretionary assignment 
not only of bills but also of deputies (who is part of the ad-hoc committee). In fact, the 
President of the House for the period under study was the leader of the majority party in 
                                                
66 For Guatemala, with the data available, only 2% of the bills approved were assessed by the especial committees with 
pre-defined tasks, and no information on the especial committees without assigned tasks –the spot of interest for the 
Honduran case and where our attention lies with respect to hypothesizing on agenda control – is available for Guatemala 
or Panama. Lastly, for Costa Rica, only three bills were assessed by the especial committees with tasks assigned, and no 
information  was available for the especial committees without assigned tasks.  
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Honduras for the period under study (Rafael Pineda), and would in fact be the presidential 
candidate for the PLH in the general elections in 2001.  
With respect to enactment, the bills assigned to this committee are mostly enacted 
by legislators, which indicates that the internal resources belonging to the House are known 
and appreciated by legislators, but not by the Executive. This fact makes sense not only in 
that the physical placement of legislators is within the House, but also because the 
organizational resources of the legislature are known to them (with knowledge here 
designating informational advantages as we have been referring to above). We can also see 
that the chosen size of committee is systematically the smaller one, always an odd number 
(three) so that whatever voting rule is adopted (unless unanimity, which is not present in 
committee voting rules for dictum), the two deputies of the majority party constitute a 
majority. A particularly remarkable qualitative piece of information from the employment 
of ad-hoc committee in Honduras is that the scope of the bill is not related to the choice of 
an ad-hoc committee for dictum (the correlation test is not significant and of a weak 
negative size). Similarly, the temporal efficiency of this committee as compared to ordinary 
(permanent) committees is not significantly higher, and so the time pressure to approve a 
bill cannot explain the employment of ad-hoc committees for dictum. There is thus some 
indication that the grounds for employing ad-hoc committees are not related to time 
pressure or to a lack of technical capabilities, as was initially attributed to the existence of 
this procedural resource.  
In fact, the results for Honduras on ad-hoc committees – how and when these are 
employed – point to an additional refinement to the bulk of hypotheses developed thus far: 
when there is unified government the opportunities for agenda control are doubled. This 
expectation also applies to Costa Rica, where the political scenario is also historically 
characterized by unified government. The variation the other two cases with unified 
governments for the period under study provide is thus the degree of fragmentation and 
polarization in the House. The literature on unified versus divided government in fact 
emphasizes the divergences between the performances of these contextual conditions on 
the need for parties to coalesce, negotiate or find compromises. This need also appears 
under unified government when the seats of the biggest party in Congress – especially in 
parliamentary systems – are a relative majority instead of an absolute one: that is, 
fragmentation matters. In addition to fragmentation, when this situation is combined with 
polarization (a measure of ideological distances), the prospects for coalescing, negotiating 
and finding compromises also become increasingly narrow. In our cases, this variation is 
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present in Guatemala and Panama, where the expectation is, therefore, that there is either 
plain Executive dominance of the agenda, or that the possibilities in terms of monopolizing 
the legislature’s internal resources within the reach of majority party legislators are not 
placed on the ad-hoc committee design – since they cannot assure a majority.  
The general argument is that the procedures which are accessible to legislators, 
such as the organizational characteristics of the committee system provide a way for the 
majority party to get its bills passed with the least number of amendments. In turn, 
resources that may be more accessible to Executives – such as vetoes, decrees and calling 
an extraordinary session, which are exogenous to the legislature’s internal (organizational or 
procedural) structure, may offer an alternative method of agenda control. If a single party, 
for example in the context of unified government, has assured access to both resources 
from its privileged position in terms of the available resources, the phenomenon of agenda 
control is most likely. This assertion is equivalent to considering plurality, or more 
accurately the possibilities for political plurality (i.e. the aggregation of interests), as a 
phenomenon of disagreement. It is in fact an essential characteristic of democracy that 
disagreement is allowed and fostered by the institutional design and rules, or as has been 
argued: that the channels for conflict solving are institutionalized (Przeworski, 1991).  
The hypothesis hints that agenda control may be exerted in two ways: first, through 
plain Executive dominance of the agenda through strong authoritative tools such as veto 
power, decree power and extraordinary or exceptional agenda-setting powers; second, 
through the majority party’s advantageous position with respect to informational and 
distributional advantages within the House’s organizational and procedural design, more 
specifically embedded within the committee system’s characteristics assessed above (size, 
jurisdictional specialization and assignment rules – plus the interaction between these).  
This Chapter offers measurement options and general and specific hypotheses 
concerning how and when procedural justice is missing and where there are instead 
embedded advantages benefiting some political actors as compared to others, specifically 
majority parties and Executives. These advantages clearly involve a troubling relationship 
with the underpinnings of democracy on representation, universal principles (access to 
institutional participatory and decisional mechanisms for elected representatives67) and the 
                                                
67 Notice that, while the legal literature on the universality of participatory rights in democracy is usually only concerned 
with citizens’, as is the literature on the Theory of Democracy, which assesses the equality of citizens and the universal (at 
least) electoral participation of citizens as a pre-condition for calling a regime democratic, my point here remarks the 
importance of procedural justice and universal equality among politicians as a central drive determining the degree of 
representativeness of the democracy at work. In fact, this is an important theoretical point further developed in the 
conclusions of this Chapter in connection with the function of Institutional Theory and its predictions for Theory of 
Democracy.  
 
122 
equal application of procedures as embedded in the rule of law. Detailed hypotheses 
regarding emergency procedures will now follow, before their empirical assessment.  
1.6. 2.2) -. THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 
Emergency procedures are those that allow a bill to be passed more quickly by 
appealing to its special character (urgent for social needs, urgent for a deadline on an 
International Treaty, etc). Mechanisms like decree authority (Shugart and Carey, 1998) and 
the imposition of closed amendment rules (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989) have attracted the 
academic attention as a way to assess emergency procedures. Whilst it is true that decrees 
constitute the most studied tool for solving emergency situations (Nacif and Morgesntern, 
2002; Shugart and Carey, 1998), it may not be that which is most often employed. We 
simply do not know which other tools can also fall in the category of emergency 
procedures unless we pay close attention to the procedural design. There are four68 
common factors that can be considered emergency procedures from the definition that 
they provide channels for a bill to get a quick approval. These are: (1) the reduction of the 
number of debates on the floor; (2) the call for an extraordinary session, out of the 
ordinary calendar of the Congress; (3) the modification of the status of the bill to urgent; 
and (4) alteration of the order-of-the-day to include a legislative proposal.  
Emergency procedures are, hence, heterogeneous and may offer distinctive means 
to political actors to transform an open round of amendments (without temporal or 
quantitative constraints) into a closed one (with temporal constraints for quick passage or 
rejection) [Baron and Ferejohn, 1989]. The availability of these distinctive emergency 
procedures for the four cases under analysis follows:   
                                                
68 A fifth would eventually be the assignment of a bill to an ad-hoc committee. As seen in Table 3 for the case where the 
most detailed information exists on the matter, the temporal efficiency of ad-hoc committees is not significantly higher 
than the time any other standing committee takes to emit a dictum. Thus the endorsement that temporal efficiency is not 
the explanatory source of ad-hoc committee formation has already been obtained.  
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Table  23.  Avai lab i l i t y  o f  emergency  procedures  in  four  Centra l  Amer i can countr i e s  
Types of 
emergency 
procedures 
HONDURAS COSTA RICA GUATEMALA PANAMA 
Reduction of the 
number of debates 
in the floor 
Yes No Yes  No  
Extraordinary 
session 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bill proposed as 
urgent 
Yes Yes Yes Yes(*) 
Motion for 
altering the 
agenda-of-the-day 
to include a bill 
No Yes No No 
Source: own construction.  
(*) In Panama the bill cannot be proposed as urgent until the second debate (given that the first debate is 
the committee dictum) and is called ‘notoria’ designating the special – urgent – treatment of the bill.  
 
The hypotheses elaborated for the committee system with respect to the strategic 
maneuvering of political actors when (1) conflict on the floor is expected, (2) the size of 
legislative support for the Executive agenda is small and (3) there is unbalanced access for 
majority parties to privileged information regarding spaces for the discretional use of 
power, also hold for the use of emergency procedures. The distinction, however, between 
committee choice and the employment of emergency procedures, is placed at the analytical 
level at which these types of procedures operate, i.e. in relation to the temporal sequence for 
the bill’s approval. In this case, then, the choice of emergency procedures is related to the 
anticipation of the rhythm of bill approval. As Schmitter and Santiso emphasize: “when 
something happens, as well as in what order and with what rhythm, can be even more 
important in determining the outcome than whether something happens or what happens” 
(1998: 69, italics in original).   
The specific hypothesis on the use of informational advantages does not, however, 
appear to be crucial for the choice of emergency procedures, since these do not involve 
issues of specialization where choice may be exercised. Instead, emergency procedures 
involve a choice from temporal alternatives within a range of possible procedures.  
Concerning the way (how) in which I employ the analytical distinction between the 
range of discretional procedures that we developed previously. On this point, while there 
are more ‘risky’ emergency procedures – such as the reduction of debates on the floor, 
requiring a simple majority vote in Honduras and an absolute majority vote in Guatemala - 
the call for an extraordinary session or the proposal of a bill with urgent status does not 
require any previous vote on the floor of the House. With respect to extraordinary session, 
I have already described in Chapter 2, together with the assessment of constitutional rules, 
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that the authority to call an extraordinary session always lies with the Executive (Table 4 in 
Chapter 2), while legislators have varying authority over this (with the possibility to call for 
it in Guatemala and Honduras, absent in Costa Rica and Panama). I have considered the 
extraordinary session as an emergency procedure because it offers an exceptional way of 
placing an issue on the agenda and getting it passed, possibly under exceptional quorum 
and voting circumstances69. However, data availability is again a constraint on measuring 
exactly the same phenomenon in all cases; as can be seen below, a descriptive account of 
the employment of emergency procedures displays a varying range of available data for the 
four countries under analysis.  
Table 24. Frequencies  o f  the use o f  emergency procedures in four Central  American 
countr ies  
Types of emergency procedures HONDURAS COSTA 
RICA 
GUATEMAL
A 
PANAMA 
Reduction of the number of debates on 
the floor 
86,9% n.a. 5,5% n.a.  
Call for Extraordinary session N.A. 50,5% N.A. 9,9% 
Bill proposed as urgent N.A. 30% 15,2% 19,4% 
Alteration of the order-of-the-day to 
include a bill 
n.a. 40,9% n.a. n.a. 
Source: own construction. The percentages show the use of the emergency procedures, that is value ‘Yes’ 
in Table 1.  
n.a. Not  available in the procedural rules of the country; N.A. not  available in the data.  
 
Only with the descriptive information of the Table above, and yet surprisingly enough, 
a clear pattern in the data above is that the two bipartisan cases, Honduras and Costa Rica, 
use more often, in quantitative terms, the emergency procedures for which data is available 
than the multiparty cases – Guatemala and Panama.  
In addition, due to the moderate diversity of emergency procedures in the cases under 
study, case-specific analyses will first need to be developed in order to be able to capture 
the same phenomenon (the use of endogenous procedures for agenda control through 
emergency procedures) in the final comparative assessment. Despite this fact, four 
explanatory variables that may shed light on the phenomenon as such may still be 
elaborated, while disregarding the specific type of emergency procedure employed:  
1) Is the call for an extraordinary session a systematically chosen path for Executive 
dominance of the agenda? In terms of variables, the expectation is that positive values on 
the variables regarding Executive authority and Executive independence – which capture 
                                                
69 For instance in Guatemala, there is a type of quorum which is called the ‘reduced quorum’ (quorum reducido) that sets 
25% of deputies as the benchmark to install a legislative session. If this quorum were adopted on a call for an 
extraordinary session by the Executive, this would practically imply that a bill could be approved with only 14 votes in the 
legislature (as result of 113 total number of deputies in the term under study, of which 28 is a 25%, of which 14 deputies 
are a 50% for the absolute majority voting rule).  
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the constitutional power of the Executive to call for an extraordinary session - correlate 
with positive values on the procedural choice of emergency procedures. If the answer to 
this question is positive, then the original hypothesis that there is a more complex 
interaction between macro-institutional (such as constitutional) and micro-institutional 
rules (such as procedural) is only partially supported, indicating that constitutional rules 
alone can in fact determine varying degrees of institutional performance and policy 
outcomes.  
2) Do the policy characteristics of the bill determine the employment of an emergency 
procedure, for instance bills that fix deadlines for institutional approval (such as 
International Treaties signed by the Executive which require ratification on the floor; or 
amendments to the budget bill that are of interest to the proposer). If the answer to this 
question is positive, the hint is that procedural choice manifested through the employment 
of emergency procedures is not reflective of strategic behavior, but rather of exogenous 
determinants, like the bills’ characteristics.  
3) Do also the levels of fragmentation and polarization (following the hypothesis on 
unified versus divided government developed in the previous subsection) also determine 
the differential employment of emergency procedures by Legislative and Executive? Once 
more, the expected distinction lies in the varying access that these political actors have with 
respect to procedures. For instance, while the authority to call an extraordinary session is 
provided to all Executives in the cases under study, this is not the case for Legislative 
actors, who must, furthermore, coordinate to access this emergency procedure70. If the 
answer to this question is positive, that it is not an inherent tendency of presidential 
systems to perform badly in institutional terms, but the combination of presidentialism and 
multipartism that explains varying degrees (and qualities) of institutional performance 
(Mainwaring, 1990)71.  
4) Does the pressure of the electoral cycle determine which emergency procedure is 
employed and who enacts the bill appealing to an urgent status? The expectation is that 
towards the end of the term there is in fact a greater use of emergency procedures, 
especially by the Executive (that is, extraordinary sessions or the introduction of bills with 
an urgent status). This expectation should hold if the hypothesis derived on the basis of the 
                                                
70 In Panama and Costa Rica the call for an extraordinary procedure is not awarded to the Legislative at all, and in 
Guatemala and Honduras, where it is, constitutional rules require a simple majority vote on the floor for the former case 
and a supermajority vote for the latter. Clearly, the voting requirement demands coordination if agreement on the need to 
consider an issue in an exceptional session is to be made.  
71 Mainwaring then extended the argument not only to the format of the party system in terms of number of parties but 
also to the roots of the party system in society and additional measures of ideological distances between parties and the 
like, elaborating on the concept of party system institutionalization (see Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mainwaring, 1998).  
 
126 
exploration of honeymoon effects (Table 4, Chapter 3), which displayed a decrease of the 
legislative support of the Executive agenda towards the end of the term, is correct. To 
circumventing the decrease of support in the legislature, the Executive may instead appeal 
for an urgent status of the bill or an especial procedure. Finally, if the answer to this 
question is positive, the classical perspective on the ‘electoral connection’ (Mayhew, 1974) 
would stand as an explanation of the branches’ behavior with respect to legislative 
production. This perspective basically emphasizes the role of individual goals and not 
institutional structures.  
The general expectation is that all variables explain some variance of procedural and 
organizational choice. A competitive modeling strategy (which is better explained in 
Section IV) will, however, allow me to assign specific weights to each type of factor, 
thereby allowing the distinction between the contextual and structural explanatory sources 
of endogenous procedures employed as tools for agenda control to emerge. Again, the 
analytical distinction between exogenous factors (such as the constitutional rules 
determining variation in Executive authority and independence, the time pressure of the 
electoral cycle, the characteristics of the legislative scenario such as fragmentation and 
polarization) and the endogenous (such as the sequential design making committees 
powerful and emergency procedures effective or the hypotheses concerning informational 
and distributional advantages within the legislative decisional structure) is expected to 
enrich the analysis both by adding institutional detail and by capturing general comparative 
patterns.  
1.7. 2.3).- THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE PROCEDURAL AND THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL AS ENDOGENOUS RESOURCES: MULTI-LAYERING OF TOOLS 
FOR AGENDA CONTROL  
 
Up to now I have discussed specific properties, characteristics and relevant 
questions of organizational (committees) and procedural (especial or urgent procedures) 
choice. An additional analytical possibility involves exploring the interactions between the 
organizational and the procedural, and constitutes a further step largely under-explored in 
legislative studies72. For instance, I have said that committee power is entrenched from the 
sequential design of the legislative process of approval. This assertion involves in fact the 
recognition that the purely procedural (the sequence for approval) affects the 
                                                
72 In Krutz (2001), Cheibub and Limongi (2002) and Haggard and McCubbins (2001) there is an explicit effort to explore 
the interactions between the legislative decisional structure, the rules governing it, and the context, as characterized by 
political behavior and responses to temporal pressures, economic shocks or to constraints from constitutional rules. The 
exploration, however, of interactions within procedural rules governing the legislative decisional structure is still 
unknown territory for the field.  
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organizational (the degree of committee centrality). Similarly, we can find examples where 
the organizational affects the procedural, for instance with respect to the quorum required 
for the installment of an extraordinary session (as an organizational demand of human 
resources), which affects the procedural (no bill can be put to vote on the floor without the 
minimum quorum requirements).  
One key piece of information from the empirical assessment of the use of ad-hoc 
committee in Honduras (see Table 22, in this Chapter) is that the use of especial 
procedures can in fact be multi-layered, or employed together, for a given bill. For instance 
we saw that, once ad-hoc committees are employed, the bill is passed in either one or two 
debates (against the three debates for ordinary legislation) in 97% of the cases. This means 
that for that specific bill an ad-hoc committee dictum was employed together with a 
successive reduction of the number of debates on the floor. Here, sequential design was 
employed strategically together with the organizational existence of ad-hoc committees.  
The possibilities to multi-layer procedural and organizational choices are obviously 
large and vary according to the available set of alternatives present in each country. 
However, we may elaborate on some possibilities that are expected to enrich the analysis by 
extending it to the interactive effects. I devise two specific multi-layered choices which are 
particularly relevant and enlightening for the assessment of how agenda control is in fact 
related to a restriction of the aggregation of interests in the decision-making process:  
1st) The interaction among the actor who enacts the bill, a particular sequential 
choice and an organizational choice attached to it. Such a situation is likely if the standard 
belief about Latin American legislatures, as coordinative devices for patronage legislation 
enacted by the Executive, holds empirically. Hence, the empirical reflection of this 
potential coordination between Legislative and Executive for patronage to the benefit of a 
particular set of interests would be characterized by the following situation: the Executive 
enacts a bill – with micro-sectional scope and spending involved73 - and attaches an urgent 
status to it; the legislature replies to the time pressure involved by the urgent status by 
sending it to an ad-hoc committee and approves the dictum in one debate on the floor 
(which, as we have seen, tends to happen in most of the cases following an ad-hoc 
committee dictum). The approved bill would see very little scrutiny by parties other than 
the proposer’s one, given that ad-hoc committees are characterized by a smaller number of 
                                                
73 These two characteristics are expected to capture, with the data available, patronage legislating. Given the micro-
sectional scope precisely designing targeted specific social groups, plus the spending involved capturing the assignment of 
resources for the policy, the two factors together may well be taken as a proxy for patronage, defined equivalently as 
policies that direct financial resources to specific targeted social groups. 
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legislators and resolving the approval in one debate also involves a shorter deliberative 
decisional process.  
The point is whether it is true that it is precisely because the Executive enacts the 
bill that the response is the multi-layering of two choices: the procedural reduction of the 
number of debates and the organizational choice of the ad-hoc committee, or for the sake 
of argument any committee where the majority party holds a majority of seats (which is a 
more general hypothesis and for which I possess detailed data for testing). This hypothesis 
is important for the identification of coordination for patronage legislation, and therefore 
in fact contributes to a meaningful assessment of the connections between the systematic 
patterns of legislative production and the low aggregation of interests in the decision-
making process as a reflection of agenda control.  
2nd) The interaction between organizational and procedural committee choices, in 
terms of the choice of a committee whose temporal efficiency in emitting a dictum is 
expected (to be systematically and significantly) higher. In this case, the organizational 
choice related to the assignment of a bill to a temporally efficient committee, overlaps with 
the procedural choice of employing a discretional rule to assign the bill to a specific 
committee where the majority party holds the majority. Such interaction may well be 
reflected if committees where the majority party holds a majority of the seats are also more 
efficient because decisional problems do not emerge, i.e. the majority party is disciplined 
and coherent (there is no great internal disagreement on the policy preferences of the 
party). If this holds, we are observing a single effect type of hypothesis and not an 
interactive one, but there is also a possibility that this fact takes place as the result of the 
interaction of factors, i.e. that a bill is assigned to a committee because of the temporal 
efficiency and not because of the seats held by the majority party in that committee.  
Before proceeding to the modeling stage, which is somewhat complex on account 
of the number and diversity of hypotheses contained in these previous sections, I first 
summarize the bulk of theory-driven hypotheses together with the empirical 
operationalization elaborated in the specific subsections for each dependent variable 
(committee system and emergency procedures). This follows in Table 6.  
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Table  25.  Summary o f  hypothese s  on endogenous  procedures  as  too l s  fo r  agenda contro l   
THEORY-DRIVEN 
HYPOTHESES 
EMPIRICAL 
OPERATIONALIZATION 
EXPLANATORY SOURCES 
AND EXPECTED 
RELATIONSHIP 
Single-effect Hypotheses 
Size of legislative support for 
Executive agenda is associated to 
procedural choice, as an attempt 
by the Executive to circumvent 
ordinary procedures  
Legislative support for Executive 
agenda depends on 
fragmentation of the party 
system, closeness of elections, 
coherence of political agendas 
between Executive and 
Legislative majority party, 
informational flows between the 
branches    
Committee choice and 
emergency procedure choice is 
positively related to large values 
of fragmentation and polarization 
on the floor; and last half of 
electoral cycle -- as a response of 
the Executive to loss of 
legislative support 
Anticipation of political conflict 
is positively related to procedural 
choice (which is a manifestation 
of agenda control) 
Political actors behave 
strategically once they have 
exhausted ordinary bargaining 
channels, or when bargaining 
becomes too costly – unless 
coordination based on trust 
(historical interaction) and 
between low number of political 
actors (bipartisan systems) is 
possible 
Political conflict is positively 
associated to polarization (i.e. in 
terms of ideological distance) or 
divergences on policy 
preferences (i.e. bill is micro-
sectional: targets a social group), 
which are positively associated 
to procedural choice 
 
Informational advantages, on the 
spaces of discretional ruling, are 
positively associated to 
procedural choice 
Discretional rules of assignment 
of bills to committees increase 
the possibilities to employ 
endogenous procedures as tools 
for agenda control 
Discretional naming and 
composition rules embed quasi-
dictatorial advantages for  the 
majority party: minority of the 
majority decides which 
committee receives each bill and 
composition of especial 
committees 
Informational advantages, on the 
jurisdictional specialization of 
committees, are positively 
associated to procedural choice   
Large committee system (as a 
system) with small committees 
(as units) provide opportunities 
for disproportional comparative 
advantages to majority parties 
 
Large committee systems favor 
discretional assignment of bill to 
committee since jurisdictions 
tend to overlap and choice is 
which committee receives the 
bill: i.e. a bill on policy area 
economic issues, may be 
assigned to a specific committee 
where advantages to majority 
party are assured 
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INTERACTIVE-EFFECT HYPOTHESES  
Executive’s incentives to 
circumvent legislative 
procedures increase when 
elections are close and when the 
competitiveness of the electoral 
cycle is high  
The size of legislative support 
for the Executive agenda is 
expected to suffer significant 
ruptures towards the end of the 
term under bipartisan systems 
with internally fractionalized 
parties  
Honeymoon effects positive and 
significant 
Interactive Executive enacts the 
bill and dummy for bipartisan 
versus multiparty systems is 
negative and significant 
Under unified government, the 
opportunities to exert agenda 
control are doubled 
Resources more accessible to 
Executive (decree power, veto 
power and call for extraordinary 
session), plus 
Resources more accessible to 
majority party in the House (ad-
hoc committees, committee 
assignment) 
Large values of Executive 
authority (as constitutionally 
provided) positively and 
significantly explain call for 
extraordinary session, and 
interact with end of term (loss of 
support for Executive agenda in 
the House) 
Executive’s incentives to 
circumvent legislative 
procedures increase when 
polarization is high and when 
elections are closer 
Call for extraordinary session 
and employment of emergency 
procedures are significantly 
higher in the multiparty cases 
(hypothesis related to the 
anticipation of conflict on the 
floor) 
Interaction between Executive 
incentives to employ emergency 
procedures (enactment of bills 
with urgent status or call for 
extraordinary session), large 
polarization (multiparty cases) 
and last half of term (elections 
are closer) 
Procedural and organizational 
choices may  be multi-layered, 
increasing the comparative 
advantages as dependent upon 
the characteristics of the bill 
(patronage) or the actor enacting 
the bill (majority actors) 
1) Coordination for patronage 
legislation: Bill is microsectional 
(targets specific social group), 
entails spending (bill is assigned 
to a committee for economic 
issues), is enacted by the 
Executive (agenda dominance), 
sent to an ad-hoc committee and 
proceeds through urgent 
treatment in one debate on the 
floor  
2) Overlapping of advantages: 
Bill is assigned to a time-
efficient committee and the 
majority party holds the majority 
of the seats 
1) Interaction between scope of 
bill and committee receiving the 
bill being assigned to a 
committee for economic issues 
and Executive enactment of bill 
with urgent status 
 
 
 
2) Interaction between time-
efficient committees and seats of 
majority party in committees 
holding over 50% of seats  
 
The analysis follows a competitive modeling strategy, whereby separate models are 
first run including as explanatory variables only those endogenous to the legislative 
structure, such as the characteristics of the committee system (size of committees, 
percentage of seats held by the majority party in each committee) and the characteristics of 
the legislative scenario (fragmentation, seats of majority party in the House, number of 
legislative blocks, ideological polarization). Then, only the exogenous variables, such as the 
characteristics of the policy (scope and economic issues, and committee receiving the bill as 
a proxy for the bill entailing spending) and the electoral cycle (honeymoon dummy for first 
half of term versus last half), are included. A third step involves searching for the best 
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fitting model74, or for which combination of endogenous and exogenous factors better 
explain the phenomenon of strategic procedural and organizational choice as derived from 
the above hypotheses. Given the large number of hypotheses tested through diverse model 
specifications, I have gathered the auxiliary estimated models of this Chapter in 
Appendixes 4, presenting the results for the best-fitting models, along with the data 
available for the cases under analysis.   
 THE MODELS  
 
The results are organized as follows: first, I devote specific sections to the single-
effects hypotheses. The results for the interactive effects follow. Within these, I first 
address the interactive effects with respect to the shape of the Executive’s incentives when 
the floor is polarized and when elections are closer, and then address the interactive effects 
between procedural and organizational choices.  
1.8. 3.1.) - SINGLE-EFFECT HYPOTHESES 
The models for the single-effects hypotheses count with four variables, two 
characterizing committee choice and two characterizing emergency procedures choice. 
These variables have been created for the four cases in order that a comparative analysis 
may be produced75. The first concerns the hypotheses developed for committee choice and 
one variable is constructed to classify the large differences among committee systems into 
four broad policy areas. These policy areas are: economic issues, political reform issues, 
socio-cultural issues and infrastructural issues. The model employed for this variable is a 
multinomial logit, which allows the comparison of transitional probabilities of a bill having 
been assigned to a committee as compared to another committee (among the four-fold 
classification). The results from the best fitting model basically endorse the main 
expectation that majority parties take advantage of the specific characteristics of the 
committee system, so essentially the factors endogenous to the committee system explain 
committee choice. As can be seen below, Executive enactment is, in addition to the 
                                                
74 The best fitting model is characterized, generally, by (1) all explanatory variables displaying statistical significance, 
meaning that their individual effect is robust, and (2) the overall goodness of fit of the model – i.e. when all explanatory 
variables appear together – is satisfactory (with a range of measures for evaluating different models’ goodness of fit). 
Here, when I refer to the best fitting model, it implies not only these two characteristics (which exclusively proceed from 
quantitative criteria) but also that the explanatory variables are meaningful for our theoretical expectations on the basis of 
the hypotheses developed in this Chapter. The rule of thumb employed, therefore, is not exclusively based on statistical 
significance, but rather on the empirical information we can obtain through modeling for the interaction we attempt to 
capture between rules, actors’ incentives and the patterns of legislative production.  
75 Table 7 in Chapter 3 and Table 4 in this Chapter display the detailed information with country specific information for 
the characteristics of the committee systems and the availability of emergency procedures in the four countries under 
analysis.  
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endogenous characteristics of the committees, the variable which best explains which 
committee receives the bill. Particularly, the probability that a bill be received by an 
economic issues committee increases greatly under Executive enactment. Two sources 
explain this phenomenon: on the one hand, constitutional rules assigning the Executive 
exclusive enactment of the budget bill. On the other hand, time pressure from the electoral 
cycle is in fact only significant for explaining the relative risk ratio change between political 
reform and economic committees (see Appendix 4.2.1, model 2), implying that the 
Executive in fact faces more pressure to circumvent legislative procedures towards the end 
of the term and specifically for policies which entail spending.  
Table  26.  Bes t  Fi t t ing  Mode l  fo r  Dependent  Variab le  Commit t e e  Rece iv ing  the  Bi l l 
Variables Political     Economic Political      Infrastructural Political    Socio-
Cultural 
Size of committees 
(number of deputies in 
each committee) 
2.3*** .78*** .78*** 
Seats of majority party 
in committees (in %) 
1.07*** 1.00 1.02*** 
Committee efficiency 
(time each bill passes in 
committ) 
1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Dummy electoral cycle 
(first half-last half of 
term) 
.80** .80 .79 
Executive versus 
Legislative enactment 
of bill (dummy) 
11.49*** 1.36 .17*** 
Fragmentation (Rae, 
1971) 
.009*** .12*** 43.07*** 
Ideological Polarization 1.04*** 1.02*** 1.01** 
Interactive Polarization-
Executive enacts the 
bill  
.96*** .96*** .99 
Model Measures 
Sample size 
Pseudo-R square 
Wald chi-square 
Log 
(pseudo)Likelihood 
P-value model  
 
3995 
.21 
1157.07 
-3899 (compared to iteration zero LL=-4912) 
.000 
Notes: Model is Multinomial Logit with reference category for calculating probability Political Issues 
Committee receives the bill76. Robust errors estimated; Relative Risk Ratios reported instead of 
coefficients; Frequency weights of variable country.  Columns reveal the transitional probabilities with 
respect to a bill having been assigned to a Political issues committee (fixed reference category) and the 
corresponding committee in each column. See Appendix 4.1. for the calculations of the polarization . *** 
Significant at 0.01 level of confidence; ** Significant at 0.05 level of confidence.  
 
                                                
76 The arrows between the four categories of committees therefore mean the difference in the probability that each 
committee receive the bill as compared to the reference category, which are the committees for political reform issues. 
The model, by construction, fixes one value of the dependent variable as the reference category, and delivers the 
probabilities of a bill having been assigned to the other committees as compared to the reference category, given the 
explanatory variables (this is why we called the results of this model ‘transitional probabilities’ in the text above).  
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With respect to the characteristics of the legislative scenario, the hypothesis that  
the strategic assignment of a bill to a committee depends on the anticipation of political 
conflict, is also endorsed. This hypothesis is better explained when polarization rather than 
fragmentation is employed as explanatory variable, indicating that the measure for 
ideological distances better captures the leverage of political conflict than the straight 
numeric criterion of fragmentation. In addition, the information from the effects of the 
characteristics of the legislative scenario reveals that, while separate effects are rather small 
(although significant under any model specification), effect is systematic and highly 
significant when assessed in interaction with the origin of enactment (Executive enactment 
adopting value one and hence being significant). Therefore, the hypothesis that the 
incentives of the Executive strongly depend on the characteristics of the legislative 
scenario, but more particularly in combination with the pressure from the electoral cycle 
towards the end of term, are altogether supported empirically.   
In turn, the hypothesis on the doubled opportunities for agenda control through 
committee choice under unified government (or, in the frame of the cases, bipartisan cases) 
does not empirically hold. It seems, therefore, more plausible that the hypotheses regarding 
the loss of Executive support are more likely in bipartisan countries, which eventually 
contradicts the hypothesis on the double opportunities for agenda control. If the 
hypothesis on double opportunities under unified government were true, this would mean 
that the Executive-Legislative agenda is assumed to be coherent, or mutually supported, in 
all cases when there is unified government. Instead, the dynamics assumed under unified 
government seem to miss the finding abounding here: the fact that electoral 
competitiveness may weigh heavily on political actors’ behavior regarding the mutual 
support of political agendas. As indicated by the empirical results here, a decrease of 
mutual support between the branches may also take place under unified government (in 
our cases, in the bipartisan countries). In short, the inter-branch dynamics when elections 
are getting closer have more to do with the electoral rules and the more or less restrictive 
character of the competition than with the previous conditions of the government in terms 
of unified versus divided government. That is, under strongly competitive electoral rules, as 
tends to be the case in bipartisan countries where competition is centripetal (Sartori, 1976), 
the incentives of political actors are placed on their own political agendas rather than on 
supporting the agenda of an Executive who will soon be out of office (especially in cases 
where the Executive cannot be re-elected, as in these countries).  
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This result, which emphasizes the relevance of electoral rules for political actors’ 
strategic behavior, is particularly supported by the results for the second dependent variable 
for committee characteristics: the seats of the majority party in each committee. The best 
model with the data available includes as explanatory variables the biasing effect due to the 
electoral cycle (which measures the systematic difference between the effective number of 
electoral parties and the effective number of legislative parties) and the fragmentation of 
the party system (see results in Appendix 4.2.2). In particular, there is a systematic negative 
relationship between the seats of the majority party in committees and the size of the 
committees, which basically confirms the previous exploratory findings: the larger the 
committees as units, the more these will tend to mirror the parent chamber (as in Francis, 
1982). Although the models do not take into account institutional choice and its path-
dependent nature77, the results hint that the hypothesis on the larger possibilities for 
coordination between fewer political actors in the split-the-cake form is in place. This fact 
is indicated by the strong and highly significant negative relationship between legislative 
fragmentation and the seats of the majority party in committees. The prediction that, in 
bipartisan systems, the monopolization of the channels of informational advantages by 
majority parties is better assured is therefore present.  
Turning to the variables for emergency procedures, there are also two possible 
dependent variables for comparative analysis: first, the call for an extraordinary session, 
which is possible in all cases under study but data are only available for Costa Rica and 
Panama, and the alteration of the status of the bill from ordinary to urgent, which is 
available for all cases.  
With respect to the first phenomenon, it was already seen in Chapter 2 that 
Executives possess the prerogative to call for an extraordinary session with more or less 
constraints (specifically the constraint of having an explicit policy proposal before calling 
an extraordinary session). In fact, Executive authority as determined by constitutional rules 
is a key variable in explaining the employment of extraordinary sessions as an emergency 
procedure: in all cases it was the Executive to call for an extraordinary session. Further to 
the origin of the initiative, the explanatory sources for employing this emergency procedure 
                                                
77 Notice that the hypothesis on ‘split-the-cake’ as a coordinative device between political actors was essentially based on 
the capabilities of political actors to build trust and be acquainted with each other’s preferences from long-standing 
interaction. A full testing of this hypothesis would demand, hence, the inclusion of a path-dependent view on the 
characteristics of the institutional design currently observed as a byproduct of previous historical choices. The 
unavailability of time series data, which would bring variation over alternative institutional designs, constitutes a major 
drawback to carry out this test empirically. This problem appears in this thesis with respect to several indicators of the 
political system, as a consequence of having data for only one legislative term. It is, nonetheless, possible to assert some 
indication of the hypothesis being present in the political dynamics from case expert knowledge, i.e. qualitative knowledge 
on the historical development of the political system, a typical way of evaluating results in the discipline. In particular, this 
hypothesis was generated with expert knowledge of the Honduran case in mind.  
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are mostly found in the exogenous pressure of the electoral cycle and on the degree of 
polarization on the floor. These are not usually the reasons raised in the call for an 
extraordinary session, which are formally linked to a specific policy that the legislature is 
urged to consider. Instead, neither the scope of the bill (or its policy objective), nor the 
temporal efficiency of approval were significant in explaining extraordinary sessions.  
The results of the models are difficult to assess, since the distribution is over-
determined by Executive authority to call for this type of session. In fact, when comparing 
endogenous and exogenous explanatory factors, the goodness of fit, as a measure of the 
whole model specification (or how much it explains given all explanatory variables 
together) does not vary to any great extent. Therefore, the best model will be a 
combination of endogenous and exogenous factors, as is portrayed in the best fitting model 
below:  
Table  27.  Bes t  Fi t t ing  Mode l  fo r  Emergency  Procedure  Extraord inary  Leg i s la t iv e  Sess ion 
Variables Odd Ratios and 
Significance 
Model Measures 
Dummy Executive-Legislative enactment 
of bill  
6.29*** Sample size= 1599 
Pseudo R2=.23 
P-value=.000 
% Correctly classified= 85% 
Positive predictive value= 65%  
Negative predictive value= 89% 
Dummy electoral cycle (first half-last half 
of term) 
1.22*** 
Ideological Polarization  -.12*** 
Interactive polarization and Executive 
enactment of bill  
-.10*** 
Notes: Model is Logit with dependent variable dummy ordinary-extraordinary session; with frequency 
weights of variable country. Odd ratios reported. *** Significant at 0.01 level of confidence.  
 
The first remarkable piece of information from the results above is that two of the 
explanatory variables contribute to fostering the phenomenon (have positive sign), while 
two contribute to hindering it (have negative sign). I have already mentioned that the call 
for an extraordinary session constitutes a pillar of Executive dominance as empirically 
sustained by the data for Costa Rica and Panama, and that such dominance is reflected in 
the very large and highly significant odd ratio for the first variable. In addition, the 
likelihood of calling for an extraordinary session increases with the closeness of elections, 
so that the last half of the term is positively related to the probability of the Executive 
getting a policy approved through extraordinary sessions. However, an important nuance 
obtained through the empirical analysis is that when polarization is large the likelihood that 
the Executive calls for an extraordinary session decreases. A possible explanation is that the 
Executive is able to predict a possible blockage which is related to quorum deficiency. As a 
more subtle type of blockage, when polarization is large the possibility that opposition 
parties or minor parties coordinate not to attend the session, when the Executive is trapped 
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by the need to obtain legislative approval of a bill78. It is in this sense that positive values of 
fragmentation and polarization are negatively associated to the call for an extraordinary 
session.  
Finally, the last analysis for the second variable for emergency procedures – urgent 
status of the bill – is available for all countries. The results add one nuance to the previous 
picture: for urgent legislation, only the exogenous factors matter, with the greatest 
importance applying to the characteristics of the legislative scenario. With relative surprise, 
I find that political actors do not employ this tool – the introduction of bills with urgent 
status – in relation to the characteristics of the policy, or when employing their 
informational advantages concerning the committee expected to receive the bill (neither 
committee efficiency nor the size of committees contribute to the explanatory capacity of 
any model, despite their statistical significance). The best model in terms of combination of 
variables gathers exogenous and contextual variables as explanatory of urgent legislative 
enactment, as follows:  
Table  28.  Bes t  Fi t t ing  Mode l  fo r  Urgent  Leg i s la t iv e  Enactment 
Variables Odd ratio and 
Significance 
Model Measures 
Biasing effect of electoral cycle -2.94*** Sample size= 4228 
Pseudo R2=.46 
P-value=.000 
% Correctly classified= 86% 
Positive predictive value= 91% 
Negative predictive value= 83% 
Number of legislative blocks .91*** 
Ideological polarization -.03*** 
Dummy Executive-Legislative enactment -.24*** 
Dummy electoral cycle (first half-last half 
of term) 
.45*** 
Notes: Model is a Logit with dependent variable urgent versus ordinary status of bill. Frequency weights 
of variable country. *** Indicates significant at 0.01 level of confidence.  
 
The results imply a divide between the three factors with a negative sign, and hence 
associated to the non-employment of urgent legislation enactment, and the two factors 
with a positive sign that are associated to the dependent variable. Within the former, the 
variation in ideological polarization on the floor contributes very significantly to explain 
urgent enactment, but only slightly affects the probability of urgent legislative enactment. 
This fact indicates that the hypothesis on the anticipation of conflict is in fact empirically 
supported but that this positive relationship acquires a larger impact when other, possibly 
exogenous or contextual, factors are also present – such as electoral cycle pressure or the 
                                                
78 For instance, in the Guatemalan case, there is a ‘reduced quorum’ provision in the Constitution, for extraordinary 
sessions, but this type of quorum does not allow for approval of bills.  
The type of subtle blockage procedures, as quorum rupture, are much more explored for parliamentary cases and for the 
presidential case of the U.S., with particularly numerous studies existing for filibustering, or the ability of legislators to 
block the approval of a bill from exhausting very long times of speech in the House in order to have the final vote 
postponed.  
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more or less stringent character of the electoral system (captured by the variable biasing 
effect of the electoral system, which has a large negative and highly significant impact).  
In fact, within the contextual factors, a high significance is obtained for time 
pressure from the electoral cycle, with a positive relationship existing between the 
probability of urgent enactment and the moderate size of this effect. This fact implies that, 
while urgent legislative enactment is present during the whole legislative term, it is 
moderately intensified when elections get closer, i.e. in the last half of the term.  
Finally, the negative sign of the dummy for Executive versus Legislative enactment 
means that this procedural tool, which affects the sequential treatment of the bill, is mostly 
employed – in relative terms – by legislators. This result partially supports the hypothesis 
that the tools which are most accessible to legislators are in fact significantly more likely to 
be employed by these actors than they are by the Executive. Despite this partial 
endorsement, the full hypothesis on the double opportunities for agenda control under 
unified government is still open to assessment in the interactive-effects analysis which 
follows in the next section.  
Overall, the model displays a very satisfactory goodness of fit (there are good 
figures for the model measures, and the positive and negative predictive values are 
balanced79), yet each of the variables weighs little (their separate effects are small to 
moderate). This fact points to the need to include interactive explanatory variables which 
may better capture the underlying data structure80.  
In sum, in this section examining the single-effect variables, I have obtained 
empirical support of the hypotheses in relation to the anticipation of conflict and on 
variation with respect to the size of legislative support for the Executive agenda. Further, I 
have obtained empirical endorsement for the hypothesis that the employment of 
endogenous procedures is related to the endogenous characteristics of the institutional 
structure. This is particularly well-supported for committee choice. In addition, I have 
obtained empirical insights that exogenous and contextual factors better explain the 
employment of emergency procedures, especially when they are all present. Finally, an 
important piece of information from the analysis above is that the scope of the bill (or it5s 
policy objectives) and temporal efficiency do not determine the employment of emergency 
                                                
79 This fact indicates that the model predicts the ratio between ordinary and urgent enactment well, or in other words, that 
it does not over-predict one particular value as opposed to another. This is a desirable characteristic of logit modeling, in 
that it assumes a binomial distribution to be true for the population and bias may appear if the actual distribution is not 
close to binomial (or if an unbalance exists between the cases in value zero and the cases in value one).  
80 Essentially, the fact that the explanatory variables do not increase the overall model goodness of fit separately, but only 
altogether, or when they are all present, generally indicates the under-specification of the model in the omission of 
interactive variables on the explanatory side.  
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procedures (extraordinary session or urgent status of the bill), although they do matter for 
committee choice. This result is largely relevant, since it supports the idea that strategic 
behavior is not related to the characteristics of the bill, but to the choice of procedures that 
assure the bill’s approval with the least number of amendments. The assessment of the 
interactive effects follows, before a gathering of the conclusions of this Chapter.  
1.9. 3.2.) - INTERACTIVE-EFFECT HYPOTHESES 
The interactive effects, which were theoretically referred to as the multi-layering of 
endogenous tools for agenda control in the form of (1) coordination for patronage 
legislation and (2) the overlapping of advantages, offer a refined view of the empirical 
results presented above. Essentially, the analysis delivers a confirmation of the hypothesis 
that the overlapping advantages indeed takes place, therefore bringing a more refined 
assessment of how agenda control takes place.  
The results, which included new explanatory variables to capture interactive effects, 
display an improvement in the goodness of fit with respect to the previous (single-effect) 
models. In particular, I have included in this model the interaction between efficiency of 
committee (the time each committee takes to emit a dictum) and the seats held by the 
majority party in each committee. The new variable comprises the idea of that committee 
choice (the dependent variable in the first case of the single-effects models) might be 
related not only to the estimation of the temporal efficiency of committees and to the 
distributional advantages of the majority party (through a monopoly of a majority of seats 
within committees) but also to the combined effect of these variables. Again, the 
transitional probabilities of committee choice better explained are those for a bill from 
going to a committee for political reform to an economic issues one. In fact, the new 
interactive variable holds significant and positive under any specification. The results 
including the interactive variables for the Executive incentives towards the end of the 
electoral cycle (elections being closer) are as follows:  
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Table  29.  Assess ing  the  Over lapping  o f  Procedura l  Advantages  and Commit t e e  Choi c e 
Variables Political      Economic Political        
Infrastructural 
Political        Socio-
Cultural 
Dummy for seats of majority 
party in committees over 
50% (has a majority on its 
own or not) 
.26*** .67** 2.93*** 
Interactive efficiency of 
committees in temporal terms 
and seats of majority party in 
committees 
.99*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Seats of majority party in 
committees 
1.09*** 1.06*** 1.02** 
Committee efficiency (time 
in emitting dictum) 
1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 
Ideological polarization .94*** 1.02*** 1.04*** 
Interactive ideological 
polarization and Executive 
enactment 
1.02*** .96*** .97*** 
Dummy electoral cycle (first 
half versus last half of term) 
1.41** .70** .64** 
Interactive last half of 
electoral cycle and Executive 
enactment 
.64** 1.41* 1.20 
Model Measures 
Sample size 
Pseudo-R square 
Likelihood ratio chi-square 
Log (pseudo)Likelihood 
P-value model  
 
3995 
.15 
1463 
-4180 (compared to Iteration 0 LL= -491281) 
.000 
Notes: Model is Multinomial Logit with reference category for calculating probabilities Political Issues 
Committee receiving the bill; Relative Risk Ratios reported instead of coefficients; Frequency weights of 
variable country.  Columns reveal the transitional probabilities with respect to a bill having been assigned 
to a Political issues committee (fixed reference category) and the corresponding committee in each 
column.  
See Appendix 4.1. for the calculations of the polarization index following Coppedge (1998).  
*** Significant at 0.01 level of confidence; ** Significant at 0.05 level of confidence. * Significant at 
0.10 level of confidence.  
 
With the new interactions included, I can now assess committee assignment as a 
procedural choice that tends to be associated to a choice made on the basis of the 
efficiency of committees. Therefore, it seems plausible to suggest that political actors not 
only place bills in committees independently of the policy area of the bill itself, but also in 
relation to their strategic priorities, which are associated with estimates of the temporal 
efficiency of each committee. In this sense, time pressure for policy making appears to be a 
powerful drive for procedural choice, with respect to both specific micro-rules for the bill’s 
path through the legislature and with respect to broader rules of approval.  
                                                
81 For this model, the final log-likelihood being so close to the departure likelihood of the model without explanatory 
variables (which is the Iteration 0 LL) indicates that the model is over-determined. Essentially, this fact implies that a 
more parsimonious model exists with fewer variables. This is typically the case in many models, but in this case we are 
interested in assessing whether the newly created interactive variables add insight to both theory and empirical analysis. 
Therefore, this is a standard case where we are willing to assume a statistical cost in favor of the theoretical and empirical 
sense of the analysis.  
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The evidence for this interaction between committee choice and the efficiency of 
committees in temporal terms appears as a systematic and significant but very weak 
relationship (the coefficient of the interactive variable for efficiency is .003 for all 
committee categories). Hence, it seems that, while it can be asserted that the efficiency of 
committees is of relevance for political actors, they cannot exactly predict the variation of 
the efficiency of committees. In fact, the variation of committee efficiency is rather small if 
compared to any other time-related variable of the process of legislative approval, 
indicating that the time a bill spends in committee is a difficult tool to employ 
strategically82.  
The second finding is related to the newly included variable for the committees 
where the majority party holds the majority of seats. This variable, which captures the 
concept of distributional advantages, displays both high significance and a large effect. 
Although the risk ratio is positive and moderate, the size of the effect is best understood by 
looking at the coefficients83, with a negative and large impact in the transitional 
probabilities of a bill assigned to a committee for political reform issues or other 
committee. Practically, this result means that the hypothesis on the overlapping of 
advantages in fact takes place in a particular manner: political reform issues (the reference 
category in the model) are systematically assigned to committees where the majority party 
has distributional advantages (holds an absolute majority of seats) and are more likely to be 
approved at the beginning of the electoral cycle.  
The finding indicates that despite discretional rules existing in diverse spaces within 
the procedural design of the legislative process of approval, their employment is relatively 
circumscribed to a particular specification, which provides relevant information on the 
question of agenda control. The fresh nuance that derives from this finding is that when 
agenda control is associated to distributional advantages, it is particularly directed to 
controlling the pace and the content of issues associated to political reform. I will extend 
the implications of this finding in the partial conclusions of this Chapter. Now, having 
identified the large significance and effect of the variable capturing the distributional 
advantages of majority parties in committees, I assess the interactive effects that will help 
explain more clearly the employment of these committees, by considering this 
phenomenon as a procedural choice in itself. The results follow in Table 30. 
                                                
82 The argument is that, since the variable time in committee has such a compressed distribution, with moderate variation, 
the possibilities of strategic use decrease, as there is not much space to reduce the time of committee assessment of any 
bill. The distributions for all cases of time in committee display a smaller range (with very close mean, median and mode 
figures) than any other time-related variable, especially in comparison to total time of approval.  
83 See Appendix 4.2.3 for the same model as 
Table 29 with coefficients reported instead of relative risk ratios.  
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Table  30.  Major i ty  in  Commit t e e s  as  Procedura l  Choi c e 
Variables Odd ratios (Coefficients) and 
Significance 
Model Measures 
Scope of bill (policy 
characteristics) 
1.14 (.14) *** Sample size= 4112 
Pseudo R2= .50 
Wald chi sq= 922 
p-value model=.000 
LL= -1419  (LL0=-2846) 
Correctly classified= 86% 
Positive predictive value= 86% 
Negative predictive value= 
86% 
Executive-Legislative enactment .35 (-1.04) *** 
Dummy electoral cycle .57 (-.56) *** 
Ideological polarization .99 (-.005) 
Interactive ideological 
polarization and Executive 
enactment  
.99 (-.004) 
Bill is urgent or ordinary 4.37 (1.47) *** 
Number of blocks in the 
legislature 
.57 (-.56) *** 
Notes: Model is a logit, with dependent variable Committees where the majority party holds a majority of 
seats on its own (50% of the seats and higher) or not. Frequency weights of variable country. Robust 
errors estimated. Reported odd ratios and coefficients in parentheses.  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level of confidence. 
 
The results are enlightening on the types of bills committees where the majority 
party holds a majority tend to receive: they are more likely to be national bills in scope, 
enacted by the Legislative and not the Executive, and urgent. Also, the likelihood that any 
bill is assigned to a committee where the majority holds the largest number of seats 
decreases with the number of blocks in the legislature and when elections are close (in the 
last half of the legislative term). Since the variation in the cases concerning these variables 
is low, it is easy to identify that the cases better explained by the model are bipartisan (with 
the variables blocks and polarization adopting the lower values). If this holds, then a 
procedural choice where the hypothesis on the split-the-cake coordination holds 
empirically has been identified, since this hypothesis was developed especially for the 
bipartisan cases. It seems that the procedural choice which involves committees where the 
majority party has an assured majority is positively associated to low polarization and a low 
number of blocks in the legislature. One interesting piece of information arising from this 
model is that the interactive variables for Executive incentives when polarization is large do 
not display any significance and the size of the effect is negligible. This last result supports 
the claim that legislative structure has an impact on its own in defining the decision-making 
process, where legislators and parties can behave strategically to ensure that their policy 
priorities are approved.  
Overall, therefore, it seems that coordination for the overlapping of advantages in 
the form of urgent legislation and committee choice where the majority party is powerful 
holds particularly well for the bipartisan cases. Essentially, this is equivalent to the previous 
finding from the interpretation of the results of 
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Table 29, i.e. the overlapping of legislative procedures takes place within a set of 
possibilities. Interestingly, the hypothesis with no empirical support refers to the significant 
employment of committee choice specifically when the bill is an Executive enactment. 
Moreover, bivariate correlations appear significant between all variables pertaining to 
procedural choice, but this pattern does not hold when attempting to identify a more 
structural relationship between the variables (i.e. placing these in a full model).  
In sum most of the hypotheses for the overlapping of procedural choices have 
robust empirical support. In turn, the second hypothesis concerning the interactive effects 
of the coordination of patronage does not hold empirically with the data available. Once 
more, this comparative work shows that standard stereotypes of Latin American politics 
are not in fact true. Or at least, they are not empirically supported with the data available, 
which in fact come from the institutional arena. This may suggest that the hypothesized 
coordination of patronage may take place, if at all, outside the institutional channels (see 
Helmke and Levistky, 2003). The results of the models for coordination of patronage84 add 
relatively little knowledge to the earlier findings; in fact, they only show that the legislative 
agenda is controlled – quantitatively – by the majority party if considering the initiatives 
from the Executive and the majority party in the legislature together. Furthermore, the only 
sustained result from this last model, as in previous findings, is that those emergency 
procedures such as urgent status of the bill and extraordinary session in fact tend to overlap 
for each bill approved in the House.  
In sum, the hypotheses for the overlapping of advantages are much better 
explained by the tools endogenous to the legislative process of approval, accessible to 
legislators, than by Executive dominance through extraordinary session, which is 
constitutionally assigned almost exclusively to this actor. In the following Section, I gather 
the conclusions from the empirical investigations developed in this Chapter and extend the 
theoretical implications of these for the assessment of agenda control as ill-advised for the 
quality of democracy.   
                                                
84 The results are found in Appendix 4.2.4. Given the low goodness of fit of the models I decided to collect them, for the 
sake of complete evidence, in the set of Appendixes for this Chapter.  
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- PARTIAL CONCLUSIONS AND CONTINUING THE RESEARCH 
 
“While there is no single model 
or easy solution for democratic political 
development (…) presidential institutions 
can provide a complex system of 
representation when bargaining, 
negotiation and compromise are 
essential”85 
 
The extensive analysis carried out in this Chapter has shown that variables internal 
to the decision-making process have a significant effect on policy outcomes as defined 
here. The most general result is that the variables pertaining to the legislative decisional 
structure have a significant effect in explaining institutional performance and the degree of 
aggregation of interests in the legislative production. While this result was also suggested 
from the analyses in Chapter 3, in this Chapter I developed more specific and refined 
hypotheses by assessing the specific tools and contextual specifications under which 
political actors are motivated to choose specific procedures to get a bill passed.  
This general result is crucial for the generation of a more explicit bridge between 
the theoretical expectations and normative predictions of Institutional Theory. Essentially, 
my argument here has been that the predictions of Institutional Theory with regard to the 
effects of rules and institutional structure(s) on political outcomes need to put the real 
actors into the explanatory equation. While it is generally asserted that the literature on 
incentives engages particularly badly with the literature on institutional factors, since the 
former tends to hold as constant the preferences of actors and the latter tends to hold as 
constant the individual actor effect, I have shown here that the possibility of integrating 
new institutional approaches exists86. This actual engagement is particularly relevant for 
analyzing strategic behavior, since this is a specific realm affecting institutional performance 
and mediated by specific actors’ behavior.  
This Chapter has offered a large array of alternatives to connect theoretically driven 
hypotheses with empirical assessment (although constrained by data availability) of actors’ 
incentives, procedural rules and a specific output of legislative production. In this analytical 
effort, I have obtained findings on two levels of operation in addition to the more general, 
                                                
85 Von Mettenheim, 1997: 245.  
86 Specifically, where the new institutional approach with strong actor-centered theoretical underpinnings (as in Shepsle, 
1989) and where institutional rules constitute the set of constraints and fostering factors of individual action (as in North 
and Weingast, 1989).  The meeting point of these initially divergent approaches may be generated when adopting a 
sequential research design, as Diermeier and Krehbiel, 2003 suggest, and as has been applied in this Chapter. The 
facilitating sequence is characterized by focusing first on the shape and determinants of actors’ incentives, which are then 
included in the modeling of institutional outcomes.  
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key finding above, which I shall now unpack for the sake of clarity. First, the substantive 
findings related to the debate on the inherent tendency of presidential systems to Executive 
dominance. Second, the set of findings related to the theoretically induced implications of 
the possible systematic employment of endogenous tools for agenda control by majority 
political actors.   
Within the substantive findings, the first and most outstanding is that, while 
presidential systems are characterized by the independence of the branches, the patterns of 
agenda control display a more complex shape than plain Executive dominance. The only 
phenomenon which is characterized by Executive dominance, explained by the 
constitutional power of Executives to employ this procedural tool, is the call for an 
extraordinary session. Further to this procedural tool, there is no systematic pattern of 
Executive dominance of the agenda on the other procedural and organizational choices 
considered in this Chapter. On the contrary, there is evidence of the need for Executives to 
take legislative action into account. In fact, the variable capturing interaction between the 
degree of polarization on the floor and Executive enactment, as a way of measuring the 
incentives of Executives to play strategically has displayed the expected relationship 
(significant and positive) in all models.  
This is partly explained by the fact that legislative support for the Executive agenda 
does not directly depend on constitutional sources of power and authority, which in turn 
depends partly on the competitiveness stemming from electoral rules (or the number of 
actors competing – fragmentation – and the ideological distances between them – 
polarization) and partly on the capacity of political actors to anticipate political conflict 
over policy preferences. It thus appears that Executives need to observe the legislative 
decisional structure in order to get a bill passed. Therefore, the results hint that the highly 
emphasized formal independence between the branches pertains ‘only’ to the electoral 
realm with its effectively divergent devices for election. But, following the electoral ‘dis-
connection87’, Executives and legislatures in presidential systems still need to bargain 
continuously and observe one another during the term.  
I have also obtained detailed information on the more subtle tools for agenda 
control that are in fact offered by the internal decisional structure of the legislature, such as 
the committee system design and the especial procedures for urgent bills. The more 
                                                
87 I employ the term dis-connection because there are both possibilities for disconnected elections of the branches (for 
instance, where mid-term elections of the legislature are present or generally non-concurrent elections of the two 
branches are in place), and for the electoral events for Executive and legislature being connected (when elections are 
concurrent, i.e. take place the same day and coherent voting is more likely).  
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specific hypotheses have obtained varying levels of support, but the general claim that 
endogenous institutional design matters has been endorsed. A second important 
substantive finding is that while there is general empirical support for the assertion that the 
characteristics of the legislative scenario influence the strategic behavior of majority 
political actors, ideological polarization more satisfactorily captures the variation in 
procedural choices than legislative fragmentation under any specification. This result 
indicates that the more qualitative measure of political conflict is in fact more suitable for 
assessing the incentives of political actors than purely quantitative measures such as 
fragmentation (referred to as effective number of parties). Essentially, one of the central 
hypotheses, which focused on whether the anticipation of conflict is a drive for strategic 
behavior, is empirically supported. The refinement of the analysis here is that this 
anticipation is associated to the ideological distances between actors, i.e. to disagreement 
over policy preferences88, more strongly than any other characteristic of the legislative 
scenario.  
Third, the findings with respect to the overlapping of procedural choices constitute 
an innovative modeling effort for including interactive effects, which is typically an 
extremely tricky task in institutional analysis. While there are abundant studies on specific 
phenomena of the decision-making process of legislatures89, there is a clear lack of 
modeling strategies for interactive effects, even if it is well-known that institutional rules, 
outcomes and actors playing within institutions are not easily dissociable. Amongst those 
accounted for in this Chapter, all interactive variables except the coordination for 
patronage legislation have obtained empirical support, and display robust significance. This 
finding is also interesting, since it allows us remarking one general objective of this thesis, 
its emphasis on producing empirical evidence in a comparative light. By confronting the 
standard stereotype that corruption and patronage is a common policy style of Latin 
American governments in a critical manner, this finding shows that comparative work is 
necessary for the review of these stereotypes, which are often grounded on case-specific 
examples and rely strongly on contextual evidence. However, it should be recognized that 
this finding does not fully discuss the specific phenomenon of coordination for patronage. 
Due to the lack of data available on the informal bargaining that takes place outside the 
institutionalized realm of legislative activity, this result is taken cautiously and I fully 
                                                
88 Adopting the view developed in Freeden (1998), ideology is understood as the institutionalized struggle among 
alternative ideal visions on the societal order, which is practically reflected in the institutionalized disagreement over 
public policy priorities.   
89 Investigations such as on amendment rules, Baron and Ferejohn, 1989 and on the characteristics of the committee 
system, Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1989, as particularly strongly developed ones.  
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acknowledge its the lack of generality. Still, the result does indicate that Helmke and 
Levitsky (2003), in their call for attention to informal politics in fully explaining the 
radically varying indicators of institutional performance in the Latin American region, are 
correct in their assessment of what is lacking in ‘overly-institutional’ analyses.  
Fourth, I have also obtained support for the hypotheses on the importance of 
contextual factors. However, the particular shape of the effects of contextual factors adopts 
a complex pattern depending on which procedural choice is taken into account. The only 
contextual, and exogenous, factor that appears as systematically significant is the electoral 
cycle (which was measured through the honeymoon effect). Therefore, the results support 
the ‘electoral connection’ view (Mayhew, 1974), but add a specific contribution: time 
pressure works intensely towards the end of the legislative term, which is reflected in the 
enactment of a larger volume of urgent legislation, for instance, but the modification of the 
efficient approval of a bill is relatively difficult. In particular, the modification of the 
temporal efficiency of committees is significant with a moderate effect. The conclusion 
drawn from this was that political actors are interested in estimating the temporal efficiency 
of committees, as key gate-keepers of the legislative approval, but they lack precise 
information on the factors determining temporal efficiency. Although the two factors 
appear to be relatively dissociated, they are in fact closely related: the overall result is that 
time pressure from the electoral cycle is powerful only to a certain extent. Generally, the 
pressure from the electoral cycle is a fostering factor for strategic behavior, but the tools 
available to carry out such behavior remain dependent on the legislative decisional 
structure, and not on the time pressure, since actors cannot control many resources related 
to time (as illustrated with the temporal efficiency of committees).  
Finally, a last relevant substantive finding relates to the intense phenomenon of 
agenda control when policy issues refer to political reform. The central finding is in line 
with the literature emphasizing how little political systems change as a result of the very 
conditions required to change the rules: change must be initiated by the actors participating 
in the system. Questions for investigation such as why are Constitutions stable (Ferjohn, 
Rakove and Riley, 2001; Holmes, in Elster and Slagstad, 1988) or why processes of political 
reform generally benefit big and powerful parties (such as electoral reform, Garcia, Diez, 
2001), may find inspiration in the explanatory sources suggested in this thesis. These 
explanatory sources, as derived from the empirical findings above, are found in the 
interactive relationship between primary and secondary rules (respectively constitutional 
and procedural rules), contextual factors (such as time pressures from the electoral cycle 
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and majoritarian pressures related to the conflict between parties, as reflected in all 
significant measures of ideological polarization) and the path dependent factors present in a 
certain institutional structure (such as large committee systems and the availability of 
emergency procedures).  
With respect to the theoretical findings, I would underline two particularly relevant 
results. First, I have inductively discovered that the traditionally viewed tradeoff between 
representation and efficiency does not hold under any contextual specification – i.e. the 
coexistence of both representation and efficiency appears to be possible. Instead, my 
theoretical claim notes the importance and robustness of varying contextual specifications 
of the tradeoff between representation and procedural justice. Procedural justice is a recent 
term in the discipline, which views everyday politics with regard to the equal and universal 
access of citizens and political actors to the democratic process (Klosko, 2000; Teitel, 2000; 
Jupille, 2004). The term captures the idea that fairness springs from the equal and universal 
application of procedures to both citizens (for instance, access to justice) and among 
politicians, which is my specific focus. Thus, the various ranges of fair application of 
procedures and fair results constitute a narrowly interrelated, ongoing process which is 
reflected in the way everyday politics deals with conflict – which is equivalent to assessing 
decisional styles. The emphasis is placed on the recognition of the two-way relationship 
between procedures and outcomes, insofar that “fair procedures lead to fair outcomes, 
while fair outcomes generally result from fair procedures” (Klosko, 2000: 208). The specific 
finding is that the relationship between procedural justice, as the constellation of interactive 
relations between procedures and outcomes, is in a direct tradeoff relationship with 
representation. When procedural justice is damaged, or curtailed, so is representation. This 
fact implies that, in close association to agenda control as a systematic mechanism for 
majority political actors exploiting their comparative advantages, the representative grounds 
of democratic regimes consequently suffer from embedded biases in favor of some.  
The term procedural justice is hence manifestly engaged with issues of rule of law, 
and bridges the interactions between macro-institutional rules and micro-institutional 
indicators. The approach to empirically analyzing agenda control in four presidential cases 
used here, with its major analytical effort to capture the partial effects of constitutional 
rules (as macro-institutional rules that settle the parameters of variation but do not 
determine all possible courses of action) and specific procedural choices (as micro-
institutional components affecting the prospects and the way policy-making is made), 
constitutes a reflection on how this analytical effort may be developed. This finding is 
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central for the range of issues this thesis discusses and is further elaborated in the 
concluding Chapter of the thesis.   
The second theoretical result is that coordination between political actors depends 
on the trust they are able to generate mutually90. These two issues (trust and possibilities of 
coordination) require time series data in order to generate empirical analysis if they are 
viewed as institutional outputs. It is in this sense that the explanation of a particular 
institutional choice (be it as particular as the number of members in committees and the 
assignment rules, or as general as the set of exclusive policy jurisdictions assigned to the 
branches) would require synchronic data. In particular, this type of data would allow the 
examination of how much the constellation of preferences of the political actors 
participating in the constitutional choice (or other packages of rules) weighs in determining 
the actual configurations of discretional spaces of decision or opportunities for agenda 
control. Overall, this statement is equivalent to acknowledging that accounting for path-
dependent devices present in the actual institutional configuration of rules and procedures91 
is necessary.  
The path for continuing the research is adequately laid out by the results obtained 
in this Chapter. What remains, essentially, is to develop specific assessments of the 
independent effect of the two broad sets of factors which appear to explain agenda control: 
the characteristics of the legislative scenario and the specific weights and effects of time-
related factors.   
Chapter 5, devoted to the assessment of the characteristics of the legislative 
scenario, constitutes an effort to test whether the influential hypothesis that presidentialism 
and multipartism together what have a negative effect on the institutional performance of 
these systems (Mainwaring, 1990) holds empirically for my cases, and whether it has a 
powerful explanatory capacity. While, generally, this hypothesis is in tune with the 
standpoint of this thesis, I shall nevertheless undertake a critical methodological assessment 
of whether it is derived from the adoption of a particular measure of political conflict, 
which may determine the strong causal attribution attached to the format of the party 
system as translated into the legislative scenario.  
                                                
90 The hypothesis was that coordination is facilitated when there are few political actors in the game – such as in 
bipartisan countries. However, the difficulty to produce general theoretical expectations without specific cases is 
considerable. The inability to deliver a general testing of this hypothesis is in fact related to this problem. The only aspect 
where the empirical results hinted a correct elaboration of the above proposition was with regard to the assessment of the 
committees where the majority party holds a majority, which displayed a large explanatory capacity for the bipartisan cases 
(Costa Rica and Honduras).  
91 Notice the insistence on assessing packages of rules, including the constitutional design, adopting a configurational 
approach, as argued in Chapter 2.  
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In Chapter 6, in turn, I unpack the two time-related factors which appear to 
strongly determine the contextual forces on the incentives and behavior of political actors: 
the sequential design of every bill approval (endogenous to the legislative decisional 
structure) and the electoral cycle (exogenous to the legislative decisional structure).  
The final Chapter gathers the conclusions and lays out the normative implications 
of the theoretical reflections and empirical findings of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 5  
 
THE LEGISLATIVE SCENARIO AND LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE IN  
PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS:  
IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDES AND LEGISLATIVE FRAGMENTATION 
 IN FOUR CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Ideology has been, and remains, one 
of the most persistent and ubiquitous concepts 
in modern political thought. No doubt this 
popularity is due to the absence in our political 
lexicon of alternative terms that link political 
thought and behavior in a satisfactory way”92 
                                                
92 Mullins, W.A. (1972: 498).  
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3) - INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter deals with the question of whether the characteristics of the 
legislative scenario determine the institutional performance in presidential systems. I 
have already obtained empirical evidence in the previous Chapters that the legislative 
scenario has at least two types of effects on the patterns of legislative production. First, 
through its direct effect on the volume of legislative production and all qualitative 
measures characterizing it, as shown in Chapter 3. Second, I have also discovered a 
mediated effect of the characteristics of the legislative scenario via the incentives of 
political actors to take certain procedural choices, as elaborated in Chapter 4. In this 
Chapter, I will focus on its specific impact, first by carrying out a detailed analysis of 
the lines of ideological division and then by adopting the aggregate measure for 
ideological polarization.  
Thus far I have employed the original measure for ideological polarization, 
which is based on the idea of the maximal distance in a party system on the left-right 
continuum and weighted for the presence of each party in the legislature (as in 
Appendix 4.1). In this Chapter, what I specifically address is whether this 
methodological choice, systematically adopted, is responsible for the strong causal 
attribution to the characteristics of the legislative scenario on the institutional 
performance of presidential systems (as ‘the difficult equation’, Mainwaring, 1990). 
This normative and empirical approach develops and then compares several measures 
for capturing the ideological divisions in the four countries under analysis, which add 
up to generate alternative aggregate measures of ideological polarization.   
The Chapter proceeds as follows: I first discuss the alternative and numerous 
conceptual approaches to ideology, the minimal unit which must be understood before 
generating more aggregate and comparative measures of the political scenario, such as 
ideological polarization.  
Then, the empirical analysis is developed in two stages. First, in Section 3, I 
assess country-specific patterns, followed in Section 4 by the comparative and 
aggregate analysis. I believe the country-specific component to be highly important in 
characterizing the ideological divides and competition in each country. For that reason, I 
employ original data on elite position-taking derived from interviews with legislators in 
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the four countries93 and unpack the different dimensions in which these positions matter 
for the evaluation of ideological divides.  This detailed country-specific analysis is 
nonetheless common for the four countries under examination here, in order to facilitate 
further comparative analysis. Finally, Section 5 puts together the pieces of information 
and hypotheses derived from the previous analyses, and offers alternative measures of 
ideological polarization. The existence of alternative measures will allow me, in the 
comparative analysis, to test whether the original assertion of causality is correct or not, 
from an examination of its impact on agenda control. As previously, the Chapter ends 
with a summary of findings and a brief reference to how the research will continue in 
the final Section.  
4) - MEASURING IDEOLOGY: CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL 
APPROACHES 
The concept of ideology is one of the key concepts in the discipline, yet some 
elaboration of the concept is necessary. The low level of consensus on the definition of 
how to assess ideology has led to a large body of work, from philosophical to empirical, 
with few connections across perspectives or contributions. This Chapter attempts to 
discuss in an intertwined fashion the conceptual and the empirical approaches to 
ideology in order to carry out a further analysis of legislative performance, accounting 
for ideological polarization as an independent variable.  
Of particular interest here are the conceptual elaborations of ideology that have 
some impact on the study of the performance of political systems. Ideology has been 
attributed many functions in political systems: from the protection of the bourgeois 
interests in the form of hegemony (Marx, Gramsci, Laclau) to the symbolic vehicle for 
channeling social interests and demands (Sartori, Coppedge). Therefore, the 
conceptualization of ideology faces two substantial challenges: (1) the placement of the 
concept in a more or less pragmatic/abstract continuum; (2) the specification of the 
consequences of adopting a particular normative approach for its empirical assessment.  
Putnam emphasizes that “few concepts in social analysis have inspired such a 
flood of commentary as has ideology. Yet few have stimulated the production of so 
little cumulative knowledge. The lack of cumulation is the result of recurrent confusion 
                                                
93 The data proceed from two Research Projects on the Legislative Elites in Latin America, fully quoted in the references, 
which contain excellent original information on the values and ideological positions of legislators from all parties present 
in the legislature in all Latin American countries, and also include time series variation. The specific items chosen from 
the large datasets available are described in Appendix 5.1.2.  
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of empirical with definitional issues and both with normative concerns” (1973: 31). In 
effect, the analysis of ideology demands not only a discussion of alternative and 
available conceptual choices, but also on the normative roots of these.  
Due to the importance of normative, often underlying, assumptions in the study 
of ideology, it is crucial here to broadly discuss to what extent these affect the nature 
and scope of a further empirical analysis. Some well-established approaches to ideology 
may help in uncovering the assumptions I aim to revise, as summarized in the 
following:  
Table  31.  Approaches  and bases  o f  some we l l - e s tab l i shed  theor i e s  o f  ideo logy   
Approach Grounds Representative 
authors 
1-Programmatic approach Ideologies provide answers to general principles of 
political ideas and offer specific policy 
orientations 
Party Manifestos 
Project 
Coppedge 
Alcantara 
2-Institutionalist approach Electoral system characteristics plus the type of 
electoral competition shapes the ideological 
placement of parties 
Lijphart 
Sartori 
3-Historical 
institutionalism 
Historical configuration of cleavages in the origin 
of the party system  
Lipset and Rokkan 
Bartolini and Mair 
4-Rational institutionalism Spatial analysis: parties are vote seekers and are 
only ideologically oriented insofar as this enhances 
their attractiveness to the median voter 
Downs  
5-Macrocultural approach Ideologies as matrices for the creation of collective 
conscience 
Ideology as a macroscopical consequence of 
attributing meanings to a range of interrelated 
political concepts; 
Postmaterialist shift: ideology loses power in the 
economic right-left axis, but is restructured in the 
more complex, crosscutting axis of immaterial 
values  
Geertz 
 
Freeden 
 
 
Inglehart 
 
The general picture of the approaches laid out above induces reflection on the 
elaboration and comprehension of what ideology is and how it operates, is closely 
linked to the comprehension of how political representation works. From this 
standpoint, the understanding of the mutual shaping of ideology by context and other 
political concepts providing support to the legitimacy of the political system become 
central. As Freeden puts it “political concepts acquire meaning not only through 
historically transferred traditions of discourse, but also through their particular location 
within a constellation of other political concepts” (1998: 54).  
While these approaches generally differ more or less on whether ideology is a 
more or less abstract system of beliefs and values with some degree of pragmatic 
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reflection on alternative programmatic offers, one underlying assumption persists: that 
ideology can be grasped in a uni-dimensional space. This assumption is present in all 
these approaches except the historical institutional approach. The attention of this 
approach to the origin, context and evolution of meaningful political cleavages has 
proved essential to the understanding not only of how ideology is organized in certain 
societies, but also of how it operates in relation to the evolving social context. 
Conceptually, I will assess ideology as a multi-layered phenomenon that nonetheless 
materializes in specific systems of beliefs. These specific systems of beliefs have a 
strong country-specific content, whose reasons may vary from a differential use of 
language to the perception of social problems and varying meanings attributed to 
political concepts. This fact does not mean, however, that comparative analysis is 
unfeasible for ideology. Instead, whereas national context helps to frame the discourses 
and possibly heterogeneous systems of beliefs, comparative analysis can be produced 
through the elaboration of certain relevant common dimensions that shape the electoral 
competition and therefore determine the placement of parties in an ideological fashion.  
Empirically, therefore, it follows that it is necessary to use a combined 
qualitative and quantitative methodology to measure ideology. The qualitative side 
accounts for the case-specific information that requires historical knowledge and the 
careful analysis of each case; the quantitative part will then make the study comparative 
and, thereafter, facilitate an analysis where ideology is an independent variable. First, I 
attend to case-specific patterns so as not to lose revealing information regarding the 
types and evolution of cleavages in each case. Thereafter, once those pieces of 
information are in place, I develop a comparative analysis where I elaborate on four 
dimensions of ideology, all meaningful to the four cases under analysis: (1) role of the 
State; (2) vision of society; (3) spatial distances between parties in the left-right scale; 
(4) vision of democracy. The analysis of such dimensions should be relational94. These 
dimensions correlate with both the analysis of ideology at the intra-party level and the 
inter-party or party system level (see Table 2 below).  
 
 
                                                
94 The Party Manifestos Project represents great teamwork in which the content analysis of party programs was mainly 
thematic (See Budge and Laver, 1986; Keman and Pennings, 2000). Here, I opt for a combination between thematic and 
relational analysis of programmatic divides across parties, where the thematic perspective – connecting ideology with 
broader case-specific knowledge - is combined with a broader, comparatively oriented analysis of how the systems of 
beliefs are interrelated. Thus, I expect that the different sets of indicators above will cluster in meaningful relational axis 
(See Section 3).  
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Table  32 .  Dimens ions  and ind i ca tors  to  measure  ideo logy  in  four  Centra l  Amer i can countr i e s  
DIMENSION  VARIABLE  INDICATORS  
Intra-party Party cohesion Degree of agreement over key ideological principles+ salience of 
an issue 
Role of State 1.1 Position towards dichotomy State-market 
1.2 Degree of State intervention/regulation (which are the salient 
issues?) 
1.3 Attitude towards public spending on social services 
1.4 Attitude towards privatization of public services 
Vision of Society 2.1 Attitude towards abortion (individual decision versus State 
regulation) 
2.2 Attitude towards divorce (individual decision versus State 
regulation) 
Vision of 
democracy 
3.1 Evaluation of potential advantages of a democratic regime (in 
terms of regime legitimacy or regime effectiveness) 
3.2 Democracy is preferable to any other regime or not 
3.3 Belief on partitocracy as a vehicle of representation 
3.4 Belief on elections as the key democratic mechanism 
3.5 Preference for majoritarian vs. proportional electoral system 
3.6 On the legalization of political parties 
Inter-party  Electoral rules  4.1 Ballot system: closed vs. open lists 
4.2 Average districts magnitude 
4.3 Number of districts 
4.4 Systematic reducing effect of electoral system 
4.5. Electoral formula and existence of threshold 
Spatial distances in 
left-right scale  
5.1 Self-placement of the interviewee in the left-right scale 
5.2 Placement of the political party in left-right scale 
Cleavage 
formation and 
evolution 
6.1 Age of party system (oldest parties in current party system) 
6.2 Type of cleavages at the time of party system formation  
 Indicators for dimensions “Role of State”, “Vision of society”, “Vision of democracy” and “spatial 
distances” come from Research Projects on Elite positions in Latin America, fully quoted in the 
references. Original questions in the survey, measurement scales and years of the surveys are found in 
Appendix 5.1.2. 
 
In the building of the dimensions to measure ideology, three types of variables 
have been included: (1) Historical variables (such as the origin of the party system and 
the types of cleavages that organize political competition). (2) Institutional variables 
(such as the electoral system and the type of political competition). And (3) system of 
beliefs variables (such as the role of society, role of state, vision of democracy, and left-
right).  
The historical variables account for the ‘stickiness’ of the past into the present. The 
standpoint here is that the past affects the present via diverse mechanisms (which are not 
discussed here95). The hypothesis is that the existent cleavages (or ideological divides) are 
related to those that contributed to freezing certain political ideas into political programs. In 
                                                
95 Whether that mechanism is path dependence, critical junctures, institutional inertia, embedded political interests and 
clienteles in maintaining a status quo, etc, is not under discussion here. That question constitutes a separate query, given 
the great debate behind it. For further references, see Hall and Taylor (1996) and Immergut (1991).  
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other words, not only which, but also how, political ideas became intrinsic to political 
competition may be explained via attention to their historical development. Paying closer 
attention to the period when the party system emerged may therefore be informative as to 
which, and how, political discourses became meaningful dividing lines of political 
competition. Within this ‘category’ of variables, the age of the party system and the types of 
cleavages relevant at the time of its emergence are included. The age of the party system 
informs us as to the degree of institutionalization, as a general indicator of how grounded 
or volatile a party system is. The hypothesis is that the degree of institutionalization affects 
the way ideological competition is organized, which is complimentary to the second 
measure of this set of variables: the types of cleavages at the time of the party system 
formation. This latter variable is richer and provides substantive information about the 
original dividing lines of political competition in each party system under analysis.  
Second, the inclusion of institutional variables attempts to relate the analysis of 
ideology to that of the determinants of the real actors’ behavior. Party systems and 
parties have access to tools which allow them, alone, to move along the ideological 
spectrum independently of external forces. However, the electoral system, the number 
of seats to be elected and the type of electoral competition are all elements that may 
render such a degree of independence in strategy formation profitable or not. In fact, a 
particularly prolific literature in this field has for decades dealt with the question of 
what effects electoral systems have on party discipline, party cohesion and on party 
organization96. These dimensions are also components affecting the ideology of a 
political party. At the intra-party level, it has been learned that the structure of electoral 
lists (open, closed not blocked, closed and blocked) affects party cohesion significantly, 
and thus affects its position on certain issues. This fact brings about the question of the 
salience of issues, which is in principle the choice of each individual party, and only 
subsequently transferred to inter-party competition. Party cohesion, then, as a complex 
variable composed by the degree of agreement of partisans over the key political ideas 
the party flags, along with the salience of issues, is incorporated in the analysis.  
At the inter-party level, the electoral system shapes political competition as 
much as the existing political parties do. The type of competition is shaped principally 
by the number of parties competing in a system, but also depends on whether the 
electoral system systematically favors big parties or not (as will be seen, in the end, the 
                                                
96 For example, Cox (1997), Taagepera and Shugart (1989), Grofman and Lijphart (1986), Lijphart (1999), Sartori (1976). 
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three variables are strongly correlated). District magnitude, the electoral formula and the 
size of the electoral threshold (if present), have been shown to affect not only party 
politics but also the overall quality of democracy (Lijphart, 1984, 1994, 1999). This is 
so because of their powerful impact on political fragmentation and polarization, which 
are aggregate measures of how ideology works. As such, these components of the 
electoral system are included to measure the workings of ideology.  
Finally, the third dimension is composed by the variables falling into the system 
of beliefs category. These represent the meaningful ideological issues chosen as the key 
points common to the four countries under analysis. At this macro-level of analysis, the 
diffusion of patterns of political competition in the geographical area under examination 
(just as in Europe, for example)97 must be acknowledged. For instance, the indicator 
‘Vision of democracy’ attempts to capture the normative division between a vision of 
democracy as an end in itself, and a vision of democracy as a tool for other (usually 
economic) objectives (growth, stability, commerce, etc). Given that the transitions to 
democracy in the cases under study (the Central American region) have taken place 
relatively recently, a sharp division between parties regarding how do they assume a 
democratic regime to work is expected to be a significant and revealing ideological 
dimension. In fact, particularly given the way in which transitions to democracy took 
place in the region, that is without a parallel process of profound elite renovation, it is 
relevant to the analysis of ideology to check whether a legitimate function is given to 
democracy or, instead, a functional view.  
The second dimension in the ‘system of beliefs’ is ‘the role of the State’. This 
dimension attempts to capture the division of parties in ideological terms between the 
supporters of State intervention in the economy and the supporters of a more minimal 
version. This dimension is relevant to understanding the specific political discourses of 
each party, since it is a particularly dividing line of competition between parties in Latin 
America. Indeed, this cleavage was present in most countries of the region when the 
party systems emerged, and continues as an important dividing idea throughout the 
history of democracy in the region98.  
                                                
97 Diffusion not only affects the existence and particular salience of some issues across the region at certain periods of 
time (as happens in Europe), but also the waves of political reform in the region from their direct experience of managing 
conflict. Many scholars have indeed benefited from the revival of using diffusion as a tool to spread means of 
democratization via advice on reform of institutional design, as an example of the importance of this pattern of spreading 
knowledge.  
98 I am referring here to the split between ‘Liberals’ and ‘Conservatives’, as the main political forces, originating just after 
the wars of independence in the region (1820-1830).   
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The third and final dimension is ‘Vision of society’. This dimension aims to 
capture whether a more ‘collectivist’ or ‘individualist’ vision of society is underscored 
in the ideological principles of the parties. The inclusion of this information may 
contribute to detail the relational axis of ideology. The natural source for information on  
this dimension would be the documents where the ‘ideological principles’ of the party 
are stated. However, the unavailability of such ideological principles for every party in 
every case (especially Panama99) has led me to search for other possible sources. Two 
questions in the survey, related to attitudes towards abortion and divorce, were worded 
precisely in terms of ‘collectivism’ (regulation of divorce or abortion by society) versus 
‘individualism’ (individual decision).  
5) -  COUNTRY PATTERNS: FOUR CENTRAL AMERICAN CASES 
“Ideologies, as actual 
practices of political thinking 
which never attain the total 
determinacy (and lucidity) of 
counterfactual thought, mix and 
balance the various concepts. The 
real question then is not, ‘is there a 
mix?’ but ‘what is the range of 
mixes?’”100 
 
A key commonality to all the cases is that, generally speaking, two cleavages 
were present at the founding moment of the parties: (1) full democracy versus ‘façade 
democracy’ and; (2) left-right divisions in Latin American politics (i.e. ‘Liberals’ versus 
‘Conservatives’). The evolution of the party systems in these four countries (Alcantara 
and Freidenberg, 2001; Alcantara, 2004), however, shows that the “old” party system 
was forced to readapt in the face of relatively new political forces which are currently 
gaining more representation. This fact contributes to the need to address country-
specific patterns in more detail, which now follow in specific subsections devoted to 
each of the countries. In the country analyses, I first carry out a factor analysis as a 
general tool to capture clusters among values on the dimensions employed to measure 
                                                
99 Panama is a special case in which, despite the parties being relatively old institutions, not all have a single document 
setting out the ideological principles of the party. The author exhausted all possible sources where these documents could 
be present. The case, it seems, is that the most similar documents parties produce to flag some ideological ideas as 
opposed to others, are in the electoral programs of each electoral event.  
100 Freeden. M. (1996: 40).  
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ideology101. Then, I attempt to capture a more general explanation of the ideological 
placement of parties in each of the countries through regression analysis. The analytical 
strategy is identical for all cases, in order to facilitate comparative analysis after detail 
has been gathered.   
3 . 1 . ) -  P A N A M A  
Panama is the youngest democracy of the cases under analysis, and no truly 
systematic analysis of the party system in ideological terms exists102. This fact is partly due 
to the difficulty of gathering information about the ideological principles and positions of 
the political parties. In addition, the party system in Panama is highly volatile in terms of 
frequent coalition building and rebuilding, which is particularly ad-hoc for every electoral 
event. Generally speaking, the party system is strongly organized in a ‘bipolar’ fashion 
(Alcantara, 1999), around the ‘old’ Partido Revolucionario Democratico (PRD), founded in 
1979 and the ‘new’ coalition under the umbrella of Partido Arnulfista (PA), founded in 
1991 (Garcia Diez, 2001). A first exploratory analysis of how the variables within each of 
the dimensions described above cluster follows, using factor analysis for both the inter-
party and intra-party levels103:  
                                                
101 Factor analysis is employed to detect the underlying structure of data with respect to factors, or dimensions, which 
depict the number and weights of each dimension. 
102 But see Otero Felipe (2003) and Garcia Diez (2003).  
103 The intra-party analysis includes, for all cases, the big parties as separate categories, with the category Others created 
from the low sample size of cases for other small parties. I have attempted to create a typology that is sensitive to each 
case. This typology is included, together with the acronyms of the parties, after the Bibliography at the end of the thesis.  
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Table  33.  Fac tor  analys i s  by  d imens ion a t  the  in t er-par ty  and in tra -par ty  l eve l  fo r  Panama 
Dimension Interparty: all 
cases 
n=63 
Intraparty: 
PRD 
n= 29 
Intraparty: PA 
N= 20 
Intraparty: 
others 
n= 14 
Role of State 
 
 
Total variance:  
Interparty: 52% 
Intraparty PRD: 
72%  
Intraparty PA: 
70% 
Intrapart Other: 
79% 
Factor 1 
(21%):  
-Labor 
policies 
-Pension 
policies 
-
Environm
. 
Policies 
Load
s: 
 
.81 
 
.63 
 
.56 
Factor 1 
(22%):  
-
Housing 
policies 
-
Educatio
n3 
-
Unempl
oyment 
subsidie
s 
Loa
d 
 
.86 
 
.62 
 
.82 
Factor 1 
(28%):  
-
Educatio
n 1 and 
2 
-Health 
care 
policies 
-
Environ
m. 
Policies 
Lo
ad 
 
.90 
 
.80 
 
.91 
 
Factor 1 
(25%): 
-Health 
care 
polic. 
-
Educatio
n3  
-
Unemplo
y. 
Subsidie
s 
-Control 
prices 
Loa
d 
 
.79 
 
.72 
.73 
 
.70 
 
Factor 2 
(19%):  
-Housing 
policies 
-
Education
3 
-
Unemplo
ym. 
subsidies 
Load
s: 
 
.81 
 
.67 
.66 
Factor 2 
(18%): 
-Pension 
-
Environ
m. 
Policies 
Loa
d 
 
.87 
 
.90 
Factor 2 
(23%): 
-Labor 
policies 
-
Pensions 
-
Educatio
n3 
-
Unempl
oy. 
Subsidie
s 
Lo
ad 
 
.77 
 
. 73 
.65 
.64 
Factor 2 
(24%): 
-Labor 
policies 
-
Pensions 
-
Environ
m. 
policies 
Loa
d 
 
.72 
 
.90 
.62 
 
Factor 3 
(16%):  
-
Educatio
n 1and2 
Loa
d 
 
.78 
Factor 3 
(19%):  
-Control 
prices 
-
Housing 
policies 
Lo
ad 
 
.87 
 
.87 
Factor 3 
(14%): 
-
Educatio
n 1 and 2 
Loa
d 
 
.87 
Factor 3 
(12%):  
-Control 
prices 
Load
s:  
 
.95 
Factor 4 
(15%):  
-Labor 
policies 
Loa
d 
 
.95 
 
Factor 4 
(14%): 
-Housing 
policies 
Loa
d 
 
.91 
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Vision of 
society 
Factor 1 (66%): 
-Attitude divorce: 
.81 
-Attitude 
abortion: .81 
Factor 1 
(60%):  
-Att. divorce: 
.77 
-Att. abortion: 
.77 
Factor 1 
(77%):  
-Att. divorce: 
.88 
-Att. Abortion: 
.88 
Factor 1 
(61%):  
-Att. Divorce: 
.78 
Att. Abortion: 
.78 
Vision of 
democracy  
 
Total variance:  
Interparty: 50% 
Intraparty PRD: 
76% 
Intraparty PA: 
54% 
Intrapart Other: 
61% 
Factor 1 
(29%):  
-Regime 
legitimac
y vs. 
effectiven
ess 
-
Partitocra
cy (belief 
on) 
-
Legitimac
y of 
elections 
-Ideal 
electoral 
sys.  
Load 
 
.62 
 
 
.58 
 
.65 
 
.52 
Factor 1 
(27%):  
-Regime 
legitima
cy vs. 
effective 
-Ideal 
elect. 
sys.  
Loa
d 
 
.85 
 
 
.78 
Factor 1 
(30%): 
-Partito- 
cracy 
-Legaliz. 
of 
parties  
Lo
ad 
 
.73 
 
-
.71 
Factor 1 
(35%):  
-Regime 
legitimac
y vs 
effective
ness 
-
Legitima
cy of 
elections 
Loa
d 
 
.89 
 
 
.73 
Factor 2 
(25%):  
-
Partitocracy 
-
Legitim
acy 
elections 
Loa
d 
 
.73 
-.71 
Factor 2 
(24%):  
-Regime 
legitima
cy vs 
effective 
-Ideal 
electoral 
sys.  
 
Lo
ad 
 
.76 
 
 
 
.60 
Factor 2 
(26%):  
-
Legalizat
ion of 
parties 
Loa
d 
 
.75 
 
 
Factor 2 
(21%):  
-
Legalizati
on of 
parties 
Load 
 
.90 
 
Factor 3 
(23%): 
-
Legaliza
tio of 
parties   
Loa
d 
 
.92 
Notes: Factor analysis using Principal components method of extraction (eigenvalues 
over one) and varimax rotation. The loadings given above belong to the rotated solution.  
Next to the factors, between parentheses, the percentage of variance captured by that 
factor.  
In Role of State: Education 1 and 2 stands for “Intervention of State in Primary and 
Secondary education”; Education 3 stands for “Intervention of Sate in University 
education”. 
 
Two general patterns are clear from the results presented above: first, most of the 
variables chosen are salient, capturing variance at both the inter-party and the intra-
party level. Second, none of the factors in each dimension capture a significantly higher 
variance than any other, indicating that all factors, or underlying political divides, are 
equally important. This fact is probably a consequence of the indeterminate shape (or 
morphology) of political competition between parties in this country. The variables that 
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capture the highest percentage of variance are those two on the dimension Vision of 
society, particularly for the PA. In general, regarding the dimension role of State, it is 
seen that the variables are pooled: at the inter-party level, all the factors ranged between 
the typical welfare capabilities of a State (such as unemployment subsidies, pensions, 
basic education, control prices, labor policies) and the more ‘postmodern’ set of values 
(university education, environmental policies) combine in a mixture. At the inter-party 
level, the two big parties compete on the same policy principles, with the exception of 
the emphasis of the PA on State intervention on healthcare and inflation control, 
whereas the PRD instead emphasizes State intervention on housing and labor policies. 
The other parties obviously also include all these policy areas in their principles, in 
different mixtures, due to the bipolar fashion of the party system and the difficulties 
imposed by the electoral system on new parties entering the legislative arena104. Finally, 
concerning the dimension vision of democracy, the factor analysis shows that the 
variance captured at the inter-party level is not as high as that captured by the factors for 
the PRD, indicating a higher importance of this dimension for that party. Overall, a 
remarkable result is that all the variables of that dimension significantly contribute to 
defining the positions of parties. The most common significant variable at all levels is 
the legalization of parties (which is indeed negatively correlated to belief in parties as 
the vehicles of representation). In addition, the variable ‘ideal electoral system’, 
portraying the attitude towards a more ‘majoritarian’ or ‘proportional’ democracy, is a 
constant in its contribution to explain the structure of this dimension at all levels of 
analysis. Both issues are indeed hot topics in the political life of Panama and this 
preoccupation has translated into an intense political reform that is never considered 
satisfactory by all parties105.  
 A more detailed analysis of what defines ideological placement in Panama 
required non-linear models, indicating that, in effect, the dividing lines of competition 
are not parsimonious, being neither linear nor additive, but different shapes of various 
layers of political ideas. I used an ordinal regression that uses as the sorting (ordering) 
variable the mode of the ideological placement of parties. 
                                                
104 In Section 4 I will consider institutional variables such as the effects of the electoral system on the party system.   
105 Electoral reform has many faces in Panama: from the reform of the electoral threshold, to the adoption of a complex 
mixed electoral system, to the reform of district magnitude, all aiming at opening possibilities for small parties to enter the 
legislative arena. Pragamatically, those reforms also aimed at creating majority governments, which has traditionally been a 
problem in the country’s political life. For an excellent review of the types of electoral reforms in the country and their 
effects, see Garcia Diez, 2001.  
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Table  34.  Ordina l  r egr e s s ion wi th  sor t ing  var iab le  mode o f  ideo log i ca l  p la cement  by  par ty ,  Panama 
Thresholds106 Variables Coefficients Model fit 
Mode= 5 then -11.616 
Mode=6 then -9.941 
Market versus State  
State intervent. Control 
prices 
State intervent. Education 1 
and 2 
State intervent. Housing 
policies 
State intervent. Labor 
policies 
State intervent. in 
Unemployment subsidies 
Public spending on Safety 
Public spending on 
Education 
Public spending on Defense 
Public spending on Pensions 
Public spending on 
Unemployment subsidies 
Attitude towards divorce 
Attitude towards abortion 
-.83** 
.97** 
-1.42* 
 
-1.34*** 
 
-1.1** 
.98*** 
 
2.3* 
-5.62*** 
-1.27** 
2.26*** 
-.57 
 
-.54** 
.81** 
Pseudo-R sq (Nagelkerke)=.66 
Intercept-only Likelihood= 
99.27  
Likelihood with variables (2) 
=58.73 
n= 47 
Link function: Probit 
Significance= 0.000 
* Significance at the 0.10 level; ** Significance at the 0.05 level; *** Significance at the 0.01 level.  
As before, Education 1 stands for “Intervention of State in Primary education”; Education 2 stands for 
“Intervention of State in Secondary education”; Education 3 stands for “Intervention of Sate in University 
education”.  
  
The distances between the parties along the dimensions is the first piece of 
information, yielded by the thresholds. The thresholds are calculated within the interval 
(+∝ and -∝), so that -11 denotes the interval between -∝ and -11, which is spatially 
covered by the PRD; between -11 and -9, the PA, and the other parties are between -9 
and +∝. This means that the PRD and the PA are spatially very close, which is precisely 
why we may speak of a bipolar organization of the party system (Sartori, 1976, Ch. 6). 
The second piece of information is that the other parties are not competing for the same 
electorate, but can only aim at building coalitions, because their ideological placement 
is outside the area of the two traditional parties’ monopoly.  
Combining these results with those from the factor analysis, will allow a better 
understanding of the ideological divides in this country. The general lesson is that the 
political divides in Panama are largely based on the role of State and on the vision of 
society dimensions, since no variable from the dimension vision of democracy shows 
significance in the more complete analysis from the ordinal regression. The most 
                                                
106 I used the mode of the ideological placement of parties in the left-right scale due to a high dispersion in the responses 
for this question (therefore the mean or the median are not good predictors of the distribution; See Appendix 5.2). In this 
case, mode=5, corresponds to the PRD; mode=6, to the PA and mode=7 to ‘others’ (compared implicitly by the model, 
so that the last threshold is the difference between the PA and others in spatial terms when taking into account the 
dimensions under study).  
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powerful issues, where all parties compete, are education, labor policies and housing. 
Other key policy areas where parties need to take a position are Safety policies and 
Pensions. Clearly, the first group of policies has a strong electoral flavor, since they 
involve the sorts of promises parties make to citizens that they can change the situation 
of the poor (labor policies), plus benefit the middle classes (public education at all 
levels). The second group of policies, however, seems more target-oriented, in the sense 
that pension policies favor older electors and safety policies favor the wealthy. In sum, 
the Panama party system seems to have a low profile in the definition of key political 
divides, although the role of the State dimension has showed relevance and explanatory 
capacity, and the distances between parties is small, most likely as a strategy to hold a 
monopoly of the political center.  
3 . 2 . )  -  G U A T E M A L A  
 
Guatemala is a multiparty democracy where the ‘old’ party system is 
disappearing in a slow but deep process of political change (Ajenjo and Garcia in 
Alcantara and Freidenberg, 2001). One of the most volatile party systems of the region 
(the average volatility rate for the 1990s was 66%), the party system faces 
reorganization at every electoral event. Whereas at the origin of the party system the 
main cleavage was façade democracy versus pluralist liberal democracy, the current 
party system is organized around other key dividing issues. As before, I employ factor 
analysis to detect how the several components of each dimension cluster together in 
meaningful ways.  
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Table  35.  Fac tor  analys i s  by  d imens ion a t  the  in t er-par ty  and in tra -par ty  l eve l  fo r  Guatemala  
Dimensions Interparty: all 
cases 
Intraparty: 
FRG 
Intraparty: 
PAN 
Intraparty: 
LEFT107 
Intraparty: 
OLD party 
system108 
Role of 
State 
 
Total 
variance:  
Interparty:5
1.5% 
Intraparty: 
FRG: 
60% 
Intraparty: 
PAN: 
63% 
Intraparty: 
LEFT: 70% 
Intraparty: 
OLD party 
system: 
75% 
 
Factor 
1 
(26%):  
-
Educat3 
-
Educat2  
-Labor 
policies 
-Unem- 
ployme
nt 
subsidie
s 
Loa
d 
 
.77 
.63 
 
.62 
 
.64 
Factor 
1 
(32%): 
-Labor 
policie
s 
-
Educat
3 
-
Unemp
lo. 
subsidi
es 
Load 
 
.77 
 
.72 
 
 
.70 
Factor
1 
(23%):  
-Educ1 
-
Enviro
nm 
policie
s 
Lo
ad 
 
.82 
 
.81 
Facto
r1 
(36%):  
-Labor 
policie
s 
-
Educat
2 
-
Unem
plo 
subsid
ies 
Lo
ad 
 
.78 
 
.83 
.84 
Facto
r1 
(30%)
:  
-
Healt
h care 
-
Educ1 
-
Envir
o/ 
nment
al 
polici
es 
Loa
d 
 
.93 
 
.91 
.80 
Factor 
2 
(21%):  
-Labor 
policie
s 
-
Unemp
lo- 
yment 
subsidi
es 
Lo
ad 
 
.78 
 
.83 
Facto
r 2 
(19%):  
-
Enviro
n 
policie
s 
-
Contro
l 
prices 
Lo
ad 
 
.70 
 
.63 
Facto
r 2 
(23%)
: 
-
Contr
ol 
prices 
-
Educ3 
  
Loa
d 
 
.87 
 
.73 
Factor 
2 
(25%):  
-
Educat1 
-
Environ 
mental 
policies 
-Health 
care 
Loa
d 
 
.79 
.78 
 
 
.62 
Factor 
2 
(27%):  
-
Educat. 
1 
-Health 
care 
-
Enviro
nm 
Lo
ad 
 
.86 
.75 
 
.83 
Factor 
3 
(18%):  
-
Educat
2 
-
Educat
3 
-
Contro
Lo
ad 
 
.82 
.76 
.61 
Facto
r 3 
(14%):  
-
Health 
care 
Lo
ad 
 
.90 
Facto
r 3 
(21%)
:  
-
Unem
p- 
loyme
nt 
subsid
ies 
Loa
d 
 
 
.87 
 
 
.76 
                                                
107 In the factor analysis of the dimension Vision of democracy, the questions “Do you think democracy is always 
preferable even under tough circumstances?” and “Should all parties have the possibility to be legalized, even if they have 
an antidemocratic character?”, were deleted from the analysis because they are constants (all respondents of the left 
parties agreed on the positive response).  
108 In the factor analysis of the dimension Role of State, the variable “Education1” was deleted from the analysis for these 
parties, because it is a constant (all respondents agreed that a maximal State intervention should be allowed in that policy 
area).  
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policie
s 
l prices -
Educ2 
Vision of 
society 
Factor 1 
(61%):  
-Att. 
Divorce:.78 
-
Att.Abortion:.
78 
Factor 1 
(56%):  
-
Att.Divorce:.
75 
-
Att.Abortion:
.75 
Factor 1 
(58%):  
-
Att.Divorce:.
76 
-
Att.Abortion
:.76 
Factor 1 
(66%): 
-
Att.Divorce:
.81 
-
Att.Abortion
.81 
Factor 1 
(74%): 
-Att. 
Divorce:.86 
-
Att.Abortion:
.86 
Vision of 
democracy 
Total 
variance 
Interparty: 
Intraparty:F
RG: 72% 
Intraparty:P
AN: 60% 
Intraparty:L
EFT: 77% 
Intraparty:O
LD party 
sys: 76% 
Factor 1 
(20%): 
-Demo/ 
critic 
convictio
n 
-
Legalizat
. 
of 
parties 
Loa
d 
 
 
.77 
 
.70 
Factor  
1 
(28%):  
-Ideal 
elect. 
sys. 
-
Legaliz
at of 
parties 
Loa
d 
 
.77 
 
.80 
Factor 
1 
(22%):  
-Ideal 
elect 
sys 
-
Regime 
legitim
acy vs 
effectiv
e 
Load 
 
 
.71 
 
-
.70 
Factor 
1 
(48%):  
-
Regim
e 
legitim
acy vs 
effecti
ve 
-
Partito
c/ 
racy 
Load 
 
 
.97 
 
 
.97 
Factor 
1 
(26%):  
-
Regime 
legitim
ac 
vs 
effectiv
e 
-
Democ
r 
convict
ion 
Loa
d 
 
 
.86 
 
 
 
.88 
Factor 2 
(20%): 
-
Partitocr
acy 
-
Legitima
cy of 
elections 
Loa
d 
 
.78 
.70 
Factor 
2 
(23%):  
-
Regime 
legitim
acy vs 
effectiv
e 
Loa
d 
 
.92 
Factor 
2 
(20%):  
Legitim
acy of 
election
s 
-
Legaliz 
of 
parties 
Load 
 
 
.76 
 
 
.69 
Factor 
2 
(29%):  
-Ideal 
elect 
sys 
-
Legiti
m/ 
acy of 
electio
ns 
Load 
 
.82 
 
.68 
Factor 
2 
(25%):  
-Ideal 
elect 
sys 
-
Legaliz 
of 
parties 
 
Loa
d 
 
.75 
 
-
.77 
Factor 3 
(18%): 
-Dem. 
Legitima
cy vs 
effective
. 
-
Legitima
cy of 
elections 
Loa
d 
 
 
.82 
 
.65 
Factor 
3 
(20%):  
-
Partitoc
ra 
Legitim
acy of 
election
s 
Loa
d 
 
.86 
.68 
Factor 
3 
(18%):  
-
Partitoc
ra 
cy 
 
Load 
 
.87 
 
 
Factor 
3 
(24%):  
-
Legitim
ac of 
election
s 
-
Partitoc
r/ 
Loa
d 
 
 
.90 
 
 
.77 
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acy 
The method used was Principal component analysis (eigenvalues over one) with Varimax 
rotation of the factors. This is the solution given). Between parentheses next to each factor, 
the percentage of variance that factor explains.  
In Role of State: Education 1 stands for “Intervention of State in Primary education”; 
Education 2 stands for “Intervention of State in Secondary education”; Education 3 stands 
for “Intervention of Sate in University education”.  
 
The factor analysis for Guatemala shows one clear pattern concerning the dimension 
role of State: there is a clear divide between poverty alleviation policies (education, 
labor policies, unemployment subsidies) and the intervention of the State on 
infrastructure (healthcare, control of inflation). This is a common pattern both at the 
inter-party level and at the intra-party level, showing that these variables in effect 
contribute to shape political competition. A remarkable result in this dimension is that 
the pattern of responses clusters more clearly for the left and old party system parties 
than for the others, thereby placing the two most extreme sets of parties in the left-right 
scale along this dimension. This is a good indication that this is a structural cleavage 
shaping the political competition in Guatemala, since it has been not only present across 
time but also across the two extremes of the left-right scale.  
 Concerning the dimension vision of society, the same pattern as the previous 
case is displayed: there is a single underlying dimension, both at the inter-party and 
intra-party levels and the percentage of variance captured is large, that is, this dimension 
matters at both levels. Unsurprisingly, this dimension is more defining (the percentage 
of variance captured is higher) for the old party system parties (placed in the far right), 
and likely indicates the presence of a secularism-Catholicism cleavage.  
 Finally, the dimension vision of democracy is also meaningfully clustered into 
three factors at the inter-party level, with a high importance for regime legitimacy 
versus effectiveness and conviction on democracy (with the two highest loadings). This 
fact is revealing of the problematic democratic institutionalization the country faces, 
which probably stems from a weak appropriation of democratic rules by the elite. At the 
intra-party level, again the left and the old party system parties share a common pattern: 
a very high variance is captured by this dimension, showing that a structural cleavage 
exists around this attitudinal vision of democracy, and that this is stable across time (the 
left being a new actor and the old parties actors more established).  
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Other variables within the factors that display high loadings and thus structure 
the internal positioning of parties, are those related to the more tangible institutional 
structure, i.e.: legalization of parties, ideal electoral system and belief in partitocracy 
(parties as the vehicles of political representation). This shows that these variables 
denote a real and powerful splitting line between those who support a ‘majoritarian 
efficient’ democracy and those who support a ‘proportional all-inclusive’ democracy. It 
seems that the FRG and the left parties agree on opening the barriers of entry to the 
party system (the variables legalization of parties and ideal electoral system are 
positively correlated), whereas for the PAN and the old parties, a negative correlation is 
in place. This latter position reflects a positive view on a majority electoral system plus 
high barriers to the entry of new parties.   
Contrary to the Panamanian case, linear models display both significance and 
explanatory power for Guatemala. The results follow in Table 36.  
Table  36.  Regres s ion analys i s  w i th  dependent  var iab le  ideo log i ca l  p la cement  o f  par t i e s ,  Guatemala 
Models Variables Coefficients Fit of the model 
Dimension Role of 
State 
Model 1: Independent 
variables Intervention of 
State 
 
State interv. on Housing policies 
 
-.48* 
 
R square = .027 
P-value= .057 
n= 135 
Model 2: Independent 
variables Public 
spending priorities 
variables 
Public spending on Health care 
Public spending on Defense and 
Military 
Public spending on Pensions 
-2.8 
2.51*** 
-.79* 
R square= 0.113 
P-Value= 0.007 
n=120 
Model 3: Independent 
variables attitude 
towards privatization 
and market-State 
dichotomy  
 
Market vs State 
Att. Towards privatization 
 
 
.33** 
-.50*** 
R square= .011 
P-value= .001 
n= 133 
Model 4: Independent 
variables all (saturated 
model) 
Att. Towards privatization 
Market vs State 
State interv. on Housing 
Public spending on Health care 
Public spending on Defense and 
military 
Public spending on Housing 
-.66*** 
.42*** 
-.68** 
-4.67** 
2.25*** 
1.75** 
R square= .266 
P-value= 0.000 
n=122 
Dimension Vision of 
Society 
Model 1: Saturated 
(both variables: attitude 
towards divorce and 
abortion indep.) 
 
Att. Towards divorce 
 
.34* 
 
R square= .023 
P-value= .082 
n= 135 
Dimension Vision of 
democracy  
Model 1: Saturated 
model (all variables of 
this dimension as indep. 
vars.) 
 
Regime legitimacy vs effectiveness 
Conviction on democracy 
Ideal electoral system 
Legalization of parties 
 
-.51 
-1.12 
.62*** 
.81 
 
R square= .09 
P-value= .022 
n= 135 
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Saturated model (all 
dimensions) 
Market vs State 
Att. Towards privatization 
State interv. on Housing 
Public spending on Health care 
Public spending on Defense and 
Military 
Public spending on Housing 
Ideal electoral system 
.48*** 
-.60*** 
-.62** 
-5.82*** 
3.02*** 
1.96** 
.66*** 
R square= .34 
P-value= .000 
n= 122 
Regression models using backward method (using sig. 0.10 level to drop variables).  
* Significance at the 0.10 level; ** Significance at the 0.05 level; *** Significance at the 0.01 level.  
 
The most noteworthy results from these regressions are two: first, the variables 
that strongly determine power over the ideological left-right scale (that is, the number of 
layers that overlap with the left-right dimension) are mainly related to the Role of State 
and Vision of democracy dimensions. Particularly, public spending on healthcare, 
defense and housing and the belief in democracy display very robust results, showing 
significant and powerful relationships under any specification. More specifically, by 
attending to the signs of the coefficients, we see that the more the parties shift to the 
right, the more they tend to support public spending on Defense and the Military and 
Housing policies, and are more pro-market concerning the regulation of the economy 
and finally they are pro-majoritarian electoral systems. Instead, the more they shift to 
the left, the parties support heavy public spending on Health care policies, they reject 
massive privatization of public services and they are more convinced over democracy as 
the best regime under any circumstance.  
The second important result is that the dimension vision of society has a very 
low explanatory power with regard to the ideological placement of parties, showing, as 
in the factorial analysis, that the secularism-Catholicism cleavage has a low profile for 
the definition of ideology (there is a cleavage but it is not very strong).  
Finally, the results from the ordinal regression show a very strong explanatory 
power for, mainly, the same variables that appeared as robust and relevant in the linear 
models, especially the public spending priorities (Health care on the left and Housing 
and Defense on the right). In addition, variables from all dimensions appear in this 
specification, reflecting the multilayered nature of ideology in this country.  
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Table  37.  Ordina l  r egr e s s ion wi th  sor t ing  var iab le  mode o f  ideo log i ca l  p la cement  by  par ty ,  Guatemala 
Thresholds109 Variables Coefficients Model fit 
Mode=2 then -3.78 
Mode=5 then -2.64 
Mode=5.5 then -
2.1 
Mode=6 then -1.22 
Market vs State  
Attitude towards privatization 
public servs. 
State interv. on Housing 
State interv. on Education 2 
State interv. on Unemploym. 
Subsidies 
State interv. on Labor policies 
Public spending on Health care 
Public spending on Housing 
Public spending on Unemploym. 
Subsidies 
Attitude towards abortion 
Regime legitimacy vs 
effectiveness 
Belief on partitocracy 
Conviction on democracy as best 
regime 
Attitude towards Legalization of 
parties 
.46*** 
-.46*** 
 
.35* 
-.48*** 
-.34*** 
 
.08 
-3.9*** 
1.07** 
.21 
 
.49*** 
.43* 
-.15 
-.41 
 
.38 
Pseudo-R sq (Nagelkerke) 
=.445 
Intercept-only Likelihood= 
322.44 
Likelihood with variables (2) 
=264.84 
(Chi-square=57.6)  
n= 104 
Link function: Probit 
Significance= 0.000 
* Significance at the 0.10 level; ** Significance at the 0.05 level; *** Significance at the 0.01 level.  
As before, Education 1 stands for “Intervention of State in Primary education”; Education 2 stands for 
“Intervention of State in Secondary education”; Education 3 stands for “Intervention of Sate in University 
education”.  
 
The thresholds show that the distances between the parties are relatively small, 
reflecting a centripetal competition between the FRG, the old parties and the DCG, thus 
leaving a large space towards the left for the set of left parties, with the right exclusively 
occupied by the PAN. This may be indicative of a biased perception of the interviewees 
of their own party’s placement, or a tendency to place their party more towards the 
center than it really is (this seems to be the case for the FRG).    
                                                
109 I used the mode instead of the mean or the median due to the wide dispersion of responses to these questions (See 
Appendix 2). For Guatemala, the modes above correspond to the following parties: mode=two, Left parties; mode=5, 
FRG; mode=5.5, Old party system parties; Mode=6, DCG and the last category is mode=7, PAN (so the last threshold is 
the cutting point between the interval occupied by the DCG and that occupied by the PAN).  
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3 . 3 . )  -  H O N D U R A S  
 
Honduras is a stable bipartisan democracy in which the two largest parties have 
been in existence since the end of the nineteenth century. As in the other cases, a slow 
but deep restructuring of the party system has taken place since the entrance of three 
smaller parties (between the mid and late 1980s). A curious characteristic of the 
Honduran party system is that, despite this plurality of parties which breaks the 
bipartisan character of competition, the center of the political spectrum is towards the 
right110. A first explorative analysis using factorial analysis follows below:  
Table  38.  Fac tor  analys i s  by  d imens ion and at  the  in t er -par ty  and in tra -par ty  l eve l  fo r  Honduras  
Dimensi
on 
Interparty level 
(n=235) 
Intraparty: PLH 
(n=112) 
Intraparty: PNH 
(n=105) 
 
 
 
 
Role of 
State 
 
Total 
variance:  
Interpart
y: 51% 
PLH: 
60% 
PNH: 
57% 
Factor 1 
(38% of 
variance) 
-Education 2 
-Education 3 
-
Unemploym
ent policies 
Loading
s:  
 
.70 
.80 
.57 
Factor 1 
(35% of 
variance) 
-Control 
prices 
-Health care 
-Education 3 
-
Unemploym
ent policies 
Loading
s:  
 
.63 
.66 
.68 
.72 
Factor 1 
(32% of 
variance) 
-Control 
prices 
-Housing 
-Labor 
policies 
-
Unemploym
ent policies 
-Health care 
Loading
s: 
 
.57 
.85 
.82 
.77 
 
.62 
Factor 2 
(13% 
variance) 
-Housing 
policy 
-Labor 
policies 
-Health care 
Loading
s: 
 
.77 
.89 
.53 
Factor 2 
(25% 
variance) 
-Education 1 
-Education 2 
-
Envrionment 
Loading
s 
 
.80 
.72 
.78 
Factor 2 
(24% of 
variance) 
-Education 1 
-Education 2 
-
Environment 
Loading
s:  
 
.72 
.81 
.74 
Vision of 
society 
Factor 1 
(63% 
variance) 
-Att. 
Abortion 
-Att. 
Divorce 
Loading
s:  
 
.79 
.79 
Factor 1 
(61% 
variance)  
-Att. 
Abortion 
-Att. 
Divorce 
Loading
s:  
 
.78 
.78 
Factor 1 
(64% 
variance) 
-Att. 
Abortion 
-Att. 
Divorce 
Loading
s: 
 
.80 
.80 
                                                
110 The ideological positions of the interviewees in the left-right scale (1 to 10, respectively) is more radicalized when they 
self-place (occupying the whole ideological spectrum), than when they locate the parties they belong to. The range of the 
latter was between 4 and 8, therefore placing the center of the left-right spectrum at 6.26 (slightly to the right).  
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Vision of 
democra
cy 
Total 
variance:  
Interpart
y: 45% 
PLH: 
47.6% 
PNH: 
68% 
Factor 1 
(23% 
variance) 
-Partitocracy 
-Ideal 
elect.sys. 
Loading
s:  
 
.78 
-.51 
Factor 1 
(24% 
variance) 
-Legitimacy 
of elections 
-Legalization 
of parties 
Loading
s:  
 
-.59 
 
.73 
Factor 1 
(24% 
variance)  
-Partitocracy  
-Legitimacy 
of elections 
Loading
s: 
 
.78 
.68 
Factor 2 
(22% 
variance) 
-Regime 
legitimacy 
vs 
effectiveness 
-Legalization 
of parties 
Loading
s:  
 
.61 
 
 
.68 
Factor 2 
(23% 
variance) 
-Ideal 
elect.sys.  
-Partitocracy 
Loading
s:  
 
-.80 
.59 
Factor 2 
(23% 
variance) 
-Ideal elect. 
sys.  
-Legalization 
of parties 
Loading
s: 
 
.74 
.71 
Factor 3 
(21% 
variance) 
-Regime 
legitimacy 
vs 
effectiveness 
Loading
s: 
 
.87 
Note: Only the PLH and PNH have been included here due to the small sample size for 
the other parties (See Appendix 1).  
The method used was Principal component analysis with Varimax rotation of the factors 
(this is the solution given).  
In Role of State: Education 1 stands for “Intervention of State in Primary education”; 
Education 2 stands for “Intervention of State in Secondary education”; Education 3 
stands for “Intervention of Sate in University education”.  
 
Concerning the dimension role of State, there are two key issues where almost 
all interviewees agreed that maximal State intervention should be assured: education (at 
all levels, but especially primary and secondary) and environment. Therefore, these are 
crosscutting cleavages affecting all parties. More divisive issues are State intervention 
on housing and labor policies, which is largely relevant to the PNH. 
The general overview at the inter-party level is that the factors capture the 
positions of parties towards three types of public goods. The first factor is related to 
poverty alleviation policies (unemployment subsidies) and development policies 
(education being the key tool for this); the second factor is representative of the 
infrastructure needs of the country (specifically, housing and hospitals). Overall, the 
factors show that there is a strong agreement across parties that State intervention is 
necessary in key public goods (the best example here is education), but also that State 
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intervention on purely economic issues should be limited (price control does not appear 
for any group analyzed).  
Concerning the dimension Vision of democracy, the results show that this 
dimension has a low profile for explaining ideological differences between parties in 
Honduras111: it is not largely divisive. The only cleavage between parties in this 
dimension is a particular potential political reform: the ideal electoral system. Whereas 
the PLH, who has been the party in government during most of the country’s 
democratic experience, is significantly pro-majority electoral system. In correlation with 
a strong belief in political parties as vehicles of representation, the PNH is in favor of a 
relaxed barrier system for new parties in combination with a pro-proportionality 
position.  
Finally, the vision of society dimension also displays a single factor, capturing 
relatively high variance with its internal indicators scoring equally. The variance 
captured is highly homogeneous across the groups, showing that a broad agreement 
between parties exists in this dimension.  
A second exploratory analysis was made with the linear regressions presented 
below, in order to detect which are the key issues by dimension that define ideology in 
Honduras.  
Table  39.  Regres s ion analyse s  wi th  dependent  var iab le  ideo logi ca l  p lacement  o f  par ty ,  Honduras  
Models Variables Coefficients Fit of the model 
Dimension Role of 
State 
Model 1: 
Independent 
variables 
Intervention of 
State 
 
Education 1 
Education 2 
Health care 
 
-.60* 
-.40** 
.78* 
 
R square = .037 
P-value= .068 
n= 234 
Model 2: 
Independent 
variables Public 
spending priorities 
variables 
Infrastructures 
Health care 
Education 
1.20*** 
2.24** 
1.93*** 
R square= 0.19 
P-Value= 0.000 
n=144 
Model 3: 
Independent 
 
Market versus State 
 
.35*** 
 
R square= .095 
                                                
111 Agreement that elections are the best democratic mechanism, that democracy is preferable to any other 
regime, and that all parties must have the opportunity to legalize is maximal, indicating that these issues 
are ‘valence’ issues or that no party opposes. Therefore, they were not included in the analysis (because 
they are constants).   
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variables attitude 
towards 
privatization and 
market-State 
dichotomy  
Attitude tow. Privatiz -.41*** P-value= .000 
n= 238 
Model 4: 
Independent 
variables all 
(saturated model) 
Public spending on 
Infrastructures 
Public spending on 
Defense 
Public spending on 
Health care 
Market versus State 
.94** 
1.72*** 
2.37** 
.52*** 
R square= .255 
P-value= 0.000 
n=155 
Dimension Vision 
of Society 
Model 1: Saturated 
(both variables: 
attitude towards 
divorce and 
abortion indep.) 
 
 
Attitude towards divorce 
 
 
.55*** 
 
 
R square= .041 
P-value= .002 
n= 237 
Dimension Vision 
of democracy  
Model 1: Saturated 
model (all variables 
of this dimension as 
indep. vars.) 
 
 
‘Ideal’ electoral system 
Legalization of parties 
 
 
.43** 
.50* 
 
 
R square= .04 
P-value= .012 
n= 232 
Saturated model 
(all dimensions) 
Market versus State 
Public spending on 
Infrastructures 
Public spending on 
Health care 
Public spending on 
Defense 
.47*** 
.78** 
3.55*** 
2.04*** 
R square= .28 
P-value= .000 
n= 154 
Regression models using backward method (using sig. 0.10 level to drop variables).  
* Significance at the 0.10 level; ** Significance at the 0.05 level; *** Significance at 
the 0.01 level.  
 
The results confirm that every dimension explains some variance, and therefore 
that ideology in Honduras is a multilayered phenomenon. The last model logically 
yields the greatest variance explained when all the variables from all three dimensions 
are included; however, only variables of the dimension role of State remain significant, 
both altogether and individually. Public spending on infrastructure, healthcare, and 
defense, plus a relatively weak but positive belief in State intervention in the economy, 
characterizes the parties to the right, with the healthcare and defense sectors scoring 
particularly strongly. The final model is, as for the previous cases, the ordinal 
regression.  
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Table  40.  Ordina l  r egr e s s ion wi th  sor t ing  var iab le  mode o f  ideo log i ca l  p la cement  o f  ea ch par ty ,  
Honduras  
Thresholds112 Variables Coefficients Model fit 
Mode= 2 then 1.57 
Mode=3 then 1.78 
Mode=4 then 1.86 
Mode=5 then 4.017 
Market versus State 
Attitude towards privatization 
Intervention of State in Labor 
policies 
Intervent. State in Education 2 
Intervent. State in Education 3 
Public spending Infrastructures 
Public spending Health care 
Public spending Defense and 
Military 
Public spending Pension system 
.46*** 
-.23* 
.48*** 
 
.42* 
-.50* 
.56* 
1.74** 
1.07*** 
 
-.60** 
Pseudo-R sq (Nagelkerke)=.357  
Intercept-only Likelihood= 
233.91  
Likelihood with 
variables=182.51  
n= 240 
Link function: Probit 
Significance= 0.000 
* Significance at the 0.10 level; ** Significance at the 0.05 level; *** Significance at the 0.01 level.  
As before, Education 1 stands for “Intervention of State in Primary education”; Education 2 stands for 
“Intervention of State in Secondary education”; Education 3 stands for “Intervention of Sate in University 
education”.  
 
The thresholds show that, the parties in Honduras are concentrated in a rather 
small ideological space. The historical monopoly of government by the PLH clearly 
dominates the pattern of competition: all three new parties gather around the space 
occupied by the PLH, slightly towards the left, while the PNH occupies the space to the 
right.  
Regarding the coefficients, the results here confirm the previous ones: the 
dimension role of State has a strong effect in defining the ideological placement of 
parties in the left-right scale, reflecting an overlap between the left-right scale and the 
other dimensions included. Particularly, the parties towards the left side of the 
ideological spectrum support significant State intervention in University education and 
the pension system and oppose the privatization of public services. The parties towards 
the right, the two traditional parties, place their priorities on policies involving 
infrastructural investments, such as health care, labor and defense. In sum, therefore, 
there is agreement in the Honduran party system that the State should have an active 
role in welfare provision, but there is a disagreement over the key priorities. In addition, 
there is a broad agreement on the vision of society and a rather majoritarian vision of 
democracy. The conclusion is therefore that the left-right divide plus the role of State 
have the strongest power in explaining the morphology of ideology in Honduras.  
                                                
112 The thresholds I use are the modes of the ideological placement of each party in the left-right scale due to a high 
dispersion of the responses for this question (See Appendix 2). Above, mode=2, corresponds to the PUD; mode=3, to 
thePDCH; mode=4, to the PINU; mode=5, to PLH and mode=8, PNH (this last one implicit in the model in the last 
threshold).  
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3 . 4 . )  -  C O S T A  R I C A  
Costa Rica is the longest, and according to most scholars studying Latin 
America also the most stable, democracy in the entire region. This is partly due to the 
party system’s stability, and partly due to the consensual character of the institutional 
design and the actors, as will be seen in the data analysis. First, as in the previous cases, 
I shall look at the factor structure by dimension.  
Table  41.  Fac tor  analys i s  by  d imens ion a t  in t er -par ty  and in tra -par ty  l eve l  f o r  Costa  Rica  
Dimensions Interparty: all 
cases 
n=148 
Intraparty: 
PUSC 
n=62  
Intraparty: 
PLN 
n=57 
Intraparty: 
Provincial 
parties113, n=16 
Role of State 
 
 
Total variance:  
Interparty: 
55% 
Intraparty 
PUSC:65% 
Intraparty 
PLN: 52% 
Intraparty 
Provincial:64% 
Factor 1 
(29%):  
-Education 
1 
-Pensions 
-Health 
care 
-
Environm. 
policies 
Loa
d 
 
.80 
.75 
.77 
.74 
Factor 1 
(23%):  
-
Education 
1 
-
Environm
. Policies 
-Health 
care 
Loa
d 
 
.78 
.79 
 
.69 
Factor 1 
(31%):  
-Health 
care 
-
Educatio
n1 
-Control 
prices 
Lo
ad 
 
.81 
.73 
.71 
Factor 1 
(37%):  
-Labor 
policies 
-
Pensions 
Loa
d 
 
.80 
 
.81 
Factor 2 
(25%): 
-Control 
prices 
-Labor 
policies 
-
Unemploy
m. 
Subsidies 
-Education 
3  
Loa
d 
 
.64 
.73 
.64 
 
.64 
Factor 2 
(22%):  
-Housing 
policies 
-Labor 
policies 
Loa
d 
 
.81 
 
.87 
Factor 2 
(21%): 
-Labor 
policies 
-
Educatio
n3 
-
Unemplo
y. 
subsidies  
Lo
ad 
 
.79 
 
.81 
.73 
Factor 2 
(27%):  
-Control 
prices 
-
Educatio
n3 
Loa
d 
 
.85 
 
.76 
Factor 3 
(20%):  
-
Education 
3 
-
Unemplo
ym. 
Subsidies 
Loa
d 
 
.76 
.72 
Vision of 
Society 
Factor 1 (67%). 
load  
-Att. Divorce: 
.82 
-Att. Abortion: 
.82 
Factor 1 (62%). 
load 
-Att. Divorce: 
.80 
-Att. Abortion. 
.80 
Factor 1 
(69%). load 
-Att. Divorce: 
.83 
-Att. Abortion: 
.83 
Factor 1 
(80%). load 
-Att. Divorce: 
.90 
-Att. Abortion: 
.90 
                                                
113 For the factor analysis of provincial parties in the dimension role of State, the questions regarding the State 
intervention on Education1, Environmental policies and Health care were deleted from the analysis because they are a 
constant (i.e. all respondents from these parties had responded that maximal State intervention is needed in those policy 
areas).  
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Vision of 
democracy114 
 
Total variance:  
Interparty: 
52% 
Intraparty 
PUSC:79% 
Intraparty 
PLN:51% 
Intraparty 
Provincial 
parties:62% 
Factor 1 
(26%):  
-
Legalizati
on of 
parties 
Loa
d 
 
.80 
Factor 1 
(29%):  
-Regime 
legitimac
y vs 
effective
ness 
-
Legalizat
ion of 
parties 
Loa
d 
 
.82 
 
 
.82 
Factor 1 
(26%):  
-
Legalizat
ion of 
parties 
-Regime 
legitimac
y vs 
effective
ness 
Lo
ad 
 
.80 
 
-
.76 
Factor 1 
(33%):  
-
Partitocr
acy 
-
Legitima
cy of 
elections 
Loa
d 
 
.68 
.80 
Factor 2 
(26%):  
-
Partitocrac
y  
-
Legitimac
y of 
elections 
Loa
d 
 
.80 
.80 
Factor 2 
(27%): 
-
Partitocra
cy 
-
Legitima
cy of 
elections  
Loa
d 
 
.83 
.81 
 
Factor 2 
(25%):  
-Ideal 
elect. 
system 
-
Legalizat
ion of 
parties 
Lo
ad 
 
-
.81 
 
.75 
Factor 2 
(29%):  
-
Legalizat
ion of 
parties 
Loa
d 
 
.90 
Factor 3 
(22%):  
-Ideal 
elect. 
system 
Loa
d 
 
.94 
 
Note: Only the PUSC, PLN and provincial parties have been included here due to sample 
size (See Appendix 1).  
The method used was Principal component analysis with Varimax rotation of the factors 
(this is the solution given). Between parentheses next to each factor, the percentage of 
variance explained by that factor.  
In Role of State: Education 1 stands for “Intervention of State in Primary education”; 
Education 2 stands for “Intervention of State in Secondary education”; Education 3 stands 
for “Intervention of Sate in University education”.  
 
The factor analysis displays some very clear results: the most relevant 
dimensions structuring ideology in Costa Rica are the vision of society and role of State, 
with a much lower importance for the vision of democracy. The dimension role of the 
State is more relevant to the PUSC and the PLN, the two largest parties, and both share 
the same pattern: a first factor where basic goods in a more developed society cluster 
together (primary education, health care, environmental policies). A second factor 
where more focalized welfare policies (labor policies, unemployment subsidies and 
                                                
114 The question “Do you think democracy is preferable to any other regime even under tough economic circumstances?” 
has been excluded from the analysis because it is a valence issue for all the parties in Costa Rica (full positive agreement 
of all respondents).  
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university education) appear together. The provincial parties are, however, more 
oriented towards policies that affect specific electorates, probably their core support 
base: labor policies (for young people at the provincial level who want to remain in the 
province but find a more diversified labor offer than agriculture) and pensions (for older 
people). The second factor for the provincial parties reveals the importance they give to 
intensive State intervention in the economy (inflation control) and equality promotion 
policies (University education).  
The Vision of society dimension, as mentioned, displays large relevance for all 
the parties in Costa Rica, with particular structuring effects for the PUSC and the 
provincial parties, whereas the vision of democracy ranks high for the PLN and the 
provincial parties. Overall, these patterns show a rather low ideological polarization 
around these dimensions: relevance is commonly high for all parties and the key 
variables structuring the data are common for all groups as well. Nevertheless, a 
noteworthy aspect of this dimension, vision of democracy, is that the Costa Rican 
politicians do not hold relevant positions concerning the attitudinal components of 
democracy (those that entail a system of beliefs: conviction on democracy and belief on 
democracy as the best regime). Instead, the only ones appearing as relevant concern 
pragmatic institutional components (ideal electoral system and barriers to entry to the 
electoral arena for new parties). The second data analysis, linear regressions for each 
dimension, follow.  
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Table  42.  Regres s ion analyse s  wi th  dependent  var iab le  ideo log i ca l  p la cement  o f  par ty  by  d imens ion ,  
Costa  Rica 
Models Variables Coefficients Fit of the model 
Dimension Role 
of State 
Model 1: 
Independent 
variables 
Intervention of 
State 
Unemployment subsidies -.30** R square = .034 
P-value= .030 
n= 142 
Model 2: 
Independent 
variables Public 
spending priorities 
variables 
On Pension policies 
On Health care policies 
.95* 
-3.0** 
R square= 0.10 
P-Value= 0.072 
n=69 
Model 3: 
Independent 
variables attitude 
towards 
privatization and 
market-State 
dichotomy  
 
Att. Privatization 
Market vs State 
 
-.13 
       .49*** 
R square= .13 
P-value= .003 
n= 146 
Model 4: 
Independent 
variables all 
(saturated model) 
Market vs State  
Public spending on 
Infrastructures 
Public spending on Health 
Care 
Public spending on 
Pensions 
.70*** 
-2.73* 
-2.63* 
1.35** 
R square= .29 
P-value= 0.006 
n=68 
Dimension Vision 
of Society 
Model 1: Saturated 
(both variables: 
attitude towards 
divorce and 
abortion indep.) 
 
Att. Towards divorce 
 
.31** 
R square= .032 
P-value= .032 
n= 145 
Saturated model 
(all dimensions) 
Regime legitimacy vs 
effectiveness 
Belief on partitocracy 
Legalization of parties 
State interv. on Labor 
policies 
State interv. on Health care 
State interv. on 
Unemplo.subsidies 
Public spending on 
infrastructure 
Public spending on Health 
care 
-.76* 
.43* 
1.34** 
-.60* 
-1.54** 
.62* 
-4.73** 
-6.79*** 
2.2 
3.01* 
-1.63** 
3.10* 
1.47** 
R square= .50 
P-value= .026 
n= 70 
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Public spending on Safety 
Public spending on 
Education 
Public 
spendingUnemplo.subsidies 
Public spending on 
Housing 
Public spending on 
Pensions 
Attitude towards 
privatization 
-.40** 
Regression models using backward method (Fsig. 0.10 level to drop variables).  
Note: Dimension vision of democracy not included in the Table because no model 
displayed any significance and the R square was almost zero. However, these variables 
were then included in the saturated model and show significance under that 
specification.  
* Significance at the 0.10 level; ** Significance at the 0.05 level; *** Significance at 
the 0.01 level.  
 
The results from these models confirm the results observed in the factor 
analyses: the role of the State is remarkably relevant for the ideological positioning of 
parties, vision of society is a shared, not a divisive, issue, and some components of the 
dimension vision of democracy are significant when included in the saturated 
specification. More particularly, the results show that parties to the right of the spectrum 
emphasize public spending on education, housing, safety and pensions, support the 
opening of barriers to the entry of new parties, whereas the parties towards the left give 
priority to public investment on infrastructure, healthcare, labor policies and 
unemployment subsidies. In sum, the dimension role of State in Costa Rica seems to fit 
well with the traditional values of the left-right cleavage, reflecting a significant overlap 
between the dimensions in that direction.  
Finally, the results for the ordinal regression also confirm the high significance 
of these same variables. A new pattern that had not been detected previously is the 
strategic position of the provincial parties in the ideological space they occupy, between 
the PLN and the PUSC (the two largest traditional parties). Whereas the PFD freely 
occupies the left, the PLN absorbs some space of the left plus the center, an excellent 
strategy explaining their victory in most of the elections of the past century (supporting 
welfare and redistributive policies) and the PUSC occupies the small space at the center 
which is left by the provincial parties plus the right.  
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The second remarkable aspect, as is shown below, is that public investment on 
education is a common value for the Costa Rican parties, whereas the split between 
safety, housing and pensions (right) and labor plus unemployment subsidies (left) again 
shows very strong relevance. Accordingly, the right is slightly in favor of a pro-market 
regulation of the economy whereas the left is against the privatization of public 
services. Overall, the overlap between the chosen dimensions and the left-right 
ideological scale is reflected in the results.        
Table  43.  Ordina l  r egr e s s ion wi th  sor t ing  var iab le  mode o f  ideo log i ca l  p la cement  o f  ea ch par ty ,  Costa  
Rica  
Thresholds115 Variables Coefficients Model fit 
Mode=4, then -.13 
Mode=5, then 2.47 
Mode=5.3, then 
3.05 
Market vs. State 
State interv. on Control prices 
State interv. on Education 1 
State interv. on Housing 
State interv. on Labor policies 
State interv. on Education 2 
State interv. on Unemploym. 
Subsidies 
Public spending on Safety 
Public spending on Education 
Public spending on 
Unemploym. Subsidies 
Public spending on Pensions 
Belief on partitocracy 
Attitude towards abortion 
Attitude towards privatization 
public services 
.67** 
-.50 
.26 
1.45*** 
.46 
-2.4*** 
.39 
 
-.89 
2.84 
-2.7*** 
 
.60 
.49 
.94*** 
 
-.17 
Pseudo-R sq (Nagelkerke) =.66 
Intercept-only Likelihood= 
109.26 
Likelihood with 
variables=64.85 
(Chi-square=44.41)  
n= 49 
Link function: Probit 
Significance= 0.000 
* Significance at the 0.10 level; ** Significance at the 0.05 level; *** Significance at the 0.01 level.  
As before, Education 1 stands for “Intervention of State in Primary education”; Education 2 stands for 
“Intervention of State in Secondary education”; Education 3 stands for “Intervention of Sate in University 
education”.  
 
                                                
115 The thresholds correspond to the mode of the ideological placement of each party in the left-right scale, due to 
dispersion in the responses I do not use the mean or the median (see Appendix 2). Here, when mode=4, it corresponds 
to PFD+Renovacion Costarricense+Renovacion Democratica; when mode=5, PLN; when mode=5.3, Provincial parties; 
mode=6, PUSC (implicit in the figure for the last threshold).  
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6) -  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY IN FOUR CENTRAL 
AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
“Inasmuch as ideology conceptualizes the 
historical process and orients human 
beings for shaping it, ideology is itself an 
active agent of historical change”116 
 
 
The aim of the comparative analysis is to elaborate a new index of polarization 
that includes in more detail the several dimensions that organize ideological competition 
between parties in these four countries. The importance of constructing such a detailed 
measure of polarization lies in two key arguments: (1) the characteristics of the 
legislative scenario are relevant to explain political behavior and overall political 
outcomes. A uni-dimensional measure of one important component of the political 
system, in general, and of the legislative scenario, in particular, would provide poor 
grounds for an accurate further analysis of outcomes. (2) The measurement of 
ideological polarization in a more informed way may contribute to enhancing the 
understanding of the dynamics of bargaining in political systems. Particularly if 
ideological polarization is viewed as the explanatory force for how willing political 
actors are to negotiate and compromise, depending on the distance(s) between them, 
then the more detailed the measure, the better we are able to predict a significant part of 
those incentives. Here I will employ this definition, whereby the potential willingness of 
political actors to negotiate is directly and inversely related to the degree of political 
conflict. This definition offers the advantage that we link the characteristics of the party 
system are linked to the outcomes in the legislative arena, which is relevant for the 
analysis in Section 6.  
In order to construct this measure, some final pieces of information must be 
included in the analysis: the institutional and historical variables, as argued in the 
conceptual section of the Chapter. A general summary of these characteristics for the 
four countries under analysis follows.  
                                                
116 Mullins, W.A. (1972: 504).  
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Table  44.  His tor i ca l  and ins t i tu t iona l  charac t e r i s t i c s  o f  the  four  cases  under  s tudy 
DIMENSIONS VARIABLES HONDURAS COSTA 
RICA 
GUATEMALA PANAMA 
HISTORICAL  Age of party 
system 
(average years 
of existence, 
all parties) 
 
54 
 
19 
 
21 
 
 
14 
 
Type of 
cleavages at 
time of party 
system 
emergence 
Liberal 
versus 
Conservative 
parties 
Christian 
democracy 
versus 
Conservative 
parties 
Revolutionary 
versus 
Conservative 
Arnulfismo 
versus 
Torrijismo 
(highly 
personalized) 
INSTITUTIONAL Salient issues Role of State Role of State 
Left-right  
Role of State 
Vision of 
society 
Vision of 
democracy 
Role of State 
Vision of 
society 
 
Type of 
electoral 
competition 
Centripetal Centrifugal Centrifugal Centripetal 
Number of 
competing 
parties (1) 
 
2.2 
 
2.7 
 
5.9 
 
7.2 
Biasing 
component of 
electoral 
system (5) 
 
No (0.08) 
 
No (0.44) 
 
Yes (2.4) 
 
Yes (3.67) 
District 
magnitude (2) 
and (6) 
44% and 6.4 42.8% and 
7.8 
91.3% and 4.9 97.5% and 
1.7 
Ballot System 
(type of lists) 
Closed 
Blocked  
Closed 
Blocked 
Closed 
Blocked 
Closed 
Not blocked 
Electoral 
threshold (3) 
No No Yes (4%) Yes (5%) 
Electoral 
formula (4) 
Proportional:  
RM-Hare 
Proportional:  
RM-Hare 
Mixed: 
proportional 
(D’hont)  and 
majority 
(FPTP)  
Mixed:  
RM-Hare and 
FPTP  
(1): Effective number of electoral parties, average for the 1990s, Alcantara (1999).  
(2): In percentage of small districts, defined as where five or less deputies are elected.  
(3): Although Costa Rica has an electoral threshold, it is so small – half quotient – that it has virtually no 
effect on the party system.  
(4): Electoral formula for legislative elections.  
(5) Between parentheses, the reducing effect due to the biasing component of the electoral system. This 
figure is obtained by subtracting the effective number of electoral parties from the effective number of 
legislative parties. It denotes, therefore, the number of parties that do not make it to Parliament due to the 
electoral system.  
(6) And average district magnitude (obtained by dividing the number of seats to be elected by the number 
of districts). For Guatemala, since the size of the Parliament is variable, this figure is calculated for the 
number of seats in the term 1996-99.  
Sources: District magnitude from Jones (1995: 12). To calculate the average age of the party systems, 
Electoral Tribunals of each country.   
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The clear divide between the countries is between the more stable and open in 
terms of political competition cases of Honduras and Costa Rica and the more 
fragmented but also more majority oriented political systems of Guatemala and Panama. 
In addition, as expected, the dimension Role of State, as more likely to overlap with the 
left-right cleavage, is salient for all the cases, whereas the dimension Vision of 
democracy is only salient for Guatemala, reflecting the different historical trajectories of 
the countries in this regard.  
Now, the construction of a typology of ideological polarization based on these 
pieces of information follows a positive relationship with a composite measure of each 
type of variable: the institutional variables, composed by the characteristics of the 
electoral system, are amalgamated to build the variable ‘cohesion’. Here, borrowing 
from Morgenstern and Hawkings (2000), the hypotheses are that open ballot systems, 
intra-party competition (for instance, through primary elections), a high percentage of 
small districts, and low agreement on whether discipline should be used to enforce 
cohesion, produce low cohesion. The opposite should also hold true. Second, 
concerning the degree of fragmentation, I expect the number of competing parties and 
the biasing effect of the electoral system to be positively correlated to cohesion. Finally, 
the smaller the distances between the parties in the salient dimensions, the higher the 
cohesion (or the lower the ideological polarization).  
Scrutiny of the cases according to these measures displays the following results: 
Costa Rica and Honduras share the same pattern concerning the institutional variables, 
as do Panama and Guatemala. This fact produces a clear split between low cohesion for 
the latter two cases and high cohesion in the former two. However, the pattern is not 
completely parsimonious: Honduras has primary elections, and thus a robust tradition of 
intra-party competition, and low agreement on strong disciplinary mechanisms is in 
place for all cases117. The same combined pattern is obtained for the other two types of 
variables: there is both a large number of competing parties and a strong biasing effect 
                                                
117 Here I used a variable found in the questionnaires for the two Research projects employed here (see Bibliography for 
full references). These addressed discipline in the following terms: “How far do you agree that the party leaders should 
have more power over rank-and-file politicians to impose the party line?”. The percentages of agreement in the category 
“not very much” or “not at all” in all four countries makes this conclusion clear: for Honduras 84%; Guatemala 80%; 
Panama 64% and Costa Rica 72% of the interviewees.  
In general, however, the left parties –especially those in Honduras (PUD) and Costa Rica (PFD) – displayed an opposite 
tendency. Nevertheless, the limited sample available for these cases (below the 5%) makes it difficult to generalize about a 
clear pattern of disagreement regarding this aspect.  
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of the electoral system in Guatemala and Panama, but the distances between the parties 
in the salient dimensions are small for all four cases118.  
Given this state of mixed scenarios, I have opted to include the variables 
individually, but classify them as follows: on the one hand, the variables exogenous to 
the legislative scenario (effect of policy, electoral cycle, age of party system, number of 
competing parties, biasing effect of the electoral system, ballot system, district 
magnitude and type of electoral competition). On the other hand, the endogenous 
variables characterizing the legislative scenario (number of blocks, size of Executive 
party in Parliament, distance between parties in the ‘system of beliefs’ dimensions, 
distance between parties on the left-right scale and support for discipline as a 
mechanism for enforcing cohesion). I will test in the next and final section of this 
Chapter the explanatory power of the exogenous and endogenous factors, showing that 
the latter do not capture causality, despite positive correlation and significance.  
7) - THE EFFECTS OF IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION ON LEGISLATIVE 
PERFORMANCE 
 
The objective of this analysis is to discuss the claim that it is not presidentialism 
alone, but a combination of presidentialism and multipartism that produces problem for 
democratic stability in presidential systems (Mainwaring, 1990 and 1998, and 
Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). These authors have shown that when high fragmentation 
and high polarization characterize the legislative scenario in a presidential system 
(particularly Latin American cases), the probability of gridlock (legislative paralysis) or 
inter-branch conflict (the Executive imposing legislation) increased substantially. These 
two facts also increase the probability of breakdown or chronic political instability.  
My contribution to this debate is to re-test this causal relationship by employing 
the measure of ideological polarization elaborated in this work. The dependent variable 
I employ here, in order to capture the effect of Executive dominance of the agenda119, is 
the origin of legislative initiative in each legislative term. The results are as follows:  
                                                
118 I used cluster analysis here to gain a more visual approach to the pattern of groupings of the cases by country. Without 
going in detail, the clusters by cases (constructed on the basis of the distances of the scores) concentrated most of the 
cases in the first few clusters. 
119 As stated in previous Chapters, the phenomenon of agenda control is complex and may adopt varying forms, as 
procedural or organizational choice (Chapter 4). In this Chapter, I only account for Executive dominance of the agenda 
since this was the reference for the original hypothesis by Mainwaring. This theory-testing effort communicates better 
with the existing literature if the dependent variable is the same. In addition the employment of the characteristics of the 
legislative scenario as explanatory variables of inter-branch dynamics is present in all other Chapters, hence offering a 
complete test.   
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Table  45.  Log i t  mode l  wi th  dependent  var iab l e  Execut iv e  dominance  o f  the  agenda,  a l l  countr i e s  
VARIABLES COEFFICIENTS MODEL FIT 
Original model  
Dummy country 
Polarization only left-right scale 
 
1.437*** 
1.010*** 
n=2005 
Sig= .000 
χ²=27.859 
PseudoR sq.=.02 
Percentage of cases correctly 
predicted= 59% 
Only exogenous variables 
Policy area of bill 
Electoral cycle 
Age of party system 
Biasing component of elect. system 
Number of competing parties 
(effective electoral number of 
parties) 
 
.442*** 
.907** 
1.026*** 
13.331*** 
.251*** 
 
n=1972 
Sig=.000 
χ²=600.8 
Pseudo Rsq=.35 
Percentage of cases correctly 
predicted=75% 
Endogenous and exogenous 
variables 
Blocks 
Distance 
Idistance 
Effect of bill 
Electoral cycle 
 
1.194*** 
.827 
.991 
.442*** 
.907** 
 
n=1972 
Sig=.000 
χ²=600.8 
PseudoRsq=.36 
Percentage of cases correctly 
predicted=75% 
** Significance at the 0.05 level; *** Significance at the 0.01 level 
 
The results show evidence in support of the general hypothesis of this work: 
while the characteristics of the legislative scenario alone have a positive and significant 
relationship with particular phenomena of legislative performance, such as agenda 
control, their explanatory capacity is very low. Therefore the original model in 
Mainwaring overemphasized the causal role of these variables. This fact implies that we 
cannot attribute a clear causal relationship if only the uni-dimensional left-right measure 
of polarization120 is accounted for. When only the exogenous variables are included 
(model 2), both the fit of the model and the explanatory capacity increase substantially, 
indicating that variables external to the legislative scenario contribute to explaining 
Executive dominance of the agenda. Furthermore, the final model, with an equal 
goodness of fit and significance, includes the two measures of distance calculated for 
the dimensions Role of State, Vision of society, vision of democracy (distance), and 
left-right (idistance). As expected, there is a mixture of endogenous and exogenous 
variables that properly explains Executive behavior regarding agenda control. The most 
powerful variables are the number of blocks (or fragmentation) and the closeness of 
elections (electoral cycle). Overall, using a more detailed measure of the ideological 
                                                
120 The measure of polarization used in the first model is the traditional left-right distance between parties weighted by 
their share of seats in Parliament at a given term, particularly following Coppedge (1998) as is shown in Appendix 4.1.  
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positioning of parties improves the possibilities to capture better the characteristics of 
the legislative scenario.  
8) - - SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND PARTIAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE 
CHAPTER 
“Cleavage is fuzzily defined 
because it lies as intermediary 
between two views: that of social 
stratification and its impact on 
institutions and political behavior, 
on the one hand, and that of 
political institutions and their 
impact on social structure and 
change, on the other”121 
 
 
This Chapter has presented evidence that a more detailed analysis of ideological 
divisions enhances the possibilities to analyze the impact of the legislative scenario on 
institutional performance. Not surprisingly, the salience of political issues varies widely 
across the countries under analysis. Still, a comparative analysis has been produced by 
adopting a common conceptual umbrella of meaningful dimensions over which parties 
compete and flag important ideas as vehicles for ideological positioning. Both the 
analyses and the results of this Chapter show that such a measure is not easy to produce. 
However, one advantage derived from the research carried out in this Chapter is that a 
methodological strategy that allows communication between two types of data has been 
developed. First, between the data on elite position-taking, whose unit of analysis is the 
individual, and data on legislative production, whose unit of analysis is the bill along 
with detailed information on the institutional characteristics of the process of approval. 
If it is true that both types of data are related to political behavior (including ideology as 
a tool for behavior in this context), then linking the individual and party level with 
respect to the first type of data with the broader institutional information from the 
second type of data is feasible and fruitful. This analytical effort is strongly inspired by 
the neo-institutional view on that actors’ behavior is a product of institutional factors 
and that institutional performance depends on institutional characteristics.  
In fact, the quotation that opened this Section, drawn from the excellent volume 
on ideological divides in Europe by Bartolini and Mair (1990), underscored that the 
intrinsic complexity of ideology – in terms of both conceptual and measurement 
                                                
121 Bartolini and Mair (1990).  
 
189 
challenges – is great. My analytical standpoint is in line with this criticism of the 
analytical over-reduction of a heterogeneous and possibly relational central component 
of politics as ideology. I have obtained proof that a more detailed analysis of ideology 
allows the injection of qualitative content into the lines of division and competition in 
different party systems. The key proposal from my analysis is that aggregate measures 
(such as ideological polarization) should build on a well-informed assessment of each of 
the units intervening in the construction of the measure. Without this, the descriptive 
and substantive capacity of aggregate measures to explain important political 
phenomena may be very limited. Hence, methodological choices are a pre-condition for 
satisfactory and meaningful research just as much as proper conceptual and theoretical 
elaboration. In the study of ideology, as both a particularly complex phenomenon in 
itself and as an explanatory variable of broader political outcomes, this effort has 
proven empirically and theoretically enlightening, even if the usual aggregate measure 
assuming uni-dimensionality in the left-right placement of parties also delivered some 
positive explanatory capacity.  
The key empirical findings of this Chapter are three. First, the measurement of 
ideological polarization demands a previous deep understanding of the pinpoints of 
ideological competition between parties in each country. Second, the analysis of the 
spatial overlap between parties on some cleavages (such as those analyzed here: Role of 
State, Vision of society and Vision of democracy) plus the left-right dimension, can 
improve our understanding of how political competition works. This effort further 
contributes to providing an appropriate linkage between the intra-party, inter-party and 
comparative levels of analysis. The third result is that the relevance and significance of 
ideology, as elaborated in this work, is positive and moderately important for explaining 
how political actors push their agenda in the decision-making process. However, 
exogenous factors substantially affect the weight of this causality and the incentives of 
actors.  
Furthermore, the theoretical contribution of this Chapter, despite its eminently 
empirical nature, is that the treatment of ideology as a multi-layered, relational 
phenomenon, improves our chances to understand the behavior of political actors better, 
and to place this within the broader political system and historical context in which they 
are based. Bringing the political actors back in institutional analysis increases the 
potential of this approach to deliver more realistic and qualitative analyses. This work 
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also shows that the specification of causal arrows between relevant political variables is 
not an easy task, and that resuming the meaningful historical and institutional devices in 
a single measure of polarization impoverishes rather than enriches the understanding of 
ideology and its effects on other spheres of the political system.   
From the results in this Chapter, there are particularly two interesting open lines 
for research. A first potential open line for research as suggested by the analysis is to 
improve the measure of ideological polarization by including hypotheses and 
appropriate weights for party cohesion and discipline. In this work, the unavailability of 
the typical sources to measure cohesion and discipline (roll-call votes in Parliament or 
percentages of re-election), has made it impossible, for the time being, to generate more 
accurate hypotheses regarding the possibly important effects of these devices.  
In addition, a second aspect that has appeared important is the inclusion of the 
characteristics of the historical development of the party system in the analysis, in order 
to properly ground the comprehension of ideology. This view is once more related to 
Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) quotation, with its emphasis on the placement of ideology 
between political behavior (from concrete political actors) and political institutions (as 
lines of division and competition), and as a pragmatic tool settling competition over the 
specific priorities of public policy (Freeden, 1996). The possibility to capture this range 
of functions is possible, as seen from the results in this Chapter, when an interactive 
historical and cross-sectional approach is employed. In my view, the generation of a 
historically grounded analysis of ideology may enhance the possibilities to successfully 
link the different levels of operation (political actors, political parties and their 
institutional role) of these types of fuzzy concepts, which are so relevant to the 
discipline.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
TIMING AND SEQUENCING IN LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE:  
THE ELECTORAL CYCLE AND THE PROCEDURAL DESIGN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“As organizations of collective 
decision making, legislatures operate 
continuously and interactively in two 
domains of choice: procedure and 
policy”122 
 
                                                
122 Krehbiel, K. (1991: 15, italics in original).  
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- Introduction 
 
 
Time is of the essence for political actors when delivering policy, be it policy 
change or status quo. As a key exogenous factor to policy-making, time has been seen as a 
powerful device in determining political behavior. From election pressure to the efficient 
resolution of social problems, time and timing affect the structure of incentives and 
disincentives present in the policy preferences of legislators and Presidents.  
If timing is so relevant for political activity, we know relatively little about the 
particular effects of the varying pressures it exerts. We have fragmentary information about 
the effects of the electoral cycle (Mayhew, 1974; Shugart, 1995) on different aspects of the 
policy-making process123 or on the rhythm of political reform and constitutional 
amendment after a change of regime has taken place (Sustein, 2003).  
More so than in other areas of knowledge, there is scarce information about the 
pressures of the endogenous timing and the sequencing of legislative procedures impose on 
political actors. The procedural design of the legislative process sets explicit deadlines for 
legislative production, establishing the minimum and  maximum amount of time available 
to get a bill passed/rejected/amended, etc. Phenomena such as delaying or speeding up a 
bill can be seen, then, as tools of agenda control, relatively available to political actors. The 
use of emergency procedures or the pre-selection of a committee to emit a dictum on a bill 
may well be manifestations of agenda control in this very sense, as seen in Chapter 4. 
However, a more specific analysis of the effects of time is possible, and is developed in this 
Chapter.   
The strategic use of time is addressed here as both an endogenous and an 
exogenous factor affecting the degree of aggregation of interests in policy. It is a factor 
endogenous to the procedural design of the legislative process when considering the 
deadlines regulated by internal proceedings, that is, when a legal document124 establishing 
the procedures to pass a bill determines the number of days each institutional unit 
processing the bill may use. It is an exogenous factor to the legislative process when 
considering the electoral cycle.   
                                                
123 The focus has traditionally attended more to the effects of time pressure from the electoral cycle on internal 
characteristics of parties, such as higher or lower cohesion or discipline, and on reelection pressures, since Mayhew’s work 
‘the electoral connection’. 
124 Sometimes it is the Constitution and sometimes it is the internal proceedings of parliamentary procedures regulating 
these specific details of the legislative process.  
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The point of departure of this Chapter is that legislative production is responsive to 
the effect of sequencing and timing and may therefore change quantitatively, qualitatively 
or both. The specific question is how does it change, what are the varying effects on each 
institutional unit when processing a bill and whether these varying effects depend on who 
proposes the bill. The first question constitutes a descriptive effort and will settle the 
parameters of variation across the cases and across political actors. The second question 
addresses the strong belief in the literature on legislative politics that once a bill has passed 
the committee dictum, the floor vote is a mere formality. Any delay would thus be 
expected at the pre-floor stages. The second section then presents more detailed 
hypotheses regarding how strategic behavior takes place and how cooperative and non-
cooperative institutional settings affect these phenomena, such as size of committee and 
assignment rules of bills to committees. Whether a bill is treated more speedily, or generally 
more efficiently, when it is initiated by the Executive or by the majority party in Congress 
may be a key explanatory factor of why legislatures are seen as marginal institutions, and as 
to what degree legislative procedures are susceptible to be used arbitrarily or discretionally 
(Cheibub and Limongi, 2002).   
The Chapter further addresses the question of whether a focus on formal 
procedures, as part of the literature on institutional design tends to, is incomplete in nature 
due to relevant, more informal and subtle resources that also affect the quality of the 
decision-making process, like the strategic use of time.   
The Chapter is organized as follows. First, I elaborate on the importance of 
analyzing time to get legislation passed, highlighting the nature of my research question in 
relation to the existing broad literature on agenda control. Second, I develop contrasting 
models that allow me test for the two types of effects: external timing and internal 
sequencing. Third, I analyze both case-specific and comparative patterns, and finally draw 
conclusions on the relevance of time for a better understanding of the strategic behavior of 
political actors in the decision-making process.  
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- The nature of the research question 
 
Time, as information, is a key good affecting the process of policy-making which in 
turn substantially affects political outcomes (whether stability, good public policy or the 
legitimacy of the institutions). Whereas time is a relatively unexplored phenomenon (but 
see Krutz, 2001; Binder and Malztman, 2002; and Cheibub and Limongi, 2000), 
information is a field that has gained the status of a new approach to legislative politics 
(Krehbiel, 1991; Lupia and McCubbins, 1994; Bimber, 1991; Sabatier and Whiteman, 
1985). In this context, models of flows of information illustrate arguments of the 
importance of coordination (mainly through specialization) in institutions of collective 
decision-making and the gains-from-trade perspective has dominated the research agenda.  
The convergence between perspectives on information and the existing works on 
the effects of time on legislative production springs from the fact that both empirical 
analyses attempt to account for more subtle tools of the procedural design that strongly 
affect political outcomes. Thus, the focus is empirical and consequential in its attention to 
micro aspects of the procedural design that affect overall legislative performance.  
The three studies in the literature closest to that developed in this Chapter are 
Krutz (2001), Binder and Maltzman (2002) and Cheibub and Limongi (2000). All make a 
claim regarding the comparative delay that some legislative initiatives suffer as compared to 
others.  
Binder and Maltzman (2002) analyze the collective (majority party in Congress) and 
individual (ideological divergences) reasons for senatorial delay in confirming federal judge 
nominations in the U.S. They find that mainly contextual factors such as divided 
government and the closeness of the end of the term help in explaining why “interested 
senators are quick to exploit the rules in pursuit of their agendas” (p.197). As an example 
of systematic strategic behavior by the majority party in Congress in a historical 
perspective, the conclusion is that exploiting procedurally guaranteed rights responds to 
clear sets of incentives. These may vary from leaving the nominee in a decisional limbo to 
the strategic passage of nominees supporting a particular political agenda.  
A similar conclusion is reached by Krutz (2001) in his assessment of omnibus 
legislation. This type of legislation is “a tactic by which unification of diverse measures 
within a single large bill occurs” (p.210) and the claim of the author is that it constitutes a 
key way to control the agenda since these type of bills are more likely to be passed, and 
with less amendments than any ordinary bill. This is a reasonable hypothesis in that 
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omnibus legislating “alters the time-honored legislative process. Omnibus packages are 
often fast-tracked through committees with less consideration than typical bills” (p. 210). 
In addition to this change in the timing of the legislative process of approval, it also allows 
for the strategic behavior of actors particularly when they anticipate that an omnibus bill is 
likely to succeed, namely: it will discourage any presidential veto, it has distributive (non 
pork-barrel) effects, it is likely to be efficient in the face of tight budgetary circumstances 
and it will override potential minority obstructionism. In Krutz’s hypotheses, contextual 
factors and procedural rules interact to produce comparative advantages to some political 
actors over others, as we will model in this Chapter.  
Krutz (2001) sheds further light on the characteristics of the legislative scenario 
when strategic behavior makes most the sense: if the majority party is homogeneous and 
cohesive and the minority parties are heterogeneous, omnibus legislation will be very likely 
to succeed. The opposite also holds. These refined specifications of the legislative scenario 
effect are also likely to prevail when assessing the effects of time on legislative production 
and agenda control, as developed in this Chapter.  
Finally, Cheibub and Limongi also suggest an institutional hypothesis, but assign a 
central explanatory role to the individual actions of legislators in their analysis of the 
differences in bill approval times depending on who enacts the bill in the Brazilian 
Congress, also in synchronic perspective. The delay of the bills enacted by legislators as 
compared to Executive bills “is also institutional, although of a diverse nature. (…) While 
the judiciary and the executive sponsor bills as institutional agents, the members of the 
legislative propose bills individually” (2000: 80). Such a loss of efficiency, they argue, in the 
selection of bills that will pass on to the process of approval is nonetheless in favor of a 
more deliberative role for the Congress in this country. Again, the tradeoff between 
efficiency and the costs of consensus (via deliberation) in the legislative arena is presented 
as one that allows other political actors to take advantage of such time losses to impose 
their political agenda (as do the Executive or the Judiciary, in their article).  
At a more theoretical level, the articles edited by Santiso and Schedler (1998, 
International Political Science Review, Issue Democracy and Time) underscore the importance of 
including time as a key explanatory variable of democratic outcomes. In particular, the 
perspective adopted by the editors’ opening article underscore that “time rules freeze 
structures of power and time rules regulate trade-offs”, with explicit reference to the 
procedural design of legislatures. The actions regulated through time and deadlines affect 
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the “opposition time”, as the authors label it, and hence the amount of time available to 
actors to influence, amend, resolve or create conflict over legislation125.  
This paper addresses such explanatory variables by attempting to predict how 
responsive legislative production is to external timing (electoral cycle) and to internal 
sequencing (deadlines defined by the procedural design of the legislative process). In the 
next Section, I detail the specific data employed for this analysis, and specify the dependent 
and independent variables and the hypotheses which may be tested for the four countries 
under analysis.  
- Available data 
 
The available data contain precise information about timing and sequencing as 
defined in the previous sections. Concerning the electoral cycle, two variables may be 
drawn directly from previous analyses in this thesis, one continuous for each year of the 
term (four in three countries and five in Panama) and a second dummy for the honeymoon 
effect (splitting the first half of the term and the last, when elections are closer).  
As seen in Chapter 3, and in line with existing studies on legislative production 
(Lanzaro et alia, 2000), we know that the beginning of a legislative term is the most 
productive one, while at the end of the term the volume of legislative production 
substantially and systematically decreases. This difference has linked to two interrelated 
factors: first, renewed legislatures and presidents do have a clear political agenda to carry 
out when they take office, which diminishes as time passes by, or equivalently in 
association to political erosion. Second, the next elections are still far away and a large 
volume of legislation, with less budget implications, is in place, whereas when elections are 
closer (end of term), politicians running for re-election will seek to approve more 
important legislation with greater budgetary implications and the volume is therefore lower. 
There is, hence, a symbiosis between quantitative and qualitative differences which depend 
on the exogenous effect of time via the electoral cycle, which will be addressed in this 
Chapter.  
The second dependent variable is the number of days that a bill spends in each sub-
unit of the legislative process, which captures sequencing. In this way, the differences in the 
internal sequencing of legislative approval may be attributed to ‘administrative 
                                                
125 As Santiso and Schedler put it: “time is scarce, delays are costly, and decisions have to be taken. (…) In this sense, time 
rules act as mediators in the conflict between, in Niklas Luhmann’s terms, substantive concerns and social concerns” 
(1998: 10).  
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inefficiencies’ or political factors more clearly. The ‘administrative inefficiencies’ apply if a 
significant and systematic time delay is observed in the pre-committee stages 
(corresponding to the time the bill spends in the administrative secretariat being registered 
and photocopied, for instance). The political factors may be diverse and affect how long 
each bill takes after the committee emits a dictum to get to the floor, or the time it spends 
from the first to the last debate on the floor126.  
The independent variables stem from four explanatory sources: (1) institutional 
endogenous variables; (2) institutional exogenous variables; (3) constitutional design 
variables, and (4) the policy characteristics of the bill. Table 1 below displays the number of 
variables within each subgroup of explanatory variables and briefly describes the type of 
variable and level of aggregation. The objective in including these explanatory variables is 
to run an explicit theory test, as is clear from the specific hypotheses attached to each set of 
factors, which are explained below the table.  
Table  46.  Independent  var iab le s :  nature  o f  the  var iab le s  and l eve l  o f  aggrega t ion 
Nature of 
variable 
Independent variable Level of 
aggregation 
Institutional 
endogenous 
Recocomi: Common coding of committee system depending on 
whether they deal with “political reform issues”, “economic issues”, 
“infrastructures” or “socio-cultural issues” 
Bill 
Size: percentage of seats of majority party in Congress 
Blocks: number of blocks in Congress 
Country 
Sesion, durgence, dpriori: dummy for whether an emergency procedure 
is employed to pass the bill or not (employed in Chapter 4 as 
dependent variables) 
Bill 
Sizecomi: Size of the committee system, that is, number of deputies in 
each committee  
Bill 
Majcomi: seats of majority party in each committee Bill 
Comieff: committee efficiency in temporal terms (number of days each 
committee as classified in the four broad policy areas spends to emit a 
dictum on each bill) 
Bill  
Institutional 
exogenous 
1) Electoral 
system 
Biaselec: biasing effect due to the electoral system in favor of big 
parties (large for Guatemala and Panama; small for Honduras and 
Costa Rica)  
Country 
Competition: type of electoral competition: centripetal (Honduras and 
Panama) and centrifugal (Guatemala and Costa Rica)  
Country 
2) Party system  Age: average age of the party system Country 
Polariz: index of polarization following Coppedge (1998), [Appendix 
4.1.] 
Country 
Constitutional 
design variables 
Executive authority: dummy for authority of the Executive based on 
two key constitutional design issues: Executive has total and partial 
veto power and has strong decree power (i.e., a law that is immediately 
effective without Congress ratification) (value zero for Costa Rica and 
Guatemala, and value one for Honduras and Panama) 
Country 
Executive independence: dummy for independence of Executive based 
on three strong prerogatives of this actor vis-à-vis the Legislative 
branch: Executive has authority to dissolve Congress; the legislature 
Country 
                                                
126 See Appendix 2 for a visual approach to the legislative process of approval in the four countries under analysis.  
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cannot impeach the President; Executive can call for referenda directly 
without the ratification of Congress  
(value zero for Costa Rica and Panama, value one for Honduras and 
Guatemala) 
Policy 
characteristics 
Scope: scope of bill following Di Palma (1976)  Bill 
Ecocomi: dummy for whether the bill was assessed by an committee 
for economic issues (proxy to capture whether the bill entails 
spending) 
Bill 
 
The institutional endogenous variables attempt to capture whether strategic 
behavior by political actors is endogeneized, that is, whether political actors use their 
informational advantages over procedures, and the discretionary spaces within them, to 
pursue agenda control. This hypothesis follows the informational approach to legislative 
politics (Krehbiel, 1991).  
The institutional exogenous pays homage to theories claiming that environment 
matters more than decision-making style or the incentives of individual politicians. 
Electoral systems as shaping party systems, and party systems’ characteristics as shaping 
degrees of discipline, have been seen as key causal covariates explaining the behavior of 
both legislators and Executives. Two hypotheses have remained remarkably stable in this 
literature, and will be addressed in this work. First, politicians are more worried about their 
own survival under a stringent electoral system (with restricted or forbidden reelection and 
with a large biasing effect in favor of larger parties). When this is the case, actors will 
attempt to pursue agenda control in order to monopolize resources for their own personal 
benefit (corruption), or foster the loyalties of targeted social groups in order to favor the 
success of the party (patronage). 
The second hypothesis is that more polarized and fragmented legislative scenarios, 
seen as a consequence of the characteristics of the electoral system and of the historical 
pattern of electoral competition between political parties, is a fostering variable of 
Executive dominance. The argument is that Executives may anticipate the degree of 
conflict on the floor, as was developed theoretically in Chapter 4.   
Finally, I include the policy characteristics of the bills analyzed in order to 
capture single and interactive effects of the time of approval as dependent on the 
qualitative content (scope) of each bill. The hypothesis is that a policy is more likely to 
trigger conflict on the floor when it involves pork-barreling (or benefits to localized 
social groups, as the micro-sectional coding attempts to capture) and when it involves 
spending (which reflects competition for public resources).  
As is well-known, theory testing is not an easy task, particularly when 
endogeneity is present. I argue here that the costs of endogeneity are unavoidable if the 
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effects of institutional rules and actors’ incentives are to be understood in an interrelated 
fashion. Because institutional rules affect institutional outputs, actors’ incentives are 
institutionally determined, and the effects of both explain a particular aspect of 
institutional performance. Endogeneity is present here from the very theoretical 
approach, as is common in neo-institutional analysis. I will suggest some possible 
methodological solutions to this problem, arguing however that the cost-benefit balance 
is skewed – especially in terms of increasing complexity and sophistication, i.e. on the 
side of the costs. Next, I proceed with the models, which once more entail some 
complexity given the relatively recent availability of analytical tools to capture the 
effects of time on political realities (Box-Steffensmeier et alia, 1997).   
- The models 
 
In this Section, I first explore the data available (Section 4.1), which includes (1) a 
detection of sample biases; (2) tests of the distributional properties of the dependent 
variables; and (3) a detection of strong correlations between the independent variables, 
which is generally problematic for the robustness of the models. Then I proceed with the 
modeling of the pooled data on legislation from the four Central American countries under 
analysis (Section 4.2).  
4.1.) - EXPLORING THE DATA: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC PATTERNS  
 
The detection of sample biases and distributional properties both form part of the 
exploration of the dependent variables. The former is relevant to facilitate the subsequent 
modeling effort. The latter is relevant due to the importance for survival analysis of 
assuming a priori distributions to fit the data, which may be based on theoretical or 
empirical reasons (Box-Steffensmeier et alia, 1997). The dependent variables are total time 
of approval for the analysis of the effects of the internal sequencing of the legislative 
process of approval, along with the dummy for the electoral cycle capturing the 
honeymoon effect for the analysis of the exogenous timing.  
Table 2 below displays the results of these first exploratory analyses.  
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Table  47.  Explor ing  sample  b iases  and d is t r ibut iona l  proper t i e s  o f  the  dependent  var iab le s127 
Exploring… COSTA RICA HONDURAS GUATEMALA PANAMA 
Frequencies and sample properties 
Total time of 
approval  
n=362 
Missing=46 
Mean=627 
Median=481 
Mode=91 
Maximum=4767 
n=884 
Missing=3 
Mean=91 
Median=40 
Mode=7 
Maximum=1394 
n=269 
Missing=166 
Mean=99 
Median=43 
Mode=28 
Maximum=1328 
n=328 
Missing=7 
Mean=86 
Median=70 
Mode=72 
Maximum=379 
Electoral cycle 
(dummy for 
honeymoon effect)  
N=391 
Missing=17 
Early term=37% 
Last years=59% 
N=887 
Missing=0 
Early term=62% 
Last years=38% 
N=432 
Missing=3 
Early term=63% 
Last years=36% 
N=335 
Missing=0 
Early term=43% 
Last years=57% 
Distributional properties128 (pooled data of the four countries) 
Total time of 
approval 
Lognormal 
Weibull 
 
The only remarkable sample bias is for the case of Guatemala on the first dependent 
variable, total time of approval, with a very large number of missing cases and a skewed 
distribution, this latter characteristic holding for all the countries under the analysis. The 
problem of imputing a mean value or, in general, a single value for all missing cases for 
which no information on whether they are structurally missing, missing at random or not, 
has been recently discussed in the literature and new methodologies for more accurate 
imputation techniques are beginning to appear in the software (see Royston, 2004). 
However, for the sake of making the use of similar imputation techniques for missing 
values for all country samples and thereby their employment thereafter in the pooled 
dataset possible, I imputed the median value for the first dependent variable of each 
country sample129. Regarding the second dependent variable, the electoral cycle, the 
exploratory analysis delivers a satisfactory degree of variation with no particular distortions 
for the further analysis.  
With regard to the distributional tests carried out for the time-related variables, we can 
see that the best strategy is not to parameterize at the first instance the baseline hazard 
(using the Cox PH model) and then proceed with a Weibull specification, as is a common 
strategy for survival modeling.   
                                                
127 The Table includes only the numeric information, but the visual approaches to these explorations can be found in 
Appendices 6.1 and 6.2.  
128 Here, I carried out visual tests employing only the distributions used in survival analysis for continuous time (total time 
of approval), that is, Weibull, Log-logistic, Log-Normal and Generalized Gamma (for parametric models), see Jenkins, 
2004.  
129 For such disperse (spread and skewed) distributions, the median is a more accurate indicator of the distributional 
characteristics than the mean. This is the case for the variable total time of approval in all four countries under analysis: 
for Costa Rica, whereas the mean is 627 days, the median is 481 days; for Honduras, the mean is 91 days whereas the 
median is 40 days; for Guatemala, mean is 99 days and median is 43, and last, for Panama, the mean is 86 days and the 
median is 70. In sum, the median appears as a less biased indicator of the distributional properties (with a large number of 
cases concentrated in both the lower and the upper values of the variable).  
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The second part of this exploratory analysis concerns the independent variables. 
Bivariate tests have been performed to detect the possible interactive effects or problematic 
large correlations between these, as they may cause problems for the robustness of the 
further models. The most worrying set of variables, due to the large collinearities between 
them, are the institutional exogenous ones: as expected, the biasing effect of the electoral 
system (which simply subtracts the effective number of electoral parties from the legislative 
equivalent), district magnitude, and the index of polarization are significantly and highly 
correlated (all above 50% association). Further, the constitutional design variables are also 
moderately correlated (significantly, 22% of the variation is shared between Executive 
independence and Executive authority). Surprisingly enough, however, we find that the 
endogenous institutional variables included in this work are significantly correlated but the 
size of their correlations is very low, implying an advantage for their simultaneous inclusion 
in the same equation.  
Pertaining to the data exploration, a final descriptive piece of information is needed 
with regard to all the time-varying potential covariates present in the data: on average, each 
bill took on average 191 days to be approved (with a very large dispersion, as seen above), 
of which 11% of the time was spent on the floor, 17% being administratively processed 
within Congress (archived and photocopied, for instance) and a remarkable 41% of the 
time in committee. This pattern supports the importance of including institutional 
endogenous variables to explain the differential use of time by different political actors. In 
effect, these descriptive figures indicate that procedural tools, especially the committee 
system, are central to explaining agenda control. In particular, the figures above suggest an 
empirical support for the informational approach: if the committee is the key procedural 
unit where bargaining takes place as a result large amount of time bills pass there as 
compared with the total time of approval, then political actors need to develop resources in 
order to control this decisional gate. The variables efficiency, size of committees and size 
of majority party within committees attempt to capture precisely this, that is whether the 
informational advantages of majority actors matter.   
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4.2.) - MODELING THE DATA: POOLED LEGISLATION OF FOUR CENTRAL 
AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
“Political time cannot be separated from the 
strategic interaction between actors. It is almost never 
purely chronological and absolute – although self-chosen or 
externally-imposed deadlines can have a quite independent 
effect – but usually and inextricably linked to the time 
preferences, expectations, anticipations, delayed 
gratifications, aims for the future of one’s allies and 
opponents”130 
 
 
Two models are constructed in this Section: the first addresses the differential volume 
of legislative production as responsive to the electoral cycle, and the second addresses the 
sequencing of the legislative process of approval. For the dependent variable exogenous 
timing (electoral cycle) I display the best fitting model131 below:  
Table  48.  Log i t  mode l  fo r  dependent  var iab le  e l e c tora l  cy c l e ,  Poo l ed  data 
Independent variables Coefficients Marginal effect in 
dependent variable 
Model goodness of fit 
measures 
Constant 6,17 - LL intercept= - 2878 
LL full model= - 2721 
Chi-square= 249.8 
BIC intercept= - 29513 
BIC full model= - 247 
%Correctly class= 62% 
Sensitivity= 44% 
Specificity= 75% 
p-value= .000 
n=4199 
Adj R square= .12 
Dummy bill is urgent-
normal 
.57*** .14 
Number of blocks in 
Congress 
-.33*** -.08 
Average magnitude of 
districts 
-.52*** -.13132 
Scope of bill (Di Palma) .11*** .027 
Time of bill in the floor .005*** .001 
Executive independence -.64*** -.16 
Size of committee .046* .01 
Seats of majority party in 
committee 
-.03*** -.01 
Notes: logit model with frequency weights of variable country; coefficients reported.  
*** significant at the 0.01 level of confidence; ** at the 0.05; * at the 0.10.  
 
The best fitting model for the electoral cycle reveals that the central explanatory 
variables for differences in legislative production are exogenous: particularly, the average 
district magnitude and executive independence as defined constitutionally. The most 
surprising result is that the policy characteristics of the bill matter relatively little, since 
                                                
130 Schmitter and Santiso, 1998: 72.  
131 I already discussed the criteria for model selection and the concept of best fitting model in Chapter 4 (footnote 16 in 
that Chapter). Here, I again adopt the same criterion, i.e. not focusing exclusively on the criteria of statistical significance 
but rather on the theoretical value of the results. The comparison among different models (following the theory testing 
objective of comparing between only-endogenous, only-exogenous and informational factors) is gathered in Appendix. 
6.3.  
132 Given that the electoral system variables are highly correlated, I plugged in different equations the other ones in order 
to avoid multicollinearity. With the same model specification as above and substituting only the district magnitude by the 
biasing effect of the electoral system (the difference between the effective number of electoral parties and the legislative 
equivalent), the marginal effect of this variable is -.10 and, performing the same with the ballot variable, the marginal 
effect is .33. These results confirm the general pattern that the pressure of the electoral cycle affects the patterns of 
legislative production depending on the stringent or permissive effect of the electoral system, as is developed below.  
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scope (intended effects of the policy are national, sectional or micro-sectional) is significant 
and positive but the size of the effect is very limited. This finding partially refutes the 
previous results in Lanzaro (2000) and in Shugart and Carey (1992), who argue that a 
differential national versus parochial policy-making process is in place for Executives and 
legislatures respectively.  
In essence, the gross differences produced by the electoral cycle in legislative 
production are due to whether the electoral system is more or less stringent: a stronger 
biasing effect of the electoral system in favor of big parties and a smaller average districts’ 
magnitude (which contributes to the biasing effect substantially) affects the behavior of 
actors significantly with regard to the legislative initiatives they present. Hence, the 
hypothesis that political actors, preoccupied for their own position in the political system, 
seek to manage the political agenda strategically throughout their term of office in order to 
assure either resources for their pockets or to target social groups that may support the 
party holds empirically for these countries. That is: parties manage their political resources 
on their own benefit, this is true of stringent electoral systems, and time pressure from the 
electoral cycle is a central drive in generating this pattern.  
The second noteworthy result from above is that it predicts moderately better the 
negative value of the dependent variable, that is, legislative production during the two first 
years of the term, rather than the last (specificity is 62%). This fact indicates that the 
characteristics of the electoral systems serve as good explanatory factors for typical 
legislative production during the honeymoon term. Essentially, this finding is in line with 
the previous findings (specifically in Chapters 3 and 4) that there is a decrease in support 
for the Executive agenda in the legislature towards the end of the term, a phenomenon 
analyzed separately earlier on in the thesis.  
Third and last, the results display very significant variables with very small coefficients, 
indicating that when the variables appear together there is a systematic explanatory effect, 
but that the size of each individual variable is limited. In fact, the full explanatory capacity 
of the model is moderate, despite the fact that this is the best fitting model for this data 
and for this sample. Once more, this may derive from a lack of knowledge, and therefore a 
capacity to include, interactive effects between the variables, which is discussed in the 
conclusions of this Chapter.  
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For the second dependent variable, the effects of the internal sequencing of the 
legislative process of approval, I employ survival analysis modeling133. Survival analysis, of 
relatively recent application in the discipline, has mainly been employed to assess the 
survival rates of cabinets in a historical perspective (Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999) and to 
model leadership or government duration (Bienen and Van der Walle, 1992; McCarty and 
Razaghian, 1999). Survival analysis requires a priori assumptions about the risk of the 
phenomenon under study which are not easy to make: choosing between distributional 
forms and between parameterized or non-parameterized models is required here. In the 
following models, I test both semi-parametric specifications (with the baseline hazard not 
parametric and the covariates parametric134, or the Cox Proportional Hazards Model, 
quoted below as Cox PH) and parametric ones (using the Weibull distribution parameters). 
The results of these competing models follow:  
Table  49.  Compet ing  mode l s :  surv iva l  ana lys i s  o f  l e g i s la t ion in  four  Centra l  Amer i can countr i e s 
Explanatory 
variables 
Only endogenous 
variables, Cox PH 
Only exogenous 
variables, Cox PH 
Mixed best fitting 
model, Cox PH 
Model with 
Weibull 
specification   
Non time-varying covariates 
Bill is budget bill 1.3 (.26) *** - 1.1 (.12) ** 1.2 (.18) *** 
Polarization .98 (-.01)*** - 1.04 (.041) *** - 
Scope of bill 1.0 (.001) - 1.03 (.03) - 
Size of committee .93 (-.07)*** - 1.1 (.12) *** - 
Seats of majority 
party in 
committees 
.90 (-.002) - - - 
Committee 
efficiency 
.90 (-.001)*** - .99 (.051) *** - 
Executive or 
Legislative 
initiative 
- .84 (-.17) - 1.3 (.23) *** 
Exe initiative and 
electoral cycle 
- 1.03 (.03) - - 
Executive 
independence 
- 2.44 (.90)*** 8.12 (2.09) *** 2.7 (.98) *** 
Districts’ 
magnitude 
- .78 (-.24)*** .85 (-.16) *** .71 (-.34) *** 
Average age of 
party system 
- 1.0 (.009)*** - - 
Electoral cycle - .98 (-.018) - - 
Type of 
committee in 
broad policy area 
- - 1.05 (.051) * - 
                                                
133 The essence of these models is to capture the effects of time-varying dependent variables, as it is the case in this 
Chapter. The necessity of these models derives, therefore, from the impossibility to apply easier or simpler models to the 
object of analysis, for reasons well-specified in Box-Steffensmeier et alia (1997).  
134 The parameterization of the covariates simply implies that the model assumes a distribution with a specific number of 
parameters that by construction are of a determinate shape. In turn, not parameterizing the covariates implies these are 
free to vary and adopt a shape as close as possible to the real distribution of the data.   
Further, in these models, the baseline hazard is equivalent to the constant in any other model, hence it is only descriptive 
of where the assumed distribution crosses the axis of origin, i.e. it is usually of no interpretative value.  
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Biasing effect of 
electoral system 
- - - .84 (-.16) 
Time-varying covariates 
Time in floor 1 (2.07e-07) .90 (-4.38e-07) - - 
Time in 
committee 
1 (7.3e-07)*** .90 (-9.65e-08)*** - - 
‘Administrative 
time’ 
.90 (-1.87e-07)*** .90 (-1.21e-07)*** - - 
Goodness of fit 
Sample size 
Likelihood ratio 
(χ²) 
Log- ps likelihood 
Significance (p-
value) 
 
1661 
284.9 
-10419 
.000 
 
1951 
560.4 
-12473 
.000 
 
1664 
634.6 
-10320 
.000 
 
1719 
667 
-2758 
.000 
Model Specifications: Dependent variable is total time of bill approval (defined survival rate with respect 
to final approval).  
Cox proportional hazards models with Breslow method for ties. Hazard ratios reported and significance. 
Coefficients between parentheses. Robust estimates.  
Weibull model using default settings. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level of confidence; ** at the 0.05 level of confidence; * at the 0.10 level of 
confidence.   
 
The survival models display very significant results and deliver some remarkable 
additional pieces of information. The most surprising result is that the variables belonging 
to the endogenous institutional design of Congress, and the time-varying covariates, 
representing the sequencing structure of the legislative approval process, show no effect, 
although significantly contributing to the fit of the data. This result implies that the 
relationship between the total time of approval and the time each bill spends in committee 
or in administrative processes of Congress is evidently positive and significant, but that 
there is no strong explanatory relationship between these. A similar result appeared in 
Chapter 4 when checking for the effects of efficient committees together with the variation 
of the seats held by the majority party in these. Recalling the result under that specification, 
I concluded that the space for strategic altering of the times spent in the various processes 
internal to the legislative structure – in particular the time a bill spends in committee – was 
limited, i.e. indicating that there were significant attempts by political actors to estimate 
efficiency, but with a poor, or very general, capability to assign specific variation across 
committees. The result here, concerning the time-varying factors, is similar. The finding, 
therefore, holds as a robust result on the relative importance of endogenous factors to the 
legislative structure in determining institutional performance. The boundaries of their 
effect, specifically in relation to the effects of time-related factors, are instead set by 
exogenous factors, such as the specialized character of the bills. Hence, spaces for the 
discretional use of these procedures are very limited.  
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The most striking explanatory variable of the hazard rate for a bill (or its quick 
approval, as defined in this work) is Executive independence as defined constitutionally. 
Overall, two exogenous forces help in determining the rhythm of legislative approval: the 
first is this constitutional design attribute, Executive independence, and second come the 
characteristics of the electoral system. Again, and opposite to the findings for the previous 
model for the effect of the electoral cycle on the legislative production, a more stringent 
electoral system decreases the pace of approval of the bill. A possible hypothesis explaining 
this divergence is that party systems characterized by an electoral system which is not 
systematically biased in favor of big parties, are characterized instead by strategic behavior 
concerning the volume of legislation and the qualitative differences that these may achieve. 
In turn, in highly competitive party systems, with electoral rules biasing in favor of big 
parties, minority parties may only employ as a strategic tool of delaying legislative approval, 
via exhausting the procedurally established deadlines. This somewhat more complex 
hypothesis would clearly require not only further theoretical elaboration but also more data 
which is currently unavailable.  
In addition to these two clear results, another two new pieces of information with 
regard to the effects of time on the approval of legislation were found: (1) first, whether the 
bill involves spending significantly contributes to explaining its quick approval. This fact 
implies that majority parties with access to government resources are interested in speeding 
up the rhythm of legislative approval. It would be necessary here to test for the 
spuriousness of this result, which once more demands the collection of more data, or the 
refinement of the theoretical approach. Finally, with regard to the time-varying covariates, 
the results confirm the hypothesis of the informational approach to legislative politics135 
given that the only significant variables are those related to administrative and committee 
time. This fact implies that the time the bill spends on the floor is practically a formality 
and supports the hypothesis that bargaining over and amendment of the bills is made 
during the pre-floor stages.  
In sum, the results of this work are in line with the results drawn by Cheibub and 
Limongi (2000, 2002) for the Brazilian Congress. Essentially, these authors argue that the 
inclusion of constitutional rules enlightens the analysis of institutional performance (as 
here, the most stable and important result is that Executive independence determines 
                                                
135 This support is nonetheless partial, given that the other central variables which were included for this theory test 
mainly related to the characteristics of the committee system were significant but showed no effect on the dependent 
variable. In order to gain definitive support, or revision of the hypotheses provided by the approach, further elaboration 
and refinement of the variables is needed.  
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variation on the effects of time on legislative approval), in particular if these are understood 
in combination with the endogenous spaces for the discretional use of the rules.  
Furthermore, despite the fact that the models are not comparable, since they do not 
share equivalent distributional assumptions, both display very significant results, albeit with 
the drawback that few of the variables are significant individually. This fact indicates that 
the specification and inclusion of interactive variables has been largely under-explored in 
the analysis of the effects of time on institutional dynamics. In fact, my suspicion is that 
this lack of a well-developed and accurate method for the inclusion of interactive effects in 
complex institutional analyses stems not only from the mixture of institutional levels of 
operation, as insisted in this thesis and according to Diermeier and Krehbiel (2003). In 
addition, there is a lack of a general assessment of the fact that the balance between 
determinacy and indeterminacy in the discipline may well be a consequence of the omission 
of the temporal dimension in the study of politics, as Almond and Genco (1977) 
emphasized in their famous article on “clouds, clocks and the study of politics”. This point is also 
important for the study of democratic rule in view of everyday politics, as I have attempted 
to generate here, and appears as a central conclusion in the following last Section of this 
Chapter.  
 
- Conclusions 
“The study of democratization, 
more than most fields of 
comparative political inquiry, 
should be sensitive to the time 
factor. When something happens, as 
well as in what order and with what 
rhythm, can be even more 
important in determining the 
outcome than whether something 
happens or what happens”136  
 
The conclusions of this Chapter are brief. I will remark on two new findings which 
represent some specific refinements to the findings from previous Chapters, and on two 
relatively innovative methodological and substantive conclusions arising from the theory 
testing effort carried out here.  
The first remarkable result is that, despite the low variation present in the data 
regarding the exogenous institutional variables, these have displayed a highly significant and 
                                                
136 Schmitter and Santiso (1998: 69, italics in original).  
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moderately sized effect in both models on the effects of time on legislative approval. In 
particular, variation from Executive independence, which only had shown significance in 
the models on the employment of extraordinary legislative sessions, constitutes the central 
explanatory drive of the rhythm of legislative approval. This finding gives partial credit to 
the original hypothesis of the debate in terms of its emphasis of constitutional design. 
However, here I have added of more qualitative content to the range of constitutional rules 
in order to test for their impact on legislative approval. In particular, for the construction 
of the variable regarding Executive independence I took into account one important source 
of authority (the ability to hold referenda without legislative ratification) and two important 
sources of mutual ties between the branches (the threat of dissolution and impeachment). 
Therefore, as I have remarked, the result constitutes only a partial endorsement since the 
constitutional rules included do not only look at the electoral devices determining the origin 
of the branches. Instead, as was insisted in Chapter 2, I have privileged the inclusion not 
only of individual rules, which affect specific capabilities to power and authority of political 
actors, but also the ties between the branches, as of relevant character for determining 
inter-branch dynamics. Here, such an emphasis has in fact delivered the expected 
relationship, with a positive independent impact.  
The second result is that the results of this Chapter support the previous bulk of 
empirical evidence from country-specific studies (as in Lanzaro et alia, 2000, for Uruguay, 
and Cheibub and Limongi, 2000, for Brazil) but adds a comparative perspective. As in 
previous Chapters, I have found that the format of the party system is substantially related 
to patterns of legislative production, in this case the pace of legislative approval. The 
impact of the party system format may only be understood in a comparative perspective. In 
addition to this general claim in favor of producing more comparative analysis in terms of 
the substantive contribution it may bring, the specific finding is that the characteristics of 
electoral rules more broadly determine the dynamics between the branches and between 
the parties than exclusively through their impact at the time of elections. In this Chapter, 
the characteristics of electoral rules have contributed to explaining the effects of the 
electoral cycle on the rhythm of legislative approval, but not of internal sequencing.  
With regard to the two methodological and substantive findings, the first refers to the 
analytical innovation brought by the employment of models which require a priori 
assumptions. This type of analysis may only deliver good theoretical results if those a priori 
assumptions are derived from sound theoretical expectations about the shape of political 
dynamics. This is a particularly difficult exercise, and the existence of more fruitful 
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dialogues between approaches – such as between exclusively theoretical and exclusively 
empirical fields of study - would probably facilitate the generation of these types of 
expectations, intuitions or benchmarks.    
The second methodological remark, which affects the substantive approach to the 
analysis of institutional performance, is that introduced in the summary of results in the 
previous Section: there is not enough knowledge on how to model the interactive 
relationships between institutional variables. There is no lack of technical possibilities, since 
the discipline is currently seeing a strong development in mixture models, which allow for 
the modeling of two distributions for a single sample. In survival models, there are the 
‘frailty models’, which include measures for capturing the potential tendency that some bills 
have to be delayed or sped up (of interest to my object of research). My proposal is that 
developing proper intuition on differential hazard rates or the potential inertia of some bills 
as compared to others would require three interrelated efforts:  
(1) First, the generation of more reliable, susceptible to comparative analysis, and 
qualitatively grounded classifications of legislation in meaningful policy areas, including 
normative judgments about the degree of aggregation of social interests in legislation.  
(2) Second, the inclusion of the more subtle tools of the decision-making process, 
susceptible to analysis under the lens of agenda control, agenda setting, or strategic 
behavior, may contribute to assessing which issues follow a specific decisional path as 
compared to other(s), or have an intrinsic ‘inertia’ or a tendency to be success/failure.  
(3) Third, the analysis of everyday politics requires the inclusion of the temporal 
dimension related to the rhythm, sequencing and timing of political dynamics in the general 
balance of the observed conflict versus consensual politics. As Schmitter and Santiso point 
out in the quotation above, it is not only important to understand what happens as a 
succession of historical facts. When and in what order facts happen may not be purely 
exogenous. It may instead be a manifestation of a structural decisional style, as found in 
this Chapter with respect to the positive correlation between Executive independence and 
the quick approval of bills.  
This Chapter is the last effort of specific theory testing in this thesis. In the last Chapter 
a summary of the relevant theoretical and empirical findings of this thesis is provided in 
light of their normative consequences for the Theory of Democracy.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS ON  
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES AND AGENDA 
CONTROL IN PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The term performance refers 
to the execution and accomplishment 
of work and also, in a connotation 
relevant to us, to the manner and 
effectiveness with which something 
fulfills an intended task”137 
 
 
                                                
137 DiPalma, G. (1976: 7).  
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1) INTRODUCTION 
 
In this Chapter I first summarize the findings of this thesis with respect to the three 
issues that have been separately analyzed on theoretical and empirical grounds: 
constitutional design, legislative procedures and agenda control in presidential systems. 
In this, I pay particular attention not only to what tools are employed to exert agenda 
control, but also to the how and when these are employed. These refined findings are 
relevant for institutional theory and its possibilities to generate more accurate 
predictions on the determinants of the political performance of institutions. The 
predictions from institutional theory also involve some normative reflection, as I defend 
and develop in the second part of this Chapter. As Haggard and McCubbins point out “a 
generation of work has shown that institutions affect various political outcomes. (…) 
Less is known about how and when institutions affect policy outcomes” (2001: 1, italics 
in original). I have followed this line of thinking in remarking that even less is known 
about the normative implications of showing how and when specific institutional 
settings matter for the short or middle-term, not to mention the long-run consequences 
of institutional settings. My approach here has emphasized the importance of assessing 
everyday politics as a middle range realm that affects the quality and type of a key 
political output: the aggregation of interests in policy-making. To that end, I have paid 
detailed attention to the characteristics of the decision-making process, with respect to 
the opportunities for political actors to act strategically, unilaterally or discretionally.  
The findings of this thesis have provided support for the idea that both contextual 
factors as path dependent factors matter in the explanation of political outcomes. These 
issues have been increasingly integrated into the institutional accounts of political 
performance, and with particular intensity in the comparative debate on forms of 
government. As I have argued in the substantive Chapters, the combination of 
exogenous and endogenous institutional tools does matter, although larger effects stem 
from the endogenous ones – such as procedural rules and the sequential design of the 
legislative process of approval – in the explanation of political performance, more 
specifically with respect to inter-branch dynamics.  
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The analysis of the endogenous tools available for agenda control, for the unilateral 
action of the Executive or for strategic behavior by legislators from the majority party, 
has been fruitful in assessing which practices become institutionalized as decisional 
styles. The question of whether the institutional structure offers systematic comparative 
advantages to privileged political actors (such as, most importantly, majority parties and 
the Executive) constitutes in this frame of analysis a middle-range set of variables that 
allow an evaluation of the decisional style and the degree to which democratic 
principles of representation are fostered or impeded.  
The central claim with respect to this type of evaluation is that the range of the 
everyday political interaction, which takes place mostly in forums of decision and 
deliberation in bodies such as legislatures, may present some variation (e.g. across 
presidential and parliamentary settings or across multiparty polarized party systems and 
consensual bipartisan settings), but that this variation derives from a systematic respect 
of two principles: (1) the effective inclusion of all political forces with representation in 
decision-making (of legislative approval) and (2) institutionalization of the means for 
solving political conflict, as a crucial element of democratic regimes. While in the 
previous Chapters I have performed a detailed empirical analysis of which elements 
affect the prospects for inclusive decision-making styles and of the ways in which 
political actors’ incentives vary according to their anticipation of policy conflict, I now 
turn to the normative level of analysis. I will pay attention to the consequences of the 
discovered variation for the evaluation of democracy and democratic institutionalization 
in the cases under analysis and, more generally, in presidential systems.  
I have employed a functional definition of performance in this thesis, in which 
political outcomes, in terms of the aggregation of interests and the representative nature 
of the legislative production, are assessed as both a result of the incentives for actors to 
behave strategically and of the tools available in the procedural design that allow for the 
discretional or unilateral use of power. The explanation, therefore, pays attention to 
endogenous tools, embedded within the institutional design, that offer comparative 
advantages to some political actors as compared to others. The evaluation is then taken 
to the normative level, which is developed here along the lines of connecting three 
crucial drives of political performance: (1) actors’ incentives, (2) rules at the macro 
(constitutional) and micro (rules of legislative approval) levels of operation, and (3) 
procedures. The normative viewpoint allows this thesis to speak more clearly to the 
 
215 
Theory of Democracy, by placing an explicit emphasis on the Tocquevillean argument 
concerning the perils of democratic regimes to degenerate into a ‘soft’ tyranny by the 
majority.  
In Section 3 I reflect on the effects of varying decisional tools and in particular on 
the majority rule in ordinary and extraordinary procedures for passing legislation. 
Section 4 then develops a possible strategy to more clearly connect the knowledge about 
the incentives of political actors, the characteristics of the procedural design and the role 
of rules in both macro and micro spheres of political action.  
The final conclusions note a central finding of this thesis regarding the tradeoff 
between representation and procedural justice, which we discovered ex novo and is 
related to a very recent emergent literature on procedural politics (see Jupille, 2004). A 
final Section is devoted to the research agenda and lines of research that directly derive 
from this thesis.  
2) FINDINGS ON CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: THE IMPORTANCE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 
 
“Rules fascinate me. How can these things that 
we ourselves devise do what they are supposed to do, 
which is precisely to prevent us from doing what we 
might otherwise do (or enable us to do what we otherwise 
couldn’t)? How, in short, can objects of human choice 
simultaneously serve as sources of human constraint?”138 
The lack of consensus in academic research about what makes a Constitution 
stable and legitimate in the view of social and political forces with representation 
(those, with capabilities to reform it) is great. Part of this lack of consensus results from 
the difficulty to measure and evaluate the effects of constitutional design on political 
outcomes. As Horrowitz reflects: “if there is a subject called constitutional design, then 
there must be alternative constitutional designs. Assuredly there are, but even now most 
constitutional drafters and reformers are, at best, only vaguely informed by anything 
resembling an articulate theory of their enterprise. (…) We also lack a consensus 
emerging from the articulate theories, whether these relate to electoral systems, 
presidential or parliamentary structure, or the costs and benefits of centralized or 
devolved power. Lack of consensus is the first obstacle” (Horrowitz, in Reynolds, A. 
(ed.), 2002: 19).   
                                                
138 Jupille, 2004: xiii.  
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This lack of consensus may be partially solved with the analytical contribution I 
presented in Chapter 2, which focuses on distinguishing between the proactive and 
reactive powers of Executives and Parliaments, and emphasizes the importance of the 
number and quality of ties between the branches for assessing inter-branch dynamics. 
This analytical distinction concerning the resources for power and authority contributes 
to capturing some of the variation neglected in analyses focusing on pure or prototypical 
forms of government. The main finding here is, hence, that the characterization of 
presidential systems by the three prototypical elements of inter-branch independence of 
origin, fixed terms of office, and the exceptional powers of Executives (Linz, 1989; 
Sartori, 1994) is a weak account of the variation possible within both the Executive and 
Legislative powers. In fact, I have found evidence that the ideal type accounted for in 
the original hypothesis by Linz (1989) was an unusual type, and falls far short of 
capturing the characteristics of presidential systems and their political performance of 
these systems. In particular, this finding is supported due to that the Executives in the 
four presidential cases studied here do possess institutional independence of origin, but 
not of survivability; hence the independence of terms of office is only partially true. 
Also, Executives possess veto and decree powers which are limited by the capabilities 
of the legislatures to oversee and constrain these (in either content or time). Third, the 
exclusive jurisdictional areas of enactment of the Executive (such as the budget, 
importantly) must also be submitted to legislative amendment, after which a veto may 
not be employed (thereby, counterbalancing the first-mover advantage of the Executive 
in this policy area).  
The bottom-line is that the original hypothesis was largely blind to the actually 
existing resources of power and authority of legislatures. What determines inter-branch 
dynamics is not only what actors can do, but what they are actually prepared to do with 
the constitutionally provided resources of power and authority. In this point, my 
findings show that combining a de jure and a de facto analysis enhances the possibilities 
to understand inter-branch dynamics, as well as to make predictions about when and 
how Executive dominance of the agenda is likely to prevail.  
Secondly, I have shown that while there is relatively little variation found among 
the Executives’ resources of power and authority in the presidential systems under 
analysis, there is a variation among the Legislative branches, judging from the 
constitutional rules. Legislatures are far from being marginal actors, they are instead 
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central gears of the political process. Two main sources of power determine the relative 
strength of the legislatures in the cases under analysis: the exclusive areas of legislative 
introduction in relevant policy areas (specifically on constitutional reform and the 
power to call referenda) and oversight capabilities on the Executive and the cabinet.  
The pieces of information important for a complete analysis of constitutional 
design are of two types: (1) the degree to which political actors may make use of 
strategic threats on each other’s survivability (degree of institutional independence) and 
(2) to what extent political actors (in this case, the branches of government) need to seek 
consensus to ensure their preferences. Although these two points have shown relevance 
in the analysis of constitutional design, there is evidence from my empirical analysis 
that any general model of macro-institutional rules lacks accuracy unless attention is 
also paid to the path-dependent effects of constitutional choice. This point is basically 
derived from the recognition that political will plays a role in determining the effects 
constitutional rules have on institutional performance. The theoretical point is closely 
related to the view that the way political actors have interacted historically – both in 
solving political conflict and in choosing a model of institutional design, with its 
associated trade-offs – matters in the long-term for the prospects of democratic rule. The 
importance of constitutional choice is precisely a reflection of this theoretical point: the 
strong weight of the past in the present is manifested through the path-dependence of 
the past constitutional choice in present institutional practices and outcomes.  
Therefore, my analytical proposal in order to develop a complete and 
comparative analysis of constitutional design is to combine a historical institutional 
approach with a forma institutional one. The former allows the inclusion of the type of 
interaction between political actors across time – the varying political will to cooperate 
or not – while the latter allows an understanding of the preferences of political actors 
with respect to the specific characteristics of each constitutional choice. In their 
common contribution, we can thus better understand why and where there are present 
embedded advantages within constitutional rules which offer opportunities to some 
political actors to behave strategically, undertake unilateral action, or employ the 
discretional use of power.  
Thirdly, I have also found that Executives employ their constitutionally provided 
powers only when they have exhausted other possible, and more subtle, devices for 
triggering support for their own legislative proposals. Specifically, Executives employ 
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extraordinary legislative sessions (as an exclusive power of this branch) and the 
alteration of the sequential design of the process of legislative approval (by appealing 
for the urgent status of a bill) when there is scarce support in the legislature (higher 
fragmentation and polarization) and when the electoral cycle exerts the most pressure 
(elections are close). These findings are in line with the general literature on these issues 
(Shugart, 1995; Lanzaro, 2001; Cheibub and Limongi, 2002; Krutz, 2001), but add one 
new insight not previously explored: the size of legislative support for the Executive 
agenda is a function of the fragmentation in the electoral realm and of the available 
mechanisms for internal discipline in parties. The shape of this function is linearly 
associated with the fragmentation in a positive fashion and non-linearly associated with 
the disciplinary devices. Basically, in multiparty systems that face stringent electoral 
rules (or where party competition is more intense), legislative support for the Executive 
agenda decreases linearly with the passage of time (when elections are closer). In turn, 
in bipartisan systems, provided that parties possess devices to enforce internal discipline 
(as in Costa Rica), support for the Executive agenda in the legislature is stable or 
slightly increases towards the end of the term. However, the effect of party discipline is 
non-linear because this latter finding does not hold for Honduras, a bipartisan system 
with largely proportional electoral rules but which lacks devices to assure internal 
discipline in parties, so that this case behaves closer to the multiparty cases (Guatemala 
and Panama).  
Fourthly, I have found that the major axes of differentiation in the constitutional 
design of presidential systems are related to the variety of reactive and proactive 
powers. The former may be assessed as a way of capturing how likely cooperation is 
between political actors, while the latter captures the capabilities of political actors to 
act independently. Because the reactive type of powers reflect the ability of political 
actors to impose constraints on each other’s actions (similar to the approach of counting 
veto players). Similarly, the proactive type of powers reflects the degree to which a 
political actor is able to undertake independent action. This argument is coherent with 
the initial claim I made about the importance of the ties between political actors – or 
how far they are necessary for each other for achieving their political preferences – in 
both quantity and quality. This approach can furthermore be combined with other 
analytical distinctions to unpack variation within presidential systems (and, indeed, 
within any type of political system, including mixed forms), such as in Haggard and 
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McCubbins (2001). The eventual generation of typologies of continuous degrees of 
cooperation and independence between the branches may deliver a better informed type 
of aggregate analysis of constitutional rules and expected political behavior. In carrying 
out such an analysis out in this thesis, I have focused especially on the likelihood of 
strategic behavior. Inserting this piece of information into a configurational analysis of 
constitutional rules (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997) helps to identify variation that does 
not appear when evaluating the effect of each constitutional rule separately.  
Finally, I have found evidence that secondary rules (i.e. procedural rules) are a 
reflection of primary rules (i.e. constitutional rules). Further to the known principle of 
legal hierarchy, by which secondary rules cannot contradict primary rules, this finding 
is sustained both empirically and in the analysis of the procedural design as essential to 
inter-branch dynamics. Because the findings with respect to the tools  provided by the 
procedural design available to political actors to behave strategically and exert agenda 
control constitute a central set of results of this thesis work, I shall now devote a 
specific section to these. 
3) FINDINGS ON PROCEDURAL DESIGN: ENDOGENOUS TOOLS FOR 
AGENDA CONTROL 
 
 
“Given that institutions 
matter, that actors have derived 
preferences over them, and that 
strategic interaction drives 
institutional choices, what can be said 
about the conditions under which 
everyday politics will take place with 
respect to rules, rather than within 
them?”139 
 
Procedural design, as a cross-sectional set of rules applicable to all policy 
proposals, constitutes a key part of the political process where inter-branch dynamics 
are clearly materialized. Whether the “preferences of a decisive coalition of political 
agents are a key ingredient in evading procedural strictures” (Shepsle and Weingast, 
1984: 208) has been a major question of this thesis. The relevance of this question lies 
not only in whether positive or negative answer is obtained, but in whether there is a 
systematic exclusion of the political aggregation of interests in the ‘evasion’ of 
procedures, or in a softer form, the strategic choice of procedures.  
                                                
139 Jupille, 2004: 18, emphasis added.  
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In what follows, I summarize the most remarkable empirical results from the 
analysis of endogenous tools for agenda control. In a final paragraph, I draw some 
relevant conclusions relevant to the theoretical debate to which this work contributes.  
Empirically, there are three main results: (1) whereas I cannot fully reject the 
strong significance of the variables pertaining to the characteristics of the legislative 
scenario (particularly ideological polarization, with a more qualitative contribution to 
capture political conflict), I have identified several conditions that are associated with 
the strength of this consistent significance. Equivalent to the conclusion that context 
(electoral cycle) is a fostering – always positive and highly significant – variable 
(empirically), interactive with the others in a theoretical sense, polarization is a 
mediating variable that contributes to the incentives for political actors to employ tools 
of agenda control, but does not fully define them. Political actors do take into account 
the fragmentation and polarization on the floor because these characteristics contribute 
to their estimations of conflict upon policy (be it policy interests, policy areas or 
spending priorities), a determining factor for agenda control. However, given expected 
conflict over policy, the interested political actors can find ways to circumvent the floor 
(e.g. through emergency procedures) or attempt to control crucial decisional gates such 
as the committee system. It is in this sense that polarization and fragmentation are 
theoretical mediators the powerfully contribute to generate and modify incentives.  
(2) A second result is that political actors employ informational advantages to 
their benefit, giving positive credit to the informational approach to legislative politics 
(Krehbiel, 1991). Especially, informational advantages are closely related to the 
structure and efficiency of the committee system. However, I have found that the 
structure of the committee system (in terms of the number of seats to be distributed, or 
the size of committees and the assignment rule of deputies to committees) is a better 
predictor of agenda control than their efficiency. This result appears as a consequence of 
the inability of political actors to make very precise estimations of the varying 
efficiency of each committee. On this particular point, I have found evidence that, 
depending upon the degree of legislative fragmentation, two strategies to exert agenda 
control are available: if the majority party holds a plain majority in the House, agenda 
control is associated to the decisional process of legislative approval, particularly by 
monopolizing key decisional and informational resources. However, when the majority 
party holds a narrow majority, it will need employing emergency procedures, i.e. 
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procedures that circumvent the ordinary process of legislative approval. In this line, the 
results allowed me to make robust differentiated claims concerning the characteristics of 
the legislative scenario and the legislative behavior of political actors.  
Furthermore, this kind of strategic behavior appears more when the bill is micro-
sectional, that is, when the policy-style tends to be characterized by patronage and 
targets particularized interests, and when the electoral cycle is at its most pressing (i.e. 
elections are close), this time holding independently of the degree of legislative 
fragmentation in the House.  
The findings with respect to the sequential design of the process of legislative 
approval provided further refinements to previous findings in that they generally show 
the importance of endogenous tools for agenda control. In particular, the central 
sequential step for the strategic choice of procedures is the time a bill spends in the 
committee. The models designed to systematically capture the effects of time show that 
the most determining factor affecting time is informational advantages produced within 
committees. Hence, and once more in tune with the bulk of empirical analyses in this 
field, once the bill has been approved in committee, the vote on the floor will very 
likely match the committee dictum where this is positive. As a consequence, being able 
to place bills in committees with some desirable characteristics – small size, particularly 
– constitutes an efficient way of subtly controlling the agenda, by ex ante estimating 
which committee will tend to receive the bill.  
In addition, the specific context that most affects the length of the legislative 
process of approval is the type of electoral rules. Sharply, more stringent electoral 
systems (i.e. with a large systematic bias in favor of big parties), related to the degree of 
competitiveness in a party system, foster the employment of time-related procedures for 
agenda control, especially when the bill involves spending. On this point, there is a 
relevant divergence that also brings more detail to the contextual specifications of 
agenda control: while the scope of the bill and the spending involved positively and 
significantly affect the rhythm of a bill’s approval, these policy characteristics do not 
affect the shape of legislative approval throughout the electoral cycle. This result means 
that, while policy characteristics do relate to endogenous procedural choices (in this 
case, the sequential process of approval), these are quite independent from the 
exogenous time pressure of the electoral cycle. Interestingly, this result confirms our 
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general expectation that endogenous procedures define what actors do with their actual 
constitutional resources of power.  
A final finding related to the use of endogenous procedures for agenda control is 
that, referring to the time-related procedures, Executive independence (as defined 
constitutionally) matters negatively and significantly. This fact confirms the main 
finding we obtained in the previous section, where I emphasized that unilateral action 
from the Executive may appear only under two circumstances: (1) when the actor has 
exhausted other means to foster legislative support for his/her own agenda and (2) when 
the power provision assures independence and not cooperation. The effects of Executive 
independence are, however, non-linear with respect to time, depending upon which time 
unit accounted for. While Executive independence is negatively related to exogenous 
pressure from the electoral cycle, this relationship is positive with respect to the 
endogenous sequential design of the legislative process of approval. In other words, 
when a bill proposed by the Executive gets to legislative approval, the passage of this 
bill through the procedural design is quicker than when any other political actor enacts 
the bill, but this needs not happening in connection with the closeness of elections. The 
latter result – the negative association between Executive independence and pressure 
from the electoral cycle – reaffirms the findings for the honeymoon pattern: decrease in 
the support for the Executive agenda tends to occur towards the end of the term, and this 
is even more likely in bipartisan cases with internally fractionalized parties.  
Overall, this thesis has found evidence that the effects of constitutional rules on 
agenda control, in particular, and as an indicator of political performance, are generally 
weak or moderate – only for the calling of an extraordinary session. The effects of 
procedural design contribute more strongly to determining the shape of the incentives of 
political actors’ and the degree to which embedded possibilities for strategic choice are 
present within the legislative realm, a key decisional institution in liberal democracies. 
With the benefit of adding institutional detail, the main findings are that informational 
advantages are provided by the characteristics of the committee system design, that 
Executive dominance of the agenda exists in the case with the weakest legislative body 
(Panama), that exogenous aspects of the party system such as available devices for 
enforcing discipline and the competitiveness stemming from the more or less stringent 
the electoral system do matter when assessing the degree of legislative support for the 
Executive agenda,. In addition, the employment of time-related procedures for agenda 
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control does not depend on the policy characteristics of the bill. Therefore, policy-
targeting and patronage, as many Latin American governments are famous for, is not a 
general output of institutional design but, probably, of other non-institutional (i.e. 
informal) conditions.  
These findings point to three types of tools susceptible to normative reflection: 
(1) the design of the committee system, (2) decisional rules of a majoritarian or 
supermajoritarian nature, and (3) interactions between these two types of rules. These 
normative insights and a general reflection on their implications for the theory of 
democracy follows. 
4) CONNECTING INCENTIVES, PROCEDURES AND RULES: NORMATIVE 
REFLECTIONS WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 
 
“Tocqueville distills his discovery 
of the essence of modern society in this 
way: the equality of conditions is not a 
single characteristic among others; it is the 
‘generative fact’ from which all the rest is 
deduced”140 
The main argument I will develop here is that the institutionalization of 
democracy possibly demands as much effort from real actors as from the ‘correct’ 
design of procedures and institutions. I have already endorsed Horrowitz’s (2002) view 
that excessive trust in our capabilities to ‘engineer’ constitutions and, more broadly, 
institutional design, constitutes a partially failed effort from a lack of precise predictive 
capabilities concerning (1) alternative institutional design(s) and (2) alternative ways of 
assessing the direct, indirect and spill-over effects of those institutional design(s) on 
political outcomes. My specific criticism has been that, if this is generally true, the most 
unrealistic aspect of the debate on the forms of government with respect to the weight 
attributed to the constitutional design of presidential systems was the misspecification 
of interactions between rules. As shown, interactions between rules also exist, and 
accounting for these interactions or not affects the possibilities to detect important 
factors affecting the determination of one political outcome or another.  
A second strong criticism underscored in this thesis is the narrow focus of the 
original debate on the forms of government, whose fault lies with the evaluation of only 
two possible outcomes: stability of democracy versus breakdown. My contribution aims 
                                                
140 Manent, P. (1996: 1).  
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to generate a fruitful strategy that allows breaking the definitional link between 
functioning democracies and political stability. While in fact both politicians and 
institutional designers of course share a desire for political stability, my point is that 
they also desire other political goals. Such goals may range from seeking for the general 
interest in their role as representatives (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin, 1999) to the 
imposition of particularized political agendas in the race for economic resources, such 
as corruption, or specific social privileges (status quo). These types of outcomes do not 
display a linear relationship with either regime stability or breakdown: they are instead 
more related to the way everyday politics is characterized by a range of indicators of 
institutional performance, as I have argued.  
My analytical proposal that may contribute to partially solve these gaps in 
accurate political analysis is that, looking at how the decision-making process allows 
more or less discretional and unilateral behavior, increases our possibilities to identify 
different combinations of practices which are not purely adaptable to the type of 
analysis on ‘well-working democracy versus breakdown’. Instead, there may be a range 
of mixes of practices that become institutionalized: for instance, fair bargaining with 
respect to socio-cultural, economic and infrastructural policies but a restricted 
aggregation of interests, or agenda control, with respect to issues of political reform, as 
we discovered empirically in Chapter 4.  
The specific finding of this thesis that may contribute to adopting a more general 
view on the connections between incentives, rules and procedures is through the central 
conceptual placement of procedural justice. As already discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 
5) some useful innovations may be drawn from this concept, as a result of its 
comparatively strong theoretical and empirical rooting.  
A normative exploration of the consequences of providing such centrality to the 
concept of procedural justice, which is particularly well suited to facilitating an 
increased dialogue between Institutional Theory and Theory of Democracy, involves 
asking: ‘Is procedural justice a byproduct of the specific characteristics of the legislative 
process of approval?’ This question is related, on the one hand, to Institutional Theory 
on that it specifically refers to the institutional characteristics and structure of a 
decisional body (legislatures). On the other hand, it makes dialogue with the Theory of 
Democracy possible in that the question aims to explore a direct relationship between an 
observable phenomenon – procedural justice – and two normative grounds of 
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democracy: representation and inclusiveness specifically by exploring which type of 
relationship exist between the two, as I argue below.   
My ex ante answer to this question is negative, but exploring the reasons for this 
answer is important to the general heading of this Section, which is devoted to the 
assessment of the connections between incentives, rules and procedures. The idea that 
fair bargaining in the decision-making process of legislatures is not only a consequence 
of the characteristics of the institutional design has also been dealt with in the literature 
specifically concerned with deliberation (Elster and Slagstad, 1988; Elster, 1998). A 
central argument here is that some bargainers are better positioned in all political 
systems. I agree, but my question related to this possible argument is whether those 
comparative advantages systematically benefit particular political agendas and hence 
specific political actors. If this is so, then there is a systematic threat to the ‘generative 
fact’ (as in the quotation above, referred to Tocqueville’s view on democracy) from the 
very institutional rules of the game. This threat is relevant since both inclusive and 
representative devices are on the very normative grounds for desiring democratic 
regimes, as oppose to the arbitrary and discretional use of power in authoritarian 
systems. While I also view deliberation as an important device for democratic rule, I 
wish to underscore that deliberative democracy benefits the democratic process only if 
the basis of bargaining and compromise among political actors is also endowed with the 
principles above, from a normative perspective.  
This point is important, and also makes a specifically adequate definitional 
contribution to the concept of procedural justice clear. Authoritarian regimes may in 
fact deliver legitimate outputs, for instance through ambitious policy making with a 
social character (e.g. targets of full employment), which are in the short-run supported 
by the citizenry. However, my point is that, structurally, by definition, authoritarian 
regimes lack legitimate input. In turn, democracies are intimately associated to the idea 
of the rule of law, which implies – in addition to some other pre-conditions which are 
not discussed here (but see O’Donnell, 1998a, 1998b) – that procedures are equal and 
universal for all citizens (as in studies of access to judicial institutions, for instance) but 
also for all politicians (my focus here).  
Therefore, despite the fact the my general answer to the question of whether 
procedural justice is exclusively associated to the characteristics of the decision-making 
process is negative, the nuance I aim to introduce is that the concept of procedural 
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justice focuses on the input side of the democratic process: i.e. to what extent are there 
universal principles, equally applied to all political actors, governing access to the rules 
governing the adoption of decisions. A further element of this nuance is that the quality 
of this input affects the output of institutions. This is where I identified a trade-off 
relationship between representation and procedural justice.  
Having identified the trade-off relationship between representation and 
procedural justice, I must now explore how far this is linked to the combination of 
incentives-rules-procedures and its impact on the quality of democracy. We have seen 
that no single form of government, and for the sake of the argument, no single 
institutional design, is free from such trade-offs (Haggard and McCubbins, 2001). Our 
standpoint has been, however, that unpacking variation with respect to both macro-
institutional (i.e. constitutional) and micro-institutional rules (i.e. procedural design) 
significantly contributes to the assessment of institutional performance, especially when 
including their interrelated effects. My emphasis was on whether or not the endogenous 
institutional structure of the legislature has an independent impact on political 
outcomes, to which our answer – on both theoretical and empirical grounds – was 
positive. As I have seen, combining actors’ incentives, procedural rules and the 
discretional spaces these offer, and macro-constitutional rules (as settling the parameters 
of variation for political action) results fruitful. But, what are the consequences of these 
combinations for the quality of democracy? Or, in specific terms for my contribution 
here: ‘What are the consequences of assuming that an increase in the quality of the 
procedural design leads to an increase in the quality of democratic outcomes?’ My 
answer has been that plurality benefits the democratic process, and that this plurality – 
including the plurality of political interests – should be procedurally guaranteed in the 
political system. Distinguishing between the local and the global positive effects of 
increasing procedural justice, the global effect is the increased capability of the political 
system to deliver representative policy, i.e. to deliver policies which reflect the plurality 
in the House, and do not privilege any specific political agenda, aggregating interests 
instead of systematically excluding them. What point would there be for holding 
elections in democratic regimes if the representatives were then systematically hindered 
in their role...  
With respect to local effects, more detail is required to evaluate each specific 
outcome. In fact, at the time of writing, an intense political debate is taking place in 
 
227 
Costa Rica over Executive re-election and the internal sequential design of the process 
of legislative approval (on reducing specific deadlines for votes on the floor), and in 
Honduras with respect to the electoral rules of primary elections in order to foster even 
less discipline within the parties. These two examples indicate that political actors do 
worry about the internal rules governing the adoption of decisions. From the empirical 
findings of this thesis, I can claim that allowing the re-election of the Executive would 
have positive local effects on the coherence of legislative production, producing less 
fluctuations in the volume of approval from the beginning of the term to the end of the 
term – a consequence of the decreased legislative support for the Executive agenda, as 
seen empirically. Second, I have also identified the positive effects of having large 
committees, which will more likely mirror the composition of the House and offer no 
comparative advantages. Third, I may say that having disciplined parties is positive for 
its influence on trust-building via the mutual knowledge of political preferences by 
political actors, which facilitates more transparent bargaining. Finally, my general 
normative claim is that the availability of discretional spaces for the interpretation of 
rules or the employment of procedures has a negative impact on all the indicators for the 
aggregation of interests, and is instead positively associated to agenda control. The 
importance, therefore, of designing clear rather than vague or fuzzy rules – a typical 
way to offer spaces for discretional interpretation, in both developed and developing 
democracies, in this case – is essential for limiting phenomena such as systematic 
agenda control, unilateral action or strategic behavior as derived from the discretional 
use of power.  
The potential normative implications for each country are evidently rich and a 
large amount of international assistance is being provided to the Central American 
region (importantly, by the Inter-American Development Bank, IADB, through projects 
strongly inspired by the principles of ‘Technical cooperation’ - with the general 
objective of “institutional strengthening in the region”). This thesis suggests some ideas 
for the more nailed down design of specific political and institutional reform of 
Parliaments or more broadly for the rules governing inter-branch dynamics, which 
institutions like the IADB are in charge of financing, proposing and evaluating. My 
normative analysis, however, stops at this point within the range of theoretical leverage. 
Next, a brief Section on the lines for research opened by this thesis follows.  
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5) A RESEARCH AGENDA  
 
The lines of research following on from this thesis are several. I will underscore 
three main areas of research, that relate to three fields of study: Theory of Democracy, 
Methodology and Comparative Politics. I briefly expand on the ways in which this 
thesis contributes to generate new lines of investigation valid and relevant to these 
fields.  
The most central finding for research related to the theory of democracy is the 
identification of constitutional choice as a source of heavy path dependent effects on the 
political performance of a country. As followed from the applied analysis of the four 
Central American cases in Chapter 2, on constitutional design, the relative position and 
preferences of political actors, together with the degree of elite renovation, affects the 
prospects for embedded comparative advantages for some political actors. This type of 
investigation has been carried out systematically for some cases where the 
characteristics of the transition to democracy have heavily influenced its further 
development (or constrained its development) of democracy itself, such as Chile. 
Extending the work to the Central American region, with the evidence of comparability 
between such cases as different as Guatemala and Costa Rica, suggests that the 
evaluation of the constitutional design is incomplete in nature unless an analysis of 
constitutional choice and, importantly, the preferences of the political actors at the time 
of choosing the institutional frame is included. 
Furthermore, this result provides the basis to produce comparative research of 
importance to both constitutional reformers and academics in the discussion of 
Constitutions as inter-generational pacts. In this sense, the opening of this line of 
research represents an innovative type of investigation, most importantly in its potential 
for interdisciplinary research. The question links properly current issues in two fields 
that could be interrelated: on the one hand, Constitutional Theory – in its objective of to 
identify the intergenerational pacts that Constitutions represent (Buchanan, 2002; 
Habermas, 2001; Holmes, 1988), and, on the other hand, Institutional Theory and 
Comparative Politics – in the objective of identifying what matters and how for 
variation in democratic and political performance.  
A second area of research that derives from the findings of this thesis and 
naturally extends into a research agenda is related to the methodological realm. I have 
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found evidence through robust and sophisticated empirical analysis that important 
biases in the original hypothesis on the perils of presidential systems (Linz, 1989) were 
present due to the methodological choices. Innovation in this debate will thus clearly 
derive from a greater awareness of sources of bias and the effects of these biases on 
research output. The development of this area of research is relatively recent as well, in 
the recognition that conceptual and methodological choices are largely interrelated. 
However, a broad discussion on the range of consequences of the methodological 
choices on the research output has not yet explored all the implications seriously and 
consequentially for the renewal of the field. Such a debate is necessary in the light of 
the need to take methodological choices as seriously as conceptual clarifications and 
delimitations. That is, methodology is central to the process of elaborating and 
justifying the object of research. In the thesis work, I have mostly explored the effects 
of choosing alternative modeling strategies, favoring quantitative modeling on the basis 
of a qualitative construction of variables. In addition, with reference to the discussion on 
alternative modeling strategies as a valid and necessary step affecting the research 
output, I contend that sample size choices also affect the information and results 
obtained from research. Including normative views in  methodological choices will, in 
this way, increase awareness on how the discipline may develop in a less competitive 
style, away from the proliferation of several measures for the same phenomenon that do 
not communicate, and towards an increased effort to contrast each measure and 
determine its specific explanatory capacity.  
Finally, a relevant finding of the thesis for the field of Comparative Politics is 
the acknowledgement that variation within each form of government may deliver better 
informed judgments about issues of political performance. Hence, while the broad 
comparison between pure presidential and pure parliamentary systems is rather 
exhausted, the exploration of hybrid systems and the number of varieties within either 
presidential or parliamentary systems may yield diverse and relevant comparisons from 
the existing ones that are, hence, unexplored to a large extent (cf.  Cheibub et alia, 
2004). My specific proposal has been that multiple layers of combined systems may be 
elaborated by applying the distinction between large-low variations in the (1) proactive-
reactive powers, for each (2) Executive-Legislative branches, and varies under (3) the 
context of unified-divided government. By adding the possible cells of variation from 
those political factors plus the possible ranges of variation, the pure presidential and the 
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pure parliamentary forms of government are in fact only two cells out of sixteen 
potential ones. Clearly, there is a vast potential for exploring the political outcomes of 
varying forms of government in a comparative perspective.   
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ACRONYMS OF POLITICAL PARTIES EMPLOYED IN CHAPTER 5:  
- HONDURAS:  
PLH: Partido Liberal de Honduras 
PNH: Partido Nacional de Honduras 
PINU: Partido Innovacion y Unidad 
PUD: Partido Unificacion Democratica 
PDCH: Partido Democrata Cristiano de Honduras 
- GUATEMALA:  
PAN: Partido de Avanzada Nacional 
FRG: Frente Republicano Guatemalteco 
URNG+EGP+PUR+FDNG: Union Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca+Ejercito 
Guatemalteco Popular+Frente Democratico Nueva Guatemala 
DCG+PNR: Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca+Partido Nacional Revolucionario 
MLN: Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional 
UCN: Union de Centro Nacional 
DIA: Desarrollo Integral Autentico 
MAS: Movimiento Accion Solidaria 
- COSTA RICA:  
PLN: Partido Liberacion Nacional 
PUSC: Partido Union Social Democrata 
Provincial parties includes: PUAC: Partido Union Agrícola Cartaginesa, ADA: Accion Democratica 
Alajuelense, PAN: Partido Agrario Nacional, PAC: Partido Union Agricola Cartaginesa.  
Others includes: PALA: Partido Accion Laborista Agricola+ML: Movimiento 
Libertario 
- PANAMA 
PA: Partido Arnulfista 
PRD: Partido de la Revolucion Democratica 
Others includes: Solidaridad, Papa Egoro, Morena, Molirena, Renovación Civilista, 
Libre, Liberal Autentico.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1. CHAPTER 1. VISUAL APPROXIMATION OF THE RESEARCH 
DESIGN: LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
How do the constitutional design and the legislative decisional 
structure affect the weakness or strength of Assemblies in the 
legislative production?  
 
1- Empirical and comparative analysis 
2- Links between institutional theory and regime performance 
3- Links between macro-institutional analysis (of 
constitutional design of presidential systems) and micro-
institutional analysis (procedural choices, actors’ incentives)  
 DE FACTO PRACTICES IN LEGISLATIVE PRODUCTION 
What do the actual patterns of legislative production tell us about 
two outcomes in policy:  
a) aggregation of interests 
b) representation 
 
The argument is based on the assumption that Parliaments are 
not only descriptive mirrors of electorate (Pitkin) but also forums 
for deliberation and the aggregation of interests (Shugart and 
Carey, 1992) 
 
POLICY OUTCOMES 
The degree to which legislation reflects and gathers the political divisions 
within Parliament in seeking the general interest, i.e. throughout the process 
of legislative approval, reflection of a process of aggregation of interests  
Agenda control prevents this process from being effective by limiting the 
number of amendments to the proposal and by monopolizing key channels 
of information  
Agenda control refers to which tools are available to political actors to 
ensure their most-preferred policy is approved 
My answer is that which institutional tools, as well as when and how these 
are employed, matters for defining the decisional style of everyday politics 
NORMATIVE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 
Objective of generating explicit bridge between the theory of democracy and institutional theory 
No exclusive focus on stability and survivability of regime as a measure of regime performance 
The idea is to analyze democratic institutionalization from the nature of institutions 
Attention is paid to classical argument of the potential danger of democratic rule from its inherent privilege to 
majority rule for the adoption of decisions  
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APPENDIX 2. CHAPTER 2.  
2.1. LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURAL DESIGN IN HONDURAS 
 
     LAW INITIATIVE 
Legislative Directory 
Floor 
Special Committee Standing Committee 
Not passed Floor Not passed Floor 
3 debates 1 debate 
Not passed Executive 
3 debates 1 debate 
Executive Not Passed 
Congress Supreme Court 
Not Passed Insistence Disregarded 
Veto Pass 
Absolute Majority 
Simple Majority 
Qualified Majority (2/3) 
Published Official Bulletin 
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2.2. LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURAL  
DESIGN, COSTA RICA 
LAW INITIATIVE 
Legislative Directory 
Published in Official Journal 
of Assembly 
Dpt of Technical Studies 
Committee 
Passed Not Passed 
1st Debate in Floor 
Passed Delegates to Committees 
With full legislative jurisdiction 
Not passed 
Passed Not Passed 
Committee of Redaction 
2nd Debate 
Passed Not passed 
Executive 
Congress Supreme Court 
Passes Executive 
Amendments 
Insistence Disregarded 
Veto2 Pass 
Published Official Bulletin 
Absolute Majority  
Simple Majority 
Qualified Majority (2/3) 
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2.3. LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURAL DESIGN IN GUATEMALA  
1) The Floor can send back an initiative to the Standing 
Committee that emitted the dictum (or another) on simple majority 
2) The Presidium sends copies to all legislators. If within five days 
there are no objections, the bill is considered passed. 
3) Veto is not possible in matters of internal regulation of 
Congress, Budget, Interpellations and Conferral of Honors. 
No Objections 
LAW INITIATIVE 
Legislative Directorate 
Passed Not Passed 
Floor1 
3 Debates 1 Debate 
Supreme Court Of Justice 
Objections 
Published Official Bulletin 
Absolute Majority  
Qualified Majority (2/3) 
Constitutional Issues Human Rights Issue 
Congress 
Standing Committee 
Passed Not Passed 
Presidium2 
Passed Veto3 
Executive 
Passed Disregarded 
Supreme Court 
of Justice 
Referendum Special Committee 
for Human Rights 
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2.4 LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURAL DESIGN IN PANAMA  
Passed 
LAW INITIATIVE 
Standing Committee 
Passed Not Passed 
2nd Debate on Floor (1) 
Passed Not passed 
3rd Debate on Floor (1) 
( 
Passed 
Supreme Court Of Justice 
Executive 
Veto 
Published Official Bulletin 
Absolute Majority of total 
Absolute Majority of present 
Qualified Majority (2/3) 
1) For organic laws, an absolute 
majority is required. In this 
diagram, I assume the law 
initiative is an ordinary one. . 
Ad-hoc 
Committee 
Human rights 
Committee 
Partial veto Total veto 
Returns to 2nd 
debate 
Not passed Returns to 3rd 
debate 
Not passed 
Not passed 
Dictum of Standing 
Committee is 1st Debate 
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APPENDIX 4. CHAPTER 4.  
4.1. INDEXES OF POLARIZATION FOR FOUR CENTRAL AMERICAN CASES 
I follow Coppedge (1998: 556-557) to calculate the index of polarization1, 
)(*1)(*5,0)(*5,0)(*1 slxlmlrpsclxclmlrpscrxcrmlrpsrxrmlrp +−−++−−++−++−
 
 where mlrp is MLRP/100, the Mean Left-right position calculated as follows:  
MLRP=(xr+sr)+,5(xcr+scr)-,5(xcl+scl)-(xl+sl).  
The idea in calculating the polarization is first to place the competing political parties 
along the left-right scale, and then to weight them by the percentage of votes or seats won in 
the elections of interest (or, if over time, a weighted average). Then, I display the percentage 
of votes of the parties who won a seat in Congress for the legislative periods under study.  
 
Electoral data2 and 
polarization 
HONDURAS 
Elections 1997 
COSTA RICA 
Elections 1994 
GUATEMALA 
Elections 1996 
PANAMA 
Elections 1994 
Parties 
and electoral data 
(in %of vote won) 
 
PLH: 49,5%  
PNH: 41,3%  
PINU: 4,1%  
PDCH: 2,6%  
PUD: 2,3%  
PLN: 44,6% 
PUSC: 40,4% 
PUAC: 1,1% 
PAN: 0,9 
PFD: 5,3% 
FRG: 20% 
PAN: 34,3% 
FDNG: 9,1% 
UCN,DCG,PSD: 
12,8% 
MLN: 3,4% 
PUD: 4,5% 
 
PDC: 6,42% 
PRD: 22.86% 
MOLIRENA: 11,26% 
LIBRE: 2,41% 
UDI: 1,26% 
MORENA: 6,63% 
ARNULFISTA: 14,53% 
SOLIDARIDAD: 6,51% 
LIBERAL: 3,43% 
PALA: 2,72% 
PAPA EGORO: 9,65% 
RENOV. 
CIVILISTA:5,57% 
PLA: 3% 
Mean left-right 
position 
-64 -5,4 44,65 10,17 
Index of 
polarization 
29,80 49,40 23,08 64,02 
Source: own construction.  
Figures for the percentage of votes taken from Alcantara (1999), except for Guatemala, taken from 
[http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
1 In his formula, Coppedge tries to account for two crosscutting dimensions: Christian versus secular and right versus left. 
From this, the acronyms XR stand for Christian Right blocs, for instance, and SR for Secular right, and so on. Although 
here I only classify the parties in the left-right scale, I have kept the formula and the terminology as in the original. 
(Coppedge, 1998).    
2 I only account for the percentage of votes of the parties who won seats in Congress, given that my interest is to calculate 
the polarization within Congress for the legislative periods under study in this Chapter, not the overall polarization in the 
electoral arena.  
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In order to calculate the mean left-right position, I classified the parties in the 
ideological scale as follows3:  
Honduras: Left: empty; Center-left: PINU and PUD; Center-right: PDCH and PLH; 
Right: PNH.  
Costa Rica: Left: PFD; Center left: PLN; Center right: PUSC; Right: PUAC and 
PAN4.  
Guatemala: Left: empty; Center-left: FDNG; Center-right: DCG-UCN-PSD, PAN, 
PUD; Right: FRG. 
Panama:  Left: PAPA EGORO; Center-left: PRD, LIBRE, SOLIDARIDAD, 
LIBERAL; Center-right: PALA, PDC, PA,PLA, UDI; Right: MOLIRENA, MORENA, 
REN.A.V. CIVILISTA.  
 
 
                                                      
3 The classification is my own construction based on the programmatic manifestos of the parties (where available), in 
Ajenjo (2001) for Honduras, Garcia Diez and Ajenjo Fresno (2001) for Guatemala, in Garcia Diez (2001), all in Alcantara 
and Freideberg (eds.) and for Panama, Alcantara (1999). 
4 Both the Partido Union Agricola Cartaginesa (PUAC) and the Partido Agrario Nacional are peasant parties, and only have 
presence at the provincial level. I found no reference to their ideological placement, probably implying that they have none, 
and therefore only aim at a small representation in Congress in order to be able to negotiate beneficial policies for the 
province with the big parties. Thus, I placed them on the right, although their small percentages of votes won makes it 
almost irrelevant where they are placed.  
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4.2. COMPETITIVE MODELS FOR ENDOGENOUS PROCEDURES  
 
4.2.1. DEPENDENT VARIABLE COMMITTEE RECEIVING THE BILL,  
COMPETITIVE MODELS FOR THEORY TESTING  
 
- MODEL WITH ONLY THOSE VARIABLES ENDOGENOUS TO THE COMMITTEE 
SYSTEM 
 
Variables Political      Economic Political         Infrastructural Political     Socio-Cultural 
Size of committees (number of 
deputies in each committee) 
1.78*** .91** .84*** 
Seats of majority party in 
committees (in %) 
1.07*** 1.01*** 1.02*** 
Committee efficiency (time each bill 
passes in committ) 
1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Model Measures 
Sample size 
Pseudo-R square 
Wald chi-square 
Log (pseudo)Likelihood 
P-value model  
 
4136 
.12 
622.7 
-4488.16 (compared to Iteration 0 LL=-5074.8) 
.000 
Notes: Model is Multinomial Logit with reference category for calculating probabilities Political Issues Committee receiving 
the bill. Robust errors estimated; Relative Risk Ratios reported instead of coefficients; Frequency weights of variable 
country.  Columns reveal the transitional probabilities with respect to a bill having been assigned to a Political issues 
committee (fixed reference category) and the corresponding committee in each column.  
See Appendix 4.1. for the calculations of the polarization index following Coppedge (1998).  
*** Significant at 0.01 level of confidence; ** Significant at 0.05 level of confidence.  
 
- MODEL WITH EXOGENOUS VARIABLE ELECTORAL CYCLE AND INTERACTIVE 
EXECUTIVE ENACTMENT AND END OF ELECTORAL CYCLE (Testing hypothesis on 
Executive incentives towards end of term for loss of legislative support, hence including as 
explanatory variable ideological polarization on the floor) 
 
Variables Political      Economic Political         Infrastructural Political     Socio-Cultural 
Polarization .96*** 1.00 1.01*** 
Executive enacts bill 3.3*** .28*** .18*** 
Dummy electoral cycle (first half 
versus last half of term) 
1.8*** .95 .84 
Interactive Executive enactment and 
dummy electoral cycle  
.36*** .83 .96 
Model Measures 
Sample size 
Pseudo-R square 
Wald chi-square 
Log (pseudo)Likelihood 
P-value model  
 
3997 
.09 
742.1 
-4477.8 (compared to Iteration 0 LL=-4915.9) 
.000 
Notes: Model is Multinomial Logit with reference category for calculating probabilities Political Issues Committee receiving 
the bill. Robust errors estimated; Relative Risk Ratios reported instead of coefficients; Frequency weights of variable 
country.  Columns reveal the transitional probabilities with respect to a bill having been assigned to a Political issues 
committee (fixed reference category) and the corresponding committee in each column.  
See Appendix 4.1. for the calculations of the polarization index following Coppedge (1998).  
*** Significant at 0.01 level of confidence; ** Significant at 0.05 level of confidence.  
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4.2.2. DEPENDENT VARIABLE SEATS OF MAJORITY PARTY IN COMMITTEES,  
COMPETITIVE MODELS FOR THEORY TESTING 
 
- TWO COMPETITIVE MODELS WITH EXOGENOUS VARIABLES PERTAINING 
TO THE ELECTORAL RULES AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE PARTY 
SYSTEM 
 
Variables Coefficients  Model Measures 
Fragmentation -21.06** Sample size= 4629; p-value=.000 
LogLikelihood=-17517; Pseudo R2=.04 Biasing effect due to electoral system -3.40*** 
Blocks in the legislature -5.97***  
Sample size=4626; p-value=.000 
LogLikelihood=-16814; Pseudo R=.08 
Size of committees as units (number of 
deputies per committee) 
-1.91*** 
Honeymoon effect (dummy for 
electoral cycle)  
-1.1*** 
Average district magnitude -6.87*** 
Notes: Tobit  model with two-way censoring (upper limit fixed at the maximum value, 100%, and lower limit fixed to 
minimum value 14% of seats); frequency weights of variable country.  
*** Significant at the .01 level of confidence; ** Significant at the .05 level of confidence.  
Biasing effect due to electoral system is the effective number of electoral parties that do not make it into the legislative party 
system (See Table 3, Chapter 1).  
 
 4.2.3. DEPENDENT VARIABLE COMMITTEE RECEIVING THE BILL 
 
Variables Political      Economic Political         Infrastructural Political     Socio-Cultural 
Dummy for seats of majority party 
in committees over 50% (holds 
majority or not) 
-1.34 -.39 1.07 
Interactive efficiency of 
committees in temporal terms 
and seats of majority party in 
committees 
-.004 -.003 -.002 
Seats of majority party in 
committees 
-.093 .06 .023 
Committee efficiency (time in 
emitting dictum) 
.025 .02 .018 
Ideological polarization -.06 .02 .042 
Interactive ideological polarization 
and Executive enactment 
.020 -.03 -.03 
Dummy electoral cycle (first half 
versus last half of term) 
.34 -.34 -.45 
Interactive last half of electoral cycle 
and Executive enactment 
-.45 .34 .18 
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4.2.4. MODELS FOR INTERACTIVE EFFECTS ON COORDINATION FOR PATRONAGE 
 
 
The models are reported in the Appendix because their goodness of fit is very low, given that the 
imbalance in the original distributional characteristics of the dependent variable is high, and that the 
positive value is over-determined.  
The two models are designed to capture whether the Executive and Legislative actors coordinate in 
order to pass a certain type of legislation which is micro-sectional and entails spending (following the 
empirical proxies available for capturing patronage). The first dependent variable is majority party 
enacts the bill, disregarding whether it is the Executive party or the majority party in the legislature. 
The variable captures coordination between the branches if and only if the majority party enacts the 
bill with the attributes of patronage legislation. 
The second dependent variable is whether the bill is approved in an extraordinary session or not, 
which – as we saw from the analysis in Table 8, Chapter 4 – is in all cases an exclusive introduction 
by the Executive. The idea here, therefore, is to see whether legislative actors behave in a coordinated 
way when the Executive enacts a micro-sectional bill which entails spending through the 
extraordinary session procedure.  
 
Dependent variable: Majority party enacts bill  
Variables Odd ratios (Coefficients) and Significance Model Measures  
Bill is urgent 2.64 (.97) *** Sample size= 3589 
Pseudo R2= .14 
Wald chi sq= 183 
p-value model=.000 
LL= -768  (LL0=-891) 
Correctly classified= 93% 
Positive predictive value= 93% 
Negative predictive value= 70% 
Majority party holds majority in 
committees or not 
.33 (-1.09) *** 
Committee efficiency 1.00 (-.003) * 
Dummy electoral cycle (first half or 
last half of term) 
1.50 (.41) *** 
Interactive bill is assessed by an 
economic issues committee and the 
scope is micro-sectional (patronage as 
defined in text) 
2.55 (.94) * 
Bill is micro-sectional .54 (-.60) *** 
Bill is received by an economic issues 
committee 
4.3 (1.45) *** 
Notes: Model is Logit with Dependent variable majority party versus other parties (including in majority party Executive 
and Legislative enactment); robust errors estimated; frequency weights of variable country.  
*** Significant at 0.01 level of confidence; * Significant at 0.10 level of confidence.  
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Dependent variable: Call for Extraordinary session  
Variables Odd ratios (Coefficients) and Significance Model Measures  
Bill is urgent 2.48 (.90) *** Sample size= 1411 
Pseudo R2= .10 
Wald chi sq= 109 
p-value model=.000 
LL= -569  (LL0=-632) 
Correctly classified= 83% 
Positive predictive value= 38% 
Negative predictive value= 84% 
Majority party holds a majority of seats 
in committee 
2.57 (.94) *** 
Committee efficiency in temporal 
approval of bill 
.99 (-.0004)  
Interactive efficiency of committee and 
seats of majority party in committees 
1.00(.00001) 
Dummy electoral cycle (first half-last 
half of term) 
1.71 (.54) *** 
Interactive bill is micro-sectional and 
entails spending 
.46 (-.78) ** 
Bill is micro-sectional 1.87 (.63) *** 
Bill entails spending (is received by an 
economic issues committee or not) 
2.14 (.76) *** 
Notes: Model is Logit with Dependent variable Bill approval in Extraordinary session or not. Frequency weights of variable 
country; robust errors estimated. *** Significant at 0.01 level of confidence; ** Significant at 0.05 level of confidence.  
 
 
The results of both models deliver high significance on the explanatory variables but the goodness of 
fit is poor, since the positive value of the dependent variable (the value of interest) is over-
determined in both cases. The relevant pieces of information drawn from the model are that, while it 
cannot, based on the empirical evidence, be asserted that there is no coordination for patronage as a 
systematic and significant effect related to procedural choice, there is a sustained positive relationship 
between the employment of emergency procedures with other procedural choices (bill is urgent is 
positive and highly significant in both models) and of the bill being assessed for dictum in an 
economic issues committees. With respect to the rest of the variables, the significance is doubtful for 
the efficiency of committees, supporting the hypothesis in the Chapter that while political actors 
possess information on the efficiency value of committees, they cannot make very precise 
estimations, and hence the size of such a coefficient is limited.  
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APPENDIX 5. CHAPTER 5.  
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
 
5.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DATA: TIME COVERED AND SAMPLE  
 
Time frame covered in 
datasets 
COSTA RICA HONDURAS GUATEMALA PANAMA 
Legislative term of 
interview and number of 
respondents 
1994-1998: 52 1994-97: 67 
 
1995-99: 79 - 
1998-2002: 49 1997-2001: 71 
 
2000-2004: 63 1999-2004: 64 
2002-2006: 51 2002-06: 102 - - 
NB: Sampling was proportional to the number of seats held by each party had in Parliament at the time of the 
interview.  
 
5.1.1. SAMPLING METHOD: PROPORTIONALITY OF INTERVIEWEES BY PARTY TO 
NUMBER OF SEATS HELD IN CONGRESS 
 
COUNTRY / 
PARTY / YEAR 
COSTA RICA HONDURAS GUATEMALA PANAMA 
EARLY 1990S 
INTERVIEWS 
PUSC= 23 
PLN= 25 
PFD&RD= 2 
PROVINCIAL 
PARTIES= 2 
PLH= 35 
PNH= 30 
PINU= 2 
 
 
 
 
LATE 1990S 
INTERVIEWS 
PUSC= 22 
PLN= 20 
PFD&RD= 3 
PROVINCIAL 
PARTIES= 1 
RENOV. 
COSTARRIC.= 1 
OTHER= 1 
PLH= 37 
PNH= 30 
PINU= 2 
PDCH= 2 
FRG= 8 
PAN= 27 
LEFT* = 8 
DCG= 10 
MLN+UCN= 5 
MAS+PDC= 2 
 
2000 INTERVIEWS PUSC= 17 
PLN= 14 
PROVINCIAL 
PARTIES= 14 
RENOV. 
COSTARRIC. = 1 
OTHER= 5 
PLH= 42 
PNH= 48 
PUD= 5 
FRG= 21 
PAN= 17 
LEFT* = 7 
DCG= 19 
MLN+UCN= 7 
MAS+PDC= 2 
PRD= 30 
PA= 20 
OTHER= 14 
 
 
 
Appendices                                                                                                                                          Natalia Ajenjo Fresno 
 269 
5.1.2. ORIGINAL QUESTIONS OF THE SURVEYS ANALYZED IN EACH OF THE FOUR 
DIMENSIONS OF IDEOLOGY 
 
DIMENSION QUESTIONS IN THE SURVEY DEFINING THE 
DIMENSIONS 
ORIGINAL SCALING MEASURES 
(RESPONDENT OPTIONS) 
PARTY 
COHESION 
AGREEMENT OVER IDEOLOGICAL 
PLACEMENT:  
CROSS-COMPARISON OF TWO QUESTIONS:  
- SELF-PLACEMENT OF INTERVIEWEE ON 
THE LEFT-RIGHT IDEOLOGICAL SCALE 
- PLACEMENT OF THE INTERVIEWEE’S 
PARTY ON THE LEFT-RIGHT 
IDEOLOGICAL SCALE 
SCALE FROM 1, LEFT, TO 10, RIGHT  
 
ROLE OF 
STATE 
1.1)POSITION TOWARDS DICHOTOMY STATE-
MARKET:  
“COULD YOU TELL ME IF YOU ARE MORE IN 
FAVOR OF A MARKET-REGULATED 
ECONOMY OR A STATE-REGULATED ONE?” 
SCALE FROM 1, ONLY STATE-
REGULATED ECONOMY, TO 5, ONLY 
MARKET-REGULATED ECONOMY  
1.2)DEGREE OF STATE 
INTERVENTION/REGULATION:  
“I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR OPINION 
ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN 
CERTAIN TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS OF THE 
STATE. IN GENERAL TERMS, HOW MUCH 
INTERVENTION DO YOU THINK SHOULD 
EXIST FOR EACH OF THESE?” 
SCALE FROM 1, NO INTERVENTION 
AT ALL, TO 4, FULL INTERVENTION 
OF STATE ON FOLLOWING ISSUES:  
- CONTROL OF PRICES 
- GUARANTEE PUBLIC PRIMARY 
AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 
- PUBLIC FINANCING OF 
HOUSING 
- GENERATE EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITIES 
- GUARANTEE A PUBLIC SYSTEM 
OF PENSIONS 
- GENERAL PUBLIC HEALTH CARE 
SERVICES 
- GUARANTEE PUBLIC 
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION 
- GUARANTEE UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS 
- PROTECT ENVIRONMENT 
- COVER BASIC NEEDS OF 
POPULATION 
RECODED AS TRICHOTOMY: 1 
DENOTING MAXIMUM STATE 
INTERVENTION IN THE ISSUE, 2 
MEDIUM STATE INTERVENTION 
AND 3 MINIMAL STATE 
INTERVENTION 
1.3) ATTITUDE TOWARDS PUBLIC SPENDING 
ON SOCIAL SERVICES: “DO YOU THINK THAT 
A GREATER OR SMALLER AMOUNT OF 
PUBLIC RESOURCES SHOULD BE SPENT ON 
THE FOLLOWING SERVICES?” 
CATEGORICAL SCALING FROM 
“SPEND MORE”, “SPEND LESS” OR 
“KEEP LEVEL OF PUBLIC SPENDING 
AS IT IS”, ON: 
- INFRASTRUCTURE 
- HEALTH CARE 
- SAFETY 
- EDUCATION 
- DEFENSE AND POLICE 
- UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
- HOUSING 
- PENSIONS  
1.4) ATTITUDE TOWARDS PRIVATIZATION OF 
PUBLIC SERVICES:  
“WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ASSERTIONS 
DO YOU AGREE WITH MOST REGARDING 
YOUR PERSONAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE 
ONE CHOICE MADE AMONG THE 
FOLLOWING PHRASES:  
- ALL PUBLIC SERVICES SHOULD 
BE PRIVATIZED 
- PUBLIC SERVICES THAT ARE 
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PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC SERVICES?:” NOT RENTABLE SHOULD BE 
PRIVATIZED 
- ALL PUBLIC SERVICES SHOULD 
BE PRIVATIZED EXCEPT THOSE 
WITH MAJOR IMPORTANCE FOR 
THE POPULATION 
- KEEP THE THINGS AS THEY ARE 
- NO PUBLIC SERVICES SHOULD 
BE PRIVATIZED 
VISION OF 
SOCIETY 
2.1) ATTITUDE TOWARDS ABORTION:  
“WHAT IS YOUR POSITION TOWARDS 
ABORTION?:” 
SCALE FROM 1, “STATE MUST 
PENALIZE ABORTION AS ANY 
OTHER CRIMINAL ACTION” TO 10, 
“THE PREGNANT WOMAN IS THE 
ONLY ONE WITH THE RIGHT TO 
DECIDE ON THE PRACTICE OF 
ABORTION” 
RECODED AS A TRICHOTOMY: 1 IN 
FAVOR OF INDIVIDUAL DECISION 
ONLY, 2 KEEP STATUS QUO, 3 
AGAINST INDIVIDUAL DECISION 
(COLLECTIVISM) 
2.2) ATTITUDE TOWARDS DIVORCE:  
“WHAT IS YOUR POSITION TOWARDS 
DIVORCE?:” 
SCALE FROM 1, COMPLETELY 
AGAINST, TO 10, COMPLETELY IN 
FAVOR  
RECODED AS A TRICHOTOMY: 1 IN 
FAVOR OF INDIVIDUAL DECISION 
ONLY, 2 KEEP STATUS QUO, 3 
AGAINST INDIVIDUAL DECISION 
(COLLECTIVISM) 
VISION OF 
DEMOCRACY 
4.1. EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL 
ADVANTAGES OF A DEMOCRATIC REGIME  
“WHAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT 
ADVANTAGE OF A DEMOCRATIC REGIME?” 
(REGIME LEGITIMACY VS. REGIME 
EFFECTIVENESS) 
ONE CHOICE GIVEN AMONG THE 
FOLLOWING OPTIONS:  
- ECONOMIC GROWTH 
- PROTECTION OF RIGHTS AND 
FREEDOM 
- POSSIBILITY TO ELECT PUBLIC 
AUTHORITIES 
- AN INCREASED EQUALITY OF 
OPPORTUNITIES 
- THE RESPECT FOR HUMAN AND 
MINORITY RIGHTS 
- POSSIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN 
PUBLIC DECISIONS 
- A BETTER DISTRIBUTION OF 
INCOME 
- PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF 
CONFLICTS  
- POSSIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN 
POLITICS THROUGH POLITICAL 
PARTIES 
RECODED AS DICHOTOMY 
BETWEEN VISION OF DEMOCRACY 
AS REGIME LEGITIMACY OR REGIME 
EFFECTIVENESS. REGIME 
LEGITIMACY INCLUDES RESPONSE 
CATEGORIES 1,2,4,5,7; REGIME 
EFFECTIVENESS (I.E. THE 
VALUATION OF DEMOCRACY FOR 
OUTCOMES AND NOT AS AN END 
PER SE) INCLUDES RESPONSE 
CATEGORIES 3,6,8,9.  
4.2. DEMOCRACY IS PREFERABLE TO ANY 
OTHER REGIME:   
“WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES 
ONE CHOICE AMONG THE 
FOLLOWING:  
- DEMOCRACY IS PREFERABLE TO 
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DO YOU AGREE WITH MOST?:” 
(CONVICTION ON DEMOCRACY) 
ANY OTHER REGIME 
- UNDER TOUGH ECONOMIC 
CONDITIONS OR POLITICAL 
INSTABILITY, AN 
AUTHORITARIAN 
GOVERNMENT MAY BE 
PREFERABLE TO DEMOCRACY 
(THIS VARIABLE WAS A VALENCE 
ISSUE IN ALL THE CASES AND ALL 
THE PARTIES – AGREEMENT ON 
THAT DEMOCRACY IS PREFERABLE 
TO ANY OTHER REGIME WAS 
STATED BY ALL INTERVIEWEES – SO 
THAT IT WAS FINALLY NOT 
INCLUDED IN ANALYSIS) 
4.3. BELIEF ON PARTITOCRACY:  
“THERE ARE PEOPLE WHO BELIEVE THAT 
WITHOUT POLITICAL PARTIES, THERE 
CANNOT BE DEMOCRACY. TO WHAT 
EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT 
OPINION?:” 
SCALE FROM 1, TOTALLY DISAGREE, 
TO 4, TOTALLY AGREE 
4.4. BELIEF IN ELECTIONS AS A DEMOCRATIC 
MEANS: 
“TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH 
THE ASSERTION THAT ELECTIONS ARE 
ALWAYS THE BEST MEAN TO EXPRESS 
POLITICAL PREFERENCES?” 
SCALE FROM 1, TOTALLY DISAGREE 
TO 4, TOTALLY AGREE 
4.5. PREFERENCE FOR MAJORITARIAN VS 
PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEM:  
“REGARDING THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, 
WHICH ELECTORAL SYSTEM DO YOU 
CONSIDER THE IDEAL ONE FOR YOUR 
COUNTRY?” 
SCALE FROM 1, “PROPORTIONAL 
ELECTORAL SYSTEM THAT 
GUARANTEES THE EQUITABLE 
REPRESENTATION OF ALL 
POLITICAL FORCES”  TO 10, 
“MAJORITARIAN ELECTORAL 
SYSTEM THAT GUARANTEES A 
STRONG AND EFFECTIVE 
GOVERNMENT” 
RECODED AS TRICHOTOMY: 1, 
DEFENSE OF PROPORTIONAL 
FORMULAS; 2, DEFENSE OF 
PROPORTIONALITY WITH LIMITS 
(SUCH AS ELECTORAL THRESHOLDS 
OR SIMILAR, TO ASSURE MAJORITY 
GOVERNMENTS); 3, DEFENSE OF 
FPTP.  
4.6. ON THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICAL 
PARTIES:  
“REGARDING THE LEGALIZATION OF 
POLITICAL PARTIES, WHICH PHRASE BETTER 
EXPRESSES YOUR ATTITUDE?:” 
ONE CHOICE AMONG FOLLOWING 
ASSERTIONS:  
- ALL POLITICAL FORCES SHOULD 
ALWAYS HAVE THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO BE 
LEGALIZED 
- IN PRINCIPLE, ALL PARTIES 
SHOULD BE LEGALIZED, 
EXCEPT THOSE WITH AN 
ANTIDEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGY 
ALL NON-RESPONSES (RESPONSES “I DON’T KNOW” OR “I DON’T ANSWER”) WERE DELETED FROM 
THE ORIGINAL DATASETS. FREQUENCIES OF THESE WERE SO SMALL THAT NO A PARTICULAR 
TREATMENT FOR MISSING RESPONSES WAS REQUIRED.  
 
 
 
RECODING OF VARIABLE PARTY:  
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The variable ‘party’ demanded some recoding due to the sampling methods of the questionnaire. 
As noted above, the sampling method was proportionality to the seats of each party in 
Parliament at the time of the interview. Hence, the original coding contained too many small 
parties with too few responses (sample problem). I adopted two solutions: (1) placing under the 
same label parties whose program and members are the same but over the years the name of the 
party has changed. (2) Placing under the same label the political parties that, although not the 
same, their electoral programs, their electoral placement and their historical origins are common 
(such as URNG, EGP, FDNG, ANN and PUR for Guatemala; the MLN and UCN also in 
Guatemala; the category “provincial parties” in Costa Rica).  
 
5.1.3 CODING OF VARIABLE PARTY  
 
COSTA RICA HONDURAS GUATEMALA PANAMA 
-PFD, PRD and 
RENOVACION 
DEMOCRATICA same 
coding 
-“PROVINCIAL 
PARTIES” created as a 
new category including: 
PUAC, ADA, PAN, 
PAC 
-PRC+RENOV. 
COSTARRICENSE 
same coding 
-PALA and MOV. 
LIBERTARIO under 
coding “other” (very few 
respondents)  
No recoding of parties:  
-PLH 
-PNH 
-PDCH 
-PUD 
-PINU  
-FRG  
-PAN 
-Left: URNG, FDNG, 
EGP, PUR and DIA  
-DCG and PNR same 
coding 
-PDCN, MAS, MLN, 
UCN= same coding 
(representing the ‘old 
party system’) 
 
 
It has been impossible to 
unpack in detail the data 
for the small parties. 
Thus, only the two big 
traditional  parties (PA 
and PRD) count with a 
differentiated coding, 
whereas the rest are 
grouped under “others”  
Note: See Acronyms of parties in the end of the Bibliography.  
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Appendix 5.2. Measures of dispersion of the ideological placement of parties  
1 - HONDURAS 
Party  Std Deviations from 
mean 
Self-placement of 
interviewee 
 
Mean 
 
REAL 
INTERVAL ID 
PLACEMENT 
Std Deviations 
from mean 
Placement of own 
party 
 
Mean 
 
REAL 
INTERVAL ID 
PLACEMENT 
PLH 
(n=113) 
1.599 5,15 6,749-3,551 1.516 5,42 6,936-3,904 
PNH 
(n=107) 
1.752 6,79 8,542-5,038 1,592 7,50 9,092-5,908 
PINU 
(n=4) 
0.816 4,00 4,816-3,184 1.292 4,50 5,792-3,208 
PDCH 
(n=2) 
3.536 4,50 8,036-0,964 2.828 5,00 7,828-2,172 
PUD 
(n=5)   
1.342 2,60 3,942-1,258 1.732 3,00 4,732-1,268 
 
 2 - COSTA RICA 
Party  Std Deviations 
from mean 
Self-placement 
of interviewee 
 
Mean 
REAL 
INTERVAL 
ID 
PLACEMENT 
Std Deviations 
from mean 
Placement of 
own party 
 
Mean 
REAL 
INTERVAL ID 
PLACEMENT 
PUSC (n=62) 1,536 6,03 7,566-4,494 1,204 6,37 7,574-5,166 
PLN (n=57) 1,172 4,55 5,722-3,378 1,240 5,12 6,36-3,88 
PFD+Renov. 
Dem. (n=5) 
0,837 3,8 4,637-2,963 0,447 4,2 4,647-3,753 
Provincial 
parties (n=16) 
1,289 5,06 6,349-3,771 0,793 5,31 6,103-4,517 
PRC (n=2) 0,707 4,5 5,207-3,793 0,707 4,5 5,207-3,793 
PALA+M..Lib
erta. (n=3) 
1,732 6,00 7,732-4,268 1,732 6,00 7,732-4,268 
 
3 - GUATEMALA 
Party  Std Deviations 
from mean 
Self-placement 
of interviewee 
 
Mean 
 
REAL 
INTERVAL 
ID 
PLACEMENT 
Std Deviations 
from mean 
Placement of 
own party 
 
Mean 
 
REAL 
INTERVAL 
ID 
PLACEMENT 
FRG 1,414 5,33 6,744-3,916 1,485 5,96 7,445-4,475 
PAN 1,743 5,76 7,503-4,017 1,499 6,12 7,619-4,621 
Left* 1,813 3,00 4,813-1,187 2,035 3,00 5,035-0,965 
DCG 1,350 5,41 6,76-4,06 1,590 6,21 7,8-4,62 
MLN+UCN 1,865 5,25 7,115-3,385 2,163 6,70 8,863-4,537 
MAS+PDC 1,732 5,50 7,232-3,768 2,630 6,25 8,88-3,62 
 
4 - PANAMA 
Party  Std Deviations 
from mean 
Self-placement 
of interviewee 
 
Mean 
 
REAL 
INTERVAL 
ID 
PLACEMENT 
Std Deviations 
from mean 
Placement of 
own party 
 
Mean 
 
REAL 
INTERVAL 
ID 
PLACEMENT 
PA (n=20) 2,137 6,6 8,737-4,463 1,986 7,05 9,036-5,049 
PRD (n=30) 1,818 5,73 7,548-3,912 1,561 5,90 7,461-4,339 
Other (n=14) 1,301 6,00 7,301-4,699 1,774 7,07 8,844-5,296 
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Appendix 5.3. Evolution of party composition of Congress from 1985 to 2001(5), in percentage of seats  
 
1) GUATEMALA 
 
Parties 1985 1990 1994 1995 1999 
Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca 
(DCG) 
51,00 23,28 16,25 3,75 1,77 
Unión del Centro Nacional (UCN) 22,00 35,34 8,75 2,50 - 
Movimiento de Liberación Nacional 
(MLN)/Partido Institucional 
Democrático (PID) 
12,00 - - - - 
Partido Democrático de Cooperación 
Nacional (PDCN)/Partido 
Revolucionario (PR) 
11,00 - - - - 
Partido Socialista Democrático (PSD) 2,00 - - - - 
Central Auténtica Nacionalista (CAN) 1,00 - - - - 
Partido Nacional Renovador (PNR) 1,00 - - - - 
Movimiento de Acción Solidaria (MAS) - 15,52 - - - 
Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) - 10,34 28,75 53,75 32,74 
Frente Republicano Guatemalteco 
(FRG)/Partido Institucional 
Democrático (PID)/Frente de Unidad 
Nacional (FUN) 
- 10,34 - - - 
Movimiento de Liberación Nacional 
(MLN) 
- 2,59 3,75 1,25 - 
Movimiento de Liberación Nacional 
(MLN)/Frente de Avance Nacional 
(FAN) 
- 0,86 - - - 
Partido Revolucionario (PR) - 0,86 - - - 
Partido Socialista Democrático 
(PSD)/Alianza Popular 5 (AP5) 
- 0,86 - - - 
Frente Republicano Guatemalteco 
(FRG) 
- - 41,25 26,25 55,75 
Unión Democrática (UD) (Con La 
Organización Verde en 1999) 
- - 1,25 2,50 0,88 
Frente Democrático Nueva Guatemala 
(FDNG) 
- - - 7,50 - 
Unión del Centro Nacional 
(UCN)/Democracia Cristiana 
Guatemalteca (DCG)/Partido Socialista 
Democrático (PSD) 
- - - 2,50 - 
Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemalteca (URNG)/Desarrollo 
Integral Auténtico (DIA) 
- - - - 7,96 
Partido Liberador Progresista (PLP) - - - - 0,88 
Source: own construction 
 
                                                      
5 I have chosen 1985 as the starting point due to the fact that in that year the Honduran and Guatemalan Constitutions 
were ratified. The Costa Rican Constitution, adopted in 1948, would distort the information gathered for the other three 
countries. Furthermore, in these last couple of decades the relatively small political parties have gained more representation, 
as this Appendix illustrates.  
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2) HONDURAS 
 
Parties 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 
PL 53,9 51 44,3 53 49,5 40,8 
PN 41,6 45,5 52,3 43 41,5 46,5 
PINU 2,5 1,5 1,9 2,8 4,1 0,48 
PDCH 1,6 2 1,5 1,2 2,6 0,37 
PUD  - -  -  -  2,3 0,45 
Source: [http://iberoame.usal.es/legislativos/legislativos/Composicion/Hondurascomp.htm]  
 
 
3) COSTA RICA 
 
 
Parties 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 
Partido Liberacion Nacional (PLN) 55,2 47,8 41,9 44,6 34,9 27,1 
Pueblo Unido (PPU) 6,4 2,7 3,3 - - - 
Partido Unidad Socuial Cristiana 
(PUSC) 
29,1* 41,4 46,2 40,4 41,3 29,78 
Accion Ciudadana (PAC) - - - - - 21,96 
Partido Union Agraria Cartaginesa 
(PUAC) 
- 1,2 1,1 1,1 - - 
Unión Generaleña - - 2,4 1,7 - - 
Agrario Nacional2 -   0,9 - - 
Fuerza Democrática (PFD) - - - 5,3 5,7 1,98 
Movimiento Libertario (ML) - - - - - 9,34 
Renovacion Costarricense (RC) - - - - - 3,6 
Other 9,3 4,5 5,1 6,0 18,1 6,25 
Source: [http://iberoame.usal.es/legislativos/legislativos/Composicion/CostaRicacomp.htm].  
* Called Unidad until 1986 when adopts the full PUSC name.  
 
 
4) PANAMA 
 
Partido 1984 1994 1999 
PLN  - 3,43 4,2 
PR 8,4  - -  
PRD 25,1 22,86 47,9 
PPA 20,4  - -  
PALA 12,2 2,72 -  
PDC 11,5 6,42 7,0 
MOLINERA 8,4 11,26 4,2 
PLA 5,9 3 -  
ARNULFISTA  - 14,53 25,3 
PAPA EGORO  - 9,65 -  
LIBRE  - 2,41 -  
RENOV.CIVILISTA  - 5,57 -  
SOLIDARIDAD  - 6,51 5,6 
MORENA  - 6,63 1,4 
Otros 1 8,1 -  1,4 
Source: [http://iberoame.usal.es/legislativo/legislativos/Composicion/Panamacomp.htm]  
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APPENDIX 6. CHAPTER 6.  
EXPLORING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES: VISUAL APPROACH TO THE 
DISTRIBUTIONAL PROPERTIES 
 
6.1.) BAR CHARTS FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE ELECTORAL CYCLE 
 
Dummy electoral cycle
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Dummy electoral cycle
Guatemala
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6.2.) DISTRIBUTIONAL TESTS FOR TOTAL TIME OF APPROVAL, POOLED DATA 
ONLY  
 
LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTION, VISUAL GOODNESS OF FIT OF DATA TO ASSUMED 
DISTRIBUTION 
 
Lognormal P-P Plot
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Observed Cum Prob
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WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION, VISUAL GOODNESS OF FIT OF DATA TO ASSUMED 
DISTRIBUTION 
Weibull P-P Plot
Total time of approval, Pooled
Observed Cum Prob
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GAMMA DISTRIBUTION, VISUAL GOODNESS OF FIT OF DATA TO ASSUMED 
DISTRIBUTION 
 
Gamma P-P Plot
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LOGISTIC DISTRIBUTION, VISUAL GOODNESS OF FIT OF DATA TO ASSUMED 
DISTRIBUTION 
 
Logistic P-P Plot
Total time of approval, Pooled
Observed Cum Prob
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6.3. LOGIT MODELS FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE ELECTORAL CYCLE, POOLED 
DATA 
 
Logit for dependent variable electoral cycle, Pooled data, Theory testing 
 
Explanatory variables Model Only 
endogenous variables 
Model Only policy 
related variables 
Model Only 
exogenous variables 
Model only 
constitutional design  
Type of legislative 
session 
(ordinary/extraordinary) 
1.1*** 
 
- - - 
Seats of majority party 
in committee 
-.31* - - - 
Scope of bill (Di Palma) - .10*** - - 
Bill is budget bill or not - -.14*** - - 
Polarization - - .026*** - 
Average age of party 
system 
- - -.008*** - 
District magnitude - - .10*** - 
Executive independence - - - -.83*** 
Goodness of fit 
Likelihood ratio ( ²) 
Pseudo-R² 
Loglikelihood 
Significance (p-value) 
 
188 
.03 
-3203 
.000 
 
13.8 
.002 
-3096 
.001 
 
188 
.03 
-3203 
.000 
 
185 
.03 
-3204 
.000 
Model Specification: Link function logit; cases weighted by frequencies of variable country; coefficients reported.  
Only significant variables of each model reported.  
** Indicates significant at the 0.01 level of confidence; * Indicates significant at the 0.10 level of confidence.  
 
